Chase v. Nova Southeastern University, Inc.
Filing
49
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 36 Defendant Nova Southeastern University, Inc.'s Motion to Determine the Sufficiency of Answers to Requests for Admissions. Please see Order for details. Signed by Ch. Magistrate Judge Barry S. Seltzer on 4/16/2012. (kas)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 11-61290-CIV-COHN/SELTZER
ANTHONY CHASE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, INC.,
Defendant.
______________________________________/
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DETERMINE SUFFICIENCY
OF ANSWERS TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Nova Southeastern University, Inc.’s
Motion to Determine the Sufficiency of Answers to Request for Admissions (DE 36) and
the Court being sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part for the reasons set forth below.
Defendant served on Plaintiff several requests for admissions, and Plaintiff timely
responded thereto. Defendant now requests that the Court determine the sufficiency of
Plaintiff’s answers to two of these requests – Request for Admission No. 3 and Request
for Admission No. 4. It argues the Court should determine that Plaintiff’s responses are
inadequate and rule that the matters are deemed admitted, or alternatively, require a clear,
unequivocal admission or denial.
Federal Rule 36 governs requests for admissions; the Rule’s purposes are “to
expedite the trial and to relieve the parties of the cost of proving facts that will not be
disputed at trial.” Perez v. Miami-Dade County, 297 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting 8A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2252 (2d ed. 1994)); see also Thalheim v. Eberheim, 124 F.R.D. 34, 35
(D. Conn. 1988) (“An important purpose of the rule is to reduce the cost of litigation by
narrowing the scope of disputed issues, facilitating the succinct presentation of cases to
the trier of fact, and eliminating the necessity of proving undisputed facts.”) (internal
citations omitted). Rule 36(a) permits a party to serve on another party “a written request
to admit, for purposes of the pending action only, the truth of any matters within the scope
of Rule 26(b)(1) relating to: (A) facts, the application of law to fact, or opinions about either;
and (B) the genuineness of any described documents.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1). Rule
36(a) also affords the responding party limited options for answering a request for
admission:
If a matter is not admitted, the answer must specifically deny
it or state in detail why the answering party cannot truthfully
admit or deny it. A denial must fairly respond to the substance
of the matter; and when good faith requires that a party qualify
an answer or deny only a part of a matter, the answer must
specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the rest. The
answering party may assert lack of knowledge or information
as a reason for failing to admit or deny only if the party states
that it has made reasonable inquiry and that the information it
knows or can readily obtain is insufficient to enable it to admit
or deny.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). A responding party may also object to a request for admission,
but not “solely on the ground that the request presents a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 36(a)(5). A matter admitted under Rule 36 is deemed “conclusively established
unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 36(b).
Additionally, Rule 36 expressly permits the requesting party to move a court to
2
determine the sufficiency of an answer or objection to a request for admission. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 36(a)(6). If the court finds that an answer does not comply with the Rule, it “may
order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served.” Id. Where
the court finds that an objection is not justified, it “must order that an answer be served.”
Id.
Both Requests at issue reference “Exhibit A” to the Requests for Admission. See
Request for Admissions (DE 36). Exhibit A is an October 28, 2011 letter written by Plaintiff.
Although the letter is addressed simply to “Sir or Madame,” Plaintiff in response to other
Requests for Admissions has indicated that the letter was submitted to both the American
Bar Association and the American Association of Law Schools as a complaint and as a
request for investigation.
See Request for Admission Nos. 5 and 6 and Plaintiff’s
Response thereto (DE 36). The letter relates, inter alia, the circumstances surrounding
Plaintiff being placed on leave and subsequently being terminated, and it expresses
Plaintiff’s belief that the University’s stated reasons for his termination were pretextual and
proffers his own belief as to the real reason he was terminated.
Request for Admission No. 3 requests that Plaintiff “[a]dmit that you contend you
were terminated from NSU in retaliation for your ‘willingness to stand up for the rule of law’
as set forth in Exhibit A.”1 Plaintiff ‘s response states: “Admit that the Plaintiff stated in
Exhibit A, which differs from the reason stated by University President George Hanbury II,
Ph.D, in his December 20, 2011 letter. Plaintiff is unable to speculate as to President
1
According to Plaintiff, this statement “refers to [his] vocal opposition to multiple
incidents of behavior by Nova, in opposition to the Service Employers International Union’s
effort to organize custodians on its campus, that the National Labor Relations Board has
determined to constitute unfair labor practices.” Response at 2 (DE 41)
3
Hanbury’s state of mind.”
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s response “fails to comply with the requirements,
spirit or intent of Rule 36.” Motion at 4 (DE 36). According to Defendant, “the Request
does not ask whether Plaintiff made such a statement, but whether or not [he] contends
that he was terminated from NSU in retaliation for [his] willingness to stand up for the rule
of law. . . .’” Id. (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff responds that “[q]ualification of a response to a Request for Admission is
generally permitted if the statement, although containing some truth standing alone out of
context of the whole truth conveys unwarranted and unfair inferences.” Response at 5 (DE
41) (quoting McCarthy v. Darman, Case NO. 07-cv-3958, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47549,
at *12 (E.D. Pa. June 16, 2008)). He argues that the word “contend” in Request for
Admission No. 3 “convey[s] a range of meaning”2 and that the Request “uses innuendo,
requires an inference, or requires a lengthy explanation before it can be fairly answered.”
