Echeverry v. Wells Fargo Bank N. A.

Filing 24

ORDER denying 23 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Darrin P. Gayles on 3/6/2017. (zvr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 16-cv-61635-GAYLES
MARTHA ECHEVERRY,
Plaintiff,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Plaintiff Martha Echeverry’s, pro se, Motion
for Reconsideration [ECF No. 23]. The Court dismissed this action on February 24, 2017, after
Echeverry failed to respond to Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s (“Wells Fargo”) Motion to
Dismiss, filed on January 31, 2017 [ECF No. 21], finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over Echeverry’s claims under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Echeverry v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., No. 16-61635, 2017 WL 733374 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2017); [ECF No. 22]. Echeverry filed
the instant motion for reconsideration on March 3, 2017, complaining that “for reasons unknown”
to her, she did not receive a copy of Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 23] at 1. She seeks
reinstatement of the case and an opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss.
“[R]econsideration of a previous order is an extraordinary remedy, to be employed sparingly.” Williams v. Cruise Ships Catering & Serv. Int’l, N.V., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1358 (S.D.
Fla. 2004). The only grounds for granting a motion for reconsideration, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e), are (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of
new evidence; or (3) the need to correct manifest errors of law or fact. See Douglas Asphalt Co.
v. QORE, Inc., 657 F.3d 1146, 1151-52 (11th Cir. 2011); Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343
(11th Cir. 2007).
Echeverry’s motion is based on none of these grounds—only on the claim that she did not

receive a copy of Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss. Echeverry has maintained the same record
address throughout this litigation; the address appearing in her initial Complaint is identical to the
address appearing in her Motion for Reconsideration. The Court has checked the service documentation for all the Orders it has issued, as well as the Certificate of Service attached to Wells
Fargo’s motion to dismiss. Every Order and the motion to dismiss were sent to Echeverry’s record
address, but she contends that she did not receive the motion to dismiss. “Regardless of whether
her attestations are true or not regarding her receipt of [this] document[], notice has been properly
provided to her by both the Court and the Defendant[]. There is nothing more either can do beyond
mailing documents to the address she provided, which has been done in every instance.” Fuchs v.
Univ. of Ariz., No. 10-0606, 2011 WL 253426, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 26, 2011). As such, the Court
will not reconsider dismissal.
More importantly, the Court will not reconsider dismissal of the case because it granted
dismissal on the merits, not on Echeverry’s failure to respond to the motion to dismiss. The Court
concluded that Echeverry’s federal claims were barred under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine because
her claims in this action were “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s foreclosure judgment and, in essence, sought to overturn the state court’s judgment. See Casale v. Tillman, 558
F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). No argument from Echeverry would disturb this
conclusion. No amendment to the Complaint would cure the defects. The Court, therefore, will not
reconsider its motion and reopen this case. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration [ECF No.
23] is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 6th day of March, 2017.

_________________________________
DARRIN P. GAYLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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