Diaz et al v. Amerijet International, Inc.
Filing
141
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 101 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granting in part and denying in part 101 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga on 5/24/2012. (ps1)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
CASE NO. 11-61812-CIV-ALTONAGA/Simonton
MARIO DIAZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
AMERIJET INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant, Amerijet International, Inc.’s
(“Amerijet[’s]”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h), Or, In the Alternative, Fully-Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Motion”) [ECF No. 101], filed March 19, 2012. Plaintiffs filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] on
August 12, 2011, alleging one count for violations of Sections 2, Third and Fourth of 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151, et seq. (“Railway Labor Act” or “RLA”), or “infringement on Plaintiffs’ rights to engage
in and to organize union activities and representation.” (Compl. 2). The Court has previously
denied Amerijet’s motions to dismiss the Complaint on the basis of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Federal Rule”) 12(b)(6) (see Nov. 9, 2011 Order [ECF No. 32]) and Federal Rule
12(b)(1) (see Nov. 28, 2011 Order [ECF No. 37]).
Amerijet now moves to dismiss the
Complaint under Federal Rule 12(h), or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
claims. Plaintiffs filed a Response [ECF No. 119] on April 2, 2012. Amerijet filed its Reply
[ECF No. 127] on April 12, 2012. The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions
and the applicable law.
Case No. 11-61812-CIV-ALTONAGA/Simonton
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendant Amerijet moves to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule 12(h)(3), which
provides that “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). A defendant may attack subject matter
jurisdiction in two ways — a facial attack or a factual attack. Amerijet asserts the portion of the
Motion concerning subject-matter jurisdiction is a factual attack, “not duplicative of the
grounds” addressed in the Court’s November 28, 2011 Order, and “based upon the facts as now
known after discovery.” (Mot. 13 n.13). For the purpose of Federal Rule 12(h), Amerijet seeks
to use the undisputed facts that also serve as the basis for the portion of the Motion seeking
summary judgment. (See id.). A factual attack “challenges the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings such as
testimony and affidavits, are considered.” Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507,
511 (5th Cir. 1980).
In a factual attack, courts are free to weigh the evidence to satisfy
themselves they have the power to hear the case. See Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529
(11th Cir. 1990).
No presumption of truth attaches to the plaintiff’s allegations, and the
existence of disputed material facts does not prevent the trial court from evaluating for itself the
merits of the jurisdictional claim. See id. Moreover, “[i]n the face of a factual challenge to
subject matter jurisdiction, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that jurisdiction exists.” OSI,
Inc. v. United States, 285 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
B.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment shall be rendered “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
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genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In making its assessment of summary judgment, the Court
“must view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc.,
117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997), and “must resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in
favor of the non-movant.” United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Ins. Co. of America, 894
F.2d 1555, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990).
“By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (emphasis in original). “As to materiality, the
substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
Likewise, a dispute about a material fact is a “genuine” issue “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of
the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is proper “against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322. In those cases, there is no genuine issue
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of material fact “since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323.
II. BACKGROUND1
Amerijet is a small cargo airline serving the Caribbean and Latin America, with its
domestic flights originating from and terminating at Miami International Airport (“MIA”). (See
Amerijet’s Concise Statement of Undisputed Material Facts . . . (“SMF”) [ECF No. 102] ¶ 1). In
addition to aircraft flight operations, Amerijet’s operations at MIA include the “provision of
warehousing, warehouse services, and/or transportation of cargo and loading/unloading of cargo
at the airport,” collectively referred to as “cargo handling services” pursuant to the Airline Use
Agreement and related policies and leases in place between Miami-Dade County (“County”),
which owns and manages MIA, and the airlines such as Amerijet that use MIA. (Id. ¶¶ 2–3).
Amerijet has cargo handling employees at locations other than MIA in Miami and at locations
throughout the country. (See id. ¶ 4). As a small airline, Amerijet’s pay rates have not matched
the rates of large air carriers in the industry. (See id. ¶ 5). Amerijet employees performing cargo
handling services (“Cargo Handlers”) were at the low end of Amerijet’s wage scale, due to the
skill and experience required for that position. (See id. ¶ 6).
Beginning in February 2010, in addition to handling its own cargo, Amerijet began
providing cargo handling services to another air carrier, British Airways (“BA”), at MIA. (See
id. ¶ 7). Cargo handling services performed by one airline lessee for another airline at MIA are
permitted under the Airline Use Agreement and under Amerijet’s lease with MIA, with approval
from the Miami-Dade County Aviation Department (“MDAD”).
(See id. ¶ 8).
obtained approval from the MDAD to handle BA’s cargo. (See id. ¶ 9).
1
Unless otherwise noted, the facts are undisputed.
4
Amerijet
Case No. 11-61812-CIV-ALTONAGA/Simonton
When Amerijet began handling BA’s cargo, the Miami-Dade County Code contained a
Living Wage Ordinance (“Wage Ordinance”). (See id. ¶ 10). Since 2002, the Wage Ordinance
has required any service contractor providing “covered services” at MIA to pay an employee
performing a covered service a minimum hourly wage set by the County and higher than the
state and federal minimum wage. (Id. ¶ 11). Since 2006, the Wage Ordinance has included “inwarehouse cargo handling” among covered services. (Id. ¶ 12). The Wage Ordinance requires
covered employers to post “Living Wage Notices” in work areas throughout MIA stating the
current minimum wage for covered employees and the process for making a complaint to the
County of a violation of the Wage Ordinance. (Id. ¶ 13).