Id. at 10. According to Plaintiff, Request for Admission No. 3 is “the kind of ‘trick-question’
request for admission that court after court has held requires qualification since even
though ‘it contain[s] some truth, standing alone out of context of the whole truth [, it]
conveys unwarranted and unfair inferences.” Id. Plaintiff additionally asserts that he
attempted in good faith to respond to Request for Admission No. 3 by “admitting he made
the statement but alerting the defendant that he did not agree with defendant’s
interpretation of what he said in the letter, i.e., adopting retaliation for his opposition to
Nova’s unfair labor practices as being the sole reason that he felt he was terminated.” Id.
2
The Court disagrees. Webster’s Dictionary defines “contend” as “maintain” or
“assert.” See Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/contend.
4
Based on Plaintiff’s response to Request for Admission No. 3 and his arguments in
response to the instant Motion, the Court believes that Plaintiff has misinterpreted what
Defendant is asking him to admit. In response to the Request, Plaintiff admitted that he
stated in Exhibit A that the reason he was terminated was because of his “willingness to
stand up for the rule of law.” But Defendant has clarified that this Request is not asking
Plaintiff whether he made such a statement in Exhibit A; rather, it is requesting Plaintiff to
admit “whether or not [he] contends that he was terminated from NSU in retaliation for [his]
willingness to stand up for the rule of law. . . .’” Motion at 4 (DE 36). The Court, therefore,
will not deem Request for Admission No. 3 admitted. Instead, the Court will afford Plaintiff
an opportunity to respond to the Request for Admission No. 3, as clarified by Defendant.
Accordingly, on or before April 23, 2012, Plaintiff shall serve on Defendant an amended
answer in compliance with Rule 36(a)(4), that is, admitting or denying the Request and, if
necessary, qualifying its response.
Request for Admission No. 4 requests that Plaintiff “[a]dmit that nowhere in the
document attached as Exhibit A, do you contend that you were terminated because NSU
perceived you as suffering from a mental disability that interferes with the major life
activities of thinking and working.” Plaintiff denied that Request. He then explained his
denial by identifying seven statements he made in Exhibit A, contending that an inference
that Nova perceived him as suffering from a mental disability arises from these
statements.3
3
These statements are: (1) “Dean Athornia Steele’s comment to me that ‘serious
safety concerns have developed’ about plaintiff”; (2) “Dean Steele’s statement that ‘there
were rumors that [plaintiff] had a gun or guns in [his] office’”; (3) “The vice president for
human resources stating that ‘we’re just concerned about the gun’”; (4) The plaintiff’s
5
Defendant argues that these statements in no way imply that it terminated Plaintiff’s
employment because it perceived Plaintiff was suffering from a mental disability.
According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s “qualification of a denial has not been supplied in good
faith as the Plaintiff’s own statement and words contained in [Exhibit A] show that his
denial of Request for Admission No. 4 is unreasonable and false.” Motion at 6 (DE 36).
Defendant, therefore, requests that the Court deem Request No. 4 conclusively admitted.
Defendant, in essence, is requesting that the Court ascertain the truth or falsity of
Plaintiff’s denial. However, in determining the sufficiency of a request for admission, the
court’s role is to “ensure the formalities of [Rule 36(a)] are observed. As long as a
responding party’s answer is adequate to satisfy the technical requirements of Rule 36, the
court is not empowered to compel [the responding party] to change an answer to conform
to the ‘truth’ or to any particular theory or other evidence. . . .” Collins v. JC Penney Life
Ins. Co., No. 02cv0674-L(LAB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8455, at *32 (S.D. Cal. May 5,
2003).
As one court recently explained: “[t]he Federal Rules provide two avenues for
challenging a party’s answers to a request for admission. Rule 36(a), which addresses the
statement that President Hanbury’s termination letter implied that his colleagues at the law
school could not do their work ‘because I had frightened them’”; (5) “The plaintiff’s
statement that ‘They were frightened because I had purportedly sent them an email that
caused them to believe that I was potentially violent, a threat to public safety, and
specifically a threat to shoot them in the building or in the parking lot’”; (6) “The plaintiff’s
statement that he colleagues he was perceived by his colleagues have ‘scared [them] ito
[sic] thinking that [he] would shoot them with the gun [he] did not own or possess’” [note
that the court has quoted the statement verbatim, but is unable to ascertain the meaning
thereof]; and (7) “ Plaintiff’s statement that no one had spoken to him about his ‘supposed
potential dangerousness.’” Plaintiff’s Response to Request for Admissions (DE 36).
6
form of the answer, and Rule 37(c)(2),4 which addresses the answers factual accuracy. “
Point Blank Solutions, Inc. v. Toyobo America, Inc., No. 09-61166-CIV, 2011 WL 742657,
*at 2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2011) (Goodman, M.J.) (emphasis in original). The Point Blank
Court ruled that Rule 36(a)(6) “clearly speaks to the form of the answer or objection, not
to its substance”; the Rule “does not authorize a Court to inquire into the substantive
accuracy of the denial” before trial or before summary judgment has been granted to either
party.
Here, Plaintiff’s answer comports with the (technical) requirements of Rule
36(c)(2)(4)); Plaintiff denied the Request then qualified its answer to explain its denial. The
Court does not find that Plaintiff lacked good faith in qualifying its answer, particularly as
the reason Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment goes to the very heart of this
litigation. If Plaintiff’s answer ultimately proves to be false, then Defendant has a remedy
under Rule 37(c)(2). Accordingly, the Motion with respect to Request for Admission No.
4 is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 16th day of April 2012.
4
Rule 37(c)(2) provides that “if a party fails to admit a request under Rule 36, and
if the requesting party later proves a document to be genuine or the matter true” a court
must award the requesting party “its reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees,
incurred in making that proof,” unless certain enumerated conditions exist. Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(c)(2).
7
Copies to:
All counsel of record
8
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?