Gelbart v. Acting Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 26

ORDER Adopting 23 Report and Recommendations; denying 13 Motion for Judgment; granting 14 Motion for Summary Judgment. Closing Case. Signed by Judge Beth Bloom on 9/25/2018. See attached document for full details. (ail)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 17-cv-61361-BLOOM/Valle
CARMELLA A. GELBART,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Defendant.
_________________________________________/
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s Motions for
Summary Judgment, ECF Nos. [13] and [14], which were previously referred to the Honorable
Alicia O. Valle for a Report and Recommendation. See ECF No. [4]. On August 22, 2018,
Judge Valle issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment be denied, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, and the
Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) Decision be affirmed. See ECF No. [23]. Plaintiff timely
filed her Objections and the Government thereafter filed a timely Response. See ECF Nos. [24]
and [25]. The Court has considered Plaintiff’s Objections, the Government’s Response, and has
conducted a de novo review of Magistrate Judge Valle’s Report and Recommendation and the
record, and is otherwise fully advised. See Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir.
2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). Plaintiff interposes two separate objections to the Report
and Recommendation. The Court has considered each objection and finds that they are due to be
overruled for the reasons that follow.

Case No. 17-cv-61361-BLOOM/Valle
I.

BACKGROUND

The Court adopts Judge Valle’s description of the administrative history and record
below, ECF No. [23] at 2, and incorporates it by reference herein.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiff does not object to Judge Valle’s recitation of the standard for judicial review of a
final decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, which, in any event, is
correct. As stated in the Report and Recommendation, ECF No. [23] at 2-3, judicial review of
the ALJ’s decision is limited to whether there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to
support the ALJ’s finding and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in making her
determination. Carson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 440 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing
Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)); see also 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Carson, 440 F. App’x at 864 (quoting
Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1158); accord Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987). A court,
however, “may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that
of the [ALJ].” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal
citation omitted). Even if evidence preponderates against the ALJ’s Decision, a court must affirm “if
the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239
(11th Cir. 1983) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Within this narrow role, however, courts do not act as
automatons. MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986). Rather, a court “must
scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by
substantial evidence.” Id. (citing Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239).

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The Report and Recommendation properly stated the legal and regulatory standards an
ALJ must employ in making a determination as to eligibility for disability insurance benefits.
ECF No. [23] at 3-4. A claimant is disabled if she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A “physical or mental impairment” is one that
“results from anatomical, physiological or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).
To determine eligibility, the ALJ employs a five-step sequential evaluation:

(1) Is the person presently unemployed?
(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?
(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific impairments
set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (the “Listings”)?
(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?
(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to
the next question, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding of disability. McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d
1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). A negative answer to any question, other than Step 3, leads to a
determination of “not disabled.” Id.
Importantly, the burden of proof rests on the claimant through Step 4.

Phillips v.

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). At Step 4, the ALJ must assess: (i) the
claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (ii) the claimant’s ability to return to her
past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). The regulations define RFC as that which an
individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by her impairments. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(a). The ALJ will “assess and make a finding about [the claimant’s RFC] on all the
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relevant medical and other evidence” in the case.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

The RFC

determination is used to determine whether the claimant can return to her past relevant work
under the fourth step, and if so, “the ALJ will conclude that the claimant is not disabled.”
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239 (citations omitted). Otherwise the ALJ proceeds to Step 5.
At Step 5, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience to
determine whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to other work.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239. The ALJ must determine if there is other work
available in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant has the ability to perform.
357 F.3d at 1239. If the claimant can make the adjustment to other work, the ALJ will determine that
the claimant is not disabled. Id. Conversely, if the claimant cannot make the adjustment to other
work, the ALJ will determine that the claimant is disabled. Id. The ALJ may determine whether the
claimant has the ability to adjust to other work in the national economy by either: (1) applying the
Medical Vocational Guidelines (contained within 20 C.F.R. part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2); or (2)
using a Vocational Expert, who can opine on whether someone with the claimant’s limitations can
obtain employment in the national economy. Id. at 1239-40.

III.

DISCUSSION

i.