In June 2010, Amerijet’s Senior Director of Airport Operations, Rasheme Richardson
(“Richardson”), received a letter from the Miami-Dade County Department of Small Business
Development (“SBD”), which enforces the Wage Ordinance. (See id. ¶ 14). The letter (“SBD
Letter”) notified Amerijet that the SBD was initiating an investigation into Amerijet’s
compliance with the Wage Ordinance, specifically as to Amerijet’s employees performing cargo
handling services for BA (“Cargo Handlers for BA”). (See id. ¶¶ 14–15). The SBD Letter stated
that the County “has received a complaint from an Amerijet employee who indicated that
Amerijet had started providing cargo services for British Airways and other airlines and
[employees] are not being paid a living wage.” (Id. ¶ 15). The SBD Letter further stated that
Amerijet’s failure to pay the Cargo Handlers for BA the minimum wage pursuant to the Wage
Ordinance would violate that Ordinance. (See id.). The SBD requested certain information from
Amerijet as part of its investigation. (See id. ¶ 16).
Amerijet engaged outside counsel for assistance regarding the SBD Letter. (See id. ¶ 17).
During discussions between Amerijet’s outside counsel and the County Attorney’s Office, the
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SBD informed Amerijet in July 2010 that in response to Amerijet’s request, no response to the
County’s information requests would be required until the County made a legal determination
with respect to Amerijet’s compliance with the Wage Ordinance as concerned the Cargo
Handlers for BA.
(See id. ¶ 18).
The County Attorney’s Office never issued a legal
determination. (See id. ¶ 19). Amerijet never pressed the County Attorney’s Office for an
opinion, and the SBD took no further steps to investigate. (See id. ¶ 20).
Michael Simpson (“Simpson”), business agent at the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (“IBEW”) (see id. ¶ 29), met with several Plaintiffs, including Plaintiff
Jonathan Guerrero (“Guerrero”), several times between March 21 and April 29, 2011, about
potentially joining the IBEW union. (See Pls.’ Additional Facts (“SAF”) [ECF No. 119-1] ¶ 1).
Plaintiffs, all Cargo Handlers, believe they should have been paid in accordance with the Wage
Ordinance. (See SMF ¶ 57).
On April 8, 2011, the IBEW, Local 349, filed a petition (“IBEW Petition”) seeking to
represent Amerijet’s 34 in-warehouse Cargo Handlers at MIA under Section 9 of the National
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). (See id. ¶ 21). The IBEW Petition identified cargo handlers as
the unit of which a substantial number of employees wished to be represented by the IBEW for
collective bargaining. (See SAF ¶ 5). Richardson received a facsimile dated April 8, 2011 from
the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) enclosing the IBEW Petition. (See SMF ¶ 22;
Resp. to Amerijet’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SMFO”) [ECF No. 119-1] ¶ 22).
Richardson forwarded the facsimile to Amerijet’s in-house counsel. (See SMF ¶ 23). In the
faxed letter, the NLRB advised that it intended to conduct a formal investigative hearing on April
18, 2011 if one was necessary. (See SAF ¶ 6).
Since 2004, some of Amerijet’s employees, specifically its pilots and flight engineers,
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have been represented by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“IBT”), Local 769. (See
SMF ¶ 24). Based on its experience with the IBT, Amerijet knew that the NLRB lacked
jurisdiction over Amerijet, an air carrier covered exclusively by the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”)
and the National Mediation Board (“NMB”), which administers the RLA. (See id. ¶¶ 25, 40).
The IBT received an intervenor letter from the NLRB with a copy of the IBEW Petition. (See id.
¶ 26). Upon receipt, IBT President Michael Scott (“Scott”) advised the NLRB supervising agent
in charge of the matter, Karen Thornton (“Thornton”), that Amerijet was an airline and covered
by the RLA. (See id. ¶ 27). Thornton agreed with Scott. (See id. ¶ 28). As a matter of
professional courtesy, Scott telephoned Simpson and informed him the NLRB lacked jurisdiction
over Amerijet. (See id. ¶ 29). Scott told Simpson that organizing under the NMB must be done
on a system-wide basis and not based on a single location. (See id. ¶ 35).
Amerijet holds a U.S. Department of Transportation air carrier operating certificate as
well as several certificates of public convenience and necessity. (See id. ¶ 39). The NMB in two
certification decisions has made formal findings that Amerijet is a carrier within the meaning of
the RLA, and the NMB has jurisdiction over disputes between Amerijet and its employees. (See
id. ¶ 40). Amerijet sets forth the flight schedule and information on its public website for its
services in air transportation of cargo in foreign commerce. (See id. ¶ 41). After receiving the
IBEW Petition, on April 12 and 13, 2011, Amerijet’s general counsel filed a position statement
and supplemental position statement addressing the NLRB’s lack of jurisdiction. (See id. ¶ 42).
After doing some research on the matter, the IBEW recognized it could not simply re-file
the IBEW Petition with the NMB, whose requirements differ from NLRB requirements. (See id.
¶ 36). The IBEW further saw it did not have the requisite number of authorization cards under
the RLA. (See id.). Under the RLA, a petition for representation must be supported by signed
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authorization cards from 35% of the employees in a system-wide craft or class. (See id. ¶ 30).
Under the NLRA, a petition for representation must be supported by a showing that 30% or more
of the employees in the bargaining unit seek union representation. (See id. ¶ 31). On April 14,
2011, Simpson orally requested that the NLRB withdraw the IBEW Petition, which request was
approved the same day by the NLRB Regional Director of Region 12, Rochelle Kentov. (See id.
¶ 48). Simpson believed the NMB had jurisdiction, which he verified after receiving a final
determination on the matter from the NMB. (See id. ¶ 37; SMFO ¶ 37).
Amerijet was promptly notified by the NLRB that the IBEW Petition was withdrawn, and
the NLRB was terminating proceedings with respect to Amerijet. (See SMF ¶ 49). Until
Plaintiffs filed the instant suit, Amerijet had no knowledge of which, if any, of the 34 Cargo
Handlers had signed a card with the IBEW or any other union to represent them. (See id. ¶ 44).
No employees informed Amerijet that they signed a union authorization card. (See id. ¶ 46).
