RUSS v. THE GEO GROUP INC et al

Filing 100

ORDER granting 57 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 58 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part 61 Motion for Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is: granted in favor of GEO on Count I; denied to Deputy Pelfrey on Count II; granted in favor if Sheriff Haddock on Count III, denied to GEO on Count IV; and granted in favor of GEO and Sheriff Haddock on Count V, but denied to Deputy Pelfrey. Signed by JUDGE RICHARD SMOAK on 12/20/2012. (jcw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
MICHAEL RUSS,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 5:12-cv-38-RS-CJK

THE GEO GROUP, INC.; BOBBY
HADDOCK, in his official capacity as
SHERIFF OF WASHINGTON COUNTY;
LOUIS ROBERTS, in his official capacity
as SHERIFF OF JACKSON COUNTY;
JEREMY PELFREY; and BENJAMIN BURCH,
Defendants.
_________________________________________/
ORDER
Before me are:
 Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant, Bobby Haddock (Doc. 57),
Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 68), and Defendant Haddock’s Reply (Doc. 84);
 Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Jeremy Pelfrey (Doc. 58),
Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 69), and Defendant Pelfrey’s Reply (Doc. 85);
 Defendant The GEO Group, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
61), Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 67), and Defendant The GEO Group’s Reply
(Doc. 87); and

1

 Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Summary Judgment Motions of
Defendants Bobby Haddock and Jeremy Pelfrey (Doc. 59), Defendant The
GEO Group, Inc.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Doc. 62), and
Plaintiff’s Statement of Disputed Material Facts (Doc. 70).
Standard of Review
The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is
“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986).
The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to
any material fact, and in deciding whether the movant has met this burden, the
court must view the movant’s evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144 (1970); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993).
Thus, if reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed
facts, then a court should deny summary judgment. Miranda v. B & B Cash
Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Mercantile Bank
& Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir. 1985)). However,
a mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s position will not
suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for
2

that party. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).
Background
On March 26, 2010, Plaintiff was acquitted of Possession of Contraband
Upon the Grounds of a State Correctional Institution. Doc. 73-6. On August 29,
2009, he had been stopped in the parking lot of the Graceville Correctional Facility
(“GCF”) and subjected to a search of his vehicle. According to law enforcement,
this search yielded a baggie of cocaine and a baggie of marijuana. According to
Plaintiff, either the officer conducting the search or employees of GCF planted the
drugs in his vehicle.1
Plaintiff was employed from January 2009 through October 2009 as an
assistant library aide by Defendant The GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”), which operated
GCF at that time. GCF is located in Jackson County, Florida. The Assistant
Warden was Terry Dudley, and Captain Tim Taylor was a security officer. Early
in his employment, Plaintiff began noticing misconduct by other employees. He
documented the misconduct and reported it to his supervisors. One of the main
offenders was a law library aide who engaged in inappropriate relationships with
inmates and provided inmates with drugs. Plaintiff alleges that this aide
1

The substance believed to be cocaine was tested by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and did contain
cocaine. The substance believed to be marijuana field tested positive for marijuana, but Plaintiff claims that “testing
demonstrated that the substance within the vehicle was not marijuana or contraband.” Compl. ¶ 15. Defendants
Haddock and Pelfrey claim that the substance believed to be marijuana was not tested by the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement. Doc. 59 n.3.
3

orchestrated a fight among inmates because one inmate had been discussing her
illicit activities with other inmates. According to Plaintiff, he contacted Captain
Taylor to report the fight, but Captain Taylor ignored Plaintiff and instead went
into a room with the aide. Eventually Plaintiff discovered hard evidence of the
aide’s activities, and she resigned.
Plaintiff also alleges that he was told by an instructor of academic courses at
the facility that GEO falsified the number of students in the courses to show
compliance with GEO’s contractual obligations. Plaintiff’s job included engaging
in “corrective consultations” with inmates regarding their coursework, but he told
supervisors, including Assistant Warden Dudley, that he refused to participate in
the consultations because he did not want to be involved with any fraudulent
activity. Plaintiff also claims to have overheard the chief of security threaten an
inmate with disciplinary action if the inmate did not drop a lawsuit pending against
GEO.
In August of 2009, Plaintiff was summoned to Assistant Warden Dudley’s
office and questioned about a baggie of marijuana. Dudley alleged that Plaintiff
had brought the marijuana to an inmate and the inmate had reported him. Plaintiff
denied bringing the marijuana and told Dudley that he felt like he was being
targeted for reporting the misdeeds of other employees.