Objection Number One: The ALJ Failed to Properly Weigh the Medical
Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly afforded little weight to the opinions of
Plaintiff’s three treating doctors, Drs. Kaplowitz, Gomez, and Seidman.
When evaluating physician opinion evidence, an ALJ is required to give proper
consideration to the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. See Russ v. Astrue, 2009 WL
764516, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2009) (“The ALJ commits legal error when he fails to
consider and discuss the § 404.1527(d) factors before discrediting a treating physician’s
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opinion.”). The regulatory factors include: (1) the examining relationship; (2) the treatment
relationship; (3) supportability of the opinion by medical signs and laboratory findings; (4)
consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; (5) the specialization of the source of the
opinion; and (6) any other factors which tend to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R §
404.1527.
A treating physician’s opinion must be given “substantial or considerable weight unless
‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” Wright v. Barnhart, 153 F. App’x 678, 684 (11th Cir.
2005) (citing Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1439); accord Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583 (11th Cir.
1991) (“[T]he opinion of a treating physician is entitled to substantial weight unless good cause
exists for not heeding the treating physician’s diagnosis.”). “The Eleventh Circuit has found
there is “good cause” to place less weight on the opinion of a treating physician where: (1) the
opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) the evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3)
the opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” Russ, 2009
WL 764516 at *9 (citing Wright, 153 F. App’x at 684); accord Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179
(“Good cause exists ‘when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the
evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was
conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.”) (quoting Phillips, 357 F.3d
at 1241). “The law is clear that . . . the ALJ is free to reject the opinion of any physician when
the evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir.
1985) (citation omitted).
An ALJ’s decision will not be upset where supported by substantial evidence. However,
a decision which focuses on one aspect of the evidence while disregarding or failing to properly
evaluate other, contrary evidence is not considered to be based on substantial evidence.

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McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986). “In determining whether substantial
evidence exists, [a court] must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence
favorable as well as unfavorable to the Secretary’s decision.” Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222,
225 (11th Cir. 1990). Further, regardless of the existence of support in the record, an ALJ’s
determination cannot be affirmed where she has “fail[ed] to . . . provide the reviewing court with
sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted[.]”
Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The Court finds that the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and her determination to
afford the medical opinions little weight is well supported. Consistent with Magistrate Judge
Valle’s Report and Recommendation, the ALJ properly considered the opinions of Drs.
Kaplowitz, Gomez, and Seidman, specifically assigned them “little weight,” and articulated her
reasons for doing so, all of which is supported by substantial evidence.
First, although the ALJ did not specifically enumerate and discuss by name the regulatory
factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527, it is evident from reviewing the ALJ’s decision as a whole
that she considered these factors in her analysis. For example, the ALJ discussed the treatment
relationship between the Plaintiff and Dr. Kaplowitz (factor 2), the evaluation relationship
between Plaintiff and Dr. Seidman (factor 1), and the supportability and consistency of the
doctors’ opinion vis-a-vis other evidence in the record (factors 3 and 4). See ECF No. [10] at 5556. Thus, the ALJ applied the proper legal standard.
Second, the ALJ articulated “good cause” to give limited weight to the opinions of Drs.
Kaplowitz, Gomez, and Seidman.

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The ALJ expressly gave Dr. Kaplowitz’s December 2013 psychiatric impairment
questionnaire “little weight.” Specifically, the ALJ referenced the record and explained that Dr.
Kaplowitz’s December 2013 opinion that Plaintiff is incapable of even low stress work was not
supported by the medical record as a whole. ECF No. [10] at 55 The ALJ found that there is
absolutely no objective medical evidence prior to March 31, 2010 reflecting the extent of
symptomatology endorsed by Dr. Kaplowitz or evidence that the claimant’s mental condition
resulted in the type of limitations opined by Dr. Kaplowitz. Id. The ALJ also noted that Dr.
Kaplowitz’s opinion “relied quite heavily on the subjective report of symptoms and limitations
provided by the claimant.” Id. at 56.
A review of the record supports the ALJ’s decision that Dr. Kaplowitz’s opinions on the
severity of the claimant’s conditions are unsupported by and inconsistent with the medical record
as a whole. Dr. Kaplowitz treated Plaintiff from November 1995 through September 2012, and
completed a psychiatric impairment questionnaire on December 26, 2013. ECF No. [10] at 32425. The record contains only one and a half pages of handwritten notes spanning six years of
treatment. Id. Records dated March 3 and March 29, 2010 reflect that Plaintiff was “doing very
well” and had no abnormalities except “issues of menopause.” Id. at 55, 325. Dr. Kaplowitz’s
progress notes dated after the date last insured also fail to include any examination findings,
abnormalities, or functional limitation. Id. at 55, 324-25.
Plaintiff concedes that Dr. Kaplowitz’s treatment notes lack detail, but argues that they
do not contain any findings contradicting the December 2013 questionnaire, and cites several
cases purportedly standing for the proposition that “the lack of functional limitations recorded in
treatment notes does not render the opinions unsupported.” ECF No. [24] at 2-3. In each of
Plaintiff’s cases, however, the opining doctors’ treatment notes contained substantial evidence

