Jean Charles v. Augustus et al
Filing
101
ORDER denying 45 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 47 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. on 9/26/2014. (rss)
United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Kens Carter Jeancharles, Plaintiff
v.
Eric Augustus, and James Gibbons,
and the City of Hollywood,
Defendants
Lucmany Andre, Plaintiff
v.
James Gibbons, and the City of
Hollywood, Defendants
)
)
)
)
Civil Action No. 13-60723-Civ-Scola
)
)
)
)
)
)
(Consolidated Case No. 13-60729)
)
)
)
Order On The Parties’ Motions For Summary Judgment
This lawsuit started with a fight at a nightclub. A bouncer at Club
Atrium, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, threw one of the Plaintiffs’ friends out of
the Club. One of the Plaintiffs, Lucmany Andre, went to his car to get his gun.
He had a valid concealed-weapons permit, and was a member of the United
States Navy. Officer James Gibbons, a member of the City of Hollywood Police
Department, who had been working a detail at the Club that night, stopped
Andre while he was walking in front of the Club toward a group of his friends
in the parking lot. Gibbons searched him, seized his weapon, and placed him
under arrest. Later, Gibbons and his supervisor, Officer Eric Augustus,
engaged the other Plaintiff, Kens Carter Jeancharles, who is also a member of
the United States Navy. The details of this interaction vary greatly, depending
on which party is telling the story, but ultimately the Officers handcuffed
Jeancharles, searched him, and seized and searched his mobile phone and
wallet. The Officers released Jeancharles after leaving him handcuffed on the
ground for over an hour. The Officers arrested Andre and took him to jail that
night.
The Court consolidated these civil-rights cases for discovery and trial.
The parties have moved for summary judgment on several, but not all, of the
claims. For the reasons explained in this Order, the Court denies summary
judgment on most of the claims because the parties dispute most of the
material facts. The Court is able to grant summary judgment in favor of Andre
on one of Gibbons’s affirmative defenses.
Since there are two consolidated cases here, involving multiple claims,
multiple plaintiffs, and multiple defendants, the Court provides this chart for
clarity:
Plaintiff
Moving for
Summary
Judgment
Plaintiff
Defendant
No
Andre
Gibbons
Yes
Andre
City of
Hollywood
Yes
Andre
Gibbons
No
Jeancharles
Augustus
No
Jeancharles
Augustus
No
Jeancharles
Gibbons
No
Jeancharles
Gibbons
No
Jeancharles
City of
Hollywood
No
Jeancharles
Augustus
Cause of Action &
Claim Number
false-arrest claim under
28 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 1)
false-arrest claim under
Florida state law (Count 2)
false-arrest claim under
Florida state law (Count 3)
unlawful detention under
28 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 1)
unlawful search under
28 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 2)
unlawful search under
28 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 3)
unlawful detention under
28 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 4)
unlawful detention under
28 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 5)
false-arrest claim under
Florida state law (Count 6)
Defendants
Moving for
Summary
Judgment
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
1. Cross Motions For Summary Judgment Regarding Andre’s Claims
Andre and Gibbons are both asking for summary judgment on Andre’s
state-law claims for false arrest. Specifically, they are seeking a judgment on
the limited issue of whether Gibbons had probable cause to arrest Andre. In
other words, Andre is asserting that accepting all the existing facts as true, no
reasonable jury could find that Gibbons had probable cause to arrest him. See
Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990). Gibbons asserts the
opposite is true. Since only the state-law claims are at issue, this Court
applies Florida law. See Flava Works, Inc. v. City of Miami, Fla., 609 F.3d 1233,
1237 (11th Cir. 2010).
The Court cannot grant summary judgment (for either party) on the issue
of whether Gibbons had probable cause to arrest Andre for carrying a
concealed weapon without a valid permit. Under Florida law, probable cause
exists if reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the officer’s
knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe
that an offense has been, or is being, committed. Florida v. Betz, 815 So. 2d
627, 633 (Fla. 2002). Gibbons arrested Andre for carrying a concealed weapon
without a valid permit, in violation of Florida Statute Section 790.01(2). (Defs.’
Stmt. Facts ¶48, ECF No. 44.) Andre contends that since he produced a valid
concealed-weapons permit (from Virginia), Gibbons lacked probable cause to
arrest him for violating Section 790.01(2). (Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 12, ECF No.
47.) Andre cites the testimony of Augustus (Gibbons’s supervisor) that the
officers knew that Andre’s concealed weapons permit was valid. (See Augustus
Dep. 53:10–16, Nov. 25, 2013, ECF No. 60-2.) But Gibbons testified that he
was not able to verify whether the Virginia concealed-weapons permit was real
or valid. (Gibbons Dep. 73:4–74:12, Nov. 20, 2013, ECF No. 42-1.)