4

August 29, 2009, was a Saturday visitation day at GCF. Jeremy Pelfrey, a
Washington County, Florida, deputy sheriff assigned as a K-9 handler, was at GCF
with his K-9 Aix to conduct a sweep of the vehicles in the parking lot. Deputy
Pelfrey claims that he was called on the previous evening by a GEO officer
requesting him to do the sweep, that he suggested that the officer contact the
Jackson County Sheriff’s office, and that he was told by the GEO officer that the
Jackson County K-9 unit had already been contacted and was unavailable. Deputy
Pelfrey alleges that he was told that GEO officials were suspicious that Plaintiff
would be involved in bringing drugs into GCF. Doc. 59 ¶ 3.2
Plaintiff arrived at work around 7:35 a.m. He clocked out around 10:30 a.m.
for his lunch break and drove around downtown Graceville. He then returned to
work and attempted to clock back in. Plaintiff claims that he was unable to clock
back in because he still had time left on his lunch break, but GEO asserts that he
did successfully clock back in. Doc. 70 ¶ 33; Doc. 62 ¶ 3. Plaintiff returned to his
vehicle and attempted to leave the GCF parking lot to get gas, but Captain Taylor
stopped Plaintiff’s vehicle and asked Plaintiff where he was going. Plaintiff
alleges that Captain Taylor had been crouching between vehicles earlier and

2

GEO Officer Maura Williams was instructed to alert security when Plaintiff returned from lunch and understood
that he might be subjected to a search because security officers were suspicious that he might attempt to bring drugs
into GCF. See generally Williams Dep. (Doc. 60-5). Officer Williams had listened to an inmate’s recorded phone
conversation which made her suspect that Plaintiff was going to attempt to bring drugs into GCF. Id. at 26:10-28:7.
5

“jumped out from between parked cars” to stop Plaintiff from leaving. Doc. 70 ¶
34, 36. What happened next is largely in dispute.
Plaintiff claims that Captain Taylor stepped away from the vehicle and
Plaintiff resumed driving out of the parking lot, but Captain Taylor then motioned
to somebody and Deputy Pelfrey ran from the opposite side of the parking lot and
stood in front of Plaintiff’s vehicle. Doc. 70 ¶ 38. Plaintiff claims that Deputy
Pelfrey did not have Aix with him. Defendants claim that Aix performed a sniff of
Plaintiff’s vehicle and alerted for the presence of drugs. Doc. 62 ¶ 5; Doc. 59 ¶ 9.
According to Plaintiff, Deputy Pelfrey said that Aix had sniffed the vehicle and
that “he knew there were drugs in the vehicle.” Doc. 70 ¶ 45. Plaintiff claims that
Deputy Pelfrey asked whether Plaintiff used drugs, Plaintiff said that he did not,
and Deputy Pelfrey said, “of course you don’t use them, you just sell ‘em.” Doc.
70 ¶ 46. Plaintiff then consented to a search of his vehicle, and Deputy Pelfrey
performed a search.3 During the search, Deputy Pelfrey asked Plaintiff for his
keys, which were needed to open the glove box, and Plaintiff gave his keys to
Deputy Pelfrey. Deputy Pelfrey alleges that he observed two baggies in the glove
box, and recognized them to contain crack cocaine and marijuana. Doc. 59 ¶ 13.
Deputy Pelfrey claims that he left the baggies in the glove box and placed Plaintiff
in handcuffs, and then contacted the Jackson County Sheriff’s Department to take

