Reano et al v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA

Filing 58

ORDER DISMISSING CASE for Lack of Jurisdiction. The case is CLOSED. Signed by Judge James I. Cohn on 4/21/2015. (sry)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 14-60581-CIV-COHN/SELTZER
CARMEN REANO and
SANTIAGO REANO,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
d/b/a America’s Servicing Company,
Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER DISMISSING CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint, or in the Alternative, Motion to Stay [DE 39] (“Motion”). The Court
has carefully reviewed the Motion and all related filings and is otherwise fully advised in
the premises.
I.

Background
On March 5, 2014, Plaintiffs Carmen and Santiago Reano filed this action

against Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., d/b/a America’s Servicing Company, the
servicer of Plaintiffs’ home-mortgage loan. See DE 1 (Compl.). In their current
Amended Complaint [DE 21], Plaintiffs allege that Defendant wrongfully refused to
credit certain payments toward Plaintiffs’ delinquent mortgage account. As a result,
Plaintiffs claim, the owner of the mortgage loan brought a foreclosure action against
them in state court and obtained a final judgment of foreclosure. Plaintiffs contend that
they incurred damages from the foreclosure suit and from the increased amounts they
owe under the state court’s judgment.

Defendant has moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint or, alternatively, to
stay this action until Plaintiffs’ pending appeal of the foreclosure judgment is resolved.
In support of dismissal, Defendant argues that (1) Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by res
judicata and collateral estoppel, and (2) Plaintiffs have stated no valid claim for relief.
See DE 39; DE 48 (Reply). Plaintiffs oppose the Motion and contest Defendant’s
arguments for dismissal. See DE 42 (Response).
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court concludes that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction over this action. The Court will therefore limit its discussion to the
jurisdictional issue and will not address the parties’ contentions regarding the Motion.
II.

Discussion
Before it may consider the merits of this case, the Court must determine whether

subject-matter jurisdiction exists. See Wernick v. Matthews, 524 F.2d 543, 545 (5th Cir.
1975) (“[W]e are not free to disregard the jurisdictional issue, for without jurisdiction we
are powerless to consider the merits. If we lack jurisdiction, it is our duty to notice that
fact sua sponte.”);1 see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any
time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
Subject-matter jurisdiction “involves the court’s competency to consider a given type of
case,” so it “cannot be waived or otherwise conferred upon the court by the parties.”
Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1000 (11th Cir. 1982).
Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, a federal district court generally lacks
jurisdiction to review final judgments of a state court. See D.C. Court of Appeals v.

1

Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981, are binding
precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16
(1923). Rooker–Feldman applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The doctrine bars
claims “that were actually raised in the state court and those ‘inextricably intertwined’
with that state judgment.” Figueroa v. MERSCORP, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1316
(S.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam)), aff’d, 477 F. App’x 558 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). “A claim is
inextricably intertwined if it would effectively nullify the state court judgment or [if] it
succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues.” Casale,
558 F.3d at 1260 (citations & internal quotation marks omitted). Still, “the Rooker bar
can apply only to issues that the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise” in state
court. Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983).
Here, all of Plaintiffs’ claims are based on Defendant’s refusal to credit certain
payments to Plaintiffs’ defaulted mortgage account. According to Plaintiffs, this alleged
unlawful conduct resulted in the mortgage owner filing the foreclosure action and
obtaining a judgment against Plaintiffs. But as Defendant notes, Plaintiffs raised the
account-credit issues in asserting a payment defense in the state foreclosure suit.
And Plaintiffs have continued to rely on these issues in connection with their appeal of
the foreclosure judgment. If successful, Plaintiffs’ claims here would effectively nullify
the state judgment, or would at least mean that the state court wrongly entered it.
See Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260. The present claims are therefore inextricably
intertwined with the state judgment, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider them.
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III.

Conclusion
For the reasons discussed, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1.

The above-styled action is DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction;

2.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, or in the
Alternative, Motion to Stay [DE 39] is DENIED AS MOOT; and

3.

The Clerk shall CLOSE this case and DENY AS MOOT all other pending
motions.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County,

Florida, this 21st day of April, 2015.

Copies provided to:
Counsel of record via CM/ECF

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