Quality of Life, Corp. et al v. The City of Margate

Filing 333

ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGES REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ; denying 303 Motion for Attorney Fees; granting in part 304 Motion for Bill of Costs. Pursuant to Rule 54(d), Defendant is awarded $23,458.04 in taxable costs.; denying 319 Motion for Attorney Fees; Adopting 327 Report and Recommendations. Defendants Objections, ECF No. 328 , are OVERRULED. To the extent not otherwise disposed of, any scheduled hearings are CANCELED, all pending motions are DENIED as moot, and all deadlines are TERMINATED. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case. Signed by Judge Beth Bloom on 2/17/2021. See attached document for full details. (drz)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 17-cv-61894-BLOOM/Valle
QUALITY OF LIFE, CORP.,
and MMJ FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE CITY OF MARGATE,
Defendant.
__________________________________/
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the Honorable Alicia O. Valle’s Report and
Recommendation, ECF No. [327] (“Report”). On December 9, 2020, Judge Valle issued her
Report, recommending that the Court deny Defendant City of Margate’s (“Defendant”) Renewed
and Revised Verified Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, ECF No. [303] (“Motion for Fees and
Costs”); grant, in part, Defendant’s Renewed and Revised Motion for Bill of Costs, ECF No. [304]
(“Motion for Bill of Costs”) and award $23,458.04 in taxable costs; and deny Defendant’s Verified
Motion for Appellate Attorneys’ Fees, ECF Nos. [318] & [319] (“Motion for Appellate Attorneys’
Fees”). ECF No. [327] at 23. The Report advised that any objections to the Report’s findings were
due within fourteen days of receipt of the Report. Id.
Defendant timely filed Objections to the Report, challenging only the denial of its Motion
for Fees and Costs and Motion for Appellate Attorneys’ Fees. ECF No. [328] (“Objections”).
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Objections. ECF No. [331]
(“Response”). This Court has conducted a de novo review of the record, including the portions of

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the Report to which Defendant has objected, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and the
remainder of the Report for clear error, and finds that the Objections are without merit and are
therefore overruled. Taylor v. Cardiovascular Specialists, P.C., 4 F. Supp. 3d 1374, 1377 (N.D.
Ga. 2014) (citing United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir. 1983)).
I. BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the reader’s familiarity with the facts underlying this case and does not
repeat them. Additionally, the Court adopts Judge Valle’s description of the procedural history of
this case. ECF No. [327] at 2-3.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. District Court Review of a Report and Recommendation
When a magistrate judge’s “disposition” has been properly objected to, district courts must
review the disposition de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Although Rule 72 is silent on the standard
of review, the United States Supreme Court has determined Congress’s intent was to require de
novo review only when objections were properly filed, not when neither party objects. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district
court review of a magistrate[] [judge]’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other
standard, when neither party objects to those findings.” (alterations added)). A proper objection
“identifie[s] specific findings set forth in the [Report] and articulate[s] a legal ground for
objection.” Leatherwood v. Anna’s Linens Co., 384 F. App’x 853, 857 (11th Cir. 2010) (alterations
added) (citation omitted). “Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by
the district court.” Id. (quoting Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)); see also Russell v. United States, No. 11-20557-CIV,
2012 WL 10026019, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2012) (declining to address general or blanket

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objections not specifically identifying aspects of the magistrate judge’s report to which the
petitioner objected).
B. Attorneys’ Fees and Non-Taxable Costs
Defendant does not object to Judge Valle’s recitation of the standard for awarding
attorneys’ fees to a prevailing defendant in a civil rights action, which, in any event, is correct. As
stated in the Report, “a district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to a prevailing
defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Bruce v. City of
Gainesville, Ga., 177 F.3d 949, 951 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). The standard set
forth in Christiansburg applies equally to awards of attorneys’ fees sought by prevailing
defendants under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”), and
the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. (“FHA”). Id.; see also Young v. New Process Steel,
LP, 419 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The Christiansburg rule applies not only to trials in
civil rights cases, but also to appeals by plaintiffs in them.”); Attea v. Univ. of Miami (Miller Sch.
of Med.), No. 12-23933-CIV, 2015 WL 5921790, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2015) (“A party entitled
to recover attorney’s fees under the Christiansburg standard may also recover expert fees and nontaxable costs.” (citing Hodge v. McNeil, No. 08-23440-CIV, 2012 WL 663175, at *1 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 28, 2012))). Importantly, for a plaintiff’s claims “[t]o be deemed ‘meritless’ for purposes of
assessing a prevailing defendant’s attorneys’ fees, it is not enough that the plaintiff had ultimately
lost his case.” Bruce, 177 F.3d at 951.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, recognizing that determinations of frivolity are to
be made on a case-by-case basis, has set forth a three-part inquiry to guide a court’s analysis: “(1)

