Carriuolo v. General Motors Company
Filing
28
ORDER denying 22 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Defendant shall answer the Amended Complaint on or before 12/26/2014. Signed by Judge James I. Cohn on 12/11/2014. (drv)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 14-61429-CIV-COHN/SELTZER
GERI SIANO CARRIUOLO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
GENERAL MOTORS LLC,
Defendant.
__________________________________/
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [DE 22]
(“Motion”), Plaintiffs’ Response [DE 24] and Defendant’s Reply [DE 25]. The Court has
reviewed these motion papers, the relevant portions of the case file, and is otherwise
advised in the premises. Upon review, the Court will DENY the Motions.
I.
Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court shall grant a motion to
dismiss where, based upon a dispositive issue of law, the factual allegations of the
complaint cannot support the asserted cause of action. Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459
F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006). Indeed, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). Thus, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Nonetheless, a complaint must be liberally construed, assuming the facts alleged
therein as true and drawing all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s
favor. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint should not be dismissed simply because
the court is doubtful that the plaintiff will be able to prove all of the necessary factual
allegations. Id. Accordingly, a well-pleaded complaint will survive a motion to dismiss
“even if it appears that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556.
II.
Background
Plaintiffs sue Defendant for misrepresentations made in connection with their
purchase of new cars. Plaintiffs allege that they bought new 2014 Cadillac CTS sedans
from third-party General Motors dealerships. [DE 7 at 1.] Plaintiff Geri Siano Carriuolo
purchased her car from a dealership in Florida. [Id. at 2.] Plaintiff Peter Bracchi
purchased his car from a dealership in Tennessee. [Id.]
Defendant shipped these cars with so-called “Monroney Stickers” that relay
information about the cars’ safety ratings awarded by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (“NHTSA”). [Id. at 3–4, 7–8.] These Monroney Stickers indicated
that the 2014 Cadillac CTS sedans received a five-star rating in three categories:
Frontal Crash Driver, Frontal Crash Passenger, and Rollover. [Id. at 4.]
But this information was false. At that time, the 2014 Cadillac CTS had received
no safety ratings from the NHTSA at all. [Id. at 5.] Since Plaintiffs purchased the
vehicles, the NHTSA has rated the 2014 Cadillac CTS. Although not mentioned in the
Amended Complaint, the parties seem to agree that the NHTSA has awarded the 2014
Cadillac CTS a five-star “overall” safety rating, but only four stars in the “Frontal Crash
Driver” category. [See DE 22-1 at 2 n.1; DE 24 at 4.]
2
Based upon these incorrect Monroney Stickers, Plaintiffs bring three claims
against Defendant. Count I of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges violation of the
Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”), Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et
seq. [DE 7 at 7–8.] Count II of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges violation of the
Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), Tennessee Code § 47-18-101, et seq.
[Id. at 8–10.] Finally, Count III of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges Unjust
Enrichment under both Florida and Tennessee Law. [Id. at 11–12.]
III.
Discussion
The Court will deny Defendant’s Motion as to each of the counts in the Amended
Complaint. This Order will address each cause of action in turn.
A.
Violation of the Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
Act.
Defendant properly observes in its Motion that a FDUTPA claim has three
elements: “‘(1) a deceptive act or unfair practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual
damages.’” [DE 22-1 at 4 (quoting Lustig v. Bear Stearns Residential Mortg. Corp., 411
F. App’x 224, 225 (11th Cir. 2014)).] Defendant argues that Count I of Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint fails to sufficiently plead the first of these elements. Defendant
argues that to plead an “unfair” act, Plaintiffs must allege an act that is “likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers.” [DE 22-1 at 4.] And any “deceptive” act must relate to
a “material representation or omission.” [Id. (citations omitted).] Per Defendant, “[t]he
Amended Complaint does not contain any allegations or facts that Plaintiffs or any other
consumer incurred ‘substantial injury,’” [Id.] and Plaintiffs “allege no facts whatsoever to
explain why [the Monroney Stickers’ inaccuracy] was ‘material’ to Plaintiffs or any other
purchaser or lessee” [Id. at 5].