Amerijet claims it hired employee relations consultant Alex Casillas (“Casillas”) to meet
with the 34 Cargo Handlers, outside the presence of Amerijet supervision or management, to find
out why employees were taking grievances to the County instead of directly to Amerijet, and to
determine where Amerijet could make improvements. (See id. ¶ 51). Amerijet claims that
Casillas met with Vice President of Human Resources Isis Suriá (“Suriá”) who briefed him on
the Wage Ordinance and NLRB filing. (See id. ¶ 52). Amerijet claims it met Casillas only once,
prior to his meeting Amerijet employees, and they discussed County ordinance issues and
Amerijet’s position. (See SAF ¶ 7). According to Amerijet, it did not discuss union activities
with Casillas. (See id.). On April 19 and 20, 2011, Casillas met with the employees at issue in
small groups. (See SMF ¶ 53). Nobody apart from Casillas and the Cargo Handlers was present
at these meetings. (See id. ¶ 54). Simpson has stated that he heard nothing from Plaintiffs
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regarding their conversations with Casillas that he thought would be grounds for an unfair labor
practice. (See id. ¶ 55).
On April 29, 2011, Amerijet entered into a service contract with Alliance Ground
International, Inc. (“AGI”), a third party cargo handling services contractor at MIA, to perform
the services for the BA contract. (See id. ¶¶ 66–67). The fee for the outsourced service was
based on a price per kilogram of cargo moved, and it was AGI’s responsibility to budget labor
costs. (See id.). Also on April 29, 2011, as a result of the contract with AGI, Amerijet laid off
all of its in-warehouse Cargo Handlers at MIA. (See id. ¶ 67).
Simpson had continued to meet with a mixed group of Cargo Handlers, on multiple
occasions, after the submission of the IBEW Petition to the NLRB and prior to their discharge.
(See SAF ¶ 2). All twenty-two (22) Plaintiffs signed union authorization cards prior to their
termination by Amerijet. (See id. ¶ 3). Following Plaintiffs’ termination, Simpson filed an
unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB based on Amerijet firing Plaintiffs for their attempt
to organize. (See id. ¶¶ 4–5). According to Simpson, the IBEW never filed a petition with the
NMB because it required a petitioner to have 35% of all cargo handlers of the company, and
while he was in the process of obtaining the requisite signatures, the Cargo Handlers were fired.
(See SMF ¶ 38; SMFO ¶ 38).
On August 29, 2010, Plaintiff Rafael Bello (“Bello”) sustained a claimed occupational
injury. (See SMF ¶ 72). Bello was out of work simultaneously on workers’ compensation leave
and Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave after he requested and received the same.
(See id. ¶ 73). Bello’s personnel file reflects he was terminated in early April 2011 because his
“FMLA expired/WC” and “FMLA expired, unable to return to work at present time.” (Id. ¶ 75).
By letter dated April 7, 2011, Amerijet notified Bello by certified mail that his employment at
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Amerijet was terminated, effective April 8, 2011. (See id. ¶ 76). Bello signed the certified mail
return receipt, acknowledging receipt of this letter, on April 14, 2011. (See id. ¶ 77). At no point
from August 20, 2010 until his termination did Bello return to work at Amerijet. (See id. ¶ 78).
III. ANALYSIS
Amerijet seeks dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 12(h), or, in the
alternative, summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims. The Court addresses Amerijet’s arguments
in turn.
A.
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As noted, the Court has denied Amerijet’s previous motion to dismiss the Complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See Nov. 28, 2011 Order).
In that motion, Amerijet
contended that Plaintiffs did not have a private right of action under RLA Section 2, Third or
Fourth. (See id. 7). The Court observed that “the great weight of law persuades the Court that
private rights of action exist under the RLA for major disputes,” after having explained that the
present action is just such a major dispute. (Id.). The Court further declined to find Plaintiffs
were barred on grounds of judicial estoppel from bringing their RLA claim where they had
previously filed a charge under the NLRA, as Plaintiffs had not “succeeded” in their prior NLRA
claim. (Id. 10–11).
In the present motion, Amerijet again contends Plaintiffs have no private right of action
under the RLA, Section 2, Third or Fourth. (See Mot. 14). This time, however, Amerijet has
reframed its argument somewhat.
Amerijet asserts, “Plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain a labor
representative under the NLRA pursuant to the NLRB’s processes, and with respect to a unit of
employees clearly not eligible for labor representation under the RLA, cannot give rise to a
private right of action to enforce Section 2, Third or Fourth of the RLA.” (Id.). According to
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Amerijet, “there can be no violation of the RLA as a result of organizing activities which
undisputedly and unequivocally were engaged pursuant to the NLRA and which concern a
proposed bargaining unit cognizable only under the NLRA.”
(Id.).
Amerijet bases this
contention on the black letter principle that the NLRA and RLA are “independent and mutually
exclusive federal labor schemes.” (Nov. 28, 2011 Order (quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377 (1969))). Amerijet further argues that the fact that
the RLA Section 2, Third and Fourth repeats the phrase “for the purposes of this [Act]” is proof
that activities governed by the RLA must have been engaged in specifically with the RLA in
mind. (Mot. 15–16).
Amerijet contends its argument now differs from the one that previously failed because it
incorporates facts obtained through discovery. (See id. 13 n.13). Nevertheless, the only fact the
Court can identify relevant to this argument is that Plaintiffs’ initial organizing efforts were done
“pursuant to the NLRB’s processes,” as opposed to those of the RLA. (Id. 14). Amerijet
contends:
Where the petition for representation was filed with the NLRB and not the
NMB, where the unit sought in the petition is one potentially appropriate under
the NLRA only and not the RLA, and where the authorization cards obtained
from certain Plaintiffs were provided to the NLRB and not the NMB, Plaintiffs’
efforts to obtain union representation can only be deemed to have occurred under
the NLRA.
(Mot. 16).
