Leor Exploration & Production LLC et al v. Aguiar

Filing 810

ORDER Granting, in Part, and Denying, in Part, 619 the Motion for Protective Order by Non-Parties Angelika Drew and Justin Corey Drew; Granting 628 the Cross-Motion to Overrule Angelika Drew's and Justin Corey Drew's Objections to, and Compel Compliance with, Plaintiffs' Subpoenas Duces Tecum. Signed by Magistrate Judge Andrea M. Simonton on 1/2/2013. (mmn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 09-60136-CIV SEITZ/SIMONTON
LEOR EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION, LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GUMA AGUIAR,
Defendant.
/
ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, THE DREWS’ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER,
AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL
This matter came before the Court on the Motion for Protective Order by NonParties Angelika Drew and Justin Corey Drew (DE # 619). The Plaintiffs have filed a
Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion (the “Response”), along with a Cross-Motion
to Overrule Angelika Drew’s and Justin Corey Drew’s Objections to, and Compel
Compliance with, Plaintiffs’ Subpoenas Duces Tecum (DE # 628). The Drews have filed
no reply in support of their Motion or response to the Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion. The
Honorable Patricia A. Seitz, United States District Judge, has referred all discovery in this
case to the undersigned (DE # 520). For the reasons stated below, the Drews’ Motion is
granted, in part, and the Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion is granted.
I.

BACKGROUND AND PARTIES’ POSITIONS

Non-parties Angelika Drew and Justin Corey Drew (Guma Aguiar’s sister and
brother-in-law, respectively) filed their Motion on May 31, 2012 (DE # 619). On June 18,
2012, Plaintiffs filed their Response and Cross-Motion (DE # 627). On October 11, 2012,

the Drews’ attorneys moved to withdraw from representing the Drews (DE # 697), which
the Court granted on October 15, 2012 (DE # 700).1
The Drews move for a protective order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c) and Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) to prohibit any further deposition of them in this case. As the first
basis for a protective order, the Drews assert that Plaintiffs have impermissibly served
each of the Drews with a second subpoena duces tecum without leave of court. They
contend that each of them has already provided a full day of testimony, totaling over ten
hours (DE # 619 at 1). Relatedly, the Drews claim that they had an agreement with
Plaintiffs that the Drews would only be subject to one deposition each in connection with
this case and at least one other case, Leor Exploration & Production LLC, et al. v.
Angelika Aguiar, et al., Case No. 09-014890 CACE (02) in the General Jurisdiction
Division of the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida
(the “Drews’ State Court Case”), which the Drews claim was frivolously filed against
them by some of the same parties to this suit (DE # 619 at 2-3). According to the Drews,
the agreement with Plaintiffs’ counsel included the stipulation that the Drews would be
deposed only once, “absent a special situation” (DE # 619 at 3). The Drews argue that
Plaintiffs’ decision to depose the Drews relatively early in the federal case, before the
deadline for amending pleadings, does not provide Plaintiffs a basis for a second
deposition due to recently learned information, nor does any other “special situation”
exist (DE # 619 at 3). As additional support for a protective order, the Drews contend that
Plaintiffs also had sought a second deposition on similar bases in the Drews’ State Court
Case, which the court denied. Finally, the Drews argue that any second deposition

1

Counsel withdrew after these motions became ripe for disposition.
2

should be limited to one hour for each of them, and should be limited in scope to topics
not covered by their earlier testimony (DE # 619 at 7).2
In the Drews’ Motion, they also seek a protective order with regard to the
document requests contained in the respective subpoenas duces tecum.3 The Drews
argue that the requested documents are cumulative of requests made of them by
Plaintiffs in 2009 (DE # 619 at 3). Specifically, the Drews assert that they have already
provided almost 4500 pages of discovery, and that 16 of the 19 requests in the current
subpoena overlap with the older requests, yet Plaintiffs will not accept the earlier
production as satisfying the related current requests (DE # 619 at 5-6). The Drews claim
that the cost of reviewing and producing documents again, and appearing for a second
deposition, creates an undue burden on them. The Drews add that, if the Court finds that
the Drews must respond to the requests, the relevant time period for the requests should
be limited to the period of 2002 through the end of 2008. Moreover, the Drews state that
the expenses incurred due to any second production or deposition should be borne by
Plaintiffs (DE # 619 at 6).
In their Response, Plaintiffs acknowledge their agreement with the Drews to “try”
to take only one round of depositions, but Plaintiffs point out that the agreement was not
absolute; instead, it recognized the possibility that, under certain circumstances, a
subsequent deposition might be justified (DE # 627 at 4-5). Along those lines, Plaintiffs
state that developments since the first deposition justify a second deposition, including
amended claims and newly discovered evidence. As for exceeding any rule-based time

