IN THE MATTER OF THE EXTRADITION OF KEVIN YUNGMAN

Filing 38

ORDER DENYING 23 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alicia O. Valle on 10/25/2024. See attached document for full details. (lbe)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 24-MC-61373-AOV

IN THE MATTER OF EXTRADITION
OF KEVIN YUNGMAN
______________________________/
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Kevin Yungman’s (“Yungman”) Motion for
Reconsideration of Detention Order (the “Motion”) (ECF No. 23). After due consideration of the
Motion, the Government’s Response (ECF No. 26), Yungman’s Notice of Filing Exhibit in
Support of the Motion (ECF No. 27), Yungman’s Reply (ECF No. 29), and the Government’s SurReply (ECF No. 34), and being otherwise fully advised on the matter, the Motion is DENIED.
I.

BACKGROUND

On July 30, 2024, the Government filed a Complaint seeking the extradition of Yungman
to Ireland. (ECF No. 1). Thereafter, the Government moved to detain Yungman on the grounds
that: (i) he poses a serious risk of flight and a danger to the community; and (ii) there are no
“special circumstances” to warrant his release on bond. (ECF No. 5 at 13-19). In turn, Yungman
filed a motion for release on bond pending the extradition hearing. See generally (ECF No. 12).
On August 16, 2024, the undersigned held a hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181 et seq. to
determine whether Yungman should be detained pending his extradition hearing. See (ECF No.
14). At the conclusion of the detention hearing, the Court orally ruled that that Yungman be
detained and subsequently issued a written detention order. See generally (ECF No. 15) (Detention
Order). More specifically, the Court found that although Yungman was not a serious risk of flight,
Yungman nonetheless failed to establish “special circumstances” that would warrant his release

on bond.1 Id. at 5. Thus, the undersigned ordered Yungman be detained prior to his extradition
hearing. Id. at 7.
The instant Motion followed. (ECF No. 23). In the Motion, Yungman recounts the facts
underlying the extradition Complaint, challenges the credibility of the alleged victim’s statements,
disputes the probable cause underlying the Complaint, and urges the Court to reconsider its
conclusion that no “special circumstances” exist warranting his release on bond. Id. at 2-5, 8-18.
In opposing the Motion, the Government asserts that Yungman has not met the standard for
reconsideration and his Motion should therefore be denied. See generally (ECF No. 26).
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Bond in Extradition Proceedings
As this Court has previously stated, international extradition proceedings and the
determination of whether to release an extraditee on bail is sui generis, neither civil nor criminal
in nature. (ECF No. 15 at 2) (citing In re Matter of Extradition of Bell, No. 21-MC-80533, 2021
WL 1616127, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2021)). Rather, extradition proceedings are controlled by
the extradition statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 3181 et seq.) and the governing treaty between the United
States and the requesting country, in this case Ireland. Accordingly, neither the Rules of Civil
Procedure nor the Rules of Criminal Procedure apply in extradition proceedings. In re Extradition
of Bell, 2021 WL 1616127, at *2. Furthermore, the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 et seq.,
does not apply because an extradition proceeding is not a criminal case. Id.; see also Martin v.
Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 829 (11th Cir. 1993).