These, however, are not new facts. The Court is somewhat astonished that Amerijet
could call them new, given that Plaintiffs advised they had initially pursued a charge with the
NLRB on the first page of their Complaint (see Compl. 1 n.1), and the previous NLRB action
was extensively discussed in the November 28, 2011 Order. The Court and all parties have been
aware from the inception of this lawsuit that Plaintiffs previously proceeded under (i.e., acted to
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conform to the procedures of) the NLRA. Notwithstanding this undisputed fact, the Court found
that the organization activities alleged by Plaintiffs stated a claim under the RLA. (See Nov. 9,
2011 Order). The November 9, 2011 Order’s holding necessitates the conclusion that Plaintiffs’
original focus on following NLRB procedures does not negate Plaintiffs’ ability to state a RLA
claim.
Amerijet’s argument therefore could be construed as partly asking the Court to reconsider
its denial of Amerijet’s earlier attempt to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule 12(b)(6). In
order to succeed, Amerijet would need to raise grounds that would merit reconsideration, such as
actually new evidence or potential clear error or manifest injustice. See Instituto de Prevision
Militar v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2007). As discussed, the
simple fact of the original NLRA petition is not new evidence. Furthermore, the Court does not
find it points to a clear error or manifest injustice. Apparently, Amerijet contends that because
the RLA and NLRA are two distinctive statutory schemes, there can be no overlap as a matter of
law between the types of activities governed by either statute. Such a position has no basis in the
language of either statute or even in common sense. Both statutes deal with employees’ right to
self-organize. The NLRA provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 157. The RLA provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right
to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.” 45 U.S.C. §
152, Fourth. Amerijet’s narrow focus on the procedure applicable to Amerijet entirely misses
the point — both of these statutes protect the right to organize. Plaintiffs allege they took steps
to organize themselves. Just because the causes of action under the RLA and NLRA are
mutually exclusive does not mean the activities they govern necessarily are, as a matter of law.
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The Court has already ruled that Plaintiffs would have been allowed to temporarily
pursue inconsistent claims based on the same set of facts, if it were unclear which statute
governed their activities. (See Nov. 28, 2011 Order 11). The Court ruled thus because the types
of activities governed by the two statutes are inherently similar. The undisputed fact that the
IBEW initially filed a NLRA Petition, then voluntarily withdrew it with the intent of proceeding
before the NMB (see SMF ¶¶ 36–38; SMFO ¶ 38), does not therefore mean that all of the prior
alleged organizational activity would be irrelevant as a matter of law under the RLA. The Court
declines to grant the Motion on this basis. The Court does not find that Plaintiffs’ previous
actions under the NLRA deprive the Court of its subject matter jurisdiction under the RLA as a
matter of law.
B.
Motion for Summary Judgment
The Court stated in the November 9, 2011 Order that the burden-shifting test as set forth
in Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1083–88 (1980), applies to
RLA claims. (See Nov. 9, 2011 Order 5). In order to make a prima facie case under the Wright
Line framework, an employee must show:
(1) the employee engaged in union or other protected activities; (2) the employer
knew of the employee’s involvement in protected activities; (3) the employer
harbored animus towards those activities; and (4) there was a causal connection
between the employer’s animus and its discharge decision.
Carry Cos. of Ill., Inc. v. NLRB, 30 F.3d 922, 927 (7th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). If the
employee succeeds in proving a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the employer to
demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that it based its discharge decision on unprotected
conduct and that it would have fired the employee anyway.” Id. (citations omitted).
Amerijet contends that Plaintiffs do not establish a prima facie case, and even if they do,
Amerijet has proven it would have taken the same action in terminating Plaintiffs’ employment
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“even in the absence of any anti-union animus.” (Mot. 19). The Court addresses each argument
in support of this position in turn.
1.
Whether Plaintiffs Engaged in RLA-Protected Activities
Amerijet does acknowledge that activities “which arguably could” merit RLA protection
are “meeting with the IBEW pre-layoff (apparently engaged in by four of the Plaintiffs),
solicitation of union authorization card signatures (apparently engaged in by two or three of the
Plaintiffs), and signing a union authorization card (apparently engaged in by each of the
remaining Plaintiffs).” (Id.). The Court agrees.
However, Amerijet then reiterates the unpersuasive argument that these activities were
done in view of the NLRA and are necessarily unprotected by the RLA. (See id. 20). Apart
from this invalid contention, Amerijet offers no reason why the above-cited, undisputed facts
would be irrelevant to organization activities protected by Section 2, Third and Fourth of the
RLA. As this argument effectively mirrors Amerijet’s unsuccessful motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule 12(h), the Court does not grant the Motion on this basis.
2.
Whether Amerijet Knew of Plaintiffs’ Involvement in Protected Activities
Amerijet next contends that even if Plaintiffs engaged in protected activities, “Amerijet
did not know of any Plaintiff’s involvement in any of those activities prior to the layoff of the
Plaintiffs and Amerijet’s other in-warehouse cargo handlers at MIA.” (Id. 21). The Court finds,
however, it is a relatively straightforward matter to find at least a disputed issue of material fact
as to whether Amerijet knew of Plaintiffs’ organization activities.
What is absolutely
undisputed, and has been rehashed in this litigation ad nauseam, is that the IBEW Petition was
initially filed with the NLRB on Plaintiffs’ behalf. It is undisputed that Amerijet learned about
this Petition no more than a few days after it was filed, in a letter from the NLRB to Amerijet
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dated the same day as the IBEW Petition. (See SMF ¶¶ 22–23). In fact, a few days after the
IBEW Petition was filed, Amerijet’s general counsel filed two position statements in response.
(See id. ¶ 42).
A fact-finder could infer from these undisputed facts that if Amerijet knew of the IBEW
Petition, it knew of some of the organizing activity that led to the filing of that Petition, which
activity was relevant to the RLA. While it is also undisputed that Amerijet did not know before
the Complaint was filed exactly which Plaintiffs had signed union cards (see id. ¶ 44), there is
more than sufficient evidence to create at least a disputed issue of material fact as to whether
Amerijet knew that Plaintiffs were organizing themselves, as relevant to the RLA, prior to their
termination.