2

The Motion also requests that any secondary depositions be set for a specific date and
location, but since that date has already passed, the undersigned assumes that the
Drews no longer request this specific relief.
3

The requests contained in the subpoena to each Drew are identical to the requests
contained in the subpoena to the other Drew, except to the extent a request refers to the
other Drew when listing parties.
3

limits, since the first round of depositions were taken in conjunction with two other court
cases,4 Plaintiffs conclude, this second round of depositions will not violate the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure limiting the time allotted for depositions (DE # 627 at 5 n.6).
Plaintiffs further contend that other claims of the Drews regarding a second
deposition are irrelevant. In particular, Plaintiffs argue that the timing of the original
deposition is irrelevant to whether a second deposition should be permitted (DE # 627 at
2, 3). In addition, regardless whether the document requests in this subpoena are similar
to earlier requests (which Plaintiffs refute), Plaintiffs assert that this claim does not
provide a basis for avoiding a second deposition (DE # 627 at 3).
The Plaintiffs represent that they have attempted to compromise to resolve this
dispute. Specifically, the Plaintiffs state that they had agreed to accommodate the Drews
date and location request, and “to the extent possible,” not to cover matters addressed
in the earlier depositions (DE # 627 at 5). They further agreed to limit Angelika Drew’s
second deposition to two hours and Corey Drew’s second deposition to four hours (DE #
627 at 5). Plaintiffs, however, refuse to bear any of the Drews’ expenses relating to the
subpoenas, and contend that the Drews have provided no basis for shifting the expenses
(DE # 627 at 5).
In response to the Drews’ characterization of their State Court Case, generally,
Plaintiffs refute the contention that the case was frivolous and further argue that the
merits and disposition of the case are irrelevant to the discovery issues in this case (DE
# 627 at 5 n.5). With regard to the Drews’ argument that the state court already rejected a
request for a second deposition, Plaintiffs assert that the state court considered different
issues. In particular, Plaintiffs point out, while this federal case includes allegations of
hacking and industrial espionage, the state court pleadings purportedly did not include
4

In addition to the Drews State Court Case, the Plaintiffs make reference to Aguiar v.
William Natbony, et al., Case No. 09-60683-CIV-SEITZ in this District (the “Natbony
Case”).
4

these allegations. Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue that the Drews’ opposition to a second
deposition in the state court action was premised on Guma Aguiar’s status as a nonparty, which is not true in this case (DE # 627 at 4). Finally, Plaintiffs note that the state
court had left open the possibility of a second deposition if additional evidence were
developed with regard to the hacking/espionage issues, but that case was dismissed
before Plaintiffs moved again for a second deposition (DE # 627 at 4 n.4).
The Plaintiffs also cross-move to compel production of the documents requested
by the subpoenas duces tecum. With regard to the document requests, Plaintiffs
generally assert that the Drews do not deny that the requested documents are relevant
(DE # 627 at 6). Plaintiffs further refute that the requests are “largely the same” as the
requests served in 2009 (DE # 627 at 3). Plaintiffs acknowledge that “there may be a
small amount of overlap,” but they contend that the list contains several specific, distinct
requests that were not included in the 2009 requests (DE # 627 at 6). Plaintiffs continue
that, whereas the 2009 requests sought documents pertaining solely to the Drews, the
current requests seek documents relating to Guma Aguiar, Ellen Aguiar, and other
individuals and entities (DE # 627 at 6-7). Plaintiffs add that they do not seek for the
Drews to reproduce any documents but, instead, produce only any additional responsive
documents (DE # 627 at 7). With regard to any limitation for the time period of
responsive documents, Plaintiffs argue that, because requested documents could shed
light on a witness’s potential bias, the document requests should not be time-limited as
the Drews request (DE # 627 at 7-8).
With regard to specific document requests, Plaintiffs address Nos. 11, 17 and 18
because they state that the Drews have averred in their responses to the other items that
they have already produced all responsive documents (DE # 627 at 8 n.7). 5 First,