3
However, the Court has little difficulty concluding that Plaintiffs have satisfied
their burden to plead the required material misrepresentations and substantial injury.
Plaintiffs plead that Defendant conspicuously advertised that its car received safety
ratings that in fact it did not. Accordingly, Plaintiffs allege that they “were damaged
because the automobiles they purchased or leased did not contain the safety ratings
that were represented, making the automobiles less valuable than the automobiles
would have been had [Defendant’s] representations been true.” [DE 7 at 2.] Florida’s
appellate courts have found such allegations sufficient to sustain a FDUTPA claim. See
Collins v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 894 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(reversing dismissal where a plaintiff alleged that a car manufacturer violated the
FDUTPA by advertising that a car had effective seatbelts when in fact it did not).
Moreover, even in the absence of such case law, it seems reasonable that
representations concerning the safety rating that a government agency assigned to a
vehicle are material and that overstating this vehicle’s safety ratings substantially harms
the vehicle’s purchaser. Federal law requires Defendant to include the NHTSA ratings
on the Monroney Stickers that it ships with its vehicles. See 15 U.S.C. § 1232; 49
C.F.R. 575.302. Further, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant felt compelled to send
Plaintiffs a letter with the correct information when it discovered the error. [See DE 7 at
4–5.] At this stage, the Court is required to make all reasonable inferences in favor of
Plaintiffs. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion is denied as
to Plaintiffs’ FUDTPA claim.
4
B.
Violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.
Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs’ TCPA claims should be dismissed mirrors
its argument as to Plaintiffs FUDTPA claims. Defendant argues that “for the same
reasons discussed above with regard to the FDUTPA claim, Plaintiffs’ individual TCPA
claim should be dismissed.” [DE 22-1 at 7.] Specifically, Plaintiffs “have not alleged
facts to support allegations relating to ‘substantial injury’ or ‘materiality.’” These
arguments carry no more weight in the context of Plaintiffs’ TCPA claims than they do in
the context of Plaintiffs’ FUDTPA claims. Defendant’s Motion on this score will
therefore likewise be denied.
C.
Unjust Enrichment under Florida Law
Defendant next moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for Unjust Enrichment.
Defendant addresses unjust enrichment under Florida and Tennessee law separately,
and the Court will do the same.
Under Florida law, a claim for Unjust Enrichment has three elements: “‘(1) the
plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant; (2) the defendant voluntarily accepted
and retained that benefit; and (3) the circumstances are such that it would be
inequitable for the defendants to retain it without paying the value thereof.’” [DE 22-1 at
7–8 (quoting Virgilio v. Ryland Group, Inc., 680 F.3d 1329, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012)).]
Defendant attacks Plaintiffs’ pleading of the first of these elements. [DE 22-1 at 8.] In
doing so, Defendant argues that any such benefit must be “direct” and that here “the
only facts [Plaintiffs] allege pertaining to their transaction is that they purchased their
vehicles directly from automobile dealerships, not from [Defendant] GM.” [Id.]
However, taking all reasonable inferences from Plaintiffs’ allegations in their
favor, Plaintiffs have alleged that they have conferred the required direct benefit upon
5
Defendant. It is of no matter that the benefit passed through independent dealerships.
“[I]t would not serve the principles of justice and equity to preclude an unjust enrichment
claim merely because the ‘benefit’ passed through an intermediary before being
conferred on a defendant.” Hamilton v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1317
(S.D. Fla. 2014). Instead, this Court has found that dismissal is not proper if the
manufacturer of a product “marketed its product directly to consumers, but sold its
product through an intermediary, i.e., a retail outfit.” Romano v. Motorola, Inc., No. 0760517-CIV, 2007 WL 4199781, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2007).
Defendant’s Reply notes the “unique way [Defendant] GM’s transaction with its
independent dealerships are structured.” Defendant argues that Plaintiffs will therefore
not be able to allege that a benefit flows to Defendant from a dealership’s sales. [DE 25
at 8.] However, at this stage, the Court must construe the Amended Complaint firmly in
Plaintiffs’ favor. The Amended Complaint is silent as to Defendant’s arrangement with
its dealerships. That a dealership’s sale would confer some benefit upon Defendant is
plausible. The Court will therefore not dismiss Plaintiffs’ Unjust Enrichment claims on
these grounds.
