Madison v. Jack Link Associates Stage Lighting & Productions, Inc. et al
Filing
142
OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 49 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. HAL may amend its counterclaim within 14 days from the date of this Order. Signed by Judge Kenneth A. Marra on 12/9/2013. (ir)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 12-61417-CIV-MARRA
ROBERT MADISON,
Plaintiff,
v.
JACK LINK ASSOCIATES STAGE
LIGHTING & PRODUCTIONS, INC.,
HOLLAND AMERICA LINE N.V. LLC,
LEGENDARY RHYTHM & BLUES CRUISE, LLC,
Defendants,
HOLLAND AMERICA LINE N.V. LLC,
Cross-Plaintiff,
v.
JACK LINK ASSOCIATES STAGE
LIGHTING & PRODUCTIONS, INC.,
LEGENDARY RHYTHM & BLUES CRUISE LLC,
Cross-Defendants, and
REBEKAH’S DREAMS ENTERTAINMENT
& PRODUCTION SERVICES, INC.
Third-Party Defendant.
____________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court upon Cross-Defendant Jack Link Associates Stage Lighting
& Productions, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Crossclaim (DE 49) (“Motion”). Holland America Line
N.V. (“HAL”) responded (DE 65), Jack Link Associates Stage Lighting & Productions, Inc. (“Jack
Link”) replied (DE 66), and HAL filed a sur-reply (DE 76). This matter is now ripe for review. For
the reasons stated below, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. Background
This action arose from an incident aboard one of HAL’s vessels where Plaintiff allegedly
received electric shock injuries. HAL and Legendary Rhythm & Blues Cruise (“R&B”) entered into
a Charter Party Agreement (“Agreement”) for R&B to charter the ship Nieuw Amsterdam for the
purposes of hosting the Blues Cruise. Crossclaim, ¶¶ 8-19 (DE 40). Under the Agreement, R&B
was responsible for any personal injury that occurred as a result of any activity on Nieuw Amsterdam
that was organized by R&B. Id. R&B hired Jack Link to install and configure all of its concert
equipment, lighting, staging, and wiring on the ship. Id. In turn, R&B hired Rebekah’s Dreams
Entertainment & Production Services, Inc. (“Rebekah’s Dreams”) to load and transport R&B’s
equipment onto Nieuw Amsterdam. Id. Plaintiff Madison was employed by Rebekah’s Dreams, and
on the day of the incident was directed by Jack Link’s foreman to transport cables and wires. Id.
Plaintiff received an electrical shock because the wires were electrified. Id. HAL asserts that it was
wholly without fault for Plaintiff’s resulting injury. Id.
Plaintiff Madison alleged the following claims: negligence against Jack Link (Count I);
negligence against R&B (Count II); vicarious liability against R&B (Count III); negligent hiring
against R&B (Count IV); negligence against HAL (Count V); and vicarious liability against HAL
under the theory of respondeat superior (Count VI). Second Am. Compl., ¶¶ 1, 40-80 (DE 44). HAL
filed its crossclaims for declaratory relief under the Agreement against R&B (Count I); breach of
contract against R&B (Count II); contractual indemnity against R&B (Count III); common law
indemnity against R&B (Count IV); contribution against R&B (Count V); common law indemnity
against Jack Link (Count VI); contribution against Jack Link (Count VII); common law indemnity
against Rebekah’s Dreams (Count VIII); and contribution against Rebekah’s Dreams (Count IX).
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Crossclaim, ¶¶ 23-55 (DE 40). Both Plaintiff Madison and HAL base jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. §
1333 because injuries occurred aboard a vessel in navigation, and allege that general maritime law
applies. Id., ¶ 1; Second Am. Compl., ¶¶ 1, 6 (DE 44). Plaintiff Madison has settled with R&B and
HAL, and his claims against these Defendants have been dismissed. (DE 111, 126).
In the Motion under review, Jack Link asks the Court to dismiss HAL’s crossclaims of
indemnity and contribution against it pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Jack
Link acknowledges that general maritime law governs this case and that general maritime law
recognizes claims for common law indemnity and contribution. (DE 66). However, Jack Link
argues that no legal theory of indemnity can support HAL’s claim for indemnification against it; and
as to the contribution claim, that HAL does not allege that Jack Link owed a duty to Plaintiff
Madison or HAL or that Jack Link breached that duty, rendering the allegations legally insufficient.
HAL responds simply that the claims are pled sufficiently to withstand the Motion to Dismiss.