3.
Whether Amerijet Harbored Animus Toward Plaintiffs’ Activities
Amerijet states that to the extent Plaintiffs seek to introduce the statements of Casillas to
Plaintiffs as evidence of this element, “Amerijet is prepared to stipulate for purposes of summary
judgment only that Mr. Casillas’ remarks manifest a generalized anti-union animus on the part of
Amerijet and/or a hostility by Amerijet towards union organizing activities by the particular
group of employees with whom Mr. Casillas met (the on-airport in-warehouse cargo handling
employees).”
(Mot. 23–24) (emphasis in original).
Given Amerijet’s stipulation for the
purposes of the Motion, the Court finds it unnecessary to address this element.
4.
Whether There was a Causal Connection Between Amerijet’s Animus and
the Discharge Decision and Whether Amerijet Would Have Terminated
Plaintiffs Anyway
Amerijet asserts that its decision to terminate Plaintiffs and outsource cargo handling
services at MIA “was motivated by Amerijet’s legitimate desire to eliminate the controversy
with its own employees and the County both as to whether its in-warehouse cargo handling
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employees at MIA should be paid in accordance with the Wage Ordinance.” (Id. 24). As the
NLRB explains in its lengthy discussion in Wright Line, cited by Amerijet for this issue, this
element of the prima facie case is also related to the question of whether the employer can show
it would have terminated its employees even in the absence of protected union conduct, once a
prima facie case is established and the burden is shifted to the employer. Thus, the Court
addresses both issues here.
Wright Line draws a distinction between “pretext” and “dual motive” RLA cases,
observing:
In modern day labor relations, an employer will rarely, if ever, baldly
assert that it has disciplined an employee because it detests unions or will not
tolerate employees engaging in union or other protected activities. Instead, it will
generally advance what it asserts to be a legitimate business reason for its action.
Examination of the evidence may reveal, however, that the asserted justification is
a sham in that the purported rule or circumstance advanced by the employer did
not exist, or was not, in fact, relied upon. When this occurs, the reason advanced
by the employer may be termed pretextual.
251 N.R.B. at 1083–84. In other cases, however, an employer may have “dual” motives — one a
legitimate business reason, and the other “not a legitimate business reason but . . . instead the
employer’s reaction to its employees’ engaging in union or other protected activities.” Id. at
1084. In the case of a dual motive, the Court must further inquire into the role each motive
plays. See id.
After a lengthy discussion of Supreme Court and other precedent, the NLRB in Wright
Line concluded that an employee must show protected conduct “was a motivating factor in the
employer’s decision” for the causation element of his prima facie case. Id. at 1089 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Once the employee has done so and the burden is shifted to the
employer, “should the employer be able to demonstrate that the discipline or other action would
have occurred absent protected activities, the employee cannot justly complain if the employer’s
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action is upheld.” Id.
Amerijet avers that its legitimate desire to resolve the Wage Ordinance issue at once
establishes that any anti-union animus could not have caused Plaintiffs’ termination, defeating
Plaintiffs’ prima facie case, as well as proves that even if a prima facie case were shown,
Plaintiffs would have been terminated in any event for this business reason. This argument fails
to persuade.
One need only examine the timing of the events in this action to see that there is at least
an issue for the fact-finder as to whether Amerijet’s animus caused Plaintiffs’ termination and
whether Plaintiffs would have been terminated regardless. The Wage Ordinance issue arose in
June 2010, or approximately nine months before the IBEW Petition was filed. The parties’
undisputed account is that while the SBD initiated an investigation into Amerijet’s compliance
with the Wage Ordinance in June 2010, the SBD’s role in this investigation ended the next
month in July 2010, and nothing further was done by the County Attorney. (See SMF ¶¶ 14–20).
Amerijet took no further action to press for a resolution with the County Attorney (see id. ¶ 20).
Then, approximately eight months later on April 8, 2011, the IBEW Petition was filed. (See id. ¶
21). By the end of April 2011, Amerijet had responded to the Petition (see id. ¶ 42), hired
Casillas to speak with Plaintiffs (see id. ¶ 53), entered into a contract with AGI to perform cargo
handling services at MIA (see id. ¶¶ 66–67), and laid off all in-warehouse Cargo Handlers at
MIA, including Plaintiffs (see id. ¶ 67).
It may be that Amerijet solely terminated Plaintiffs to solve the Wage Ordinance issue as
raised in June 2010, and that the timing of the termination relative to Plaintiffs’ organization
activity was coincidence. However, a fact-finder may also conclude that Amerijet was not nearly
as concerned with the Wage Ordinance while it remained the complaint of one anonymous
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employee and the subject of a slow-moving investigation.
Rather, as a fact-finder might
conclude, only when its employees began organizing did Amerijet see the need to act.
Remarkably, Amerijet itself as much as admits in its Reply that this is precisely what happened,
stating:
[A]s to Plaintiffs’ contention that the Wage Ordinance controversy arose in June
201 [sic] but no action was taken by Amerijet until 10 months later, after Amerijet
became aware of union organizing activity, . . . the undisputed record evidence
explains the timing. Specifically, there was no basis for any action while the
County’s investigation was on hold, until a second agency filing was made on
behalf of these same employees in April of 2011 with the NLRB, resulting in the
engagement of a consultant to meet with this group of employees; when the report
from that consultant was that these employees believed they should be paid the
[sic] according to the wage ordinance, it became clear to Ms. Suria that the
controversy needed to be resolved even though no opinion had been rendered by
the County.
(Reply 10–11) (emphasis added).
