Roanne Eye v. Cohn et al
Filing
25
ORDER GRANTING 19 Motion to Dismiss.. Signed by Judge K. Michael Moore on 11/7/2011. (rg1)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 11-cv-61584-KMM
ROANNE EYE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES I. COHN, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19).
Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 23). This Motion is now ripe for review.
UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motion and the Response, the pertinent portions of the
record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court enters the following Order.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Roanne Eye, is the defendant in a criminal case in the Southern District of
Florida, and she brings this Complaint in response to the actions taken in that criminal case. Eye
names as Defendants Judge James I. Cohn, United States District Court Judge, and Magistrate
Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum, Magistrate Judge Lurana Snow, and Magistrate Judge Barry Seltzer;
all of whom are United States Magistrate Judges. Collectively Judge Cohn and the Magistrate
Judges are referred to as the “Defendant Federal Judges.” Eye also names as Defendants
Wifredo A. Ferrer, United States Attorney; Jennifer A. Keene, Assistant United States Attorney;
Matthew Mueller, Department of Justice Trial Attorney (collectively “Federal Prosecutors”) and
1
Steven M. Larimore, Clerk of Court for the Southern District of Florida. Eye makes claims
against all Defendants in their individual capacities in her Complaint, and she alleges what she
terms a “Full Bivens Action.” See Compl.
Eye argues that the Defendants acted in conspiracy with one another to defraud her of her
“most fundamental right to have subject matter jurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction, and
standing, established by fact, before the fact, beyond the shadow of doubt, not by the alleged
court in case #0:11-cr-60004-JIC-1 . . . .” Compl. at 33. The Complaint makes several
allegations of unconstitutional acts on the part of Defendants, mostly related to the very existence
of the Court in the Southern District of Florida, which Eye claims lacks jurisdiction because it
does not legally exist. Eye also makes some incomprehensible claims regarding a failure on the
part of Defendant Larrimore to use address labels that she provided in order to mail her filings
from her criminal case. The U.S. Postal Service attempted to deliver copies of court filings to
Eye’s address of record. See Compl. ¶ 2.1. After several failed attempts, a deputy clerk noted on
the criminal docket that mail was undeliverable and noted the attempts. See Case No. 11-cr60004-JIC, ECF Nos. 60 & 61. Eye ultimately accuses Larimore of being part of the conspiracy
to deprive her of her constitutional rights via these actions.
The Complaint is fifty-three pages in length, and is rambling and incoherent in its
allegations of wrongdoing on the part of Defendants. However, the Court recognizes that
pro se pleadings are held to a less strict standard than pleadings filed by lawyers and thus are
construed liberally. Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)). With that in mind, the
Court reviews the sufficiency of Eye’s Complaint.
2
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim merely tests the sufficiency of the
complaint; it does not decide the merits of the case. Milburn v. United States, 734 F.2d 762, 765
(11th Cir. 1984). On a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations as true
and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. SEC v. ESM Grp., Inc.,
835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1988). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “But where the well
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged--but it has not ‘shown’--‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 1950.
A complaint must also contain enough facts to indicate the presence of the required elements.
Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1302 (11th Cir. 2007). However, “[a] pleading that
offers ‘a formulaic recitation of elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of
fact or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset
Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002).
III.
ANALYSIS
A. Immunity of Defendants
1. Defendant Federal Judges
“Few doctrines [are] more solidly established at common law than the immunity of
3
judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). “This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of
acting maliciously or corruptly, and it ‘is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or
corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at
liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.’” Id.
(quoting Bradly v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 349 n.16 (1871)). Judicial immunity may only
be overcome where (1) the challenged action was not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, or (2)
the action was taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 1112 (1991).