3

Plaintiff now argues that this consent was not given voluntarily.
6

over. Doc. 59 ¶ 14. Deputy Pelfrey did not search the rest of the vehicle. Plaintiff
claims that Captain Taylor said to Deputy Pelfrey, “I told you there were drugs in
there.” Doc. 70 ¶ 53. Plaintiff alleges that he asked why he was being detained
and in response, Deputy Pelfrey pointed to the passenger seat of Plaintiff’s vehicle,
where two baggies were sitting on top of a book, not in the glove box.
Plaintiff claims that he told Deputy Pelfrey and Captain Taylor that he had
never seen the baggies before and that they did not belong to him, but Deputy
Pelfrey called Plaintiff a liar. Doc. 70 ¶ 57. Plaintiff alleges that he suggested that
Deputy Pelfrey review the security camera footage of the parking lot from that
morning because Plaintiff had accidentally left his car unlocked, but Deputy
Pelfrey responded, “I don’t need to because I know you’re guilty because that’s
how we roll in Washington County.” Doc. 70 ¶ 58. Plaintiff claims that Captain
Taylor told him that “snitches always end up in ditches” and that he overheard
Deputy Pelfrey telling Captain Taylor what to say about the incident. Doc. 70 ¶
72, 74.
Jackson County deputies arrived on the scene and took over the
investigation. Deputy Pelfrey’s handcuffs were replaced with those of a Jackson
County deputy, and Deputy Pelfrey eventually left GCF. Plaintiff alleges that he
told the Jackson County deputy who handcuffed him that the drugs were not his,

7

but that deputy said, “Mr. Dudley wants you to be charged, so I’m charging you.”
Doc. 70 ¶ 82.4
Plaintiff has brought claims for false arrest or false imprisonment against
GEO, Deputy Pelfrey, and Bobby Haddock, the Sheriff of Washington County, a
malicious prosecution claim against GEO, and claims of Fourth Amendment
violations against GEO, Deputy Pelfrey and Sheriff Haddock.
Analysis
I begin by addressing Count V, because that is the count alleging
constitutional violations which give me supplemental jurisdiction over the four
state law claims. Plaintiff argues that his civil rights were violated because of his
false arrest. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that “GEO solicited the help and
assistance of [Deputy Pelfrey] to have Plaintiff arrested knowing that the
allegations against him were not true” and that Sheriff Haddock was “deliberately
indifferent to training [Deputy Pelfrey] in the fact that probable cause is not
contrived to effect an arrest of someone like Plaintiff.5 [Sheriff Haddock] also
[has] failed to adopt adequate rules and/or procedures in place to detect problems

4

Plaintiff claims that there was a surveillance camera in the parking lot and that footage could show that somebody
planted drugs in his vehicle. He argues that the fact that Defendants failed to preserve and produce the footage
allows for an adverse evidentiary inference that the destroyed footage would not have been favorable to the
spoliator. I do not address this contention because I have not previously determined that Plaintiff is entitled to such
an inference and doing so would have no effect on my ultimate conclusions.
5
Plaintiff also alleged that GEO was deliberately indifferent to training the individual Defendants, but none of the
individual Defendants is a GEO employee so this contention is not addressed. Compl. ¶ 45.
8

with deputies . . . .” Compl. ¶ 44-45. Plaintiff argues that there was no probable
cause for his arrest.
Although not alleged in his complaint, Plaintiff now argues that the search of
his vehicle was also illegal. Plaintiff maintains that Deputy Pelfrey had no legal
reason to stop Plaintiff’s vehicle, did not have Aix do a sniff of his vehicle (and
even if he did, Aix was not certified or qualified to serve as a narcotics K-9), had
no probable cause to search his vehicle, did not obtain consent to search the
vehicle, and had no authority to act in Jackson County. Doc. 69 p. 2. This
argument is without merit.
Pursuant to the Florida Administrative Code, “[n]o employee shall refuse to
submit to a search or inspection by an authorized employee of his person, personal
property or vehicle while entering, departing or otherwise being upon the premises
of an institution.” Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-208.002(7)(a).6 Even if Defendant
Pelfrey could not be characterized as an “authorized employee,” the facts of this
case are similar to those of United States v. Sihler, 562 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1977),
where the court held that a prison employee had given consent to be searched at
any time. In Sihler, a prison employee passed a sign each day which warned him
against introducing contraband into the facility and informed him that all persons
entering the facility were subject to search. Id. at 350. Further, because “Sihler