Amerijet appears to acknowledge outright that the Wage Ordinance only became an issue
when compounded by union activity, which forced Amerijet to seriously contemplate methods of
compliance. Amerijet’s position, as construed by the Court, is that the issue of compliance with
the Wage Ordinance was fundamentally a legitimate business reason for Plaintiffs’ termination,
albeit a reason clearly brought into relief by the threat of Plaintiffs’ unionization. The Court is
troubled by such a reading of the RLA, which would seem to render the statute meaningless.
The Court surmises that an employer might very often find a business reason to discourage not
only union activity, but the object of union activity, which cannot be presumed to occur in a
vacuum. Union organization with the object of advocating for higher wages, as was done in this
action, hardly strikes the Court as a novel or unusual concept. The Court cannot envisage the
RLA to permit an employer to quash unionization because the purported union’s object is not in
its business interest — such a result is surely contrary to congressional intent. It may have been
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in Amerijet’s business interest to discourage Plaintiffs’ activities in the context of the Wage
Ordinance. What the RLA requires the Court to do, however, is to distinguish between an
employer’s business interest in discouraging union activity (and its object), and other, legitimate
business interests. Congress in enacting the RLA has distinguished the former as an illegitimate
motivation for discharging employees.
In light of the timing of events and Ameirjet’s own statements, Amerijet has not
demonstrated beyond dispute that it would have terminated Plaintiffs regardless of their
organization activities. The Court will not grant Amerijet summary judgment on this basis.
5.
Whether Plaintiff Rafael Bello May Establish a Prima Facie Case
Amerijet contends that at the very least summary judgment should be granted as to
Plaintiff Bello’s claim. Amerijet asserts that Bello cannot establish a prima facie case under the
RLA because his termination was clearly motivated by legitimate business reasons, namely that
he had exhausted all of his FMLA and workers’ compensation leave and could not return to
work. (See Mot. 29–30). According to Amerijet, Bello has not shown Amerijet had any
knowledge of putative union activity prior to his termination. (See id. 30). In particular, the
timing of Bello’s termination raises issues. The letter Bello received notifying him of his
termination is dated April 7, 2011 (see SMF ¶ 76), or one day before the IBEW Petition was
filed.
Plaintiff argues, however, that the April 7, 2011 letter did not appear on Amerijet
stationery and was not delivered to Bello until April 14, 2011, raising a question of when the
letter was actually executed. (See Resp. 12 (citing Apr. 7, 2011 Letter [ECF No. 114-29];
Certified Mail Receipt [ECF No. 114-30])). The corresponding personnel action form indicates
an effective termination date of April 8, 2011, and it was not signed by the department director
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until April 11, 2011, or by human resources until May 9, 2011 (see id. (citing Personnel Action
Form [ECF No. 114-31])). Plaintiffs further state that Bello’s FMLA leave had actually expired
months earlier, in November 2010. (See id. (citing Unemployment Benefit Determination [ECF
No. 114-33])).
The exact date that Amerijet learned of the IBEW Petition, moreover, is in dispute.
Amerijet contends it learned of it on April 11, 2011. (See Mot. 30). However, Plaintiffs note
that the letter to Amerijet containing the IBEW Petition is dated April 8, 2011 (see Resp. 12
(citing Apr. 8, 2011 Letter [ECF No. 114-6])), and the facsimile from the NLRB containing the
IBEW Petition is also dated April 8, 2011 (see id. (citing IBEW Petition [ECF No. 102-4])).
According to Plaintiffs, the only evidence that Amerijet learned of the Petition on April 11, 2011
is Richardson’s declaration (see Decl. of Rasheme Richardson (“Richardson Decl.”) ¶ 8 [ECF
No. 102-1]). Nevertheless, Richardson could not remember this fact at his deposition. (See
Deposition of Rasheme Richardson, Jan. 11, 2012 [ECF No. 114-9] (“Richardson Dep.”) 13:18–
14:3 (“Q: How did you know about that petition? A: I received a document, attention to me. Q:
And who sent that to you? A: I don’t recall. Q: Was it from the NLRB? A: I don’t recall. Q:
And then at that point you became aware that — do you know when you first became
knowledgeable? Was it in March or April, 2011? A: I don’t recall.”)).
Amerijet summarily states in reply that “because the undisputed evidence . . . shows that
Bello’s termination paperwork was generated and executed by at least one responsible company
representative as of April 8, 2011, and reflects a termination date of April 8, 2011, but Amerijet
did not receive the NLRB petition until April 11, 2011, Amerijet could not have terminated Bello
for any putative union activity.” (Reply 12). Amerijet dismisses the facsimile dated April 8,
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2011 as a document “that was in the union’s possession and not Amerijet’s possession.” (Id.
n.5).
The Court finds, in light of the evidence, a question of fact as to whether Bello was
terminated after Amerijet learned of the IBEW Petition, and whether an inference may be made
that Bello’s termination was related to the union organization activities in question.
A
reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Bello’s termination was not executed until April 8,
2011, the April 7 date on the letter (received by Bello on April 14) notwithstanding.
A
reasonable fact-finder moreover could conclude that Amerijet learned of the IBEW Petition as
early as April 8, 2011, Richardson’s declaration to the contrary notwithstanding. A reasonable
fact-finder could infer that the IBEW Petition was causally related to Bello’s termination. This is
particularly true in light of Plaintiffs’ argument that Bello was susceptible for termination as
having depleted his FMLA leave as early as November 2010, but no termination action was
taken for months, or until (approximately) the time the IBEW Petition was filed. Amerijet
disputes this fact in the context of Plaintiffs’ own motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 114],
but the existence of a dispute only further underscores the inappropriateness of summary
judgment.
At the same time, a reasonable fact-finder might well find the opposite — that Bello was
terminated days before Amerijet learned of Plaintiffs’ organization attempts. It is not for the
Court to decide this disputed issue in place of the fact-finder at this stage.
6.
Whether Plaintiffs May Proceed With a Claim for Punitive Damages
When a right of action has been implied under a federal statute, courts must “presume the
availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.”
Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992). As the Court previously held, an
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implied right of action exists under the RLA Section 2, Third and Fourth, for major disputes such
as the present action. (See Nov. 28, 2011 Order 7). The question is whether punitive damages
have been limited under the RLA, such that the Franklin presumption is overcome.
Amerijet argues that although the “weight of authority holds that an employee who is not
represented by a union and is not party to a collective bargaining agreement may seek punitive
damages for violations of the RLA,” the Court should disregard this authority in favor of an
approach espoused by the Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v.
Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979). (Mot. 31–32). Amerijet cites several other cases taking a similar
approach, generally with little discussion, to find the RLA does not permit punitive damages.
(See id. 32 (citing Tipton v. Aspen Airways, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1469 (D. Colo. 1990); Maas v.
Frontier Airlines, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 224, 226 (D. Colo. 1987); Grosschmidt v. Chautauqua
Airlines, Inc., No. C85-1432-A, 1986 WL 10077 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 1986); Bhd. Ry. Carmen of
the United States and Canada v. Delpro Co., 579 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Del. 1984); Brady v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 504, 506–07 (D. Del. 1961))).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Foust, however, does not compel the holding that
Amerijet urges. That claim involved a case by an employee against a union for breach of its duty
of fair representation. See 442 U.S. at 43. There was a collective-bargaining agreement already
in place between the union and the employer, see id., unlike the instant case. Moreover,
prominent in the opinion is the Supreme Court’s concern for limitations on union liability and
allowing remedies for union misconduct “without compromising the collective interests of union
members in protecting limited funds.” Id. at 50. The Court emphasized that punitive damage
awards “could deplete union treasuries.” Id. The Court further expressed concern about the
disruption of “responsible decisionmaking essential to peaceful labor relations.” Id. at 51–52.
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Needless to say, the concern with protecting the union’s collective interests and finances
is not at issue here. In that sense, Foust is of little value in assisting the Court to resolve this
dispute. In fact, the court in Delpro, a case Amerijet cites, recognized as much, observing:
The Foust court directed its analysis to suits against unions. That analysis
is not immediately transferable to actions against employers. Two of Foust’s
policy arguments in particular have less import in suits against management. One
is Foust’s concern with the economic hardship wrought by punitive awards. The
other is the Foust Court’s fear that collective interests would be sacrificed for
those of the individual.
Delpro, 579 F. Supp. at 1335. The Delpro court ultimately declined to allow punitive damages
in that suit by employees against an employer for failing to bargain in good faith with their union
and unilaterally changing working conditions and terms. See id. at 1333. Nonetheless, the Court
finds the reasons the court employed in Delpro are less compelling here. That court found that
“[t]o allow a threat of unpredictable punitive awards against employers, where unions sitting
opposite them at the bargaining table are immune from such threats, would unfairly multiply the
unions’ arsenal of negotiating weapons,” creating an “imbalance” in labor negotiations and
threatening “congenial labor relations between union and management.” Id. at 1336. The court
in Delpro further found that punitive damages “would conflict with the general goals of national
labor legislation,” which has broad remedial goals. Id.
In decisions such as Foust and Delpro, the Court perceives the issue of punitive damages
under the RLA to raise concerns about the integrity and balance of the collective bargaining
system as a whole. Insofar as this is the object, the Court is persuaded by what all parties
recognize as the “weight of authority,” or cases that find the integrity of the system to raise
different considerations when the plaintiff-employee is as yet un-represented by a union. The
threat of punitive damages may be a necessary protection to enable him to take his place in the
system to begin with. All parties acknowledge Lebow v. American Trans Air, Inc., 86 F.3d 661
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(7th Cir. 1996), to represent prevailing authority along this line. The Seventh Circuit in Lebow
addressed, as an issue of first impression before any federal court of appeals, “whether an
employee suing an employer under the Railway Labor Act for discharging him because of his
union-organizing activities is entitled (1) to a jury trial and (2) to seek punitive damages.” Id. at
663. The plaintiff in Lebow had been working on a secretive campaign, which ultimately failed,
to have his fellow pilots represented by a union. See id. at 664. The plaintiff passed out
authorization cards and spoke to many people, among other activities. See id.
The court in Lebow considered the same arguments as those made here by Amerijet and
found Foust to be inapposite, since “[a]n unlawful discharge suit by an unrepresented employee
against his employer . . . is quite different from a fair representation suit by a union employee
against his union. Awarding punitive damages to non-union employees would not interfere with
the collective bargaining process because there is no collective bargaining process with which to
interfere.” Id. at 672. The court noted that without such punitive damages, “employers may not
be sufficiently deterred from inappropriately discharging union organizers.” Id. The Seventh
Circuit moreover stated that punitive damages could be awarded for “intentional misconduct
(firing him because he engaged in protected activity).” Id. at 670.
The Court finds the holding in Lebow well-suited to the case at hand. Plaintiffs have
sufficiently established at least an issue of fact as to whether they were intentionally terminated
as a result of protected activities. Thus, the Court also rejects Amerijet’s argument that even if
punitive damages are permissible, they are not appropriate on the facts of this case. (See Mot.
33). Amerijet asserts this is so because it had no knowledge of any union organizing activities,
and the IBEW Petition was irrelevant because the NLRB lacked jurisdiction over Amerijet. (See
id. 34). The Court has already dismissed these arguments and does not find them to be a
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convincing basis for the exclusion of any possible punitive damages here.
7.
Whether Plaintiffs May Seek Non-Pecuniary Damages for Emotional
Distress, Pain, and Suffering
Plaintiffs state in the Complaint that they seek damages for “emotional distress and
humiliation and pain and suffering.”
(Compl. 3–4).
Amerijet notes that, as for punitive
damages, the RLA does not specify whether Plaintiffs may seek such non-pecuniary damages,
but other statutes have been interpreted by some courts not to include such damages. (See Mot.
35). Amerijet again invokes the broad “remedial” nature of the RLA (Reply 14), and cites a case
that the Court finds inapplicable.2
Plaintiffs point to cases in which compensatory damages were found to be permissible
under the RLA.