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whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle;
and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown trial on the
merits.” Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas Cnty., 773 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985)).
These factors, however, are “general guidelines only and not hard and fast rules.” Sullivan, 773
F.2d at 1189. Moreover, in determining whether a claim is frivolous, a court must “view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-prevailing plaintiff.” Barnes v. Zaccari, 592 F.
App’x 859, 872 (11th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original) (quoting Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419
F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005)).
III.

DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that it is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 12205

and 42 U.S.C. § 3613 because “this action was frivolous from the outset and Plaintiffs continued
to litigate it knowing that [Plaintiff] Jimenez was the source of the controversies in this lawsuit.”
ECF No. [328] at 12. Defendant objects to Judge Valle’s recommendation that the frivolity factors
espoused by the Eleventh Circuit in Sullivan do not weigh in favor of awarding attorneys’ fees
because: (1) Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case under all three theories of recovery
under the ADA and FHA counts; (2) Defendant did not serve an offer of judgment or proposal for
settlement; and (3) the case was dismissed on summary judgment without a trial on the merits. Id.
7-14.
The Court first notes that the majority of Defendant’s Objections are improper because
they largely expand upon and reframe arguments already made and considered by Judge Valle in
her Report, or merely disagree with the Report’s conclusions. Indeed, Defendant has copied,
verbatim or with slight modifications, large portions of its briefs into its Objections to purportedly
show the correctness of its analysis:

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1. Compare EFC No. [328] at 7-12, with ECF No. [303] at 5-10 (“Plaintiffs failed to
establish a prima facie case.”).
2. Compare ECF No. [328] at 12-13, with ECF No. [303] at 10, and ECF No. [316]
at 5 (“No offer of judgment or proposal for settlement served on Plaintiffs.”).
3.

Compare ECF No. [328] at 13-14, with ECF No. [303] at 10-11 (“The case was
dismissed without trial on the merits.”).

It is well settled that an objecting party may not “submit[] papers to a district court which
are nothing more than a rehashing of the same arguments and positions taken in the original papers
submitted to the Magistrate Judge. Clearly, parties are not to be afforded a ‘second bite at the
apple’ when they file objections to a [Report].” Marlite, Inc. v. Eckenrod, No. 10-23641-CIV,
2012 WL 3614212, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) (quoting Camardo v. Gen. Motors HourlyRate Emps. Pension Plan, 806 F. Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)).
The Court considers the frivolity factors espoused by the Eleventh Circuit in Sullivan in
light of the Defendant’s Objections. With respect to the first Sullivan factor, Defendant objects to
Judge Valle’s consideration of the proceedings at the motion to dismiss stage, arguing that “the
facts as alleged by Plaintiffs” are “not relevant to a finding as to whether this litigation, in which
[Defendant] was forced to incur attorneys’ fees and costs, was without foundation.” ECF No. [328]
at 3. The Report, however, correctly considered each stage of the proceedings and found nothing
in the record to support Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation at the commencement of the case, upon dismissal, and on
appeal. ECF No. [327] at 6-8, 11-12. Indeed, despite the Court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Defendant, the Court found Plaintiffs’ claims sufficiently meritorious and received careful
attention and review, as evidenced by the hundreds of pages of briefing by each party, the lengthy