The Federal Judges named in Eye’s Complaint were all acting within their respective
judicial capacities in making decisions in Eye’s criminal case. Eye makes conclusory statements
that the Defendant Federal Judges were not acting within their judicial capacity. See Compl. ¶¶
6.1, 7.1, 8.2, 8.3.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5. However, these are conclusory allegations which are not
supported by any facts whatsoever. Oxford Asset Mgmt., 297 F.3d at 1188. Eye further claims
the Defendant Federal Judges were acting without jurisdiction because the Southern District of
Florida itself lacks any jurisdiction. Eye’s assertions regarding the Court’s lack of constitutional
authority or jurisdiction are vague and incomprehensible and ultimately lack any merit.
Recognition of judicial immunity is certainly appropriate in this case. Accordingly, Eye’s claims
against the Defendant Federal Judges are dismissed.
2. Defendant Federal Prosecutors
Recognizing the potential for claims of constitutional deprivation by individuals
subjected to criminal prosecution, the Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor representing the
4
United States in a criminal case is immune from civil suit. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 424 (1976). The Court reasoned that to allow such suits would affect the way in which
prosecutors make decisions on prosecuting individuals, as well as how they carry out their duties.
Id. Civil suits would also likely prove tremendous burdens to prosecutors, many of whom are
responsible for hundreds of indictments and trials annually. Id.
The Defendant Prosecutors have been named as defendants by Eye because of their roles
in prosecuting her in her pending criminal case. Their immunity is clearly defined in this
instance. Defendant Ferrer is similarly provided immunity for his duties in supervising the
prosecutors who brought the criminal charges that Eye faces. A prosecutor acting in a
supervisory role is not liable in tort for allegations of negligent training or supervision. Van de
Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2009).1 Eye’s claims against the Defendant Federal
Prosecutors are therefore dismissed.
3. Defendant Larimore
Eye brings a Bivens claim against the Clerk of Court Steven Larimore, based upon the
U.S. Postal Services’ inability to deliver copies of court filings to Eye’s address of record. See
Compl. ¶ 2.1. Eye’s allegations against Larimore make little logical sense and are implausible.
Eye specifically takes issue with entries 61 and 62 on her criminal docket which are “Clerk’s
Notice of Undeliverable Mail.” Id. Eye’s Complaint indicates that the clerk who entered the
notice had the initials “rb,” which undisputably are not the initials of Steven Larimore. Id.
1
Both Van de Kamp and Imbler were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, not Bivens,
however, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the immunities provided federal officials in
Bivens actions are coextensive with those provided state officials in § 1983 actions. Bolin v.
Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1241 (11th Cir. 2000).
5
Regardless of the accuracy of Eye’s assertions, Defendant Larimore is entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity.
“Nonjudicial officials have absolute immunity for their duties that are integrally related to
the judicial process.” Jenkins v. Clerk of Court, U.S. Dist. Court, Southern Dist. of Fla., 150
Fed.App’x 988, 990 (11th Cir. 2005). “Absolute quasi-judicial immunity for nonjudicial
officials is determined by a functional analysis of their actions in relation to the judicial process.”
Id.; Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542, 1545 (11th Cir. 1983) (clerk of court has absolute immunity
when performing discretionary functions).
As the Clerk of the Court, Defendant Larimore exercised his discretion in ceasing to
make attempts to deliver copies of filings to Eye’s address after several previous attempts failed.
See Case No. 11-cr-60004-JIC, ECF Nos. 60 & 61. This decision was well within his
discretionary authority. Accordingly, he is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity, and
Eye’s claims against Defendant Larimore are dismissed.
B. Eye’s Complaint is Frivolous and Vexatious
Though Eye’s claims are all dismissed based on the various immunities of the
Defendants, the Court identifies Eye’s Complaint as frivolous and vexatious and undertaken for
the dilatory purpose of exacting retribution for actions taken by officials in her criminal trial.
The Court will not countenance such efforts, nor allow Eye to waste time and judicial resources
in addressing such matters. The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that federal courts have the
power to manage their dockets and curb vexatious litigation. May v. Maass, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20695 (11th Cir. Sept. 22, 2005) (citing Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387
(11th Cir. 1993)); see also Copeland v. Green, 949 F.2d 390 (11th Cir. 1991).