D.
Unjust Enrichment Under Tennessee Law
Defendant further argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ Unjust
Enrichment claims under Tennessee Law. The Tennessee Supreme Court set forth the
elements of an Unjust Enrichment claim in Freeman Industries, LLC v. Eastman
Chemical Co., 172 S.W. 3d 512 (Tenn. 2005). There, the court held:
The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are: 1) [a]
benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; 2)
appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and 3)
acceptance of such benefit under such circumstances that it
would be inequitable for him to retain the benefit without
6
payment of the value thereof.
The most significant
requirement of an unjust enrichment claim is that the benefit
to the defendant be unjust. The plaintiff must further
demonstrate that he or she has exhausted all remedies
against the person with whom the plaintiff enjoyed privity of
contract.
Id. at 525 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Defendant contends that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ Unjust Enrichment
Claims under Tennessee law because Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged facts
sufficient to satisfy this final requirement. [DE 22-1at 9–10.] That is, Plaintiffs have not
alleged that they have exhausted all remedies against the dealerships, with which they
were in privity of contract. [Id.]
But it is unclear that such a failure serves as grounds to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). “‘[T]he precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary depending upon
the context,’ and should not be applied rigidly.” Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. §
1216 (3d ed. 2010) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)).
Moreover, Freeman Industries concerned summary judgment, not dismissal at the
pleadings stage. 172 S.W. 3d at 526. 1 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint provides notice
of their claims to Defendant and pleads sufficient facts for the Court to conclude that
their claims are plausible.
Moreover, neither Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint nor Defendant’s Motion
suggests a claim that Plaintiffs have against the dealerships. Plaintiffs’ suit is premised
1
The Court acknowledges the Eastern District of Tennesee’s contrary conclusion in
Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-187, 2008 WL 3914461
(E.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2008). This case is not binding and the Court does not find it
persuasive under these circumstances. Further, other federal courts in Tennessee
have left it to a jury to decide what impact failing to exhaust other remedies may have
on a plaintiff’s recovery. See, e.g., Jackson v. Regions Bank, No. 3:09-00908, 2010 WL
3069844, at *11 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2010) (“[T]he jury can determine the extent to
which those circumstances should affect the unjust enrichment award.”).
7
entirely upon the inaccurate Monroney Stickers that Defendant generated and shipped
to the dealerships. These stickers appear to be Defendant’s responsibility. See 15
U.S.C. § 1232 (requiring a vehicle “manufacturer” to apply the sticker); 15 U.S.C. §
1233(c) (making it a misdemeanor to alter or remove a Monroney Sticker). Should
discovery uncover an unexhausted claim against the dealerships from which Plaintiffs
purchased their cars, Defendant may raise this issue at summary judgment or some
other appropriate time. The Court will not dismiss Plaintiffs’ Unjust Enrichment claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) on this ground.
E.
Plaintiffs’ Class Allegations
Finally, Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ class
allegations under the TCPA. [DE 22-1 at 5–6.] Defendant points to the Tennessee
Supreme Court’s decision in Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W. 3d
301 (Tenn. 2008), holding that the statute’s language forecloses a class action. This
matter is settled in Tennessee state court. But whether this language effectively
overrides Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 appears unresolved. See generally,
Shady Grove Orhopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
The Court need not address the issue at this time. “The question of class
certification is generally not addressed on a motion to dismiss.” Martorella v. Deutsche
Bank Nat. Trust, Co., 931 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1228 (S.D. Fla. 2013). Plaintiffs filed a
motion for class certification along with their Amended Complaint. [See DE 8]. The
Court holds that motion in abeyance. Rather than determine the propriety of Plaintiffs’
efforts to bring their TCPA claims as a class action at this stage, the Court will address
the matter when resolving Plaintiff’s motion for class certification.
8
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [DE 22] is DENIED.
2.
Defendant shall file its answer to the Amended Complaint on or before
December 26, 2014
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County,
Florida, this 11th day of December, 2014.
Copies provided to counsel of record via CM/ECF.
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?