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supporting the doctor’s opinion.1 In contrast, Dr. Kaplowitz ‘s treatment notes contain no
evidence supporting the December 2013 questionnaire. Thus, the ALJ had good cause to afford
Dr. Kaplowitz’s opinion little weight. See Crawford 363 F.3d 1159. Accordingly, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.
The ALJ also gave “little weight” to the opinions of Dr. Gomez. In explaining her
decision to afford “little weight” to Dr. Gomez’s opinions, the ALJ stated:
With regard to Dr. Gomez’s opinions, the undersigned notes that he confirmed
that he first treated the claimant on January 9, 2013. This, of course, is well after
the claimant’s date last insured. Nevertheless, Dr. Gomez did state that the
claimant’s symptoms and limitation went back to the “early 1990’s.” . . . Once
again, outside of the claimant’s own subjective complaints, there is absolutely no
evidence to corroborate this statement. Without the necessary objective medical
evidence, there is no support for the claimant’s (or Dr. Gomez’s) assertions.
ECF No. [10] at 56.
As Judge Valle accurately recounted, Dr. Gomez was Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist
from January 2013 through February 2016. Id. at 262-78, 286-311. Plaintiff visited Dr. Gomez
approximately 20 times, and the visits are reflected in treatment records. Id. In addition to the
treatment notes, Dr. Gomez authored three opinions regarding Plaintiff’s mental health: (1) a
PIQ dated November 22, 2013; (2) a letter dated August 8, 2014; and (3) an MIQ dated October
30, 2015. Id. at 243-50, 279, 281-85. In each of these opinions Dr. Gomez found Plaintiff
severely limited and unable to work. Id.
1

See Sampson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 694 F. App'x 727, 736 (11th Cir. 2017) (“the notes also reflect
[claimant]'s repeated complaints of worsening pain and throbbing in his feet and limbs . . .”); Brownawell
v. Comm'r Of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 2008) (“This opinion [of claimant’s disability] was
reiterated in [the treating doctor’s] May 5, 2003 treatment notes.”); Leckenby v. Astrue, 487 F.3d 626, 633
(8th Cir. 2007) (“[Claimant]'s medical records are replete with consistent complaints of chronic pain,
chronic fatigue and non-restorative sleep at night, and with treatment notes such as ‘[p]oorly tolerant of
any activity because of worsening pain’ . . .”); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 634 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The
record contains numerous reports from [claimant]'s health care providers, as well as results from medical
tests and laboratory findings, that support the questionnaires completed by [the treating doctors].”).

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Plaintiff argues that Dr. Gomez’s opinions are not based on Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints because they are “on all fours with the treatment notes from Dr. Gomez.” ECF No.
[24] at 3. But the record reflects that Dr. Gomez did not begin treating Plaintiff until three years
after her date last insured and any opinions about her symptoms and limitations prior to March
31, 2010 were most likely based on Plaintiff’s self-report. Tellingly, Dr. Gomez’s notes
identified Plaintiff’s symptom onset date “[a]s per patient report.” ECF No. [10] at 250.
Additionally, at the hearing before Judge Valle, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that Dr. Gomez’s
statement that Plaintiff’s disability dates back to the early 1990’s “probably come[s] from
listening to [Plaintiff] or asking her specific questions . . . about [what] her functioning was
during the period of time when she starts to see Dr. Kaplowitz in ’95 . . . I have to assume it’s
based on his questions [of Plaintiff].” ECF No. [22] at 33:10-17. The Court is unpersuaded by
Plaintiff’s argument.
Finally, the ALJ also afforded Dr. Seidman’s opinions “little weight.” ECF No. [10] at
56. As the Judge Valle explained, the ALJ properly considered that Dr. Seidman was a one-time
examiner, she examined Plaintiff six years after the date last insured, her examination was not
for medical treatment, and there was no objective evidence to support Dr. Seidman’s conclusion.
Id. at 56-57; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (“the more consistent an opinion is with the record
as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion”); McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617,
619 (11th Cir. 1987) (unlike treating physicians, opinions from one-time examiners are not
entitled to special deference or weight). Moreover, Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that the only
records Dr. Seidman relied upon to find disability before March 31, 2010 were Dr. Kaplowitz’s
and Dr. Gomez’s records, which are insufficient for this purpose. ECF No. [22] at 30:5-10.

