Point Blank Solutions, Inc v. Toyobo America, Inc. et al

Filing 275

ORDER granting in part 263 Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The motion is denied as to the warranty claims. The motion is granted as to Plaintiffs' FDUTPA claim based on purchases of Zylon fabric made after July 31, 2004. Signed by Judge Patricia A. Seitz on 6/7/2011. (wc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 09-61166-CIV-SEITZ/GOODMAN
POINT BLANK SOLUTIONS, INC. and
POINT BLANK BODY ARMOR, INC.,
Plaintiffs,

v.
TOYOBO AMERICA, INC., and
TOYOBO CO., LTD.,
Defendants.
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ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
RECONSIDERATION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
Court's May 13,2011 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment [DE-263]. This case arises from the manufacture and sale of allegedly
defective fiber, known as Zylon, used to make ballistic fabric. Defendants manufactured,
marketed, and sold the fiber from which the ballistic fabric was woven. Plaintiffs purchased the
ballistic fabric made from the fiber for use in body armor that Plaintiffs manufactured. Plaintiffs'
five count Amended Complaint alleged claims for: (1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach of
implied warranty of merchantability; (3) false, misleading, and deceptive advertising and sales in
violation of Florida Statute, § 817.41; (4) fraudulent inducement; and (5) deceptive and unfair
trade practices in violation of Florida Statute, § 501.204 (FDUTP A). By prior order the Court
granted in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Plaintiffs' warranty
claims for lack of privity and Plaintiffs' FDUTPA claim because it is time barred. Plaintiffs
seek reconsideration of the dismissal of these claims. Because there is no privity between the

parties, Plaintiffs' Motion is denied as to the warranty claims. However, Plaintiffs Motion is
granted as to the FDUTPA claim as to all purchases of Zylon made after July 31,2004.

I. Standard for a Motion for Reconsideration
There are three grounds for reconsideration: (1) an intervening change in controlling law;
(2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest
injustice. Burger King Corp. v. Ashland Equities, Inc. 181 F. Supp. 2d 1366,1369 (S.D. Fla.
2002). Plaintiffs assert that the Court committed clear error. In order to demonstrate clear error,
a plaintiff must do more than simply restate previous arguments. Bautista v. Cruise Ships

Catering & Service Intern 'I, N. V, 350 F. Supp. 2d 987, 992 (S.D. Fla. 2003).

It is an improper use of the motion to reconsider to ask the Court to rethink what the
Court ... already thought through-rightly or wrongly .... The motion to reconsider would be
appropriate where, for example, the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has
made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has
made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.
ZK. Marine Inc. v. MlV Archigetis, 808 F. Supp. 1561, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (citations omitted
and brackets omitted). Thus, a "motion for reconsideration cannot be used to re-litigate old
matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of the
[challenged order]. This prohibition includes new arguments that were previously available, but
not pressed." Wilchombe v. Teevee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11 th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).

II.

The Court Did Not Commit Clear Error in Holding that There is No Privity
Between the Parties
Plaintiffs argue that the Court erred in finding that Plaintiffs' warranty claims were barred

because of a lack of privity between the parties. Plaintiffs assert that privity between the parties

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was created by the direct contacts between Plaintiffs and Defendants. Plaintiffs point to
statements made by Defendants to Plaintiffs about both Zylon fabric and Zylon fiber and urge the
Court to find privity based on these statements. However, Plaintiffs misconstrue the Court's
prior Order holding that there is no privity based on the parties' direct contacts. The Order
primarily relied on the difference in the product Defendants sold to the weavers and the product
purchased by Plaintiffs, not on the content of the statements made by Defendants. As the Court
noted in the Order holding that there was no privity based on direct contacts: "there is a
significant factual difference from the cases where courts have found privity through direct contacts.
In Cedars of Lebanon and Carnival the item purchased passed unchanged from the manufacturer to
the middleman-seller to the final purchaser." See DE-262 at 9. That is not the case here. As
previously noted by the Court Defendants manufactured, marketed, and sold Zylon fiber.
Plaintiffs purchase Zylon fabric. Therefore, the Zylon did not pass unaltered from Defendants to
Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs cite to Grovenor House, L.L.C v. E.1. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 09-21698,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87635 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2010), for the proposition that whether the
product passes altered or unaltered is irrelevant to the determination of privity through direct
contacts. However, Grovenor is not binding on this Court. Furthermore, the Grovenor case cites
to no case law that directly supports that proposition. Additionally, Plaintiffs had the opportunity
to present their arguments based on Grovenor in their response to the motion for summary
judgment and did not. Plaintiffs do not get a second chance to reargue the same issue again
based on newly discovered case law that existed at the time Plaintiffs filed their opposition to
Defendants' summary judgment motion. Most importantly, Grovenor does not establish that the

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Court's holding that no privity exists between the parties is clearly erroneous. Therefore,
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Reconsideration is denied as to the warranty claims.

II.

Plaintiffs' FDUTPA Claim is Not Time Barred as to Purchases After July 31, 2004
Plaintiffs argue that the Court erred in finding that their FDUTP A claim was time barred

because Plaintiffs continued to purchase Zylon until, at least, March 24, 2005. Neither side
disputes this fact and in its Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment the Court
recognized that Plaintiffs' had presented evidence of such purchases. As the Court previously
stated, "Plaintiffs' FDUTPA claim accrued when they purchased the Zylon." See DE-262 at 11.
Therefore, any FDUTP A claim based on purchases of Zylon made after July 31, 2004 are not
time barred. While Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' last purchase order was placed prior to July
31, 2004, the relevant fact for time of accrual is date of sale, not date of the purchase order.
Consequently, Plaintiffs' Motion is granted as to this claim.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Court's May 13,2011
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE263] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part:
1. Th Motion is DENIED as to the warranty claims.
2. The Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' FDUTPA claim based on purchases of
Zylon fabric made after July 31, 2004.

?DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this;::; day of June, 2011.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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All counsel of record

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