5

The Plaintiffs’ contention does not account for all of the document requests. Plaintiffs
state that the Drews have averred that all documents have been produced with regard to
5

Request No. 11 calls for all documents relating to personal, business or professional
travel conducted by the Drews (DE # 619-7 at 12). The Drews object to this request,
arguing that it calls for irrelevant documents and has been satisfied with regard to
business or professional travel. The Drews further object to the request with regard to
personal travel, arguing that the request seeks personal and private information (DE #
619-8 at 13-14, 32-33). Plaintiffs respond that the materials are relevant to whether Guma
Aguiar inappropriately diverted company assets to family members, which the Court has
found to be a relevant discovery topic. Plaintiffs further argue that responsive
documents would reflect the Drews’ activities while employed by Leor, and would be
relevant to Guma Aguiar’s denials and defenses. Finally, Plaintiffs point out that the
confidentiality order in this case would address the Drews’ concerns for the private
nature of produced materials (DE # 627 at 10).
Request No. 17 calls for all documents relating to any of several surveillance
activities by Guma Aguiar on the “Kaplan Targets,” which is defined in the subpoena (DE
# 619-7 at 12). In objecting to this request, the Drews primarily rely on their arguments
set forth in their Motion, including that they have already been deposed and that a
protective order regarding any second deposition has been entered in the Drews’ State
Court Case. Corey Drew additionally objects because he states that he has already been
asked questions about “security issues.” He further claims the attorney-client privilege,
a joint defense protection, and a spousal privilege. Finally, the Drews state that, to the
extent production is ordered, it should be limited to 2002 through the end of 2008 (DE #
619-8 at 18, 36-37). In response, Plaintiffs rely upon the arguments set forth in their

Request Nos. 1-10 and 12-14. The Plaintiffs, however, only specifically seek to compel
responses to Request Nos. 11, 17 and 18. The disposition of any dispute with regard to
the other requests is unclear. At any rate, because Plaintiffs do not identify any other
specific requests at issue, the undersigned only addresses the three requests described
in the Cross-Motion.
6

Cross-Motion and further state that, if Corey Drew is claiming a privilege, he must
produce a privilege log (DE # 627 at 11-12).
Finally, Request No. 18 calls for production of all documents relating to payments
made to Aguiar or a related entity by the Lillian Jean Kaplan Foundation (the “LJK
Foundation”), during 2002 to 2006, for any of several enumerated business and personal
expenses (DE # 619-7 at 12). The Drews object primarily on the basis of overbreadth and
relevance. Both Drews further disavow any knowledge or involvement with the LJK
Foundation during the period in question (DE # 619-8 at 18-19, 37-38). Plaintiffs respond
that the requested documents are relevant because the case concerns, in part, Guma
Aguiar’s alleged misuse of assets from the LJK Foundation (DE # 627 at 13).
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The Drews bring their Motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) and Rule 45(c).
Rule 26(c)(1) concerns protective orders, providing a means for a party from whom
discovery is sought to avoid or limit production. It states in relevant part,
The Court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (A)
forbidding the disclosure of discovery…[and] (D) forbidding inquiry
into certain matters, or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery
to certain matters.
Rule 45 directly addresses subpoenas. Section (c)(1) states, “A party or attorney
responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid
imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.” Rule
45(c)(2)(B) adds that any order regarding the production of materials in connection with a
subpoena “must protect a person who is neither a party nor a party’s officer from
significant expense resulting from compliance.” Finally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iv)
requires that a court quash or modify a subpoena when it subjects a person to undue
burden.