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Plaintiff argues that Dr. Seidman’s opinion should not have been rejected because Dr.
Seidman made similar findings to those of other treating sources and because medical opinions
cannot be rejected on the basis that they were offered at the request of a claimant’s
representative. ECF No. [24] at 4. Plaintiff misconstrues the basis for the ALJ’s determination.
The ALJ did not reject Dr. Seidman’s findings because they were offered at the request of a
claimant’s representative. Rather, the overriding basis for the ALJ discounting Dr. Seidman’s
opinions was the lack of objective evidence to support the severe limitations. ECF No. [10] at
56. Additionally, Dr. Seidman conducted the evaluation six years after the date last insured,
ECF No. [10] at 312, 319, and there was no objective medical evidence substantiating Dr.
Seidman’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s condition prior to March 31, 2010.
ii.

Objection Number 2: The ALJ Failed to Properly Evaluate Ms. Gelbart’s
Testimony

Plaintiff also objects on the ground that the ALJ did not give proper weight to her
testimony. See ECF No. [24] at 5-7. As with the previous objection, the Court has conducted a
de novo review of the record.
The Eleventh Circuit has established a three-part “pain standard” that applies when a
claimant attempts to establish disability through her own testimony regarding pain or other
subjective symptoms. Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). The ALJ is not
required to use any particular language in applying the pain standard, as long as she sufficiently
articulates the reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony. Davis v. Barnhart, 153 F. App’x
569, 571 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (ALJ
opinion need not use particular language or adhere to a particular format, and the decision should
be read “as a whole”).

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“A clearly articulated credibility finding with substantial supporting evidence in the
record will not be disturbed by a reviewing court.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th
Cir. 1995) (citing MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1054 (11th Cir. 1986)). The Court is
also mindful that “credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ.” Moore v. Barnhart,
405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Wilson v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 513, 517 (11th Cir.
1984)).
Here, as summarized by Judge Valle, the ALJ articulated the following reasons for
discrediting Plaintiff’s pain testimony: (1) Plaintiff testified that, during the relevant period, she
experienced “meltdowns” a “couple of times a week,” but Plaintiff was never hospitalized for
any such condition; (2) Plaintiff’s purported “meltdowns” did not require additional treatment
from her treating doctor other than “quarterly” phone calls; (3) Plaintiff’s general lack of
treatment prior to March 31, 2010 directly contradicts her allegations of disability, and the record
contains only two progress notes before the date last insured; (4) one would expect a totally
disabled individual with the type of symptoms and limitations as alleged by Plaintiff to
consistently seek out and obtain medical treatment, and her failure to do so suggests she did not
consider her symptoms to be serious enough to warrant any additional intervention; (5) Plaintiff
acknowledged significant gaps in her treating history; (6) Plaintiff testified to experiencing
frequent meltdowns in March 2010, but contemporaneous treatment notes reveal Plaintiff was
“doing very well” and contain no reference to meltdowns; and (7) although during the
administrative hearing Plaintiff described daily activities which were fairly limited, her
description of daily activities during the relevant period six years prior cannot be objectively
verified with any reasonable degree of certainty. ECF No. [23] at 25-26. Judge Valle correctly