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oral argument, and the Court’s detailed 46-page Order, ECF No. [251]. See Baker v. Alderman,
158 F.3d 516, 524 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The grant of summary judgment, in and of itself, does not
mean that an action is frivolous[.]”); see also Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (“The fact
that a plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficient justification for the
assessment of fees.”). Similarly, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit issued a comprehensive 22-page
Opinion, which substantively addressed all of Plaintiffs’ claims and arguments. ECF No. [302].
Therefore, Defendant’s Objection is without merit and is overruled.
Defendant further objects to the Report’s finding that the second Sullivan factor does not
weigh in favor of attorneys’ fees. Specifically, Defendant takes issue with Judge Valle’s finding
that this factor “is, at best, neutral” because Defendant participated in court-ordered mediation, at
which a settlement offer was purportedly made. ECF No. [327] at 8-9.1 While Defendant does not
deny making an offer of settlement at mediation, it maintains that any settlement offer should not
be considered because “[Defendant] was not posited to ignore the Court’s order that the parties
attend mediation.” ECF No. [328] at 12. However, there is no authority that would preclude the
Court from considering that a settlement offer was, in fact, made during mediation. See Quintana
v. Jenne, 414 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2005) (considering a settlement offer made during
mediation, and finding that without evidence of the settlement amount, the second Sullivan factor
does not support either party); Turner v. Inzer, No. 4:11-CV-567-RS-WCS, 2013 WL 4648319, at
*2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2013) (same). Therefore, Defendant’s Objection is without merit and is
overruled.

1

In the Report, Judge Valle considered the second Sullivan factor neutral because: (1) Defendant made a
settlement offer at mediation; and (2) Defendant indicated in the parties’ Joint Scheduling Report and
Discovery Plan that it was “open to settlement negotiations.” ECF No. [327] at 8-9; see also ECF No. [9]
at 2. Defendant objects only to the first consideration.

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Lastly, Defendant objects to the Report’s finding that the third Sullivan factor does not
weigh in favor of attorneys’ fees because, although the case was dismissed without trial on the
merits, the lengthy record reflects that the case was “intensely litigated by both sides.” ECF No.
[327] at 9. Defendant, however, argues that “given the length of the [C]omplaint,” “numerous
litigation events,” and “filings which [Defendant] was required to submit to the various Courts[,]”
Defendant “was forced to develop the record to controvert the Plaintiffs’ various fictions, which
were ultimately each found to be untrue.” ECF No. [328] at 13. The Court is not persuaded. It is
inconceivable that Defendant was “forced” to expend a total of $398,546.00 in attorneys’ fees
(2,339.9 billable hours) and a total of $39,782.15 in costs2 for defending an “action [that] was
frivolous from the outset.” ECF No. [328] at 12. Rather, the amount of time, energy, and resources
devoted to this matter necessarily contradicts Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiffs’ claims were
frivolous or entirely without foundation. Defendant’s final Objection is, therefore, overruled.
The Court has carefully reviewed the Report, the record, the applicable law, and is
otherwise fully advised. Additionally, the Court has conducted a de novo review of the Report in
light of Defendant’s Objections. See Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)). Upon review, the Court finds Judge Valle’s Report to be wellreasoned and correct, and the Court agrees with the analysis set forth therein. As a result, the
Defendant’s Objections are overruled.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Magistrate Judge Valle’s Report and Recommendation, ECF No. [327], is
ADOPTED.

Defendant seeks: (1) $398,546.00 in attorneys’ fees and appellate attorneys’ fees; (2) $16,271.02 in nontaxable costs; and (3) $23,511.13 in taxable costs. See ECF Nos. [303] at 13 and [304] at 3.
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2. Defendant’s Objections, ECF No. [328], are OVERRULED.
3. Defendant’s Motion for Fees and Costs, ECF No. [303], is DENIED.
4. Defendant’s Motion for Bill of Costs, ECF No. [304], is GRANTED IN PART.
Pursuant to Rule 54(d), Defendant is awarded $23,458.04 in taxable costs.

5. Defendant’s Motion for Appellate Attorneys’ Fees, ECF Nos. [318] & [319], is
DENIED.
6. To the extent not otherwise disposed of, any scheduled hearings are CANCELED,
all pending motions are DENIED as moot, and all deadlines are TERMINATED.
7. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on February 17, 2021.

_________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
The Honorable Alicia O. Valle
Counsel of Record

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