Spadaro v. City of Miramar et al
Filing
156
ORDER Dismissing 123 Plaintiff's Appeal to the Court's Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the City Defendants' Motions to Compel Discovery. Signed by Judge James I. Cohn on 7/25/2012. (npd)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 11-61607-CIV-COHN/SELTZER
DONALD R. SPADARO, as Limited
Guardian for ANTHONY CARAVELLA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF MIRAMAR, etc., et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL TO THE COURT’S ORDER GRANTING
IN PART AND DENYING IN PART THE CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO COMPEL
DISCOVERY
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Objections to Magistrate’s Order
Granting in Part and Denying [in] Part Motions to Compel [DE 123] (“Appeal”). The
Court has considered the Appeal, the City Defendants’ Response [DE 127]
(‘Response”), Plaintiff’s Reply [DE 128], the record in this case, and is otherwise
advised in the premises.
I. BACKGROUND
This case stems from the November 1983 rape and murder of Ada Jankowski
and the subsequent arrest and conviction of Plaintiff Anthony Caravella (“Plaintiff”) for
this crime. On June 28, 2011, Donald R. Spadaro, Esq., as limited guardian for the
Plaintiff, filed suit against Defendants City of Miramar (the “City”), George H. Pierson
(“Pierson”), William Mantesta (“Mantesta”), William Guess (“Guess”), Broward County
Sheriff’s Office, Al Lamberti, Kenneth Jenne, and Anthony Fantigrassi, (collectively
“Defendants”) alleging that the acts or practices of the Defendants had violated
Caravella’s constitutional rights. Complaint [DE 1-3] ¶ 3. Plaintiff asserts that the
actions of the City, and its officers Guess, Pierson, and Mantesta (collectively “City
Defendants”) lead to his false arrest, confession, and conviction for Ms. Jankowski’s
murder. See, e.g., 2d. Am. Compl. [DE 107] ¶ 84.
During discovery, the City Defendants propounded interrogatory requests on
Plaintiff which were designed to elicit facts supporting many of Plaintiff’s contentions in
the Amended Complaint. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motions to
Compel [DE 118] (“April 25, 2012 Order”) at 2-4 (quoting interrogatories). The City
Defendants filed motions to compel challenging the Plaintiff’s responses and objections
to the interrogatories. See City’s Motion [DE 69], Mantesta Motion [DE 70], Guess
Motion [DE 71], and Pierson Motion [DE 72] (collectively “Motions to Compel”).
Specifically, the City Defendants contended that Plaintiff’s responses to the
interrogatories were improper because (1) the interrogatories were answered by a
limited guardian appoint for Plaintiff and not by Plaintiff himself1; (2) Plaintiff improperly
cited to thousands of pages of documents that are not business records; (3) Plaintiff did
not specify the location within the referenced documents which contains information
responsive to the requests; and (4) Plaintiff cited to documents unrelated to information
sought by the City Defendants.
Judge Seltzer granted in part and denied the Motions to Compel, finding that (1)
it was improper for Plaintiff to object to interrogatories and then provide a response; (2)
the interrogatories did not seek any material protected by attorney-client and/or work
1
As Judge Seltzer noted in the April 25, 2012 Order, this aspect of the
Motions to Compel was later withdrawn. See DE 108.
2
product privilege; and (3) Plaintiff failed to described the responsive documents with
specificity. April 25, 2012 Order at 6-13. Accordingly, Judge Seltzer ordered Plaintiff
to identify the pages and paragraphs of each document he claimed was responsive, or
alternatively, to provide complete written responses. Id. at 13. Plaintiff has now filed
objections to the April 25, 2012 Order.
II. DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), a magistrate judge may decide
non-dispositive motions. Upon objection by a party, the district court may reconsider
any pretrial matter where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is “clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.” See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Massey v. United Transp.
Union, 868 F. Supp. 1385, 1388 (S.D. Ga.1994), aff’d, 65 F.3d 183 (11th Cir.1995).