The Court noted that “[a]lthough the nature of the underlying charge . . . might support a finding
of dangerousness, the undersigned need not decide the issue of dangerousness as [Yungman] has
failed to meet his burden of showing special circumstances that would warrant his release on
bond.” (ECF No. 15 at 5).
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Most relevant to the Motion, the extradition statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181 et seq., do not
provide for bail. See In re Matter of Extradition of Shaw, No. 14-MC-81475, 2015 WL 521183,
at *5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2015). Moreover, unlike in domestic criminal cases, there is a presumption
against bond in extradition proceedings, reflecting the value placed on the United States fulfilling
its treaty obligations to the requesting country. Id.; see Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 62-63
(1903); Martin, 993 F.2d at 827; In re Matter of Extradition of Martinelli Berrocal, 263 F. Supp.
3d 1280, 1306 (S.D. Fla. 2017); In re Matter of Extradition of Pelletier, No. 09-MC-22416, 2009
WL 3837660, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2009). Rather, case law provides that bail in extradition
proceedings should be granted where there are “special circumstances,” described as “only in the
most pressing circumstances, and when the requirements of justice are absolutely peremptory.”
United States v. Leitner, 784 F.2d 159, 160 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting In re Mitchell, 171 F. 289, 289
(S.D.N.Y. 1909)). Thus, “special circumstances” will only be found where justification for release
is clear. In re Extradition of Bell, 2021 WL 1616127, at * 4 (citing In re Extradition of Shaw, 2015
WL 521183, at *4-6).
Furthermore, unlike in a domestic criminal case where the Government bears the burden
of establishing that the accused is a risk of flight and/or a danger to the community, the burden is
on the extraditee to establish that he is: (i) not a flight risk or danger to community; and also (ii)
that “special circumstances” exist that would warrant the very unusual grant of bond in an
extradition proceeding. In re Extradition of Bell, 2021 WL 1616127, at * 3. Some courts have
required that this showing be established by clear and convincing evidence, while others require a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. (collecting cases applying each standard); In re Matter of
Extradition of Garcia, 761 F. Supp. 2d 468, 474-75 (S.D. Tex 2010) (same). The extraditee must
establish both prongs. Simply showing that he is not a risk of flight or a danger to the community

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is not enough. Rather, the extraditee must also show that “special circumstances” exist that merit
the “extraordinary” step of granting release on bond. In re Extradition of Bell, 2021 WL 1616127,
at * 4. Such special circumstances are “limited to the most extraordinary circumstances and cannot
involve factors applicable to all potential extraditees.” Id. at *3. Thus, although not impossible,
release on bond in the extradition context is unusual and extraordinary. See In re Extradition of
Shaw, 2015 WL 521183, at *6.
B. Motions for Reconsideration
In the domestic criminal setting, “reconsideration of a previous order is an extraordinary
remedy to be employed sparingly.” United States v. Carrera, No. 14-CR-20286, 2014 WL
3908204, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2014) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Ashland Equities, Inc.,
181 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1370 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8. 2002)). Indeed, the purpose of a motion for
reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.
United States v. Edler, No. 13-CR-60168, 2013 WL 4543695, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2013)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not specifically authorize
motions for reconsideration, both the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have permitted the
filing of such motions in criminal cases. See United States v. Simmons, No. 8:24-CR-200-WFJ,
2024 WL 3183859, at * 1 (M.D. Fla. June 26, 2024) (quoting Serrano v. United States, 411 F.
App’x 253, 255 (11th Cir. 2011)). Thus, in deciding motions for reconsideration in criminal cases,
courts in this District have generally relied on the standard applicable to motions for
reconsideration in civil cases. See, e.g., United States v. Sabooni, No. 09-CR-20298, 2014 WL
4385446, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2014) (citing United States v. Pugh, 426 F. App’x 876, 876 (11th

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Cir. 2011)) (noting that the same standard of review applies to both criminal and civil motions to
reconsider).
In the civil arena, motions for reconsideration are governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b) (applicable to interlocutory orders and decisions) and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 59 and 60 (applicable to final orders and judgments). More specifically, Rule 54(b)
provides that “any order . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities
of fewer than all the parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment
adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see In
Matter of Extradition of Liuksila, 133 F. Supp. 3d 249, 255-56 (D.D.C. 2016)). Rule 60(b), for its
part, lists various circumstances a court may consider to relieve a party from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding. These circumstances include but are not limited to: (i) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (ii) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (iii) fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; or (iv) any other reason that justifies relief.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (requiring that a motion to alter or amend
a judgment be filed within 28 days of entry of the judgment).
Although Rule 54(b) does not identify factors that a court should evaluate in deciding a
motion to reconsider, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that the factors set forth in Rule 60(b) should
apply to motions for reconsideration brought under Rule 54. See Herman v. Hartford Life & Acc.
Ins. Co., 508 F. App’x 923, 927 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Although Rule 54(b) does not delineate the
parameters of a district court’s discretion to reconsider interlocutory orders, we have at least
indicated that Rule 54(b) takes after Rule 60(b).”); Fernandez v. Bankers Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 906
F.2d 559, 569 (11th Cir.1990) (reviewing a district court’s grant of a motion to reconsider a denial

