WILLIS v. City of Coral Springs et al
Filing
23
ORDER granting 5 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 11 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Beth Bloom on 7/11/2016. (lrz)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 16-cv-60959-BLOOM/Valle
MARC ANTHONY WILLIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CORAL SPRINGS,
and NICOLE HILDEBRANDT,
Defendants.
____________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon two Motions filed by Defendants City of Coral
Springs (“the City”) and City of Coral Springs Police Officer Nicole Hildebrandt (“Officer
Hildebrandt,” together with the City, “Defendants”), respectively, ECF Nos. [5], [11] (together,
the “Motions”), which seek to dismiss counts in Plaintiff Marc Anthony Willis’ (“Plaintiff”)
Complaint, ECF No. [1] (“Complaint”), pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court has
carefully reviewed the Motions, all supporting and opposing submissions, the record, and
applicable law. For the reasons set forth below, the Motions are granted.
I. Background
This controversy arises from events that occurred on the ill-fated night of April 29, 2013.
Willis claims that Officer Hildebrandt inexplicably became aggressive and arrested him, utilizing
excessive force in the process. Specifically, the incident unfolded around 7:00 p.m., when
Officer Hildebrandt, who was on duty and uniformed, traveled to Plaintiff’s residence in Coral
Springs to address “alleged noise complaints.”
Compl. ¶¶ 21-22.
Upon her arrival, she
encountered Willis, who was “working on his vehicle” that was “legally parked in front of
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Plaintiff’s home.” Id. ¶¶ 23-24, 51. An altercation involving the noise level of Willis’ car radio
ensued.
Officer Hildebrandt ordered him to turn down the volume of the radio, and when Willis
complied, Officer Hildebrandt told him that he did not turn it down “low enough.” Id. ¶¶ 25-26.
So, Willis turned the radio off, prompting Officer Hildebrandt to ask, “what the hell is your
problem[?]” Id. ¶¶ 27-28. “Willis stated that he did not have a problem and attempted to explain
to [Officer] Hildebrandt what he was doing with his vehicle.” Id. ¶ 29. Officer Hildebrandt then
became “belligerent,” “suggesting that [] Willis had no right to be in the neighborhood.” Id. ¶
30. Eventually, the Defendant told Willis to turn around and “get up against his vehicle” and
asked if he had identification. Id. ¶¶ 31-32. Plaintiff advised Officer Hildebrandt “that his
driver’s license was in his house and asked if he could get the driver’s license,” which she
“refused to allow.”
Id. ¶¶ 33-35.
“Willis continued to completely comply with Officer
Hildebrandt’s commands[,] despite [her] refusal to allow Plaintiff to get his driver’s license,” and
“continued to explain . . . why he was there.” Id. ¶¶ 36-37. This only “further enraged
Defendant,” who then told Willis “to place his hands behind his back.” Id. ¶¶ 38-39. Once he
complied, Officer “Hildebrandt[] placed hand cuffs on Plaintiff.” Id. ¶¶ 40-41. “[D]uring this
process[, Officer] Hildebrandt’s aggression escalated to an outright physical attack on the
Plaintiff, including but not limited to the twisting of Plaintiff’s arm and throwing the Plaintiff
hard against his vehicle.” Id. ¶ 42. Officer “Hildebrandt then took Plaintiff into custody and the
Plaintiff was arrested.” Id. ¶ 43.
Plaintiff alleges that Officer Hildebrandt had no justification for asking him to produce
identification while he was standing on his own property, nor for aggressively pushing and
striking him against his vehicle.
Id. ¶¶ 44-46.
2
Furthermore, Plaintiff claims that Officer
Case No. 16-cv-60959-BLOOM/Valle
Hildebrandt “did not, at any time, have probable cause to arrest” him “or reasonable suspicion to
believe that Plaintiff had violated any state or local laws or any traffic ordinances.” Id. ¶¶ 47, 58.
At no time did Plaintiff “pose any threat to Defendant” or “display a furtive appearance or
suspicious conduct.” Id. ¶¶ 56-57. Nevertheless, based on the information that the Defendant
provided, “the Broward County State Attorney’s Office filed a one-Count Information against
the Plaintiff for resisting, obstructing a police officer without violence F.S. 843.02.” Id. ¶ 48.
All charges against Willis were dropped on February 26, 2014. Id. ¶ 50.1
Willis alleges that Officer Hildebrandt was negligent and reckless in these actions, which
“endangered [his] life” and caused him to suffer severe mental and physical injuries. Id. ¶¶ 5255, 62-64. He further submits that the Defendant “had an unjustified belief that the Plaintiff did
not belong in the neighborhood because of his race,” which motivated her improper conduct. Id.
¶¶ 60-61. Accordingly, Plaintiff brings the following ten counts for relief: (I) violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Hildebrandt generally; (II) deprivation of civil rights against the
City; (III) federal claim for false arrest/imprisonment against Officer Hildebrandt; (IV) federal
claim for excessive use of force against Officer Hildebrandt; (V) state claim for false
arrest/imprisonment against the City; (VI) state claim for false arrest/imprisonment against
Officer Hildebrandt; (VII) excessive use of force against the City; (VIII) state claim for
battery/unnecessary use of force against Officer Hildebrandt; (IX) malicious prosecution against
Officer Hildebrandt; (X) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Hildebrandt for “initiation
and pursuit of prosecution without probable cause.” Id. ¶¶ 116-18. The Complaint indicates that
Officer Hildebrandt “is being sued in her individual and official capacities.” Id. ¶ 19.
1
Plaintiff alleges that conviction for nonviolent resistance of an officer requires proof that the officer was
engaged in the performance of a lawful duty – and, here the officer was not so engaged. Id. ¶ 49.
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Officer Hildebrandt’s Motion seeks dismissal of all claims asserted against her in her
official capacity. At the same time, the City argues that Counts I and II fail to state plausible
claims for relief. The Court will address each Motion in turn.
II. Legal Standard
A pleading in a civil action must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint
“does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining
that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). Nor can a complaint rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557
(alteration in original)). ”To survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court, as a general rule, must accept the plaintiff’s
allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the
plaintiff. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012); Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration Alliance, 304 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir.
2002). Although the Court is required to accept all of the allegations contained in the complaint
and exhibits attached to the pleadings as true, this tenet is inapplicable to legal
conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 449 F.3d
1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006) (“When considering a motion to dismiss . . . the court limits its
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consideration to the pleadings and all exhibits attached thereto.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In the Rule 12(b)(6) context, a plaintiff’s pleadings should be read as a whole. See
Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 623
F.3d 1371, 1383 (11th Cir. 2010) (interpreting specific language in complaint within the context
of the entire complaint); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1252 n.
11 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that, in a Rule 12(b)(6) context, “[w]e read the complaint as a
whole”). “Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is not appropriate ‘unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.’” Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Through this lens, the Court addresses the instant Motions.
III. Discussion
Both Defendants, as noted, have filed Motions to Dismiss in this action. The City
requests dismissal of only Counts I and II, arguing that Count I misstates the law, and Count II is
insufficiently plead.
Officer Hildebrandt, on the other hand, seeks dismissal of all counts
asserted against her in her official capacity, namely Counts I, III, IV, VI, VIII, IX, and X,
“because they improperly co-mingle official capacity claims, which are duplicative of the
municipal claims against the City, with individual capacity claims.” Hildebrandt Mot. at 1.
Plaintiff opposes the requested relief, arguing that he has “presented sufficient facts that are nonconclusory [and that] establish a plausible claim for relief.”
ECF No. [20] (Response to
Hildebrandt Mot.) at 4; see ECF No. [19] (Response to City Mot.). The Court disagrees.
A. The City’s Motion
Though the City seeks to dismiss Counts I and II, Count I seeks relief only against
Officer Hildebrandt. See Compl. ¶ 72 (“Plaintiff prays this Court assess compensatory damages
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against the Defendant HILDEBRANDT, in excess of Seventy Five Thousand ($75,000.00)
Dollars together with reasonable attorney[‘]s fees and costs as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1988.”).
To the extent that Plaintiff does intend to hold the City liable for all claims against Officer
Hildebrandt, pursuant to Count I or otherwise,2 “[i]t is well established in this circuit that
supervisory officials are not liable under Bivens for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates
on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228,
1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971))
(alterations adopted). Instead, supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs either when a supervisor
personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a “causal
connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional
deprivation.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003).3 Accordingly, the City’s
Motion, to the extent applicable, is granted as to Count I.
In Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to hold the City liable for deprivation of his
civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seemingly on a failure to train theory.4 Specifically,
Willis alleges that his constitutional rights pursuant to the 14th Amendment were violated by
2
The Complaint states as follows: “At all times material hereto, HILDEBRANDT was acting within the
course and scope of her employment as a police officer with the City’s Police Department. As a
consequence thereof, CITY is liable as hereinafter alleged under the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior.”
Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 17, 71, 76.
3
Accordingly, “to state a claim against a supervisory defendant, the plaintiff must allege (1) the
supervisor’s personal involvement in the violation of his constitutional rights, (2) the existence of a
custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, (3) facts
supporting an inference that the supervisor directed the unlawful action or knowingly failed to prevent it,
or (4) a history of widespread abuse that put the supervisor on notice of an alleged deprivation that he
then failed to correct.” Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App’x 865, 875-76 (11th Cir. 2011). A supervisor cannot be
held liable under § 1983 for mere negligence in the training or supervision of his employees. Greason v.
Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836-37 (11th Cir. 1990).
4
To the extent that Plaintiff also seeks to plead a policy claim, he has alleged no such facts that would
enable the Court’s analysis in that regard.
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Hildebrandt as a result of the City’s failure to “adequately train and supervise” their police
officers.
Compl. ¶¶ 74-79.
Any person acting under color of state law who violates a
constitutional right of another is liable for the injured party’s losses. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
“Section 1983 provides a fault-based analysis for imposing municipal liability; therefore,
plaintiffs must establish that the city was the person who caused them to be subjected to their
deprivation.” Depew v. City of St. Marys, Ga., 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). “[W]hen
execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury th[en] the
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “A plaintiff . . . has two methods by which to establish a
[municipal actor’s] policy: identify either (1) an officially promulgated [ ] policy or (2) an
unofficial custom or practice of the county shown through the repeated acts of a final
policymaker for the [municipal actor].” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th
Cir. 2003). “To establish a policy or custom, it is generally necessary to show a persistent and
wide-spread practice[; h]owever, the custom need not receive formal approval.” Depew, 787
F.2d at 1499 (“Random or isolated incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or policy.”);
see also Smith v. Mercer, 572 F. App’x 676, 679 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A plaintiff must identify a
‘consistent and widespread practice’ of constitutional deprivations to prove local government
liability for an unofficial custom.”); Carter v. Columbus Consol. Gov’t, 559 F. App’x 880, 881
(11th Cir. March 18, 2014) (“[T]he challenged practice or custom must be ‘so pervasive as to be
the functional equivalent of a formal policy’”) (quoting Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330 n. 6).
“In addition, . . . a municipality’s failure to correct the constitutionally offensive actions
of its employees can rise to the level of a custom or policy ‘if the municipality tacitly authorizes
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these actions or displays deliberate indifference’ towards the misconduct.” Griffin v. City of
Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Brooks v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191, 1193
(11th Cir. 1987)); see Piccirillo v. City of Pembroke Pines, No. 15-CV-62378, 2016 WL
1028333, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2016); Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (rejecting
city’s argument that municipal liability can be imposed only where the challenged policy itself is
unconstitutional, and finding that “there are limited circumstances in which an allegation of a
‘failure to train’ can be the basis for liability under § 1983”). That is, “a Section 1983 claim for
inadequate training exists only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the
rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Riley v. Newton, 94 F.3d 632, 638
(11th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted); see also Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (“Only where a
municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate
indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a
city ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.”); Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346,
1350-51 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[A]n allegation of failure to train or supervise can be the basis for
liability under § 1983 . . . only where the municipality inadequately trains or supervises its
employees, this failure to train or supervise is a city policy, and that city policy causes the
employees to violate a citizen’s constitutional rights.”).
“Deliberate indifference can be established in two ways: by showing a widespread pattern
of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees or by showing that the need for
training was so obvious that a municipality’s failure to train its employees would result in a
constitutional violation.” Mingo v. City of Mobile, Ala., -- F. App’x --, 2014 WL 6435116, at *6
(11th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014) (citing Connick v. Thompson, -- U.S. --, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011);
Gold, 151 F.3d at 1350-52). “To establish a city’s deliberate indifference, ‘a plaintiff must
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present some evidence that the municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a
particular area and the municipality made a deliberate choice not to take any action.’” Lewis v.