Accordingly, unless Judge Seltzer’s determinations with respect to the matters at issue
were clearly erroneous or contrary to law, those determinations shall not be disturbed.
Plaintiff contends that Judge Seltzer’s “ruling is contrary to the law, as [the City]
Defendants’ contention interrogatories, are overbroad and unduly burdensome, and
invade Plaintiff counsel’s work product privilege.” Appeal at 2. The City Defendants
oppose Plaintiff’s Appeal because the interrogatories only seek “material and principal
facts supporting specific allegations in the lawsuit.” Response at 3. The City
Defendants also contend that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that answering the
interrogatories would “reveal either confidential communications between the Plaintiff
and his counsel or would otherwise reveal mental impressions of the Plaintiff’s counsel.”
Id. Finally, the City Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to provide any basis to
support his argument that “Judge Seltzer was incorrect in requiring the Plaintiff to
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identify the page and paragraph numbers from the documents upon which the Plaintiff
relied to answer the interrogatories.” Id. For the reasons discussed below, the Court
finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that Judge Seltzer’s
well-reasoned order was clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
First, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s argument that the challenged
interrogatories are overbroad and unduly burdensome. As Judge Seltzer recognized,
courts within this district have held that interrogatories which seek to discover the
factual basis of an opposing party’s allegations are permissible. See, e.g., Donahay v.
Palm Beach Tours & Transp., Inc., 242 F.R.D. 685, 688 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Belfleur v.
Salman Maint. Servs., Inc., Case No. 07-20219-CIV, 2007 WL 2608668, at *4 (S.D. Fla,
Sept. 5, 2007). The Court also disagrees with Plaintiff that these interrogatories are
improper because they were served “at the very beginning of discovery.” Motion at 6.
This case has been pending over a year. Fact discovery was set to close on July 27,
2012,2 until the recent extension of pretrial deadlines and the trial date. Since the close
of fact discovery is imminent, it is not premature to require Plaintiff to respond to
contention interrogatories at this time. See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. CV–04–2799
(NG)(VVP), 2012 WL 957970, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2012) (finding contention
interrogatories were timely where discovery had been ongoing and was nearing
completion). Upon review of each interrogatory in question, the Court agrees with
Judge Seltzer that the interrogatories are “narrowly tailored” and are not overbroad or
unduly burdensome. See April 25, 2012 Order at 9.
2
The Court notes that Plaintiff originally opposed any extension of the trial
date. See DE 142.
4
The Court also disagrees with Plaintiff’s contention that the interrogatories seek
material protected by the work product privilege. As codified under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(3)(A), generally “a party may not discover documents and tangible
things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or
its representative.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). Here, Plaintiff argues that the
interrogatories “require Plaintiff counsel’s [sic] to provide her analysis of MIRAMAR’s
own records” in violation of the work product privilege. Appeal at 5. Plaintiff essentially
argues that answering the interrogatories would require disclosure of work product
because the responses might “reflect an attorney’s opinion as to the significance of
those documents in the preparation of his case.” Id. at 8 (quoting United States v.
Pepper’s Steel & Alloys, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 695, 698 (S.D. Fla. 1990)). This Court
disagrees.
Numerous courts have rejected the proposition that interrogatories which seek
material or principal facts that support a party’s allegations violate the work product
doctrine. See Perfect Web Tech. v. Insousa, Inc., 07-80286-CIV, 2008 WL 725726, at
*2-3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2008) (rejecting work-product objections to contention
interrogatories that sought factual basis for defense); Hamilton v. RadioShack Corp.,
No. C 11–00888 LB, 2012 WL 2327191, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2012) (rejecting
work-product objection to contention interrogatories because “the work product doctrine
does not protect the facts of a particular claim.”); Kolker v. VNUS Med. Techs., Inc., No.