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of summary judgment as if it were a Rule 60(b) motion); Horowitz v. Allied Marine, Inc., No. 21CV-60358, 2023 WL 3568113, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 19, 2023) (analyzing a motion to reconsider
under Rule 54(b) using same standard as a Rule 60(b) motion); Berisha v. Stan, Inc., 461 F. Supp.
3d 1257, 1259 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (same).
Thus, regardless of whether reconsideration is sought in the civil or criminal context, or
from an interlocutory or final order, courts have generally found three major grounds that would
justify reconsideration: (i) an intervening change in the controlling law; (ii) the availability of new
evidence; and (iii) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. See, e.g., Benestad
v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 20-CV-60496, 2022 WL 5239598, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2022);
Sabooni, 2014 WL 4385446, at *1; Carrera, 2014 WL 3908204, at *2; Burger King Corp., 181 F.
Supp. 2d at 1369; Edler, 2013 WL 4543695, at *1. In addition, motions for reconsideration cannot
be used to “simply rehash previously litigated issues.” United States v. Russo, No. 11-MJ-6337,
2011 WL 3044844, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2011); see Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d
949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (“A motion for reconsideration
cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been
raised prior to the entry of judgment.”).
III.

DISCUSSION

In his Reply brief, Yungman argues—for the first time—that the undersigned should use
the “less stringent” standard of Rule 54(b) (for interlocutory orders) in determining his motion for
reconsideration of the Detention Order. (ECF No. 29 at 2-4) (citing In Re Matter of Extradition of
Liuksila, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 255-56) (using Rule 54(b) standard in denying extraditee’s motion for
reconsideration of an order denying extraditee’s motion to dismiss the extradition request). In its
Sur-Reply, the Government asserts that because the standard for reconsideration under either Rule

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54(b) or Rule 60 is the same, the undersigned’s analysis will be unchanged and the Motion should
therefore be denied. (ECF No. 34 at 3). For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned agrees.
While Rule 54(b) does not specify what considerations a court should weigh in deciding a
motion to reconsider, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that the circumstances set forth in Rule
60(b) should apply to both. See Herman, 508 F. App’x at 927 n.1; Fernandez, 906 F.2d at 569;
Horowitz, 2023 WL 3568113, at *4; Berisha, 461 F. Supp. 3d 1257 at 1259. Here, Yungman has
not established that reconsideration would be appropriate under Rule 60. Indeed, Yungman has
not shown: (i) a change in the law; (ii) the existence of new evidence; or (iii) any clear error or
manifest injustice. See In re Extradition of Shaw, No. 14-MC-81475 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2015)
(ECF No. 105) (denying motion for reconsideration of detention order in extradition case relying
on factors in Rule 60(b)). Instead, the Motion repeats the issues and arguments previously raised
at the detention hearing, which the undersigned already considered and rejected. See Russo, 2011
WL 3044844, at *1 (noting motions for reconsideration “should not simply rehash previously
litigated issues, but instead, should raise new issues or identify a change in the factual or legal
underpinnings upon which the original decision was based”); Wilchombe, 555 F.3d at 957 (same).
For example, the Motion repeats Yungman’s arguments at the detention hearing that the delay in
bringing charges, Yungman’s good character, lack of criminal history, substantial family and
community ties, and the lack of evidence and weak probable cause (based solely on the victim’s
equivocal statements), all combine to reach the level of “special circumstances” warranting his
release on bond. (ECF No. 23 at 8-19). But the undersigned has already considered and rejected
those arguments, singly and in combination. (ECF No. 15 at 6-7). As the undersigned wrote in
the Detention Order:
In his Motion for Bond and at the hearing, Yungman pointed to several
circumstances that he argued, either singularly or in combination, rose to the type