Since there is conflicting testimony on this issue, the Court cannot grant
summary judgment on this point. Based on the facts and circumstances that
Gibbons testified to (i.e., Andre had a concealed weapon without a verifiable
permit) a reasonable person would believe that Section 790.01(2) had been
violated. Alternatively, a jury may be persuaded by the testimony from
Augustus that the officers knew that Andre’s concealed weapons permit was
valid. Since there is disputed evidence on this issue, the Court will not enter
summary judgment on Gibbons’s (and the City of Hollywood’s) probable-cause
affirmative defense as it relates to Gibbons’s arrest of Andre for the violation of
Florida Statue Section 790.01(2), relative to Andre’s state-law claims for false
arrest.
Andre and Gibbons also ask for summary judgment on Gibbons’s
alternative reasons for the arrest. Those reasons were, first that Andre did not
have his concealed-weapon permit on him (it was in his car), and second that
Andre was unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon “at a place that distributes
alcohol.” (Gibbons Dep. 78:14–79:3.) The Court will not enter summary
judgment on the first alternative reason, but will grant summary judgment on
the second.
The Court cannot grant summary judgment on the issue of whether
Gibbons lacked probable cause to arrest Andre for not having his concealedweapon permit on him, under Florida Statute Section 790.06(1). That Section
states that a person licensed to carry a concealed weapon “must carry the
license, together with valid identification” whenever the person has the weapon.
But a violation of Section 790.06(1) only constitutes a “noncriminal violation.”
Fla. Stat. § 790.06(1) (2013). To decide this issue, the Court must determine if
a noncriminal violation is an arrestable offense under Florida law. There is
some indication that it may not be. See Thomas v. Florida, 614 So. 2d 468,
471 (Fla. 1993). But the parties have not adequately briefed this issue. (See
Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 6, ECF No. 45 (providing no case law for the proposition
that a person’s failure to have his concealed-weapons permit on him is an
arrestable offense); Defs.’ Reply 2, ECF No. 74 (same); Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 10–
11, ECF No. 47 (same); Pl.’s Reply 2–3, 3 n.3, ECF No. 78 (providing a single,
irrelevant, federal case).) The Court will not decide an issue the parties have
not fully put before it. Cf. Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (“The premise of our adversarial system is that . . . courts do not sit as
self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of
legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them.”).
The Court can grant summary judgment on the probable-cause
affirmative defense regarding Gibbons’s second alternative reason for arresting
Andre, namely for carrying a concealed weapon at a place that distributes
alcohol. Under Florida law, it is unlawful for a person with a valid concealedweapons permit to carry a concealed weapon on “[a]ny portion of an
establishment licensed to dispense alcoholic beverages for consumption on the
premises, which portion of the establishment is primarily devoted to such
purpose.” Fla. Stat. § 790.06(12)(a)(12). Gibbons has admitted that the
parking lot of the club where he arrested Andre was not primarily devoted to
dispensing alcoholic beverages. (Compare Andre’s Stmt. Facts ¶¶52–53, ECF
No. 46 with Defs.’ Resp. ¶¶52–53, ECF No. 72.) Since Florida law only
prohibits the (otherwise valid) carrying of a concealed weapon on portions of
alcoholic-beverage-dispensing establishments that are primarily devoted to
dispensing alcohol, then no reasonable person with the facts and
circumstances known to Gibbons at the time of Andre’s arrest would have
believed that Andre was violating Florida Statute Section 790.06(12)(a)(12).
Summary judgment will be entered in favor of Andre, and against Gibbons and
the City of Hollywood on the probable-cause affirmative defense as it relates to
Gibbons’s alternative reason for Andre’s arrest (i.e., violation of Florida Statue
Section 790.06(12)(a)(12)), relative to counts 1 and 2 of Andre’s First Amended
Complaint (state-law claims for false arrest).
(Inexplicably, the City of
Hollowood, never filed a response to Andre’s summary-judgment motion. In
failing to oppose the motion, it forfeited any arguments that it may have had in
opposition.)
Finally, the Court cannot enter summary judgment on Gibbons’s
qualified-immunity defense because Gibbons has only asserted the defense
with respect to Andre’s state-law claim for false arrest. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.
2, 11, ECF No. 45.) The defense of qualified immunity does not apply to suits
gtggoverned by state law. Heggs v. Grant, 73 F.3d 317, 320 n.5 (11th Cir.
1996). Qualified immunity is a federal concept that applies only to federal
claims brought under Section 1983. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala.,
608 F.3d 724, 740 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying federal-qualified-immunity law to
the plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983, then applying state-law-immunity
principles to the plaintiff’s state-law claims).
2. The Officers’ Motion
Jeancharles’s Claims
For
Summary
Judgment
Regarding
The Court cannot grant Augustus’s and Gibbons’s summary-judgment
motion on Jeancharles’s claims, because there are genuine issues over several
material facts. In fact, there are considerable and significant factual disputes.
