Griffin v. J.A.R.S., LLC et al
Filing
22
ORDER denying 4 Motion to Dismiss. Please see Order for details. Signed by Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum on 4/21/2014. (RSR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 14-60520-CIV-ROSENBAUM/HUNT
VERNON GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
J.A.R.S., LLC, and
THE WHOLE ENCHILADA
FRESH MEXICAN GRILL, LLC,
Defendants.
/
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on Defendants J.A.R.S., LLC, and The Whole Enchilada
Fresh Mexican Grill, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss and/or for More Definite Statement [ECF No. 4].
The Court has carefully reviewed Defendants’ Motion, all supporting and opposing filings, and the
record. For the reasons set forth below, the Court now denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
I. Background1
Plaintiff Vernon Griffin is “disabled” under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181, et seq. (“ADA”), as he lacks the ability to walk or stand, to hear out of his left ear, and to
speak without great difficulty (if at all), as a result of a series of strokes that he suffered during 2008.
ECF No. 1 at ¶ 3. To ambulate, Griffin must use a motorized wheelchair. Id.
1
The background is taken from the Complaint in this matter, as all factual allegations in a
complaint must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff on a
motion to dismiss. American Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted).
During December 2013, Griffin attempted to access Defendants’ property, a restaurant known
as The Whole Enchilada. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 9. At that time, however, Defendant could not fully access The
Whole Enchilada because of physical barriers to his access, dangerous conditions, and alleged ADA
violations. Id. at ¶ 9. In addition, Griffin claims to have encountered discriminatory policies towards
the disabled, precluding or limiting Griffin’s access to the facilities, goods, and services offered. Id.
Griffin has expressed his desire to visit The Whole Enchilada again “in the near future” to enjoy
Defendants’ facilities, goods, and services but has alleged that he will be unable to do so as a result
of the alleged barriers and policies in place at the restaurant. Id. at ¶ 10.
Contained within the Complaint is a listing of eleven specific alleged deficiencies at The
Whole Enchilada. See id. at ¶ 12. Each alleged deficiency also identifies the particular ADA
standard promulgated by the Department of Justice that the alleged deficiency violations. See id.
Among other alleged deficiencies, the complaint asserts that the property suffers from the following
problems:
a)
Non-compliant disabled person parking spaces (in violation
of STANDARDS 208 and 502);
b)
Non-compliant accessible routes from the parking spaces,
public street, sidewalk and public transportation stop to the
restaurant including non-compliant curb ramps (in violation
of STANDARD 206);
c)
Non-compliant floor and ground surfaces (in violation of
STANDARDS 302, 303, 304, 305, 306 and 307);
d)
Non-compliant interior accessible routes and clear floor space
(in violation of STANDARDS 206, 402, 403 and 404);
e)
Non-compliant restrooms including improperly heighted
dispensers and mirror and lack of compliant side approach on
the restroom stall door (in violation of STANDARDS 213,
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603 and 604);
f)
Non-compliant lavatory and
STANDARD 606);
sink
(in
g)
Non-compliant signage (in violation of STANDARD 216);
h)
Non-compliant service counters
STANDARDS 227 and 904);
i)
Non-compliant doors and doorways (in violation of
STANDARD 404);
j)
Non-compliant indoor and outdoor seating spaces (in
violation of STANDARDS 226 and 902) and
k)
Non-compliant dining surfaces and bars (in violation of
STANDARDS 226 and 902).
(in
violation
violation
of
of
Id. at ¶ 12. Griffin seeks an injunction under the ADA requiring Defendants to remove the alleged
physical barriers, dangerous conditions, and ADA violations, and to discontinue any discriminatory
policies towards the disabled. Id. at ¶ 15.
In response to the Complaint, Defendants filed the pending Motion to Dismiss, contending
that they are unable to discern what violations Griffin alleges, based on his Complaint. See ECF No.
4-1. Defendants seek dismissal of the Complaint, or, in the alternative, to issue an order requiring
Griffin to file a complaint that is “more specific as to what the exact violations are and not to place
four violations in one paragraph.” Id. at 5. In support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
Defendants attach a letter from Griffin’s counsel, opining that the level of specificity contained in
the Complaint is sufficient and offering to meet Defendants and defense counsel at The Whole
Enchilada to “actually show [them] the areas at issue and explain the violations in any level of detail
[they] desire.” ECF No. 4-3.
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II. Discussion
Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., governs motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. That
rule provides, in relevant part,
(b)
How to Present Defenses. Every defense to a claim for relief
in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if
one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses
by motion:
(6)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted; . . .
Id. The Court, therefore, considers the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as they set forth the
requirements for stating a claim.
Rule 8(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., demands that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While a
complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations, the standard “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007));
see also Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 958 (11th Cir. 2009); Corbitt v. Home
Depot U.S.A., Inc., 573 F.3d 1223, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009); Cobb v. State of Fla., 293 F. App’x 708,
709 (11th Cir. 2008); Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). “[N]aked
assertion[s]” bereft of “further factual enhancement” do not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557.
As the Supreme Court has explained, a complaint’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. “Moreover, the facts supporting the claim
must be ‘consistent with the allegations in the complaint.’” Wilchombe, 555 F.3d at 958 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562).
