Taffe v. Wengert et al

Filing 108

ORDER on 93 Plaintiff's Supplementation of the Record. Signed by Magistrate Judge Edwin G. Torres on 8/8/2017. (js02)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 16-61595-Civ-COOKE/TORRES
DONNETT M. TAFFE,
Plaintiff,
v.
SCOTT J. ISRAEL, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________/
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE RECORD
This matter is before the Court on Donnett M. Taffe’s (“Plaintiff”)
Supplementation of the Record [D.E. 93] against Scott J. Israel (“Defendant Israel”),
the Sheriff of Broward County.

Defendant Israel responded to Plaintiff’s

supplementation on June 22, 2017 [D.E. 94] to which Plaintiff did not reply.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s supplementation is now ripe for disposition.

After careful

consideration of the supplementation, the response, relevant authority, and for the
reasons discussed below, we find that Plaintiff has not properly supplemented the
record and that Defendant Israel’s Protective Order remains in effect.
On

February

16,

2017

the

Court

granted

Plaintiff’s

motion

for

reconsideration and stated that “[w]hile Plaintiff is entitled to depose Defendant
Israel, this Order will not take effect until Plaintiff can supplement the record later
in the discovery period with evidence supporting his § 1983 claims against Mr.
Israel in his individual capacity.”

[D.E. 51].
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The Court required Plaintiff to

supplement the record because “[i]t is well established that § 1983 claims may not
be brought against supervisory officials on the basis of vicarious liability or
respondeat superior,” and that “supervisors are liable under § 1983 ‘either when the
supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when
there is a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the
alleged constitutional violation.”’ Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th
Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th
Cir. 2003)). “A causal connection can be established by, inter alia, ‘facts which
support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully
or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from
doing so.”

Keating, 598 F.3d at 762 (quoting Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1235); see also

Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Using a negligence standard
to determine a supervisory official’s liability would result in de facto respondeat
superior liability for the official”).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant Israel personally
participated in the alleged constitutional violation or that there is a causal
connection between his actions and the shooting at issue. There is no witness,
deposition testimony, or evidence that allows for Plaintiff to overcome the apex
doctrine. Instead, the evidence suggests that Defendant Israel was not a witness to
the shooting, did not participate in the investigation of Deputy Wengert, and did not
personally direct any subordinate to take any action in regards to Deputy Wengert
or the Plaintiff.

Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any personal

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involvement on behalf of Defendant Israel in a material way, Defendant Israel’s
Protective Order remains in effect. See United States v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2002
WL 562301, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 29, 2002) (finding that a “high-ranking official,
active or former” must have “personal involvement in a material aspect of the claim
presented before a deposition will be required. Mere knowledge or awareness of
information that may be helpful if discovered is insufficient.”)
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 8th day of
August, 2017.
/s/ Edwin G. Torres
EDWIN G. TORRES
United States Magistrate Judge

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