(Compare Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶¶50–74, ECF No. 44 with Pls.’ Resp. ¶¶50-74,
ECF No. 64.) For example, according to Augustus and Gibbons, Jeancharles
was being loud and obnoxious, yelling and screaming at Gibbons. Augustus
observed Jeancharles in a standoff with Gibbons. Augustus asked Jeancharles
to sit down and he refused. Augustus asked him for identification, and he
refused again. Augustus asked him if he had a gun on him and Jeancharles
told him that it was none of his business. But Jeancharles denies that any of
those things ever happened. (See Jeancharles Dep. 28–37, Dec. 23, 2013, ECF
No. 88-1; accord Jeancharles Aff. ¶¶2–6, ECF No. 64-1.) This is not a close
call. And this is not a situation where summary judgment can be granted. In
fact, the Court must remind counsel for Augustus and Gibbons that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(3) requires counsel to have evidentiary support for
factual contentions. In other words, it is not appropriate to assert that there is
no genuine issue over any material facts, when the record clearly reveals that
there are considerable and significant factual disputes. The Court cannot
grant summary judgment on Jeancharles’s substantive claims.
3. Augustus’s And Gibbons’s Assertion Of Qualified Immunity As To
Jeancharles’s Claims
Augustus and Gibbons are not entitled to qualified immunity at this time
because there are significant factual disputes as to whether the Officers had
probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) to stop, handcuff, and search
Jeancharles. Augustus and Gibbons have asserted that they were engaged in
discretionary acts when they stopped and searched Jeancharles. Upon that
assertion, the burden now shifts to Jeancharles to show that the Officers
violated a clearly established constitutional right. See Lewis v. City of W. Palm
Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009). Jeancharles contends that
the Officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they seized and
searched him without having any reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.
The law is clearly established that, in the absence of reasonable suspicion of
criminal conduct, a police officer who detains a person to determine his
identity violates the person’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful
seizures. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979). So the qualified-immunity
issue turns on whether the Officers could have reasonably suspected
Jeancharles of criminal conduct when they seized and searched him.
The Officers argue that they had probable cause to seize and search
Jeancharles. (Mot. Summ. J. 12, ECF No. 45.) According to the Officers,
Jeancharles was acting belligerent, being loud and obnoxious, and engaging in
a standoff with Gibbons. They contend that he refused to cooperate with
Augustus. According to the Officers, they asked the group of friends if any of
them had any firearms; two of the individuals responded no, but Jeancharles
first refused to answer, and later responded that it was none of the Officers’
business. (Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶65–66, ECF No. 44.) The Officers argue that the
facts that support their assertion of probable cause include: (1) that
Jeancharles was involved “in a standoff with Gibbons,” (2) that when asked for
identification, Jeancharles “refused to cooperate.” (Id.) But Jeancharles
disputes all of these facts.
According to Jeancharles, he was sitting against a wall with several other
friends, waiting to see if the police were going to release Andre or arrest him.
(Jeancharles Dep. 28:12–29:4 , ECF No. 88-1.) Gibbons approached him and
asked him for his military identification. Jeancharles explained that he was
not permitted to surrender his military identification, but offered Gibbons his
Florida driver’s license. (Id. at 33:10–34:3.) Later Gibbons and Augustus
approached him again. They told him “give me your military ID right now or
I’m going to arrest you.” (Id. at 35:12–17.) He surrendered his military
identification at that time. (Id.) Then Gibbons and Augustus questioned him
about his military supervisor’s telephone number.
(Id. at 35:20–36:6.)
Jeancharles explained that his military supervisor’s telephone number was on
his military issued mobile telephone, but that he did not have that telephone
on him. (Id. at 36:7–18.) The Officers then handcuffed him, and seized his
wallet and mobile telephone. (Id. at 36:20–37:4.) The Officers demanded his
mobile phone password, and then searched the contents of the phone. (Id.
37:11–21.) After being handcuffed on the ground for about an hour, Augustus
said “okay, he has had enough attention” and the Officers released the
handcuffs. (Id. at 40:10–25.) Neither Augustus nor Gibbons ever asked
Jeancharles if he had any weapons on him or in his car. (Id. at 46:8–48:10.)
When genuine disputes exist over material facts that are necessary to
determine whether probable cause existed, a court may not grant summary
judgment on an officer’s qualified-immunity defense. Herren v. Bowyer, 850
F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1988). Considering the facts in the light most
favorable to Jeancharles, and based on the arguments presented by the
Officers, Augustus and Gibbons lacked a reasonable suspicion that
Jeancharles had engaged in, or was about to engage in, any criminal conduct.
Consequently, the Court may not grant summary judgment on the Officers’
qualified-immunity defense as to Jeancharles’s claims.
4. Conclusion
The Court denies the Officers’ summary-judgment motion (ECF No. 45).
The Court grants in part and denies in part Andre’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 47), and enters judgment in favor of Andre and
against Gibbons and the City of Hollywood solely on the probable-cause
affirmative defense regarding Gibbons’s alternative reason for Andre’s arrest
(i.e., violation of Florida statue section 790.06(12)(a)(12)). This judgment
relates to Andre’s state-law claims for false arrest (counts 1 and 2 of the First
Amended Complaint).
Done and ordered, in chambers at Miami, Florida, on September 26, 2014.
_______________________________
Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?