7

Rule 30 governs depositions by oral examination. Specifically, Fed. R. Civ. P.
30(d)(1) states, “Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a deposition is
limited to 1 day of 7 hours. The court must allow additional time consistent with Rule
26(b)(2) if needed to fairly examine the deponent or if the deponent, another person, or
any other circumstance impedes or delays the examination.” Section (a)(2)(A)(ii) of Rule
30 further states, “A party must obtain leave of court, and the court must grant leave to
the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(2)…if the deponent has already been deposed in the
case.” Rule 26(b)(2), in turn, provides in relevant part that the court must limit discovery
if it determines that
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,
or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient,
less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery
has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in
the action; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues.
Courts generally require a party seeking to conduct a second deposition to demonstrate
“good cause” for doing so. See, e.g., Gadsby v. Am. Golf Corp. of Cal., No. 2:10-CV-680FTM-99SPC, 2012 WL 2368568, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 21, 2012); Home Design Servs., Inc. v.
W. Gargas Constr., Inc., No. 3:08cv244/MCR/EMT, 2009 WL 3190462, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Oct.
1, 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 2000 Amendment Advisory Committee Notes);
Kleppinger v. Tex. Dept. of Transp., 283 F.R.D. 330, 336 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (noting that
other district courts use the “good cause” standard in this instance, citing cases from D.
Utah, S.D. Ohio, and D.S.D.).
The Plaintiffs cross-move pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 and 45 for an order
overruling the Drews’ objections to Plaintiffs’ subpoenas duces tecum, and compelling
them to appear for deposition and produce documents. Rule 37 generally permits a party

8

to move to compel discovery, and Rule 45(c)(2)(B)(i), more specifically, entitles the party
serving a subpoena to move the court for an order compelling production.
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

A Second Round of Depositions

As an initial procedural matter, the Drews contend, and the Plaintiffs do not
deny, that the Plaintiffs failed to obtain leave of court before serving the Drews
with their second subpoenas, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(ii). The
Plaintiffs, instead, seek leave of court discretely in a footnote of their Response
and Cross-Motion (DE # 627 at 2 n.2). The Drews, having filed no reply in support
of their Motion (or a Response to the Cross-Motion), have not addressed whether
Plaintiffs’ request for leave is procedurally inappropriate.
While the Drews note Plaintiffs’ purported failure to comply with Rule 30 as
a footnote in their Motion, the Drews do not appear to seek to prohibit the second
round of depositions on this basis, nor do the Drews describe any particular
prejudice that has resulted by the alleged violation. Moreover, while Rule 30(a)(2)
appears to contemplate a party obtaining in advance leave of court before serving
a second subpoena, at least one court has found that this is not fatal to a party’s
efforts to conduct a second deposition. See Christy v. Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 160
F.R.D. 51, 52-53 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying motion for protective order that argued
that party failed to obtain leave of court, stating that the party seeking protection
failed to demonstrate good cause to avoid a second limited deposition). As
another court has concluded (under different circumstances seeking leave to
depose a prisoner pursuant to Rule 30(a)), ordering a halt to this discovery to
allow the Plaintiffs to move for leave of the court, “only would delay the progress
of the instant litigation and would waste the time and resources of this Court and
the parties.” Miller v. Bluff, 131 F.R.D. 698, 700 (M.D. Pa. 1990). Even if the
9

Plaintiffs were deficient in seeking leave of court at the outset, the Motion and
Response have provided the parties a means for arguing the merits of a second
deposition of the Drews, as would appear to be contemplated by Rule
30(a)(2)(A)(ii)’s requirement.
The undersigned notes, however, that the Drews should not be penalized in
this analysis by having the burden of proof placed on them to demonstrate good
cause to obtain a protective order when, procedurally, they should be in the
position of responding to Plaintiffs’ motion for leave of court. In other words, the
burden of proof should rest on the Plaintiffs to demonstrate good cause for
another deposition, instead of on the Drews to demonstrate good cause for a
protective order. Therefore, the undersigned finds that any violation of Rule
30(a)(2)(A)(ii) by the Plaintiffs is not fatal, but, under the analysis that follows, the
Court places the burden of establishing good cause on the Plaintiffs.
Turning to the merits of the parties’ positions, for the reasons stated below,
the undersigned finds that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated good cause to
conduct a second round of depositions of the Drews. At the outset, the
undersigned rejects the Drews’ framework for considering the merits of a second
round of depositions that is based upon their State Court Case. As the Plaintiffs
point out, the circumstances surrounding the state court’s decision to enter the
protective order in favor of the Drews in that case are simply not those before this
Court. The dispute in the Drews’ State Court Case entailed different parties,
claims, procedural posture, and governing rules, among other differences. Thus,
the undersigned agrees with Plaintiffs that consideration of the State Court Case
is largely irrelevant to the calculus of whether to grant leave for a second round of
depositions in this case.

