Randall v. Target Corporation
Filing
48
ORDER denying 33 Defendant's Motion for Final Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge James I. Cohn on 1/21/2014. (ns)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 13-61196-CIV-COHN/SELTZER
JOSEPH S. RANDALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
TARGET CORPORATION,
Defendant.
/
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Final Summary
Judgment [DE 33] ("Motion"). The Court has reviewed the Motion, Plaintiff's Opposition
[DE 36], and Defendant's Reply [DE 41], and is otherwise advised in the premises.
I.
BACKGROUND
This action arises from injuries Plaintiff sustained when he fell at a store operated
by Defendant. On July 8, 2012, Plaintiff visited Defendant's store (the "Premises") to do
some shopping. DE 33 at 1. While Plaintiff moved about the Premises, a customer in
another part of the store dropped a bottle of white wine, which shattered and spilled on
the floor. Id. at 3. One of Defendant's employees heard the bottle break, immediately
obtained a "wet floor" safety cone from one of the spill stations located throughout the
Premises, and placed the cone by the spill. Id. at 3–5. The employee determined that
the spill was too large to clean up on his own, and walked back to the spill station for
another safety cone and absorbent powder. Id. at 5. While at the spill station,
Defendant's employee asked another nearby employee for assistance. Id. As the two
employees returned to the spill, Plaintiff turned down the aisle in which the spill had
occurred. Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff did not see the safety cone and walked towards the spill.
Id. at 6–7. Defendant's employees saw Plaintiff approach the spill and attempted to
warn him verbally, but by then it was too late; Plaintiff reached the spill, slipped, and fell.
Id. at 5–7. Time-stamped images from Defendant's in-store cameras show that no more
than one minute and twelve seconds elapsed between the breakage of the wine bottle
and Plaintiff's fall. Id. at 12.
Plaintiff alleges that his fall and accompanying injuries resulted from Defendant's
failure to maintain the Premises in a reasonably safe condition or warn him of the
dangerous wine spill. DE 1-2 ¶¶ 7–12. Plaintiff has asserted one count of negligence
against Defendant on this basis. Id. Defendant now moves for summary judgment in its
favor.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A district court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party "always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To satisfy
this burden, the movant must point out to the court that "there is an absence of evidence
to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.
After the movant has met its burden under Rule 56(a), the burden of production
shifts, and the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). As Rule 56 explains, "[i]f a party fails to
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properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's
assertion of fact . . . the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and
supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant
is entitled to it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). Therefore, the non-moving party "may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings" but instead must present "specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573,
1576–77 (11th Cir. 1990).
Essentially, so long as the non-moving party has had the opportunity to conduct
discovery, it must come forward with affirmative evidence to support its claim.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). "A mere 'scintilla' of
evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough
of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party." Walker, 911 F.2d
at 1577. If the evidence advanced by the non-moving party "is merely colorable, or is
not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 249–50 (citations omitted).
The Court's function at the summary-judgment stage is not to "weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial." Id. at 249. In making this determination, the Court must discern
which issues are material: "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248. In
deciding a summary-judgment motion, the Court must view the facts in the light most
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favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's
favor. Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law because its
employees responded as quickly as they could to the spill and attempted to warn
Plaintiff of the spill, thereby satisfying any duties of care to Plaintiff. Plaintiff counters
that Defendant's employees improperly left the spill unattended and failed to provide
adequate warnings of the spill. Although the parties agree on many of the facts
underlying Plaintiff's claim, the Court finds that disputes over the inferences to be drawn
therefrom regarding the reasonableness of Defendant's response to the spill preclude
summary judgment in Defendant's favor.
A plaintiff asserting a negligence claim under Florida law must prove: "(1) a legal
duty on the defendant to protect the plaintiff from particular injuries; (2) the defendant's
breach of that duty; (3) the plaintiff's injury being actually and proximately caused by the
breach; and (4) the plaintiff suffering actual harm from the injury." Zivojinovich v.
Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1067 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Within the context of a suit
against a business owner for the on-premises injuries of a customer, the business
owner owes the duties "(1) to take ordinary and reasonable care to keep its premises
reasonably safe for [the customer] and (2) to warn of perils that were known or should
have been known to the owner and of which the [customer] could not discover" through
the exercise of due care. Delgado v. Laundromax, Inc., 65 So. 3d 1087, 1089 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2011); see also Westchester Exxon v. Valdes, 524 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 3d DCA
1988). Florida's legislature has further elaborated upon the duty of care to keep
premises safe with regard to on-premises spills, providing that a "person [who] slips and
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falls on a transitory foreign substance in a business establishment . . . must prove that
the business establishment had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous
condition and should have taken action to remedy it." Fla. Stat. § 768.0755(1).1
Defendant argues that summary judgment is warranted because its employees
quickly reacted to the spill, satisfying any duty Defendant owed to Plaintiff. Defendant's
employees responded immediately to the spill by placing a "wet floor" safety cone at the
site of the spill to warn Plaintiff and other customers of the hazard. DE 33 at 14–15.
The employees then organized among themselves and gathered the necessary tools to
remedy the spill. Id. at 14. One of Defendant's employees testified that they verbally
warned Plaintiff of the spill before he fell. DE 33-5 at 24:18–25:4. Defendant argues
that its employees' rapid and thoughtful attempts to clean up the spill and warn Plaintiff
of the hazard fulfilled any duty of reasonable care, even though the employees were
ultimately unsuccessful in preventing Plaintiff from slipping on the spill just over a
minute after it occurred.
Plaintiff, however, contests that Defendant's employees acted reasonably.
Plaintiff faults the employees for leaving the spill unattended to gather cleaning
supplies. DE 36 at 3. Plaintiff argues that a single safety cone placed in the center of
an aisle at the Premises was inadequate to warn customers of a spill that had spread
wine and glass across the entire aisle. Id. Finally, Plaintiff contests that Defendant's
employees verbally warned him of the spill before he fell. Id. at 4; see also DE 33-1
at 144:13–17 (Plaintiff's testimony that he heard no warning before the fall); DE 33-9
at 17:18–18:12 (employee's testimony that he had just begun speaking to warn Plaintiff
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Defendant does not contest that it had actual knowledge of the spill. DE 33
at 12.
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when Plaintiff fell). For these reasons, Plaintiff argues that Defendant did not take
reasonable care to keep the Premises safe and to warn of hidden dangers. DE 36
at 2–3.
The Court finds that the inferences drawn from the facts regarding the
reasonableness of Defendant's response to the spill, viewed in a light most favorable to
Plaintiff, preclude summary judgment in Defendant's favor. Whether a party has
breached the applicable duty of care is a question of fact generally reserved for the jury.
Williams v. Davis, 974 So. 2d 1052, 1056 n.2 (Fla. 2007). Here, Defendant owed a duty
to take reasonable care to keep the Premises safe and to warn of dangers unknown to
the customer. See Delgado, 65 So. 3d at 1089.2 The reasonableness of actions
Defendant's employees took with an aim to cleaning up the spill—such as leaving the
spill unattended to obtain cleaning supplies—and the adequacy of the warnings to
Plaintiff are fact-intensive inquiries inappropriate for resolution at the summary judgment
stage. See Barandas v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc., No. 11-62611, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99508, at *8–9 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2012) (denying summary judgment where
reasonable jury could conclude that defendant "had actual knowledge of [a] spill but
failed to protect [p]laintiff from harm," thereby breaching its duty of care); Johnson v.
United States, No. 06-61690, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62083, at *8–9 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23,
2007) (denying summary judgment because question of fact existed regarding
adequacy of warning sign); La Villarena, Inc. v. Acosta, 597 So. 2d 336, 338 (Fla. 3d
2
The Court rejects Defendant's contention that the spill of white wine on a white
floor (see DE 33-1 at 104:23–105:17, 114:20–24) was so open and notorious as to
relieve Defendant of a duty to warn as a matter of law. See La Villarena, Inc. v. Acosta,
597 So. 2d 336, 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (presence of liquid on floor not so visible as to
relieve defendant of duty to warn as matter of law).
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DCA 1992) (affirming denial of judgment as a matter of law in slip-and-fall case where
jury question existed as to whether warning sign by slippery floor provided adequate
warning). The Court therefore will deny Defendant's motion.
It is accordingly ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion for Final
Summary Judgment [DE 33] is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County,
Florida, this 21st day of January, 2014.
Copies provided to:
Counsel of record via CM/ECF
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