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found that these reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s credibility were supported by substantial
evidence.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s testimony because (1)
having a “meltdown” does not necessarily require hospitalization; (2) infrequent treatment is a
symptom of disability rather than an indication that Plaintiff’s conditions are not severe; and (3)
it is improper for the ALJ to discount Plaintiff’s testimony because the statements could not be
objectively verified. The Court is unpersuaded.
First, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony concerning her “meltdowns” because it
was not supported by the record as a whole. Apart from never being treated at a hospital for
these episodes, Plaintiff generally sought little treatment prior to March 31, 2010, and the
treatment notes do not indicate that she experienced any such “meltdowns.” To the contrary,
Plaintiff’s treatment notes from March 2010 reveal that she was doing very well.
Second, an “ALJ may not draw any inferences about an individual's symptoms and their
functional effects from a failure to seek or pursue medical treatment without first considering any
explanations that might explain the failure to seek or pursue treatment.” Beegle v. Soc. Sec.
Admin., Com'r, 482 F. App'x 483, 487 (11th Cir. 2012). Here, the ALJ properly considered
Plaintiff’s explanation for the gap in her treatment history — that Plaintiff lived far away from
her doctor. ECF No. [10] at 55. Taking that explanation into account, the ALJ concluded that
the evidence suggests that the claimant’s symptoms were not as serious as alleged.
Plaintiff’s cases are inapposite. Three of Plaintiff’s cases stand for the proposition – not
at issue here – that non-compliance with taking prescribed medications may be attributable to
mental illness. See Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 946 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding the evidence
overwhelmingly demonstrates plaintiff’s failure to take her prescribed medication was

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attributable to her schizoaffective or bipolar disorder); Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 814 (7th
Cir. 2011) (“ALJs assessing claimants with bipolar disorder must consider possible alternative
explanations before concluding that non-compliance with medication supports an adverse
credibility”); Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The administrative law
judge found that [claimant]'s severe depression is well controlled by drugs—when she takes
them—but ignored the fact that during manic spells [claimant] had stopped taking her
medications (a common consequence of mania)”)). Plaintiff’s fourth case recognized that “an
unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment . . . can cast doubt on the
sincerity of [a] claimant's pain testimony,” but found it inappropriate to reject “a claimant's
complaints for lack of treatment when the record establishes that the claimant could not afford
it.” Regennitter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal
quotations omitted). However, that case is inapposite as Plaintiff does not claim that she was
unable to afford her treatment.
Finally, Plaintiff cites to several cases criticizing the discounting of a claimant’s selfreports about limitations in daily activities that could not be objectively verified. See ECF No.
[24] at 6. However, an ALJ may properly find that a claimant’s testimony about limited daily
activities is not credible where the statements were hard to objectively verify, given the weak
medical evidence in support of the testimony. Anderson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 427 F. App'x
761, 764 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Fielder v. Colvin, 2014 WL 684683, at *15 (N.D. Fla. Feb.
21, 2014) (applying rule). As in Anderson, here the ALJ found that “even if the claimant’s daily
activities were truly as limited as alleged, it is difficult to attribute that degree of limitation to the
claimant’s medical condition, as opposed to other reasons, in view of the relatively weak
medical evidence and other factors discussed in this decision . . .”

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(emphasis added). Moreover, contrary to the cases cited by Plaintiff, the ALJ specifically
identified the Plaintiff’s general lack of treatment as an additional factor that made it difficult to
attribute Plaintiff’s limitation to the claimed medical condition. Id.; see Beegle v. Soc. Sec.
Admin., Com'r, 482 F. App'x 483, 487 (11th Cir. 2012) (“When evaluating a claimant's
statements regarding his symptoms and their functional effects, the ALJ may consider whether
the level or frequency of treatment is consistent with the level of complaints”).
IV.

CONCLUSION

Upon review, the Court finds Judge Valle’s Report and Recommendation to be well
reasoned and correct. This Court finds that the ALJ applied the proper legal standard and
supported her findings regarding Plaintiff’s allegations with substantial evidence. The Court
agrees with the analysis in Judge Valle’s Report and Recommendation and concludes that
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied, and that Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment must be granted.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Magistrate Judge Valle’s Report and Recommendation, ECF No. [23], is
ADOPTED;
2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [13], is DENIED;
3. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. [14], is GRANTED;
4. The ALJ’s Decision is AFFIRMED;
5. Plaintiff’s Objections, ECF No. [24], are OVERRULED.
6. To the extent not otherwise disposed of, all pending motions are DENIED as
moot;
7. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.

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Case No. 17-cv-61361-BLOOM/Valle
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 25th day of September, 2018.

_________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
The Honorable Alicia O. Valle
Counsel of Record

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