10

Next, the Court finds unpersuasive the Drews’ argument that they have
already provided a full-days’ worth of testimony for this case. The parties agree
that the Drews’ original depositions were intended to be used for more than one
case. Plaintiffs further specify, and the Drews do not refute, that the depositions
were intended to be used in not only the Drews State Court Case and this federal
case, but in the Natbony Case as well. Thus, while the Plaintiffs fail to establish
the actual time breakdown of their earlier testimony, they have demonstrated that
the earlier testimony likely includes testimony relevant to multiple cases.
Addressing the Drews’ principal arguments, and the Plaintiffs’ basis for
good cause, the undersigned rejects the Drews’ claim that a second round of
depositions is prohibited by the parties’ agreement for one round of depositions.
The Drews do not refute that much has transpired in this case since their original
depositions. They, instead, focus on Plaintiffs’ decision to depose them relatively
early in the case. In essence, the Drews appear to argue that, while a range of
issues may have emerged and evolved, Plaintiffs must live with their decision to
depose the Drews in this case’s early stages.
This position, however, is inconsistent with their agreement regarding
depositions, which does not appear to base the determination of a second
deposition on the timing of the first. By its own terms, the agreement is not
categorical, allowing for additional deposition in a “special situation,” with no
further guidance as to what constitutes a “special situation.” In fact, in the same
paragraph constituting the agreement, Plaintiffs make clear the right to seek an
exception by immediately arguing for a second deposition of Guma Aguiar (DE #
619-3 at 2). Thus, the parties’ intent for there to be an exception embodied in the
agreement is evident, while the parameters of this exception are unclear. The
Drews’ position also appears irrelevant to Rule 30’s consideration of whether
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good cause has been demonstrated for a second deposition. While the timing of a
first and second deposition may factor into a court’s analysis, the Drews provide
no authority for the proposition that good cause cannot be established where a
party has made the decision to take a deposition early in a case.
With the burden of establishing good cause, while Plaintiffs generally
identify developments in this case that justify a second round of depositions, they
fail to detail at length the extent of these developments that constitute good cause
or that form a basis for a “special situation” to re-depose the Drews. Nonetheless,
the Drews do not refute that they may have additional relevant testimony, instead,
taking issue with the deposition’s timing. Moreover, upon a general review of the
record as a whole, including the over 600 docket entries describing the last three
years of twists and turns in this case’s litigation since the Drews’ first round of
depositions, the undersigned agrees with the Plaintiffs that good cause exists for
re-deposing the Drews because the Drews reasonably may be able to provide
relevant testimony as to some of the issues that have developed since their
depositions.
The undersigned, thus, turns to the appropriate scope of a second
deposition. Courts weigh the burden imposed on a non-party by discovery
differently than that on a party. See United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, No. 05-80980CIV-RYSKAMP, 2007 WL 788877, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2007). As the Drews
admit, however, they are “not typical non-parties” (DE # 619 at 2). As discussed
above, the Drews had been named defendants in a related state court action.
Moreover, as Guma Aguiar’s family members in a suit where Plaintiffs have
accused Aguiar of, among other improprieties, improperly redirecting corporate
assets to his family members, information they possess could be highly relevant
to the parties’ claims and defenses.
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Nonetheless, the undersigned is mindful of guarding against any undue
burden on a non-party pursuant to Rule 45, and to avoid cumulative or duplicative
discovery. In this respect, however, the undersigned notes that Plaintiffs have
offered to alleviate some of the burden placed on the Drews by these subpoenas.
Specifically, Plaintiffs have agreed to limit questioning to matters not addressed
in the earlier depositions, and to impose a time limit on any second deposition.
Thus, the undersigned finds good cause for the Plaintiffs to conduct a second
round of depositions but also finds appropriate a limit on the scope and duration
of these depositions, consistent with this Order. Specifically, the scope of the
second depositions of the Drews shall each be limited to matters not explored in
their respective first depositions. Moreover, the second deposition of Justin
Corey Drew shall be limited to three hours, and the second deposition of Angelika
Drew shall be limited to two hours.
Finally, upon a review of the Motion and Response, and a review of the
record as a whole, the undersigned further agrees with Plaintiffs that cost-shifting
is inappropriate under these circumstances. As stated above, while the
undersigned must protect a non-party against undue burden or expense, the
undersigned finds that, in limiting the scope and extent of these depositions, and
given the good cause demonstrated for conducting additional depositions, the
Drews’ expenses related to these depositions should not be shifted to the
Plaintiffs.
B.

