Pollari v. Bowman et al

Filing 6

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT. Signed by Judge Darrin P. Gayles on 1/18/2018. (hmo)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO: 17-62507-CIV-GAYLES
ROBERT POLLARI,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN B. BOWMAN, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on a sua sponte review of Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint, titled “Claim for Deprivation of Constitutional, Civil and Unalienable Rights Violations
Under Color of Law” [ECF No. 5]. In December 2017, the Court determined that Plaintiff’s initial
pleading, titled “Claim Upon Constitutional Due Process Violation” [ECF No. 1], failed to meet the
pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but dismissed the action
without prejudice, offering Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleading. Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint makes clear that his claims are entirely premised on state court proceedings, and are thus
barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Therefore, the Amended Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice and the action will remain closed.
“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine makes clear that federal district courts cannot review state
court final judgments because that task is reserved for state appellate courts or, as a last resort, the
United States Supreme Court.” Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
The doctrine, named for Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), “is confined to cases of the kind from which the
doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state
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court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284 (2005). “Rooker and Feldman exhibit the limited circumstances in which [the Supreme Court’s]
appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments precludes a United States district court from
exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be empowered to adjudicate
under a congressional grant of authority.” Id. at 291. The doctrine bars litigating claims “inextricably
intertwined” with the state court’s judgment. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16. A claim is
“inextricably intertwined” if it would “effectively nullify” the state court judgment or if it “succeeds
only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues.” Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260 (quoting
Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001)); see also Springer v.
Perryman, 401 F. App’x 457, 458 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names as defendants Judge John B. Bowman and Chief
Judge Peter Weinstein of the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida. Plaintiff
alleges wrongdoing by the state court judges in a suit he brought against JPMorgan Chase in that
court. Under Rooker–Feldman, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the state court’s conduct of the
litigation. Plaintiff’s recourse is instead to appeal the state court’s orders to a state appellate court.
Therefore, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this action is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE and will remain CLOSED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 18th day of January, 2018.

________________________________
DARRIN P. GAYLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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