City of W. Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gold, 151 F.3d at
1350). “Prior incidents also must involve facts substantially similar to those at hand in order to
be relevant to a deliberate-indifference claim.” Shehada v. Tavss, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1374
(S.D. Fla. 2013) (citing Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1162 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that the City failed to provide sufficient training to or supervision
of Hildebrandt as the basis for its Monell action against the City:
Defendant CITY OF CORAL SPRINGS, as policy making officials have
continually failed to establish appropriate police procedures and train not only
other police personnel, but in this instance, specifically Officer HILDEBRANDT:
a. to prevent unconstitutional deprivations by HILDEBRANDT of the right to and
privilege to WILLIS to be secure in his person while in custody of the State of
Florida; b. to prevent unconstitutional deprivations by HILDEBRANDT, of the
right and privilege of WILLIS not to be deprived of his rights and liberty without
due process of law; c. to prevent unconstitutional deprivations by
HILDEBRANDT, of the right and privilege of WILLIS not to be subject to
punishment without due process of law; d. to prevent unconstitutional
deprivations by HILDEBRANDT, of the right and privilege of WILLIS to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment; e. employing other deputies/police officers as
well as HILDEBRANDT whose employment in law enforcement presented an
unreasonable risk of harm to persons including WILLIS; f. failing to guard
against a potential hazard to members of the public by not selecting proper or
competent police officers/deputies; g. Failing to provide proper guidelines and
regulations concerning the proper use of weapons or force during an arrest. These
deprivations are continuing and systemic in nature and not merely an isolated
incident sufficient to create a formal custom or policy of the CITY OF CORAL
SPRINGS. Moreover, Defendant CITY OF CORAL SPRINGS knew or should
have known of these continuing deprivations of civil rights and knew or should
have known of these actual and potential problems and has failed to take the
adequate and necessary steps to correct or prevent them. Thus, Defendant CITY
OF CORAL SPRINGS has failed to exercise its duties and supervise the
institution under its control.
Compl. ¶¶ 76-78. Nowhere in this long list, however, does Willis state any fact in support of the
City’s alleged training deficiencies or identify any inadequate training procedure. See City Mot.
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at 2-3. Instead, he simply sets forth general conclusions that this incident must have been the
result of inadequate procedures and training, without allegations of specific facts setting forth:
(1) the nature of any inadequate policies or procedures; (2) the factual basis – other than that this
incident occurred – for concluding that the City’s training is contrary to law; (3) the identity of
any prior incidents which would have placed the City on notice of any policy or training
deficiencies; and/or (4) the factual basis underlying assertions that the City employed
incompetent officers. Indeed, conspicuously absent from the Complaint are fact allegations
relating to anything other than the events of April 29, 2013.
Such wholly unsupported
conclusions that the City failed to establish appropriate police procedures and train police
personnel accordingly, particularly in a state with a liberal public records law, are plainly
insufficient. See, e.g., Larosa v. City of Sweetwater, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2014 WL 235449, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2014) (dismissing complaint which “offer[ed] no factual allegations other than
[plaintiff’s] own arrest and the circumstances surrounding that arrest” to substantiate allegations
of a policy or custom); Whitaker v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1327-28 (S.D. Fla.
2015) (dismissing federal failure to train claims because “the facts alleged simply do not
plausibly give rise to the inference that a final policymaker for the County made a ‘decision not
to train the officer[,]’ or that it was obvious that their failure to do so would result in a
constitutional deprivation”).
Finally, Plaintiff’s Complaint is rife with misplaced allegations that his substantive due
process rights were violated by Officer Hildebrandt. Compl. ¶¶ 67-79. The first task in a federal
claim for money damages is “to isolate the precise constitutional violation with which [the
defendant] is charged.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979). “If an Amendment
provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against the sort of conduct
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complained of, then that Amendment – not the more generalized notion of substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment – is the guide for analyzing the claim.” Jordan v.
Mosley, 298 F. App’x 803, 805 (11th Cir. 2008). Although the legal basis advanced for Count II
is a violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process, claims of pretrial deprivations of liberty are
addressed in the Fourth Amendment, which provides the explicit textual source for protection of
these rights. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1994); Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872,
881-82 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that malicious prosecution is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, as malicious prosecution arises out of the Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures); Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 586 (11th Cir. 1996) (“A section 1983
plaintiff must always base his claim on the violation of a specific federal right.”); Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, supra, 471 U.S. 1, 7-22 (1985)
(claim of excessive force to effect arrest analyzed under a Fourth Amendment standard)).
Consequently, Count II must be dismissed for this additional deficiency, that is, failure to state a
section 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted as a matter of law.
