Grijalva v. Gulf Bank et al

Filing 66

ORDER denying 56 Defendant's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Joan A. Lenard on 11/10/2010. (mhz)

G r i j a l v a v. Gulf Bank et al

D o c . 66

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT S O U T H E R N DISTRICT OF FLORIDA C a se No. 09-22375-CIV-LENARD/TURNOFF

F I D E L EGAS GRIJALVA, Plaintiff, v. G U L F BANK, ESTATE OF S A L V A D O R BONILLA-SOSA, and G R E G O R Y MARTIN, D e f e n d a n ts . ________________________________/ O R D E R DENYING DEFENDANT'S AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY J U D G M E N T (D.E. 56) T H I S CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant the Estate of Salvador Bonilla-Sosa's A m e n d e d Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion," D.E. 56), filed on October 7, 2010. O n October 22, 2010, Plaintiff Fidel Egas Grijalva filed his response in opposition (" R e s p o n s e ," D.E. 65). Defendant did not file any reply. Having considered the Motion, r e la te d pleadings, and the record, the Court finds as follows. I. B a c k gro u n d

P la in tif f filed the three-count Complaint in this action on August 11, 2009 (" C o m p la in t," D.E. 1). The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is entitled to sell certain shares o f Gulf Bank to the Estate of Bonilla-Sosa, pursuant to a put option agreement. According to the Complaint, these shares were transferred to Plaintiff but the original stock certificates w e re lost or destroyed. Count II of the Complaint requests the Court issue an Order creating

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a constructive trust of the estimated $193,312.00 set aside pursuant to a put option a g re e m e n t, for the benefit of Plaintiff. Count III of the Complaint demands that Gulf Bank b e compelled to issue replacement shares and register them. On June 2, 2010, the Court e n te re d final default judgment against Defendants Gulf Bank and Gregory Martin. (See D.E. 4 5 .) II. M o tio n for Summary Judgment

D e f en d a n t's Motion seeks summary judgment on the basis that this Court lacks s u b je c t matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Defendant argues that: (1) the "probate exception" b a rs Plaintiff's claims where the state probate court has jurisdiction over the res of the B o n illa -S o s a estate and has stricken Plaintiff's claim as untimely under Florida's statute of r e p o s e , FLA. STAT. § 733.710; and (2) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine strips this Court of ju ris d ic tio n where Plaintiff's claim has already been litigated in state court. In response, P la in tif f states that Defendant's "statements are materially correct but incomplete." (R e sp o n se at 1.) Plaintiff further states that since no notice of Salvador Bonilla-Sosa's death w a s ever provided to him it would violate due process to bar his claim as untimely. III. L e g a l Standard

O n a motion for summary judgment, the Court is to construe the evidence and factual in f e re n c es arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S .H . Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim o n ly if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

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p a rty is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The Supreme Court h a s explained the summary judgment standard as follows: [ T ]h e plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, a f ter adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at tria l. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material f a ct," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the n o n -m o v in g party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. C e lo tex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The trial court's function at this ju n c tu re is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine w h e th e r there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 2 4 9 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a re a so n a b le jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir. 1989). T h e party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of in f o rm in g the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the p le a d in g s , depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the a f f id a v its , if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material f a ct." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, t h e burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving p a r ty must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, a n sw e rs to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that

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th e re is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). In meeting this b u rd e n the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some m e tap h ysic a l doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio C o rp ., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue f o r trial." Id. at 587. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken a s a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Id. IV . D is c u s s io n

T h e Court finds Defendant's Motion should be denied for a number of reasons. First, th e Motion is untimely. Pursuant to the Court's April 7, 2010, Order (D.E. 35), the deadline fo r filing dispositive motions was September 15, 2010. Defendant's Motion was filed more th a n three weeks after that deadline. Defendant did not seek an extension of time or o th e rw is e seek leave to file its Motion. Accordingly, the Motion is denied as untimely. S e c o n d , pursuant to S.D. Fla. Local Rule 7.5, both sides were required to file concise s ta te m e n ts of material facts. Neither side filed any statement of facts. Accordingly, the M o t io n is denied for failure to comply with the Local Rules. F in a lly, the Court finds that the Motion is deficient on the merits. The "probate ex ce p tio n " as explained in Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 310-312 (2006), is a very lim ite d exception to federal court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in Marshall stated: T h u s , the probate exception reserves to state probate courts the probate or a n n u l m e n t of a will and the administration of a decedent's estate; it also p re c lu d e s federal courts from endeavoring to dispose of property that is in the c u sto d y of a state probate court. But it does not bar federal courts from 4

a d ju d ic a tin g matters outside those confines and otherwise within federal ju r is d ic tio n . Id . at 311-12. As in Marshall, this case does not involve the administration of an estate, the p ro b a te of a will, or any other purely probate matter. Rather, it involves a simple breach of c o n tra c t action and a determination of Plaintiff's rights under the subject put-option a g re e m e n t. Plaintiff is not seeking the probate or annulment of a will. Nor does he seek to re a ch a res in the custody of a state court. This action is solely concerned with a

d e te rm in a tio n of Plaintiff's legal rights under the contract. See Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 4 9 0 , 494 (1946) ("[W]hile a federal court may not exercise its jurisdiction to disturb or affect th e possession of property in the custody of a state court, . . . , it may exercise its jurisdiction to adjudicate rights in such property . . ."). There also exist no "sound policy considerations" in favor of extending the probate exception to this case. See Marshall, 547 U.S. at 312. This c a se is also not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine where the state court adjudication re la te d only to Plaintiff's untimely claim in the probate proceedings and this case is not a de f a c to appeal of that decision. Accordingly it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that D e f en d a n t's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 56), filed on October 7, 2010, is DENIED.

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D O N E AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 10th day of November, 2010.

JOAN A. LENARD U N I T E D STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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