6
Here, the Court finds no legal basis for relief in any of the claims in Eye’s Complaint.
Eye’s rambling and incoherent claims of conspiracy to deprive her of her constitutional rights are
purely alarmist, and do not provide any factual allegations that give rise to a cognizable claim.
See Carter v. Dolce, 741 F.2d 758, 760 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming district court’s dismissal with
prejudice of pro se plaintiff’s claim, specifically noting that plaintiff’s conspiracy claim was
“without arguable merit and therefore frivolous in accordance with current case law on this
point”).
C. Sanctions
“Pro se litigants are not immune from Rule 11 sanctions.” Dean v. ARA Envtl. Serv.,
124 F.R.D. 224, 227 (N.D. Ga. 1988). “That his filings are pro se offers [plaintiff] no
impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial
machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson v.
MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit
does not stringently impose sanctions on pro se plaintiffs. See Woods v. IRS, 3 F.3d 403, 404
(11th Cir. 1993) (finding “there can be no doubt that this is a frivolous appeal and we would not
hesitate to order sanctions if appellant had been represented by counsel. However, since this suit
was filed pro se, we conclude that sanctions would be inappropriate”); United States v. Morse,
532 F.3d 1130, 1133 (11th Cir. 2008) (imposing sanctions on plaintiff because his arguments
were frivolous and he had been warned by the Court not to raise them, but noting “we are
reluctant to impose sanctions on pro se litigants”).
In the present case, the Court finds that Eye’s claims are objectively groundless. Eye’s
motives in filing this Complaint were clearly vexatious and pursued as a means of retribution, as
7
well as to forestall progress in her criminal case. Thus, Eye’s action warrants sanctions pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. “Rule 11 sanctions are designed to discourage dilatory or abusive tactics
and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses . . . . They
may be imposed for the purpose of deterrence, compensation and punishment.” Didie v. Howes,
988 F.2d 1097, 1104 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
In determining appropriate sanctions under Rule 11, the court should consider the nature
of the violation, the circumstances in which it was committed, the circumstances (including the
financial state) of the individual to be sanctioned, and those sanctioning measures that would
suffice to deter that individual from similar violations in the future. Schramek v. Jones, 161
F.R.D. 119, 122 (M.D. Fla. 1995). In Schramek, as in the present case, the pro se plaintiffs failed
to assert in their motion to dismiss, any factual showing of direct or actual damage unique to
them but instead, made only conclusory statements that were not grounded in, or supported by,
fact. Id. at 121. Noting the defendant was wronged by the plaintiff, recognizing the pro se status
of the plaintiffs, and realizing that the plaintiffs did not have deep pocket financial resources, the
Court found the “imposition of financial sanctions would not be the best deterrent of future
untoward behavior.” Id. Instead, to deter future abuse of the civil litigation system, the Court, in
that instance, imposed Rule 11 sanctions by prohibiting the plaintiffs from “bringing any further
civil actions without the benefit of counsel or prior leave of court.” Id. at 122.
Likewise, a monetary sanction is not the most effective means to deter Eye from filing
future frivolous complaints. Instead, keeping with the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions, this Court
will impose sanctions, as set forth below, that are appropriate to discourage further “frivolous
claims, defenses or motions and to deter costly meritless maneuvers, thus avoiding unnecessary
8
delay and expense in litigation.” Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987).
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19) is
GRANTED. This case is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. It is further,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff is sanctioned in the following manner. The
Clerk of the Court is hereby DIRECTED not to accept any future case filings by Roanne Eye
unless represented by counsel or upon obtaining prior leave of court to proceed pro se. The Clerk
of the Court is instructed to CLOSE this case. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 7th of November, 2011.
__ day
K. Michael Moore
Digitally signed by K. Michael Moore
DN: cn=K. Michael Moore, o=USDC, ou=KMM,
email=Moore@flsd.uscourts.gov, c=US
Date: 2011.11.07 16:27:49 -05'00'
K. MICHAEL MOORE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:
All counsel of record
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?