WOOD v. CALHOUN COUNTY FLORIDA

Filing 47

ORDER granting 35 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to close the case. Signed by JUDGE RICHARD SMOAK on 12/2/2014. (jcw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
PACE WOOD,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 5:14-cv-47-RS-EMT
CALHOUN COUNTY, FLORIDA,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
ORDER
Before me are Defendant Calhoun County, Florida’s, Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 35); Defendant’s Statement of Facts in Support of Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36); Plaintiff’s Response and Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46); and
Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts in Response and Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 45).
Pace Wood has sued his former employer, Calhoun County, Florida, for
discrimination and retaliation because they fired him shortly after he returned from
worker’s compensation leave. The County claims they fired him for
insubordination after Plaintiff repeatedly used a forklift after being told not to. Its
decision to fire him was ratified after a hearing before the Board of County
Commissioners.
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I find that Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that
the County’s stated reasons for firing him were pretextual. Plaintiff’s claims thus
fail as a matter of law, and the County’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is
“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 , 91 L.
Ed. 2d 202 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue as to any material fact, and in deciding whether the movant has met
this burden, the court must view the movant’s evidence and all factual inferences
arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S. H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970);
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). Thus, if
reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then
a court should deny summary judgment. Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store,
Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Mercantile Bank & Trust v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir. 1985)). However, a mere
‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's position will not suffice;
there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that
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party. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson,
477 U.S. at 251).
II.

BACKGROUND

I accept the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Galvez v.
Bruce, 552 F.3d 1238, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008). All reasonable doubts about the
facts shall be resolved in favor of the non-movant. Id.
In 1995, Plaintiff Pace Wood became employed in the Calhoun County
Recycling Center, a facility operated by Defendant Calhoun County, Florida. (Doc.
45 at 3-4). Plaintiff performed various tasks at the recycling center, including
operating a forklift. (Id. at 4).
On January 17, 2012, Plaintiff was injured in an incident involving a forklift
that was being operated under Plaintiff’s direction by a prisoner trustee who was
assigned to work at the facility. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff attempted to return to work in
November 2012, but was still under medical restriction and was told there was no
work for him. (Id.). Plaintiff received a full medical release on December 27, 2012.
(Id.). He returned to work on January 2, 2013. (Id. at 6). However, his injuries
caused a permanent “ten percent impairment” in his ability to perform work. (Id.)
When Plaintiff returned to work, he was placed under the supervision of Joe
Wood (who is not related to Plaintiff Pace Wood). (Id.). Plaintiff’s previous duties
had been replaced by another worker, Keith Baker. (Id.). Plaintiff’s new duties
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were to ride along with Baker and assist him in performing tasks at the recycling
center. (Id. at 6-7). However, Joe Wood specifically instructed Plaintiff not to drive
the county truck or operate the forklift. (Id.). Joe Wood was concerned that, based
on Plaintiff’s previously incurred injuries resulting from use of a forklift, he could
be involved in another costly accident. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff was skeptical of this
reasoning, since the injury occurred when he was supervising the forklift, rather
than operating it, and requested this directive in writing; Joe Wood, however,
refused to provide it in writing. (Id.). Plaintiff was especially frustrated by this
directive, as he says he was unable to accomplish some of the tasks he was
assigned without being able to use the forklift. (Id. at 7-8).
After Plaintiff continued to use the forklift in violation of the directive not
use the forklift, he was fired on March 11, 2013. (Id. at 10; Doc. 36 at 5). Before
he was fired, Plaintiff also notes that Baker prevented him from returning to work
on time after lunch break by delaying giving him rides, and Baker also told him
that he should be faster and quicker at his work, despite his injuries. (Doc. 45 at 9).
Further, Joe Wood said that he needed to be careful about his words with Plaintiff,
because he had a lawsuit pending about his worker’s compensation claim. (Id.).
After being fired, Plaintiff appealed in a hearing before the Calhoun County
Board of Commissioners, where he was represented by counsel. (Id. at 10; Doc. 36
at 6). During the meeting, Plaintiff admitted to operating the forklift in violation of
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instruction not to. (Doc. 36 at 6). After the hearing, the Board voted to uphold
termination. (Id.).
Plaintiff filed suit in this court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction,
alleging a state law workers compensation retaliation claim and a claim for
discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq, and analogous state statutes.
Calhoun County now moves for summary judgment.
III.