Subpoena Duces Tecum Document Requests
1.

The Requests, Generally

The Plaintiffs and the Drews also dispute the Drews’ obligation to produce
documents in response to the subpoenas duces tecum. The Drews complain that
they have already produced thousands of pages of documents in response to the
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2009 requests, and that the majority of the current requests are duplicative of
those earlier requests. They argue that reviewing and producing the same
documents again creates an undue burden and expense, which should be shifted
to Plaintiffs. To the extent the Court orders production, the Drews add, the
relevant time period for requested documents should be 2002 through the end of
2008.
The Plaintiffs address this dispute through their Cross-Motion, which seeks
to compel production of documents in response to these requests. The Plaintiffs’
Cross-Motion describes a narrower dispute than that described in the Drews’
Motion. First, the Plaintiffs only identify three requests that are still at issue –
Nos. 11, 17, and 18. Second, the Plaintiffs state that they do not wish for the
Drews to produce again documents already produced; Plaintiffs, instead, seek
only the production of any responsive documents not provided in the earlier
production (to the extent the requests overlap).
Thus, the analysis turns to whether the Plaintiffs provide a basis for
compelling production in response to the three document requests. At the outset,
the undersigned notes that the Drews do not address any specific requests in
their Motion but, instead, argue generally that the requests are duplicative and
create an undue burden. In Response through their Cross-Motion, Plaintiffs
address these general concerns by limiting the number of requests at issue and
stating that, to the extent the current requests overlap with earlier requests, they
only seek documents not produced before. The Drews, however, fail to file any
response to the Cross-Motion, nor do they file any reply in support of their Motion,
which may have addressed the Plaintiffs’ points. Thus, the Drews have only
provided general arguments for the Court to consider, which fail to specify the

14

undue burden, expense, or duplicative production in the context of a specific
request.
2.

Request No. 11

Turning to the merits of the specific requests, after a review of the record
as a whole, and for the reasons stated below, the undersigned finds compelling
production in response to all three requests appropriate. First, with respect to
Request No. 11, the Drews’ primary objections concern relevancy and privacy
interests implicated by the request for records of personal travel. With regard to
relevancy, as stated in the Order Denying Ellen Aguiar’s Motion to Quash or for
Protective Order and Granting Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion to Overrule Objections (DE
# 610), requests calling for documents that could reasonably lead to information
concerning potential witness bias or “Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendant was
improperly siphoning off Leor assets for his own personal gain or that of his
family and friends” are proper requests (DE # 610 at 7). While the earlier Order
directed to Ellen Aguiar’s objections did not directly address this request
(although it was part of a very similar set of requests), the analysis holds true;
records of the personal travel of the Drews could reasonably lead to evidence of
their potential bias and whether Guma Aguiar improperly redirected Leor-related
assets to them as family members. In addition, similar to the dispute with Ellen
Aguiar, the Drews do not refute the Plaintiffs’ claim that any privacy interests are
addressed by the Agreed Protective Order Governing Confidentiality and Privilege
(DE # 86). Thus, the Drews’ privacy arguments are not well-taken.
Finally, with respect to the Drews’ request to limit the relevant time period
to the end of 2008 for this request, the Drews’ basis for this argument appears to
be that the Drews and Guma Aguiar no longer worked for Leor or a related
company after 2008. While this argument might address the production of
15