C 10–0900 SBA (PSG), 2011 WL 5057094, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2011) (rejecting
privilege asserted over the identity or description of witnesses or documents that may
be used to support plaintiff’s allegations because the defendant had “not requested a
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summary or even identification of ‘interviews, statements, memoranda,
correspondence, briefs, mental impressions,’ or other aspects of an attorney's
work-product subject to the protections of the work-product doctrine.”). The Court finds
the reasoning of the court in King v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 2, 5 n.3 (D.D.C.
1987), particularly instructive. In that case, the District Court for the District of Columbia
observed that:
There is also an intimation by counsel for the plaintiffs that
answering contention interrogatories some how encroaches
upon an attorney's work product. The Magistrate summarily
rejects this suggestion, for in answering contention
interrogatories the party is only giving the factual specifics
which the party contends supports a claim, and this in no
way impinges on the attorney's impressions or analysis as to
how the attorney will endeavor to apply the law to the facts.
If this elementary principle were not applicable, contention
interrogatories would not exist. As the Advisory Committee
Note reflects, as to requests for even opinions or
contentions that call for the application of law to fact, they
are permissible and can be most useful in narrowing and
sharpening the issues, which is the major purpose of
discovery.
King, 117 F.R.D. at 5 n.3. The City Defendants interrogatories are designed to elicit the
factual bases which encompass Plaintiff’s specific factual assertions in the Amended
Complaint. These narrowly tailored requests do not impinge on counsel’s work product
and are instead designed to narrow the issues.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Judge Seltzer “incorrectly applied Rule 33(d) to the
documents in question.” Appeal at 8-9. Plaintiff states that Judge Seltzer “erred in
ordering Plaintiff’s counsel to identify the page and paragraph numbers from MIRAMAR
Defendants’ own documents or to evaluate said documents for each and every fact
known to Plaintiff’s counsel based upon her review of said documents.” Id. at 9. Judge
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Seltzer ruled that Plaintiff could either provide complete written responses to the City
Defendants’ interrogatories or identify the pages and paragraphs of each document he
claims is responsive. April 25, 2012 Order at 13. As the City Defendants’ point out, the
case cited by Plaintiff, Covad Communications Co. v. Revonent, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 17, 20
(D.D.C. 2009), actually supports the proposition that Plaintiff must specifically identify
the documents which support his interrogatory responses. In that case, the court
observed that: “even if it were appropriate for Covad to answer the interrogatories by
identifying Revonet's files, it would be required to specifically identify the documents
that contain the answers.” Revonent, Inc., 258 F.R.D. at 20. Thus, even though strictly
speaking Rule 33(d) only applies when a party responds to interrogatories by producing
its own business records, the Court nonetheless agrees with Judge Seltzer’s conclusion
that Plaintiff must either provide a complete written response for each interrogatory or
cite to specific page and paragraphs of each document he claims is responsive.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.
Plaintiff’s Objections to Magistrate’s Order Granting in Part and Denying [in] Part
Motions to Compel [DE 123] are DISMISSED;
2.
Plaintiff’s Objections contained therein are OVERRULED;
3.
Plaintiff is directed to provide better answers to the City Defendants’ remaining
Interrogatories on or before August 10, 2012, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties; and
4.
To the extent that any of the interrogatories relate to the recently dismissed
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Florida RICO claims, Plaintiff will be required to respond to any such
interrogatories within 14 days of either (1) the City Defendants’ filing an answer
to a Third Amended Complaint or (2) the Court denying a motion to dismiss the
Florida RICO claims.3
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County,
Florida, on this 25th day of July, 2012.
Copies provided to counsel of record via CM/ECF.
3
The Court recognizes that the time has not yet expired for Plaintiff to file a
Third Amended Complaint. The Court has nonetheless provided a time frame for
Plaintiff to respond to any interrogatories related to the Florida RICO claims for the sake
of completeness should these claims come back into the case after the filing of a Third
Amended Complaint.
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