II. Legal standard
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires “a short and plain statement of the
claims” that “will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon
which it rests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Supreme Court has held that “[w]hile a complaint attacked
by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Overall, a complaint must “give
the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. (internal
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quotation omitted); Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir. 2008).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009) (quotations and citations omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged." Id. Thus, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives
a motion to dismiss." Id. at 1950. When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all
of the plaintiff's allegations as true in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for which
relief could be granted. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
III. Discussion
1. Applicable law
The parties agree that general maritime law governs this case, and this is consistent with the
Eleventh Circuit’s precedent. See Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 912 F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir.
1990) (“if the injury occurred on navigable waters, federal maritime law governs the substantive
issues in the case”); Marathon Pipe Line Co. v. Drilling Rig ROWAN/ODESSA, 761 F.2d 229, 235
(5th Cir. 1985) (“the body of law establishing the indemnitee's primary liability governs his claim
for indemnity or contribution against a third party”); Cooper v. Meridian Yachts, Ltd., 575 F.3d
1151, 1173 (11th Cir. 2009) (the Marathon Pipe rule requiring application of the same law
establishing the indemnitee’s primary liability to the claims for indemnity and contribution is likely
the appropriate rule when the choice is between state and federal admiralty law, but is not the
appropriate rule when the case has international aspects).
Therefore, the Court will apply maritime law. “[T]he ‘general maritime law’ is drawn from
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both state and federal sources and is an ‘amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications
of those rules, and newly created rules’ which includes a ‘body of maritime tort principles.’”
Brockington v. Certified Elec., Inc., 903 F.2d 1523, 1530 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting E. River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986)).
2. Indemnity
Jack Link argues that no legal theory of indemnity can support HAL’s claim against it, and
that HAL’s claim must, therefore, be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Only three theories of
indemnity are available under maritime law. Hardy v. Gulf Oil Corp., 949 F2d 826, 833-34 (5th Cir.
1992); Columbus-McKinnon Corp. v. Ocean Products Research, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 786, 788-89
(M.D. Fla. 1992); Sol v. City of Miami, 776 F. Supp.2d 1375, 1378-79 (S.D. Fla. 2011). Namely,
a party may rely on: (1) contractual indemnity; (2) the Ryan doctrine indemnity under Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956) available to shipowners
subject to absolute liability without contributing to the unseaworthy condition created by a stevedore
that caused the accident and the subsequent finding of liability; and (3) the non-negligent or
vicariously liable tortfeasor indemnity. Hardy, 949 F.2d at 833.
Here, the indemnity claim is not based on contract. Further, the Ryan doctrine does not apply
where the vessel owner only owes a duty of ordinary care; it only applies where the vessel owner is
subject to the “absolute nondelegable liability under the seaworthiness guaranty.” Hobart v. Sohio
Petroleum Co., 445 F.2d 435, 439 (5th Cir. 1971);1 see also Hardy, 949 F.2d at 833; see generally
Drakidis v. Mori, 12-14173, 2013 WL 6334105, – F. App’x –
(11th Cir. Dec. 6, 2013)
(unseaworthiness is a cause of action based on strict liability); Brunner v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 779
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In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit
adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981.
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F.2d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1986) (unseaworthiness is an independent cause of action). Plaintiff
Madison only brought claims against HAL sounding in negligence and vicarious liability under the
respondeat superior theory for the alleged negligence of its agent, Jack Link. Second Am. Compl.,
¶¶ 66-80. The Second Amended Complaint does not allege that HAL should be held liable for a
breach of the guaranty of seaworthiness. Accordingly, even without examining whether Jack Link
may be considered a stevedore,2 it appears that HAL cannot rely on the Ryan doctrine. However,
the last type of indemnity may be available to HAL.
A vicariously liable or non-negligent tortfeasor may be entitled to indemnity from a co-debtor
guilty of actual fault. Hardy, 949 F.2d at 833. Even though this theory of maritime indemnity
applies to both non-negligent and vicariously liable defendants, it has been interpreted to be available
in practice only to defendants who have paid damages based on vicarious liability. Sol v. City of
Miami, 776 F. Supp.2d 1375, 1378-79 (S.D. Fla. 2011). Jack Link relies on Sol, and argues that
there are no allegations and no basis to allege that HAL is legally responsible for the acts of Jack
Link. However, Plaintiff Madison specifically alleged that HAL is vicariously liable for Jack Link’s
negligence. Accordingly, the vicariously liable tortfeasor theory of indemnification may be available
to HAL.
