MCCLURE et al v. PANAMA CITY BAY COUNTY AIRPORT & INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT et al

Filing 37

ORDER denying 32 Motion for Recusal.. Signed by JUDGE RICHARD SMOAK on 5/14/2015. (jcw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
CASEY NEIL MCCLURE d/b/a
JET SOUTH, LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

CASE NO. 5:15-cv-3-RS-GRJ

PANAMA CITY-BAY COUNTY
AIRPORT & INDUSTRIAL
DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
ORDER
Before me is Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse (Doc. 32) and Defendants’
Response in Opposition (Doc. 35).
On April 15, 2015, I sent a Notice to Counsel (Doc. 29) informing the
parties of my past affiliation with Defendant Panama City-Bay County Airport and
Industrial District. I issued the Notice only in the interests of full disclosure. The
Notice stated, in relevant part,
“I represented the Panama City-Bay County Airport and Industrial District
as outside counsel when I was in private practice from 1973 until 2005 when
I was confirmed as District Judge. I have had no contact with the District or
its representatives since 2005. I did not know the identities of the District's
executive director or the members of its board of directors until today when I
viewed the District’s web site to learn their identities. I have known none of
them previously. No other cases involving the District or its representatives
have come before me during my service on the District Court.”
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Based on the Notice, Plaintiffs have now filed a motion to recuse under 28
U.S.C. § 455(a).
29 U.S.C. § 455(a) states that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Recusal under § 455(a) is
appropriate if an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts
underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant
doubt about the judge's impartiality. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 828
(11th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotations omitted).
Plaintiffs’ seek recusal because I represented the Airport ten years ago while
I was in private practice. As I stated in my Notice (Doc. 29), that was a very long
time ago. I have not kept in touch with the Airport, I have not interacted with it in
my capacity as Judge, and I do not currently know any of the board of directors. I
would obtain no benefit, financial or otherwise, by giving any preference in this
litigation to the Airport. Even my personal relationships with the individuals I
represented while in private practice would not be affected by the outcome of this
case.
The matter at hand, which appears to have accrued in 2014, is nine years
removed from any events that I witnessed or had access to when I represented the
airport, and is totally unrelated to any matter in which I represented the Airport.
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Courts in this Circuit have noted that “[t]he case law surrounding 455(a) is
generally in agreement that a judge's impartiality would not be reasonably
questioned simply because the judge's former client now appears . . . in an
unrelated matter over which the judge is presiding.” United States v. Lawson, No.
2:06CR173-MHT, 2007 WL 62854, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 9, 2007) (collecting
cases). Others circuits have found the same. See, e.g., Nat’l Auto Brokers Corp. v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953, 958 (2d Cir. 1978) (“The prior representation of
a party by a judge or his firm with regard to a matter unrelated to litigation before
him does not automatically require recusal.”); Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v.
Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The relationship
between Judge [ ] and [Client], terminated at least six years ago, is too remote and
too innocuous to warrant disqualification under § 455(a).”). Furthermore, the
Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct has specifically noted that
“If a former client of the judge is a party, but the litigation is totally
unrelated to the earlier representation, whether recusal is required depends
upon such factors as the length of time since the earlier representation
ended; the nature, duration, and intensity of the earlier representation; the
presence or absence of ongoing personal relationships; etc.”
Lawson, 2007 WL 62854, at *2 (quoting Judicial Conference Committee on
Codes of Conduct, Compendium of Selected Opinions § 3.6-5(b) (2005)). Here,
the length of time since the representation ended is very long, and there is a

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complete absence of ongoing personal relationships between myself and the
Airport.
I therefore find that no reasonable observer would entertain any significant
doubt about my ability to fairly decide this case, and recusal would be improper.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse (Doc. 32) is DENIED.

ORDERED on May 14, 2015.
/S/ Richard Smoak
RICHARD SMOAK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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