Sabal Palm Condominiums of Pine Island Ridge Association, Inc. v. Fischer et al

Filing 298

ORDER denying 206 Motion for Sanctions. Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. (rm00)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 12-60691-Civ-SCOLA
Sabal Palm Condominiums of Pine
Island Ridge Association, Inc.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Laurence M. Fischer and Deborah
G. Fischer, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/
Order Denying Motion For Sanctions
Marvin Silvergold moves for sanctions against the Fischers under Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the claims they brought
against him are frivolous. (ECF No. 206.) The Court denies his motion (ECF
No. 206).
A person signing a pleading violates Rule 11 when (1) the pleading is
presented for “any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation”; (2) the claims or legal
contentions are not “warranted by existing law” or by a “nonfrivolous
argument” for changing existing law; or (3) the factual contentions lack
evidentiary support. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Sanctions for violating Rule 11(b)
are discretionary: “[i]f . . . the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been
violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law
firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(c)(1). Just because a claim is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not mean that the dismissed claim is
automatically subject to sanctions under Rule 11.1 Thompson v. RelationServe
In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Tjoflat cited a
Seventh Circuit case to conclude that when a “complaint contains multiple
claims, one nonfrivolous claim will not preclude sanctions for frivolous claims.”
Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 664 (11th Cir. 2010)
(Tjoflat, J., concurring in the appeal and dissenting in the cross-appeal) (citing
Reed v. Great Lakes Companies, Inc., 330 F.3d 931, 936 (7th Cir.2003).
Though the Court did not exhaustively research the issue, the Court found no
controlling precedent from the Eleventh Circuit on this point. But the Court
1

Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 665 (11th Cir. 2010) (Tjoflat, J., concurring in the
appeal and dissenting in the cross-appeal).
Because the Court determines that the Fischers have stated a valid
refusal-to-accommodate claim, this claim is obviously not sanctionable under
Rule 11. Silvergold’s argument that this claim should be sanctioned because it
is frivolous therefore fails. To the extent that Silvergold argues that the NoerrPennington doctrine renders him immune from this claim, he is mistaken.
Silvergold’s liability for this claim does not stem from Sabal Palm commencing
the declaratory-judgment action. Rather, it stems from Sabal Palm’s decision
to not simply grant Deborah Fischer’s request for an accommodation after it
had more than enough information to determine that she was entitled to one
under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). (In fact, Sabal Palm’s Board, of which
Silvergold is the president, voted to deny her requested accommodation and
sue instead.)
Assuming without deciding that the Fischers’ § 3604(c) claim violates
Rule 11, the Court concludes that sanctions under Rule 11 are not warranted.
As detailed in the Court’s first Omnibus Order, Sabal Palm’s December 2011
rules and the amended November 2012 rules contain rules that are plainly
unlawful under the FHA. Sabal Palm and Silvergold are probably lucky that
the Fischers brought these claims under a section of the statute that does not
apply. In any event, sanctions are certainly not warranted for the Fischers’
attempt to state a cause of action surrounding these extremely problematic
rules.
The same result holds for the Fischers’ § 3617 claim. Assuming without
deciding that this claim violates Rule 11, the Court concludes that sanctions
under Rule 11 are not warranted. The Fischers’ argument that the declaratoryjudgment action was retaliatory was certainly a plausible argument. Sabal
Palm had more than enough information to conclude that Deborah was entitled
to keep Sorenson under the FHA. Its decision to sue her was not wise. But the
Court concluded that even if Sabal Palm’s contentions in the declaratoryjudgment action—namely, that it could deny Deborah’s requested
accommodation and that it was entitled to even more information than she had
need not decide whether each claim in a Complaint is separately subject to
sanctions under Rule 11. Because the Court concludes that sanctions in this
case are not warranted even if the 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) and 42 U.S.C. § 3617
claims violate Rule 11, deciding whether each claim in a Complaint is subject
to sanctions under Rule 11 is not necessary. The Court therefore assumes
without deciding that each claim may be sanctioned under Rule 11 even when
at least one claim in the Complaint is nonfrivolous and survives scrutiny under
Rule 12(b)(6).

already provided—were extremely dubious, the declaratory-judgment action
was not a sham. But deciding that the lawsuit was not a sham was a close
call. Sanctions against the Fischers are thus not warranted for this claim.
For the above reasons, the Court denies Silvergold’s Motion for
Sanctions (ECF No. 206).
Done and ordered in chambers, at Miami, Florida, on March 31, 2014.

___________________________________
Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge