Chanel, Inc. v. ccbagsonline.com et al

Filing 19

ORDER granting 7 Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Judge James I. Cohn on 2/6/2015. (sry)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 15-60100-CIV-COHN/SELTZER

CHANEL, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CCBAGSONLINE.COM, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________/
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction
[DE 7] (“Motion”). The Court has carefully reviewed the Motion, the attached
declarations and exhibits, and the record in this case. The Court has also heard oral
arguments from Plaintiff’s counsel at a hearing held earlier today. Although Defendants
received notice of these proceedings, none of them responded to the Motion, nor did
they appear at the preliminary-injunction hearing.
I.

Background
On January 20, 2015, Plaintiff Chanel, Inc., (“Chanel”) filed this action against

several partnerships and business associations. See generally DE 1 (Complaint).
Chanel alleges that Defendants are selling goods bearing counterfeit and confusingly
similar imitations of numerous Chanel trademarks (the “Chanel Marks”). Id. ¶¶ 18, 28.
Chanel thus has asserted the following claims against Defendants: (1) counterfeiting
and infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (2) false designation of origin under
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); and (3) common-law unfair competition. Compl. ¶¶ 43–62.

On January 21, 2015, Chanel filed an Ex Parte Application for Entry of
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. See DE 7. The Court granted
Chanel’s request for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) on January 23, 2015.
See DE 10. Based on strong evidence that Defendants are selling counterfeit and
infringing versions of Chanel’s trademarked goods, the Court found that Chanel had
satisfied all four requirements for a TRO: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) that Chanel would suffer irreparable injury if a restraining order were not
granted; (3) that the threatened injury to Chanel outweighed the harm the relief would
cause to Defendants; and (4) that entry of the restraining order would serve the public
interest. See id. at 4–7; Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225–26
(11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
The Court thus temporarily restrained Defendants and associated persons from
using infringing versions of the Chanel Marks in connection with their products and
websites. See DE 10 at 7–8. The Court also ordered the registrars for Defendants’
domain names to transfer the domains to a holding account, after which all traffic to the
websites would be redirected to a page displaying the filings in this case. See id. at
9–10. The Court required Chanel to post a bond of $10,000.00 and to serve the
Complaint, the Motion, and the TRO on Defendants through their known e-mail
addresses and via publication. See id. at 11–12.1
In the TRO, the Court also set a hearing on Chanel’s request for a preliminary
injunction. See DE 10 at 12. The Court directed Defendants to file any Response to
the Motion no later than February 2, 2015. See id. The Court cautioned Defendants

1

The record indicates that Chanel has complied with the applicable bond and
service requirements. See DE 13, 15–17.
2

that "if they do not timely respond to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and do
not appear at the scheduled hearing, the Court may enter a preliminary injunction
against them by default.” Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted).
As noted above, Defendants neither responded to the Motion nor appeared at
today’s hearing. Before the hearing, Plaintiff identified two witnesses who had
submitted written declarations in support of the Motion. See DE 14. Because
Defendants did not appear at the hearing, however, Plaintiff relied on the witnesses’
declarations in lieu of live testimony.
II.

Discussion
The preliminary injunction Chanel seeks would maintain the relief granted in the

TRO until this case is decided on the merits. The requirements for issuing a preliminary
injunction are the same as those for entering a TRO. See Schiavo, 403 F.3d at
1225–26 (“[T]he four factors to be considered in determining whether temporary
restraining or preliminary injunctive relief is to be granted . . . are whether the movant
has established: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that
irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury
outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that entry of the
relief would serve the public interest.”). Because a preliminary injunction is “an
extraordinary and drastic remedy,” it may not be granted unless the moving party
“clearly carries the burden of persuasion as to the four prerequisites.” Church v. City of
Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998). Unlike a
TRO, a preliminary injunction requires notice to the adverse party and a hearing.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a).
3

Here, Chanel is substantially likely to succeed on the merits of its claims. Chanel
has presented clear evidence that Defendants are selling goods bearing unauthorized,
infringing copies of the Chanel Marks, thereby confusing the public about the origin of
those goods. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a). Allowing Defendants to continue this
illegal conduct would cause irreparable harm to Chanel by reducing sales of its genuine
trademarked goods and by depriving it of the reputation and goodwill associated with
those products. Further, because Defendants have no right to sell counterfeit and
infringing goods, the balance of harms strongly favors Chanel. And halting Defendants’
conduct—which involves the sale of illicit goods through unlawful means—serves the
public interest. Chanel therefore has clearly proved all four requirements for a
preliminary injunction. See Schiavo, 403 F.3d at 1225–26; Church, 30 F.3d at 1342.
Although Defendants have been given notice of the Motion and an opportunity to
respond, they have made no effort to rebut Chanel’s evidence warranting a preliminary
injunction. The Court thus concludes that Chanel’s Motion should be granted.
III.

Conclusion
For the reasons discussed, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction [DE 7] is GRANTED;

2.

All provisions of the Court’s Order Granting Ex Parte Application for Entry of
Temporary Restraining Order [DE 10], incorporated by reference in this Order,
shall remain in effect while this case is pending or until the Court orders
otherwise; and

3.

Plaintiff shall promptly serve a copy of this Order on Defendants through the
means specified in paragraphs 7 and 15 of the Order Granting Ex Parte
4

Application for Entry of Temporary Restraining Order.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County,
Florida, this 6th day of February, 2015.

Copies provided to:
Counsel of record via CM/ECF

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