6

GEO is subject to this rule. See Jackson v. The GEO Group, Inc., 312 F. App’x 229, 231 (11th Cir. 2009).
9

voluntarily accepted and continued an employment which subjected him to search
on a routine basis, [the court found] that the search in question was made with his
consent.” Id. at 351. Here, GCF had two signs in the parking lot advising
employees that they were subject to search for contraband. Henry Dep. (Doc. 871). Further, Plaintiff acknowledged that he was subject to search at any time. Russ
Dep. 99:23-100:11 (Doc. 60-1). Accordingly, even if consent was needed to
search Plaintiff’s vehicle, it had been voluntarily given by Plaintiff.
It is well-settled that a warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the
Fourth Amendment and forms a basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.7 See,
e.g., Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Marx v.
Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1990)). An arrest made with probable
cause provides an absolute bar to a section 1983 action for false arrest. Ortega, 85
F.3d at 1525 (citing Marx, 905 F.2d at 1505). The Eleventh Circuit “has
concluded that the standard for determining the existence of probable cause is the
same under both Florida and federal law - whether ‘a reasonable man would have
believed [probable cause existed] had he known all of the facts known by the
officer.’” Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting United
States v. Ullrich, 580 F.2d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting State v. Outten, 206

7

Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy for
deprivations of rights established by the United States Constitution. See Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).
10

So.2d 392, 397 (Fla. 1968))). Because this case is before me on motions for
summary judgment, I need only decide whether Defendants carried their burden of
demonstrating, as a matter of law, that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff.
See Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004). “If the
defendants fabricated or unreasonably disregarded certain pieces of evidence to
establish probable cause or arguable probable cause, as alleged, reasonable officers
in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the defendants
could not have believed that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff.” Id. at
1233.
While Plaintiff did not see anybody plant the drugs in his car, a jury question
still exists as to whether Deputy Pelfrey fabricated evidence upon which to base
Plaintiff’s arrest. Thus, the question of whether arguable probable cause for the
arrest existed is suited for a jury. See id. Defendants emphasize that Plaintiff has
no direct evidence to support his assertion that the drugs were planted in his
vehicle. But Plaintiff has presented circumstantial evidence that could lead a
reasonable jury to conclude that he was framed. Many material facts are in
dispute. For example, Deputy Pelfrey asked Plaintiff for his keys and claims he
then unlocked the glove box and found the baggies inside. Doc. 59 ¶ 13.
However, Plaintiff claims that the baggies were lying atop a book on his passenger
seat. Doc. 70 ¶ 56. It could be the case that Deputy Pelfrey asked Plaintiff for his

11

keys only to make it seem like the drugs came from the locked glove box. Plaintiff
claims that he suggested that Deputy Pelfrey review the security camera footage of
the parking lot from that morning because Plaintiff had accidentally left his car
unlocked, but Deputy Pelfrey responded, “I don’t need to because I know you’re
guilty because that’s how we roll in Washington County.” Doc. 70 ¶ 58. The
Eleventh Circuit has held that “an officer may not choose to ignore information
that has been offered to him . . . . Nor may the officer conduct an investigation in a
biased fashion or elect not to obtain easily discoverable facts.” Kingsland, 382
F.3d at 1229. On the other hand, Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Pelfrey commented
that perhaps Plaintiff would start talking “if the heat was high enough,” which
would suggest that Deputy Pelfrey thought that Plaintiff had information to give.
That is inconsistent with the notion that Deputy Pelfrey planted the drugs or knew
that somebody else had and would tend to exculpate him. Further, it seems odd
that Deputy Pelfrey would want to involve himself in such deplorable behavior
when he had not been the target of any reporting by Plaintiff and seems to have no
motivation for harming Plaintiff. However, there are material facts in dispute
deserving the attention of a jury. Thus, Deputy Pelfrey is not entitled to summary
judgment for Count V.
Deputy Pelfrey is not entitled to qualified immunity. To earn qualified
immunity, Deputy Pelfrey must show that his conduct did not violate clearly
12

established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). As detailed above, a jury question exists as
to whether Defendant Pelfrey violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by contriving
probable cause for his arrest. Further, any reasonable law enforcement officer
knows that doing so would violate the constitution. See, e.g., Kingsland v. City of
Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1232-34 (11th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff also alleges that GEO is liable under section 1983. To this end,
Plaintiff must establish that GEO’s action deprived him of a right secured by the
Constitution and that the action was taken by a person acting under color of law.
Dollar v. Haralson Cnty., Ga., 704 F.2d 1540, 1542-43 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)). To state a claim against a private
entity performing a public function, there must be a policy or custom by which the
constitutional deprivation was inflicted. Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452-53
(11th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff argues that Captain Taylor violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by working in conjunction with Deputy Pelfrey to illegally
detain him. GEO argues that Captain Taylor did not deprive Plaintiff of any
Constitutional right, and, even if he had, he did not do so under color of law.