records of professional or business travel, the only issue remaining in dispute
with regard to No. 11 is the Drews’ personal travel. Moreover, because the Drews
have not responded to the Cross-Motion, their basis for limiting the time period is
unclear. Therefore, the time period of relevant documents shall not be limited, but
shall be through the present, as sought in the document request, which shall be
through the date of this Order. However, since the only relevance of such travel
after 2008 appears to be for the purpose of establishing bias, the records are
limited to travel that in any way was paid for, or reimbursed by Guma or Ellen
Aguiar, or in any way involved Guma or Ellen Aguiar or property owned by either
Guma or Ellen Aguiar. Plaintiffs have not established the same financial
connection between the Drews and Guma Aguiar as was established between
Ellen and Guma Aguiar; thus, a more limited production is warranted.
3.

Request No. 17

With regard to Request No. 17, the Drews’ objections differ slightly from
one another. In responding to this request relating to “Surveillance,” Angelika
Drew simply relies on the arguments made in the Drews’ Motion, including that
Judge Bowman in the State Court Case has already entered a protective order,
and that Ms. Drew should not be burdened with a second production. Justin
Corey Drew’s objections echo those of Angelika Drew, and he adds an assertion
of the attorney-client, joint defense, and spousal privileges.
First, as stated above, the undersigned find unpersuasive the general
arguments against a second deposition and document production as presented in
the Drews’ Motion. Second, to the extent Corey Drew wishes to assert a privilege,
he shall create a privilege log in compliance with the applicable procedural rules.
Finally, with regard to cutting off the time period of responsive documents at
2008, the Drews have failed to present any argument with respect to this request
16

as to why such a limitation is appropriate. Therefore, the Plaintiffs Cross-Motion
with respect to this request is granted, and the relevant time period shall be
through the date of this Order. Justin Corey Drew shall prepare and produce
simultaneously with the requested documents a privilege log if he withholds any
document based upon a privilege.
4.

Request No. 18

Finally, with regard to Request No. 18, the Drews’ objections primarily
concern overbreadth and relevance, but the extent of these objections is unclear.
With regard to overbreadth, the objection does not make clear whether the Drews
are asserting that the time period or the scope of the requests is overbroad.
Similarly, the basis for the claim of irrelevancy is unclear. The undersigned
agrees with Plaintiffs, however, that Guma Aguiar’s alleged use (or misuse) of LJK
Foundation funds is part of Plaintiffs’ allegations, and documents responsive to
this request could reasonably lead to admissible evidence regarding these
allegations. Again, because the Drews have chosen not to offer any greater detail
in their Motion, or further address this specific request in a response to the
Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion, the Drews fail to provide a basis for avoiding production.
Thus, the Plaintiffs’ motion to compel production with respect to this request is
granted, and the relevant time period shall not be limited, as requested by the
Drews.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, upon a review of the record as a whole, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion for Protective Order by NonParties Angelika Drew and Justin Corey Drew (DE # 619) is GRANTED, IN PART,
as set forth in the body of this Order. The deposition of Angelika Drew shall be

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limited to two hours, and the deposition of Justin Corey Drew shall be limited to
three hours. These depositions shall take place on or before January 31, 2013. It
is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion to Overrule
Angelika Drew’s and Justin Corey Drew’s Objections to, and Compel Compliance
with, Plaintiffs’ Subpoenas Duces Tecum (DE # 628) is GRANTED. The Drews
shall serve their responses to the requests described in this Order on or before
January 24, 2013, and shall simultaneously serve any privilege log.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, on January 2, 3013.

______________________________________
ANDREA M. SIMONTON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Copies furnished via CM/ECF to:
The Honorable Patricia A. Seitz,
United States District Judge
Counsel of Record

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