DISCUSSION

The parties agree that, given the lack of direct of direct evidence of
discrimination, both the ADA discrimination claim and the workers compensation
claim should be analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework for
circumstantial evidence in discrimination cases. See Earl v.Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d
1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000) (applying framework in ADA case); Andrews v.
Direct Mail Exp., Inc., 1 So. 3d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (applying
framework in workers compensation case).
In order to succeed under this framework, the plaintiff must create an
inference of discrimination through a prima facie case. Vessels v. Atlanta Indep.
Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th Cir. 2005). If plaintiff succeeds, the defendant
may proffer non-discriminatory reasons for the employment decisions. Id.The
plaintiff must then prove that these reasons were pretextual. Id. at 768.
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a.

The Prima Facie Case

In order to establish a prima facie case for ADA discrimination, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that he (1) has a disability; (2) is a qualified individual; and (3)
was unlawfully subjected to discrimination because of her disability. Stewart v.
Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997). In
order to establish a prima facie case for worker’s compensation retaliation, a
plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a statutorily protected expression; (2) an adverse
employment action; and, (3) a causal connection between participation in the
protected expression and the adverse action. Andrews, 1 So.3d at 1193.
Calhoun County conflates the elements of the claims ADA discrimination
and workers compensation discrimination, and also misstates the elements of the
prima facie case for ADA discrimination. The County claims that it only contests
the “causation element of Plaintiff’s claim,” (Doc. 35 at 9). However, it wholly
fails to explain why the causation prong is not satisfied for either claim, as well as
what exactly “causation” means in an ADA discrimination context.
Rather than developing its causation argument, the County first states that
Plaintiff has failed to identify similarly situated employees who were treated
differently; however, it appears to be conflating Plaintiff’s claim with a Title VII
claim, as disparate treatment is not an element of ADA claim. The County next
states that there is no evidence that it perceived Plaintiff as disabled—an argument
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that has nothing to do with causation. The argument is also inapposite to Plaintiff’s
claim, as Plaintiff claims to be actually disabled, rather than merely “regarded as”
disabled, see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), and the County does not appear to dispute
Plaintiff’s actual disability.
I therefore find that, by failing to effectively argue otherwise, the County has
conceded that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case for both ADA
discrimination and worker’s compensation retaliation.
b.

Pretext

The County next argues that it fired Plaintiff for the legitimate, nonretaliatory reason of insubordination, after he repeatedly continued to operate the
forklift despite explicit instructions not to. The decision to fire him was ratified
after a full hearing before the Board of County Commissioners. Plaintiff responds
that the decision to fire him was a mere pretext for firing him because of his
disabilities and in retaliation for his worker’s compensation claims.
To show pretext, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the proffered reason was
not the true reason for the termination, either by directly showing that the
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the decision or by indirectly showing
that the proffered explanation is unworthy of belief. Jackson v. State of Alabama
State Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff must