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of special circumstance that would warrant his release on bond pending the
extradition hearing. See (ECF No. 12 at 8-14). More specifically, Yungman argued
that: (i) he has been living openly, not hiding or fleeing from authorities; (ii) he is
of good character; (iii) he is involved in charitable work; (iv) he has strong family
and community ties; (v) he is a professional, having worked as a paramedic and
currently seeking certification as a physician’s assistant; (vi) the offense of rape
may be a bailable offense in Ireland; (vii) there is a lack of diplomatic necessity due
to the delay in prosecution; (viii) his presence could be ensured by an order of home
detention with electronic monitoring; (ix) he is likely to prevail on the merits of the
underlying criminal action in Ireland; and (x) there is no probable cause (i.e.,
insufficient evidence) as to the underlying charge and, therefore, he is not
extraditable. See id. The undersigned joins the multitude of other courts that have
addressed and rejected these arguments, both singularly and in the aggregate, as
sufficient to establish the rare “special circumstances” warranting bond in an
extradition setting. As to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the charges in
the extradition package, that is a determination the undersigned must make at the
extradition hearing, not at the bond hearing.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Lastly, the undersigned has reviewed the cases Yungman cites in support of the Motion
and finds them unpersuasive and/or distinguishable when applied to the facts of this case. For
example, Yungman argues that the undersigned committed “clear error” in not considering “the
lack of reliable evidence to support probable cause” as a “special circumstance” warranting bond.
(ECF Nos. 23 at 14, 29 at 5). But Yungman’s cited authority, coupled with this Court’s abundant
precedent, caution against the undersigned making probable cause determinations or credibility
findings at this stage of the proceedings. See In re Matter of Extradition of Rangel Prentt, No. 24CV-80209, 2024 WL 2219823, at *18 (S.D. Fla. May 7, 2024) (citations and quotations omitted)
(noting that arguments pertaining to substantial likelihood of success (i.e., probable cause) are to
be determined at the extradition hearing, as these arguments challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence). Similarly, the cases cited by Yungman to support his argument that the Irish authorities’
delay in seeking his extradition constitutes “special circumstances” are out-of-district, factually
distinguishable, and unpersuasive. See, e.g., In re Matter of Extradition of Chapman, 459 F. Supp.

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2d 1024, 1027 (D. Haw. 2006) (finding that more than three-year delay in extradition request
(coupled with no risk of flight) reflects a “lack of any diplomatic necessity”); United States v.
Bowman, No. 19-MJ-05089, 2020 WL 835342, at *6-7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020) (finding that 7year delay in prosecution (after the crime was first reported) was “atypical,” constituting a “special
circumstance” because requesting state did not make the prosecution a priority). The undersigned,
however, disagrees with Chapman that a three-year delay is, without more, sufficient to establish
“special circumstances.”

See In re Extradition of Rangel, 2024 WL 2220444, at *16, 17

(describing Chapman’s conclusion that the three-year delay constitutes a “special circumstance”
as an “anomaly” when compared to other cases discussing delay as a “special circumstance”
warranting bond). In addition, unlike in Bowman, the three-year delay (between the victim’s June
2018 police report and Ireland’s July 2021 formal request to extradite Yungman) is not “atypical”
considering the complexity and formalities of extradition applications.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Yungman’s
Motion (ECF No. 23) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on October 25, 2024.

____________________________________
ALICIA O. VALLE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

cc:

All Counsel of Record

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