Staats v. M/Y GOLDEN COMPASS

Filing 132

ORDER denying 122 Motion to Tax Costs Out of Time. Signed by Judge Beth Bloom on 12/20/2017. (kpe)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 16-cv-62202-BLOOM/Valle
IN ADMIRALTY
CAPTAIN JANZ STAATS,
an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNIVERSAL MARINE CENTER, INC.,
Intervenor Plaintiff,
v.
M/Y GOLDEN COMPASS,
a 1982 41.5 meter Motor Yacht, Marshall Islands
IMO Number 8737623, her engines, tackle, rigging,
dinghies, equipment, appurtenances, furniture, etc., in rem,
Defendant/Intervenor Defendant,
D.N.I. PARTNERS, INC.,
Claimant/Intervenor Defendant.
____________________________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff Captain Janz Staats’ (“Staats”) Motion to
Tax Costs Out of Time, ECF No. [122] (“Motion”). The Court has reviewed the Motion, all
supporting and opposing filings, the record in this case, and is otherwise fully advised. For the
reasons that follow, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff, Captain Janz Staats (“Staats”), filed a Verified Complaint in rem under the
Federal Maritime Lien Act to foreclose a preferred maritime lien encumbering the M/Y Golden
Compass (the “Vessel”) for unpaid seaman’s wages. See ECF No. [1]. On August 16, 2017,
Staats entered into a Consent Judgment by which he was entitled to recover “the principal amount

Case No. 16-cv-62202-BLOOM/Valle
of $17,666.00, plus costs as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (to be taxed by separate motion), plus
post-judgment interest at the statutory rate provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1961.” See ECF No. [107].
Significantly, the parties submitted a proposed Consent Judgment containing this language, which
the Court adopted. Compare ECF No. [103-1] with [107]. Nowhere in the proposed Consent
Judgment did the parties agree to alter the deadline for the filing of a motion to tax costs pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 until after the sale of the Vessel. See ECF No. [103-1]. Moreover, at no point
in time did Staats request an extension of time to file a motion to tax costs until after the sale of
Vessel. Instead, more than three months after the entry of the Consent Judgment, Staats now
belatedly seeks to tax costs and argues – without any citation to supporting case law – that this
Court can simply tax costs out of time for good cause when there is no prejudice to the opposing
party and when the “delay was caused by simple oversight on the part of counsel.” See ECF No.
[122] at 3.
Local Rule 7.3(c) sets forth the procedure by which a party must seek to tax costs pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 as Staats attempts to do here. It provides:
(c) Bill of Costs. A bill of costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 shall be filed and served
within thirty (30) days of entry of final judgment or other appealable order that
gives rise to a right to tax costs under the circumstances listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
Prior to filing the bill of costs, the moving party shall confer with affected parties under
the procedure outlined in S.D.Fla.L.R.7.1(a)(3) in a good faith effort to resolve the
items of costs being sought.
An application for a bill of costs must be submitted on form (or in form substantially
similar to) AO 133 of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and shall
be limited to the costs permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Expenses and costs that the party
believes are recoverable although not identified in § 1920 shall be moved for as
provided in paragraph 7.3(a) above. The bill of costs shall attach copies of any
documentation showing the amount of costs and shall be supported by a memorandum
not exceeding ten (10) pages. The prospects or pendency of supplemental review or

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Case No. 16-cv-62202-BLOOM/Valle
appellate proceedings shall not toll or otherwise extend the time for filing a bill of
costs with the Court.
S.D. Fla. L. R. 7.3(c) (emphasis added). Thus, Local Rule 7.3(c) requires – in mandatory terms -

that the moving party file and serve a Bill of Costs within thirty days of the entry of judgment,
which in this case imposed a deadline of September 15, 2017. It further provides that this
deadline will not be tolled or extended simply because of the pendency or possibility of
supplemental review or appellate proceedings, further cementing the mandatory nature of the
30-day deadline. In this case, Staats filed his Motion and Bill of Costs on November 22, 2017 –
more than sixty days after the deadline. Not only does Staats not provide any authority to extend
this deadline, but the Court finds no support for this request in Local Rule 7.3(c) or the case law
interpreting this rule. Addressing a similar question of timeliness, other courts within this district
have stated:
The County also argues that its motion should not be denied as untimely because
the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the late filing. The County does not cite any
authority that the lack of prejudice is sufficient to obviate the deadlines for
postjudgment motions provided by rule. To the contrary, rule limitations on
postjudgment motions serve an important policy of repose and closure. Cf. Slader
v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 199 F.R.D. 125, 126 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (“the mandatory 14–
day limit for seeking attorneys' fees should not be lightly disturbed”). The
comments to Local Rule 7.3 also indicate that the deadlines for fees and costs
motions are intended to act as bright-line cutoff points, similar in nature to statutes
of limitation. Comments Section, Local Rule 7.3 (1999) (“in no event may a motion
for fees or costs be made later than the date provided for in this rule”); see also
Klayman v. Freedom's Watch, Inc., No. 07–22433, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118672,
at *4–5 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 7, 2008). Lack of prejudice alone is not sufficient cause to
override the procedures imposed by the Local Rules.
Allen-Johnson v. Miami-Dade Cty., No. 10-23627-CIV, 2012 WL 160070, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18,
2012).

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To allow Staats to tax costs out of time simply because counsel inadvertently missed the
deadline by more than sixty days would render the procedure outlined in Local Rule 7.3(c)
meaningless. And, contrary to Staats’ bare-bones assertion that Jaffe will not be prejudiced by
the taxation of costs, the Court finds that Jaffe would indeed be prejudiced in that he would be
forced to pay $4,001.17 in costs that are procedurally time barred. If Staats wanted to recover his
costs, the onus was on him to timely file a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, but he failed to do
so. The Court will not excuse Staats’ unexplained failure to Jaffe’s detriment. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Staats’ Motion to Tax Costs Out of Time, ECF No.
[122], is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 20th day of December, 2017.

BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Counsel of Record

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