(See Resp. 16 (citing Riley v. Empire Airlines, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1016
(N.D.N.Y. 1993); Schlang v. Key Airlines, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 1493 (D. Nev. 1992))). In Riley,
the court found compensatory damages for emotional distress to be available in certain cases for
RLA violations, and “[i]ndeed, the rationale is stronger on the issue than on the issue of punitive
damages. Because compensatory damages are designed to compensate the employee for real
losses incurred as a result of the employer’s unlawful conduct, such damages are fully consistent
with the remedial objectives of national labor policy.” 823 F. Supp. at 1025. The court noted
that unlike punitive damages, such compensatory damages could not be construed as “private
fines.” Id. at 1025–26. The court found compensatory damages would serve the overarching
goals of collective bargaining by further protecting unrepresented employees from their
2
Amerijet cites Lewy v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 799 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1986), for the
contention that the RLA was intended “to limit wrongfully discharged employees to the remedies of
reinstatement and back pay.” Id. at 1295. Nevertheless, the decision in Lewy addressed “minor” disputes,
which the Court has already explained would be governed by the RLA’s grievance and arbitration
procedures. (See Nov. 28, 2011 Order 5). Thus, the Lewy court stated that the RLA preempts state tort
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the tort is governed by a collective bargaining
agreement. See 799 F.2d at 1290. The Lewy decision does not apply to this “major” dispute. (Nov. 28,
2011 Order 8).
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employers’ potential abuses.
See id. at 1026.
The reasoning in Riley is persuasive here.
Amerijet has not convincingly shown why the RLA precludes compensatory damages. See
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66.
Amerijet asks in the alternative that each Plaintiff’s action be severed at trial, an
argument more fully developed in Amerijet’s motion to bifurcate [ECF No. 100], which the
Court will address in a separate order.
8.
Whether Plaintiffs May Proceed With a Request for Attorney’s Fees
Amerijet asserts that to the extent Plaintiffs seek attorney’s fees (see Compl. 3), Plaintiffs
should not be permitted to contravene the American Rule providing that prevailing litigants
ordinarily do not collect attorney’s fees from the loser. (See Mot. 36 (citing Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975))). Amerijet further points to a provision of
the RLA that specifically provides for attorney’s fees, where a carrier fails to comply with an
order of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, as evidence that had Congress wished to
permit attorney’s fee awards for violations of RLA Sections 2, Third and Fourth, it would have
done so explicitly. (See id.).
Plaintiffs acknowledge in response that the Eleventh Circuit is silent on the issue, but
point to Williams v. ABX, Inc., No. 1:06cv833, 2007 WL 2886283 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2007), as
persuasive authority. The defendant in Williams argued that the remedy of attorney’s fees was
not provided for under Section 2, Third or Fourth of the RLA, and the plaintiffs “acknowledge[d]
that it is not clear whether attorney fees are available for RLA claims.” 2007 WL 2886283, at
*7. The court noted the governing American Rule, stating that there is a “bad faith” exception
allowing attorney’s fees “in certain exceptional cases where the opposing party has acted in bad
faith.” Id. (citing Shimman v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 744 F.2d 1226, 1229 (6th Cir.
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Case No. 11-61812-CIV-ALTONAGA/Simonton
1984)). The court in Williams held, “[b]ecause such an award could be available to Plaintiffs,
the Court finds that dismissing Plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees would be premature at this
juncture,” on a motion to dismiss. Id. (citing Pinnacle Airlines, Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., No.
Civ. 03-1642 ESH, 2003 WL 23281960 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2003) (denying, at early stage of
litigation, motion to strike claim for attorney’s fees in suit against union under RLA “as later
developments may provide a legitimate basis for an attorneys’ fees award”)).
The Court notes, however, that the decision in Williams turned at least in part on the stage
of the litigation — the court found it premature to grant defendant’s request on a motion to
dismiss. Similarly, in Pinnacle, the court found the early motion to strike premature. The Court
has not found any reason, including in the single case cited by Plaintiffs, to depart from the
American Rule here. Plaintiffs appeal to the “discretion” of the Court to determine remedies as a
reason not to grant summary judgment. (Resp. 16). In Alyeska, the Supreme Court enumerated
exceptions to the American Rule arising out of the “inherent power in the courts to allow
attorneys’ fees in particular situations, unless forbidden by Congress,” including a party’s willful
disobedience of court orders and acting in “bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons.”
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258–59 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Plaintiffs have pointed to nothing in the record creating an issue of fact relevant to any of these
exceptions. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment as to this claim.
9.
Whether Plaintiffs May Proceed With a Jury Trial Demand
Amerijet asserts that because Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive and non-pecuniary emotional
distress damages fail as a matter of law, Plaintiffs seek only equitable relief in the form of back
pay, reinstatement, front pay, and injunctive relief. (See Mot. 36–38). As a result, Amerijet
contends Plaintiffs have no right to a jury trial. (See id. 38). Amerijet further cites Lynch v. Pan
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American World Airways, Inc., 475 F.2d 764, 765 (5th Cir. 1973), for the proposition that where
claims for punitive damages and non-pecuniary emotional damages are not well-founded, no
right to a jury exists in suits seeking back pay and other equitable relief. (See id.).
Because the Court declines to find that Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive and non-pecuniary
emotional damages fail as a matter of law or are ill-founded, the Court accordingly declines to
grant Amerijet summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ request for trial by jury. See Lebow, 86 F.3d
at 672 (holding that since the plaintiff’s claims under RLA were analogous to common-law
causes of action, and the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged right to seek punitive damages,
Seventh Amendment guaranteed the plaintiff right to trial by jury).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant, Amerijet International, Inc.’s Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h), Or, In the
Alternative, Fully-Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 101] is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 24th day of May, 2012.
_________________________________
CECILIA M. ALTONAGA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:
counsel of record
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