13

Plaintiff argues that Captain Taylor violated his right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure by “assisting” Deputy Pelfrey with Plaintiff’s
detention. Doc. 67 p. 4. The entire argument focuses on Captain Taylor’s
assistance with the allegedly-illegal search of Plaintiff’s vehicle. See Doc. 67 p.
11-13. No GEO employee arrested Plaintiff, nor did any GEO employee have the
authority to do so. Plaintiff was not seized by GEO. I have already determined
that Plaintiff consented to the search of his vehicle. Thus, GEO is entitled to
summary judgment on Count V.
Plaintiff also argues that Sheriff Haddock is liable under section 1983. To
impose liability on Sheriff Haddock, Plaintiff must show that his constitutional
rights were violated, that Sheriff Haddock had a custom or policy that constituted
deliberate indifference to that constitutional right, and that the custom or policy
caused the violation. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Haddock had deficient policies permitting deputies to
operate outside of Washington County and use uncertified K-9s and failed to
properly train deputies regarding their jurisdictional restraints and the
constitutional limitations for vehicle stops, searches, and seizures. Because I have
determined that Plaintiff consented to the search of his vehicle while at GCF, the
K-9 sniff was altogether unnecessary and I need not consider Aix’s qualifications.
The issues remaining are the alleged custom of permitting deputies work outside of
14

Washington County and the deficient training regarding jurisdiction and
constitutional limitations.
Even if Sheriff Haddock had imperfect training in place regarding the
constitutional limitations on search and seizure, Plaintiff has offered no evidence
that Sheriff Haddock’s alleged deficiencies were born of “deliberate indifference”
to Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure. “‘Congress
did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless deliberate action attributable
to the municipality directly caused a deprivation of federal rights.’” Id. at 1291
(quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
415 (1997)). Thus, a plaintiff often must show a “pattern of injuries” linked to the
custom or policy alleged to be deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights.
McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1291 (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 408). The alleged
constitutional violation – here, Plaintiff’s seizure by Deputy Pelfrey – must be a
“highly predictable consequence” of the custom or policy. McDowell, 392 F.3d at
1292 (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 409-10). As previously discussed, if Deputy
Pelfrey violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, it was because he contrived
probable cause to cause Plaintiff to be arrested. That is certainly not a highly
predictable consequence of a failure to properly train deputies regarding the
constitutional limitations for vehicle stops, searches, and seizures. Accordingly,
Sheriff Haddock cannot be liable under this theory.
15

Finally, we arrive at the contention that Sheriff Haddock had a custom or
policy of permitting his deputies to work outside of Washington County and failed
to properly train them regarding their jurisdictional limitations. It is undisputed
that Deputy Pelfrey is a Washington County deputy sheriff and that GCF is in
Jackson County. However, the Sheriff of Jackson County and the Sheriff of
Washington County operated under a Mutual Aid Agreement (“MAA”), and there
was a similar Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between GEO and the
Sheriff of Washington County which permitted Washington County deputies to
assist at GCF. Mutual Aid Agreements are specifically permitted by Florida law.
Fla. Stat. § 23.1225. The Eleventh Circuit recently held that even if an officer
operates outside the scope of a MAA in violation of Florida law,8 “an arrest in
violation of state law cannot alone support a cause of action under section 1983.”
McDaniel v. Sheriff of Palm Beach Cnty., Fla., Case no. 11-4428 (11th Cir. Oct.
17, 2012). And, again, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence of any other arrest
stemming from a deputy acting contrary to the MAA which would show the
deliberate indifference of Sheriff Haddock. Plaintiff argues that he need not show
widespread abuse to hold Sheriff Haddock liable. However, it is the continued
failure of a sheriff to prevent known constitutional violations by his deputies that is
the type of policy or custom that is actionable under section 1983. Depew v. City
8