Lastly, with respect to the common law indemnity against Jack Link, HAL’s Crossclaim
states:
45. HAL is fully without fault regarding Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.
46. Jack Link is wholly at fault for Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.
47. If HAL is held responsible to Plaintiff for any of the matters set forth above, it
2
Generally, a stevedore is a “person or company that hires longshore and harbor workers to load and
unload ships.” STEVEDORE, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
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is entitle to total equitable indemnity from jack Link for any loss suffered or expenses
incurred or judgment paid, including any costs, attorney’s fees and other expenses
which have been, or in the future may be, incurred in that HAL’s liability will be
based (if at all) on only passive or secondary negligence arising as a legal result of
the active and primary negligence of Jack Link.
Crossclaim, ¶¶ 45-47 (DE 40).
Because HAL uses the terms “passive” and “active” negligence, Jack Link argues that HAL
relies on an outdated active- passive theory of indemnity. HAL only states that this interpretation
of its claim is incorrect.
It is true that the active-passive negligence rule has been abolished after the Supreme Court
incorporated the comparative fault theory into maritime law because a “tortfeasor only passively
negligent will presumably bear a smaller percentage of the fault for an injury.” Self v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987). However, in light of the fact that a valid
theory of indemnity may be available to HAL, the Court rejects Jack Link’s argument that HAL’s
indemnity claim should be dismissed because no legal theory can support it.
3. Contribution
Jack Link argues that HAL failed to plead contribution adequately because there are no
allegations that Jack Link owed a duty to Plaintiff Madison or HAL, and that Jack Link breached this
duty. Under general maritime law, a defendant who had been partially at fault and settled a claim
paying more than its share of liability may be entitled to contribution from a joint tortfeasor. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt Miller, 957 F.2d 1575, 1583-84 (11th Cir. 1992).
Tortfeasors must share a common legal liability toward the plaintiff for contribution to be available.
Simeon v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1434 (5th Cir. 1988). Further, because the liability
for contribution arises from the tortfeasor’s obligation to the plaintiff, to survive a motion to dismiss
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the party seeking contribution from a joint tortfeasor should allege that the joint tortfeasor owed a
duty to the plaintiff and that it breached this duty. Columbus-McKinnon Corp. v. Ocean Products
Research, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 786, 789 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
Here, HAL only alleges that:
49. HAL denies it either cause or contributed to Plaintiff’s injuries or damages at all.
In the event, however, HAL is held liable for the alleged injury, claims or damages
incurred by Plaintiff, which liability is specifically denied, HAL is entitled to partial
indemnity and contribution from Jack Link corresponding to their respective fault,
negligence, carelessness or willful misconduct.
Crossclaim, ¶ 49 (DE 40).
Thus, there are no allegations that Jack Link owed a duty to Plaintiff Madison, or that Jack
Link breached this duty. Accordingly, HAL failed to adequately plead a claim for contribution.2 See
Columbus-McKinnon Corp., 792 F. Supp. at 789.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED Cross-Defendant Jack Link
Associates Stage Lighting & Productions, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Crossclaim (DE 49) is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
2
The Motion is DENIED as to HAL’s
Courts mostly concentrate on the availability of theories of indemnity under maritime law when
considering motions to dismiss indemnity claims, and concentrate on the elements of contribution when
considering motions to dismiss contribution claims. See Columbus-McKinnon Corp. v. Ocean Products
Research, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 786, 788-89 (M.D. Fla. 1992); Sol v. City of Miami, 776 F. Supp.2d 1375, 137879 (S.D. Fla. 2011); HLL Barents Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mBH & Co. KG v. Stolthaven New Orleans, L.L.C.,
CIV.A. 10-2059, 2011 WL 2118872 (E.D. La. May 24, 2011). Under Florida law, for example:
[A] third party indemnity action will survive a motion to dismiss only if the third party
complaint alleges: (1) that there existed a special duty running from the indemnitor to the
indemnitee; (2) that the indemnitor breached that duty; (3) that the plaintiff's injuries
resulted from the breach; and (4) that the indemnitee can be held liable for the injuries
resulting to the plaintiff from the indemnitor's acts.
Carlson Corp./Se. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., Fla., 778 F. Supp. 518, 520-21 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (quoting
Rabon v. Automatic Fasteners, Inc., 672 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir.1982)). Thus, the elements are similar to the
ones of claims for contribution. While the Counterclaim merely alleges that HAL is entitled to indemnity
from Jack Links, maritime cases do not discuss the necessity of pleading more, and Jack Link raises the
argument that HAL failed to allege duty and breach only with respect to the claim of contribution.
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counterclaim of indemnity against Jack Link (Count VI), and GRANTED without prejudice as to
counterclaim of contribution against Jack Link (Count VII).
HAL may amend its Counterclaim within 14 days from the date of this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida,
this 9th day of December, 2013.
_______________________________________
KENNETH A. MARRA
United States District Judge
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