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produce enough evidence of allow a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that the
defendant’s articulated reasons for its decision are not believable. Id.
Insubordination—in this case, using the forklift despite repeated instructions
not to—is a valid reason for termination. See, e.g., Forbes v. City of N. Miami, 509
F. App’x 864, 868 (11th Cir. 2013). Furthermore, where a decisionmaker conducts
his own evaluation and makes an independent decision, the decision is free of the
taint of a biased subordinate employee. Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d
1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2001). Because the firing decision was ratified by the Board
of County Commissioners, after a full hearing, it is irrelevant whether Joe Wood
had any bias or animus towards Plaintiff for either being disabled or for having
suffered a work-related injury.
Plaintiff argues that the Board’s decision does not remove the taint of Joe
Wood’s alleged bias because Joe Wood was a “cat’s paw” and made the ultimate
firing decision himself, and the ratification was not truly independent of his
reasoning. In a “cat’s paw” situation, a decisionmaker acts in accordance with the
harasser’s decision without independently evaluating the employee’s situation. See
Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff relies on the recent Supreme Court Decision in Staub v. Proctor
Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1193, 179 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2011), which held that a cursory
review of a biased subordinate by an independent decision maker would not suffice
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to cleanse the employer of bias. The court adopted a proximate cause test,
requiring that the “biased supervisor’s action be a causal factor of the ultimate
employment action.” Id.
Plaintiff’s argument fails based on the nature of the review in this case. In
Staub, a supervisor made the decision to fire Staub based on a cursory review of a
subordinate’s accusation. Plaintiff, by contrast, was afforded a hearing before the
full Board of County Commissioners, and was represented by counsel. The
decision to terminate Plaintiff based on a procedurally valid and independent
review of the situation, with evidence presented by both sides. Staub specifically
noted that a supervisor’s biased report would only remain a causal factor if the
independent investigation takes it into account “without determining that the
adverse action was, apart from the supervisor's recommendation, entirely
justified.” Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1193. Because the Board held a hearing specifically
for the purpose of determining whether the adverse action was entirely justified,
reliance on Staub is inapposite. Accord Brooks v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC,
444 F. App’x 385, 388 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that review of decision maker was
sufficiently independent from allegedly biased employee to avoid Staub causation).
Indeed, due to the independent nature of the Board’s review, the Board made
its own decision and did not merely “rubber stamp” Joe Wood’s decision; Joe
Wood was thus outside the definition of a “cat’s paw.” Llampallas, 163 F.3d at
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1249. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s allegation that Joe Wood met with one of the Board
members to discuss the termination decision does not fail to render the Board’s
decision independent. Joe Wood’s initial decision to fire Plaintiff was thus
cleansed of any bias Joe Wood may have had in making the decision. Pennington,
261 F.3d at 1270.
Thus cleansed of any alleged bias from Joe Wood, Plaintiff is unable to
demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions” in the Board’s decision to fire him for insubordination as to render
its reasoning “unworthy of credence.” Jackson, 405 F.3d at 1289.
Plaintiff’s strongest argument is that he was assigned tasks that required him
to use the forklift, and he would not have been able to complete those tasks without
the forklift. However, this is not sufficient to render the Board’s decision to fire
him for insubordination “unworthy of credence.” The Board decided to fire
Plaintiff after he used the forklift multiple times in direct violation of multiple
orders from his superior not to use the forklift. Rather than choose to appeal the
forklift prohibition or see what would happen if he failed to complete the tasks that
required the forklift, Plaintiff made the decision to repeatedly use the forklift even
against repeated orders from his superior to stop.
Had Plaintiff chosen to stop using the forklift as his superior instructed him
to, his case would be very different. If he were subsequently fired for failing to
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complete tasks that could not be completed without a forklift, and was expected to
complete them without a forklift, then the explanation for his termination would be
“unworthy of credence” and could likely have been a pretext for firing him for a
different reason. “Failure to complete an impossible task,” unlike
“insubordination,” is not a presumptively justifiable reason for termination.
In fact, however, Plaintiff made the decision to disobey his supervisors and
use the forklift despite their explicit instructions not to—an offense which could
certainly merit termination. An independent Board review of the situation
confirmed that it did, and Plaintiff has not offered enough evidence to convince a
reasonable jury otherwise.
Plaintiff’s other arguments likewise fail. While it may be unusual that
Plaintiff was subject to termination rather than progressive discipline, that is not
sufficient to render the termination decision a pretext. Further, it is not relevant
why Joe Wood decided to prevent Plaintiff from using the forklift, or to which
duties Plaintiff was reassigned after returning from worker’s compensation leave,
or why Joe Wood refused to put the no-forklift-use instruction into writing. The
only relevant question is whether there is reason to believe that the Board’s
decision to terminate Plaintiff for insubordination was a pretext for firing him for
being disabled or being injured on the job. Plaintiff has not produced enough
evidence to convince a reasonable jury that it was.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

I therefore find that Calhoun County’s proffered reason for terminating
Plaintiff—insubordination for continuing to use the forklift in light of specific
orders not to—is valid, and that Plaintiff has not produced enough evidence to
convince a reasonable jury that this reason was a mere pretext to fire him because
of his disabilities and his worker’s compensation claims.
The relief requested in Defendant Calhoun County, Florida’s, Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 35) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to close the case.

ORDERED on December 2, 2014.
/s/ Richard Smoak
RICHARD SMOAK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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