B. Officer Hildebrandt’s Motion
Likewise, Count I, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Hildebrandt,
must be dismissed for the same reason. In Count I of the Complaint, Willis references various
rights and privileges that he was denied as result of Officer Hildebrandt’s actions:
HILDEBRANDT did unlawfully and wrongfully assault, batter, injure, and arrest
Plaintiff WILLIS, thereby depriving him of his rights, privileges and immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. The assault, battery
and use of excessive and/or illegal , [sic] unnecessary force used by Defendant
HILDEBRANDT operated to deprive Plaintiff of the following Constitutionally
guaranteed rights and privileges: a. The right and privilege to be secure in his
person while in the custody of the State of Florida; b. The right and privilege not
to be deprived of his right and liberty without due process of law; c. The right and
privilege to be free from unlawful attacks upon the physical integrity of his
person; d. The right and privilege not to be subjected to punishment without due
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process of law; e. The right and privilege to be immune while in the custody of
persons acting under color of law of the State of Florida from illegal assault and
battery by any person exercising the authority of said state; and f. The right and
privilege to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
¶¶ 70. However, all of Willis’ claims arise from an alleged improper use of force during the
course of an arrest. Compl. ¶¶ 67-72. The Eleventh Circuit does not recognize a cause of action
under the Fourteenth Amendment for an unlawful arrest or use of force during the course of that
arrest. See Pozdol v. City of Miami, 996 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1295 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (citing
Graham, 490 U.S. at 388); W. v. Davis, 767 F.3d 1063, 1070 (11th Cir. 2014) (any excessive
force used during the course of a seizure is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, not the
substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Weiland v. Palm Beach
County Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1326 n. 19 (11th Cir. 2015) (summarily rejecting claims
that officer violated any other constitutional amendment besides the Fourth Amendment because
“the only constitutional provision under which [plaintiff] could possibly prevail on a claim of
excessive force is the Fourth Amendment.”). As a result, Count I cannot withstand Officer
Hildebrandt’s Motion.
Defendant further seeks dismissal of Counts III, IV, VI, VIII, IX, and X – as asserted
against her in her official capacity – as redundant. See Hildebrandt Mot. at 1. Indeed, when an
officer is sued under section 1983 in her official capacity, the suit is simply “another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 165 (1985). “Such suits against municipal officers are therefore, in actuality, suits
directly against the city that the officer represents.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776
(11th Cir. 1991). Thus, “[b]ecause suits against a municipal officer sued in his official capacity
and direct suits against municipalities are functionally equivalent, there no longer exists a need to
bring official capacity actions against local government officials, because local government units
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can be sued directly.” Id. Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against Officer Hildebrandt in her
official capacity, therefore, is also subject to dismissal as it is redundant of the same claim
asserted against the City. See Busby, 931 F.2d at 776 (affirming district court’s dismissal of the
Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants in their official capacity because to keep both the city
and the officers would have been redundant and possibly confusing to the jury). Curiously,
although Willis asserts that he is suing Officer Hildebrandt in her official and individual
capacities, Compl. ¶ 19, he nevertheless indicates in his Response that he intends to proceed
against Officer Hildebrandt in her individual capacity only. See Resp. to Hildebrandt Mot. at 3.
Regardless, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges any claims against Officer Hildebrandt in her
official capacity, those claims are dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For all of these reasons, dismissal of Counts I, II, III, IV, VI, VIII, IX, and X, against the
City and Officer Hildebrandt, in her official capacity only, is warranted. Of these claims, all but
Count II fail as a matter of law and, thus, amendment would be futile. Count II, on the other
hand, fails due to pleading insufficiently. Of course, “[a] district court, before dismissing a
complaint with prejudice because of a mere pleading defect, ordinarily must give a plaintiff one
opportunity to amend the complaint and to cure the pleading defect.” Stevens v. Premier
Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Isbrandtsen Marine Servs., Inc. v.
M/V INAGUA Tania, 93 F.3d 728, 734 (11th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND
ADJUDGED as follows:
1. The Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. [5], [11], are GRANTED.
2. Count I is DISMISSED with prejudice.
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3. Count II fails to properly allege a section 1983 cause of action based on a failure
to train theory.
Plaintiff shall file an Amended Complaint addressing this
deficiency no later than July 25, 2016.5
4. Counts III, IV, VI, VIII, IX, and X as asserted against Officer Hildebrandt in her
official capacity are DISMISSED with prejudice.
5. Officer Hildebrandt shall answer or otherwise respond to these counts in the
Complaint, as asserted against her individually, no later than July 22, 2016.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 11th day of July, 2016.
_________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:
5
counsel of record
Once the Amended Complaint is filed, the City will be required to respond to Counts II, V, and VII.
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