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On a motion to dismiss, the Court should accept the non-conclusory allegations in the
complaint as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the
plaintiff. See Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted);
see also Cobb, 293 F. App’x at 709; Brown v. Budget Rent-A-Car Syst., Inc., 119 F.3d 922, 923
(11th Cir. 1997).
Courts therefore conduct a “two-pronged approach” when considering a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A court should first ask whether the pleading properly
asserts “well-pleaded factual allegations,” or instead merely asserts “‘legal conclusions’ [that are]
not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679-680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). If the
complaint contains factual allegations that are well pled, the court should assume their veracity, and
then move to the next step and ask whether the factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. Thus, where the pleading asserts non-conclusory, factual
allegations that, if true, would push the claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible,” the
motion to dismiss should be denied. Id. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570) (quotation marks
omitted).
To state a cause of action under Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1)
his is a disabled individual; (2) the defendant owns, leases, or operates a place of public
accommodation; and (3) the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff within the meaning of the
ADA. Caldarola v. Rosner Realty LLC, 2014 WL 537390 at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2014) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 12182(a)). In discrimination cases involving existing buildings, a plaintiff must show that
removal of an existing barrier is “readily achievable.” Id. (citing GathrightDietrich v. Atlanta
Landmarks, Inc., 452 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2006)).
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Here, the Complaint satisfies the requirements of Twombly and Iqbal. It sets forth sufficient
facts, that, taken as true, establish violations of the ADA. The Complaint alleges Griffin is a
disabled person, that Defendants own and operate a place of public accommodation, and that
Defendants discriminated against Griffin within the meaning of the ADA, and, contrary to
Defendants’ contentions, the allegations of the Complaint provide Defendants with sufficient notice
of what is at issue in the case. Twombly and Iqbal require no more.
Defendants’ contentions that they cannot understand what violations Griffin alleges do not
alter the outcome. First, for the reasons set forth above, the Complaint is sufficiently detailed to
survive a motion to dismiss.
Second, Defendants’ claims that they are not capable of ascertaining from the Complaint the
violations that Griffin alleges do not seem genuine. For example, Defendants complain that they
cannot understand how paragraph 12.a of the Complaint, which cites Standards 208 and 502, relates
to The Whole Enchilada because Section 208.2.1 “relates to hospital outpatient facilities and the
defendants operate a restaurant[,]” and Section 208.2.3 “relates to residential facility Parking Spaces
and the defendants operate a restaurant.” ECF No. 4-1 at ¶ 2. Thus, Defendants assert, they “do not
know how [to] fix or respond to Section 208 since it cannot be determined which section applies.”
Id. In support of their argument, Defendants attach certain pages of the ADA regulations, including
Standards 208.2.1 and 208.2.3. See ECF No. 4-2.
But, although Section 208.2.1 clearly does not begin Section 208 and appears on page 34 of
the excerpt that Defendants submit in support of their filing, Defendants conveniently do not attach
page 33 of the same document, which includes the parts of Section 208 that precede Sections 208.2.1
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and 208.2.3. See ECF No. 4-2 at 10-11.2 Significantly, Section 208.1 provides, “GENERAL.
Where parking spaces are provided, parking spaces shall be provided in accordance with 208.”
Section 208.2, in turn, notes the number of accessible parking spaces required for all establishments
not specifically identified elsewhere in Section 208. Put simply, Sections 208.1 and 208.2 apply to
parking requirements at all facilities that must be ADA-compliant, unless another provision within
Section 208 sets forth a parking requirement specific to a particular facility. Defendants point to
parts of Section 208 that they have picked and chosen and that they know do not apply to them and
use those aspects of the Standards to argue that Section 208 as a whole does not apply to them when
they know full well that the general parts of Section 208 do appear to apply to them. Worse yet, they
appear to attempt to hide the relevant parts of Section 208 by attaching only the irrelevant parts of
the Standard to their Motion. This does not comply with the duty of candor to the Court, and it is
frivolous at best and disingenuous at worst. Defendants’ other challenges to the Complaint are
similarly without basis, and the Court will not belabor this Order further pointing out the faults with
them.
Finally, Defendants’ repeated protestations that they cannot figure out what specific
violations the Complaint alleges are even less warranted in light of the fact that Griffin’s counsel has
offered “to meet [Defendants’ counsel] and [Defendants] at the property and actually show [them]
the areas at issue and explain the violation in any level of detail [they] desire.” ECF No. 4-3. While
this offer would not suffice to remedy a deficient complaint, here, the Complaint satisfies the
pleading standard. Thus, if Defendants truly desire additional detail beyond what the law requires
2
The page numbers of the original attachment differ from the page numbers imprinted by
the Court’s ECF system across the top of the filing. The original page numbers 32 and 34
correspond to the ECF page numbers 10 and 11, respectively.
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in the Complaint, they may address their questions directly to Griffin’s counsel, who has already
agreed to answer them.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants J.A.R.S., LLC, and The Whole Enchilada Fresh
Mexican Grill, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss and/or for More Definite Statement [ECF No. 4] is
DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 21st day of April 2014.
ROBIN S. ROSENBAUM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
copies:
The Honorable Patrick M. Hunt
Counsel of Record
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