Florida Statute 23.1225 permits Mutual Aid Agreements. Plaintiff argues that the MAA requires specific approval
by the Sheriff of Jackson County for a Washington County deputy to operate in Jackson County, and that the MOU
appears to provide only for assistance in the case of emergencies.
16

of St. Marys, Georgia, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff’s
contention that Sheriff Haddock is liable to Plaintiff for failing to enforce the MAA
and failing to require Deputy Pelfrey to read it is without merit. Thus, Sheriff
Haddock is entitled to summary judgment on Count V.
Counts I-III of the Complaint are state law counts for false arrest or false
imprisonment against Geo, Deputy Pelfrey, and Sheriff Haddock, respectively.
False imprisonment and false arrest are different labels for the same cause of
action. Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1431 n.5 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing
Weissman v. K-Mart Corp., 396 So. 2d 1164, 1164 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
In Florida, false imprisonment “is defined as ‘the unlawful restraint of a person
against his will, the gist of which action is the unlawful detention of the plaintiff
and the deprivation of his liberty.’” Johnson v. Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc.,
437 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Escambia Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Bragg,
680 So. 2d 571, 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
Plaintiff alleges that Captain Taylor falsely imprisoned him and that GEO is
liable for this violation. Plaintiff admits that Captain Taylor detained Plaintiff only
for a brief moment when Plaintiff was attempting to leave GCF for lunch, but
argues that Captain Taylor “assisted” Deputy Pelfrey with Plaintiff’s subsequent
detention. Doc. 67 p.4. According to Plaintiff, Captain Taylor ordered him to put

17

his vehicle in park and turn off the engine. Captain Taylor then stood next to
Plaintiff while Deputy Pelfrey searched the vehicle, and “it was clear that
Plaintiff’s freedom was restrained and he was not able to leave.” Id. at 5. Clearly
Captain Taylor did not restrain Plaintiff. GEO is entitled to summary judgment on
Count I.
Deputy Pelfrey restrained Plaintiff when he placed Plaintiff in handcuffs.9
As with a section 1983 action, the existence of probable cause is an affirmative
defense to a false arrest or imprisonment claim under Florida law. Jackson v.
Navarro, 665 So. 2d 340, 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Further, the standard for
determining whether probable cause exists is the same under Florida and federal
law. Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1435 (citing United States v. McDonald, 606 F.2d 552,
553 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979)). “The only difference in the probable cause analysis
applicable to the state and federal claims at issue here is which party carrie[s] the
burden of proving whether probable cause existed.” Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1436.
Plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the absence of probable cause to succeed
on his section 1983 claim, while Deputy Pelfrey has the burden of demonstrating
the existence of probable cause as a defense to the state law claim. Id. As detailed
above, questions of material fact exist regarding whether probable cause existed
for Deputy Pelfrey to detain Plaintiff. Summary judgment is denied for Count II.
9

Plaintiff claims that Deputy Pelfrey arrested him, but Deputy Pelfrey claims that he merely detained Plaintiff and
Plaintiff was later arrested by Jackson County deputies.
18

If Deputy Pelfrey did not plant the drugs in Plaintiffs car or know that they
had been planted, then he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, and neither he nor
Sheriff Haddock would be liable for false arrest or imprisonment. If Deputy
Pelfrey did plant the drugs in Plaintiffs car or know that they had been planted,
then he did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and acted maliciously and in
bad faith. Florida statutory law provides governmental entities such as the sheriffs’
offices with sovereign immunity when the alleged tort was committed in bad faith
or with malicious purpose. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a); see also Dist. Sch. Bd. of
Lake Cnty. v. Talmadge, 381 So. 2d 698, 703 (Fla. 1980); Rance v. Jenn, 2008 WL
5156675, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2008). Accordingly, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity bars the claim of false arrest or imprisonment from being maintained
against Sheriff Haddock and summary judgment must be granted as to Count III.
Count IV is a malicious prosecution claim against GEO. The parties agree
that in Florida,
to prevail in a malicious prosecution action, a plaintiff must establish
that: (1) an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding against the
present plaintiff was commenced or continued; (2) the present
defendant was the legal cause of the original proceeding against the
present plaintiff as the defendant in the original proceeding; (3) the
termination of the original proceeding constituted a bona fide
termination of that proceeding in favor of the present plaintiff; (4)
there was an absence of probable cause for the original proceeding;
(5) there was malice on the part of the present defendant; and (6) the
plaintiff suffered damage as a result of the original proceeding.
19

Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Campbell, 78 So. 3d 595, 602 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011) (citing Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 502 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 1986); Adams v.
Whitfield, 290 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1974)). GEO contends that Plaintiff cannot establish
that it was the legal cause of Plaintiff’s prosecution, that no probable cause existed
to institute the prosecution, or that any GEO employee acted with malice. This
argument is unpersuasive.
“In a malicious prosecution action, the element of legal causation is
established where a defendant gave information to authorities which he or she
knew or should have known to be false which was ‘the determining factor in
inducing the [arresting] officer’s decision.’” Alterra Healthcare Corp., 78 So. 3d
at 603 (quoting Orr v. Belk Lindsey Stores, Inc., 462 So.2d 112, 114 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985)). Most importantly for this action, a defendant may also be held liable
where it withholds information which could have caused the cessation of criminal
proceedings against the plaintiff. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 78 So. 3d at 603.
Here, Plaintiff claims that he saw Captain Taylor crouching between cars on the
morning that he was arrested. He claims that Captain Taylor said to Deputy
Pelfrey, “I told you there were drugs in there.” He claims that Captain Taylor told
him that “snitches always end up in ditches.” He also alleges he was previously
falsely accused by Assistant Warden Dudley of bringing marijuana into the facility
and delivering it to an inmate, and that a Jackson County deputy told him, “Mr.

20

Dudley wants you to be charged, so I’m charging you.”

A reasonable jury could

conclude that Captain Taylor planted drugs in Plaintiff’s car, or caused Deputy
Pelfrey to do so, or knew who did. If Captain Taylor in fact knew that the drugs
had been planted and withheld this information from the state attorney, then GEO
can properly be considered the legal cause of Plaintiff’s prosecution.
I turn next to probable cause. “‘What facts and circumstances amount to
probable cause is a pure question of law. Whether they exist or not in any
particular case is a pure question of fact. The former is exclusively for the court;
the latter for the jury.’” Glass v. Parrish, 51 So.2d 717, 722 (Fla. 1951) (quoting
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Dixon, 51 Ind. App. 658, 96 N.E. 815, 816
(1911)). Under Florida law, to show the absence of probable cause, Plaintiff must
establish that the criminal proceeding against him was initiated without a
reasonable ground of suspicion. Importantly, “a malicious-prosecution defendant’s
good faith is an essential element to be considered on the question of probable
cause . . . .” Alterra Healthcare Corp., 78 So. 3d at 602 (internal quotations and
citations omitted). If evidence was planted in Plaintiff’s car and a GEO employee
was aware of this fact and called in Deputy Pelfrey to cause Plaintiff’s arrest,
certainly there was no good faith and no probable cause.
Finally, it is clear that if a GEO employee planted drugs in Plaintiff’s car,
that employee acted with malice. There is sufficient circumstantial evidence for a
21

jury to conclude that Captain Taylor knew that drugs had been planted in
Plaintiff’s car, which would be malicious even in the absence of his alleged
comment that “snitches always end up in ditches.” Accordingly, GEO is not
entitled to summary judgment on Count IV.
Conclusion
Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant, Bobby Haddock (Doc. 57) is
GRANTED, Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Jeremy Pelfrey (Doc.
58) is DENIED, and Defendant The GEO Group, Inc.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 61) is GRANTED IN PART. Summary judgment is: granted in
favor of GEO on Count I; denied to Deputy Pelfrey on Count II; granted in favor if
Sheriff Haddock on Count III, denied to GEO on Count IV; and granted in favor of
GEO and Sheriff Haddock on Count V, but denied to Deputy Pelfrey.

ORDERED on December 20, 2012.
/s/ Richard Smoak
RICHARD SMOAK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

22