HUANG v. NAPOLITANO et al

Filing 62

ORDER denying 59 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Marcia G. Cooke on 7/29/2011. (tm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No.: 10-22580-Civ-COOKE-BANDSTRA
HONG HUANG,
Plaintiff
vs.
JANET NAPOLITANO, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________/
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
THIS MATTER is before me upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. (ECF No. 59). I
have reviewed the arguments, the record, and the relevant legal authority. For the reasons provided
in this Order, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Hong Huang, a.k.a., Linda Huang, a citizen of China, filed an application for
naturalization (Form N-400) on January 27, 2009, pursuant to INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). On
March 8, 2010, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denied Ms. Huang’s N-400
application and issued her a Notice to Appear, initiating removal proceedings against her. The
removal proceedings are pending. On April 6, 2010, Ms. Huang filed an administrative appeal of the
denial of her N-400 application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a). This appeal is pending. On May 10,
2010, Ms. Huang filed a complaint for de novo review of the USCIS’s denial of her N-400
application pursuant to INA § 310 (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), for a declaratory judgment that she is
eligible for naturalization, for relief of violations of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5
U.S.C. § 706, and for a preliminary injunction staying removal proceedings pending the district
court’s de novo review of her N-400 application. (ECF No. 1). On February 28, 2011, I entered an
Order dismissing Ms. Huang’s Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (ECF No. 58)

because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Plaintiff now requests reconsideration of
that Order.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
The “purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to
present newly discovered evidence.” Burger King Corp. v. Ashland Equities, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d
1366, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2002). “A motion for reconsideration should not be used as a vehicle to
present authorities available at the time of the first decision or to reiterate arguments previously
made.” Id. To prevail on a motion for reconsideration, a party generally must present at least one of
“three major grounds which justify reconsideration: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2)
the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”
Id. “[T]he moving party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the
court to reverse its prior decision.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Ms. Huang argues that I should vacate my Order because it is based on three errors of law:
(i) this Court has subject matter jurisdiction; (ii) no exhaustion requirement applies, or exhaustion is
futile; and (iii) Ms. Huang may not be able to file another complaint after removal proceedings
conclude.
First, Ms. Huang argues that the decision in Kestelboym v. Chertoff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 813
(D.N.J. 2008), indicates that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. At the outset,
I note that a decision of another district court is not binding precedent upon this Court, Camreta v.
Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011), and this case was available at the time I entered the Order
of dismissal. Moreover, the authority Ms. Huang cites does not justify reconsideration here.
In Kestelboym, a plaintiff filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey after the USCIS denied her application for naturalization and denied her request for a hearing.
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538 F. Supp. 2d at 814. When the plaintiff filed her complaint in district court, the USCIS had
initiated removal proceedings against her. Id. at 815. The court noted that there is a circuit split on
the issue of whether a district court has jurisdiction over a complaint where, as here, the USCIS
denies a petitioner’s naturalization application and initiates removal proceedings on the same grounds
as the denial of the application. Id. at 816. After reviewing different circuits’ approaches to this
issue, the district court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at
818. Specifically, the district court found that 8 U.S.C. §14211 and 8 U.S.C. § 14292 do not preclude
a district court from reviewing the administrative denial of a naturalization application while a
removing proceeding is pending. Id.
In Karam v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 373 F. App’x 965 (11th Cir. 2010), the
Eleventh Circuit—relying on the same legal principles that I relied upon in my Order—upheld a
district court’s decision that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s complaint because,
as here, the plaintiff had not yet attended a hearing before an immigration officer on the denial of his
naturalization application. The court held that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
claim. Although Karam is not binding, it is persuasive authority, particularly where the facts are
materially the same as those in the present case. See Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 487 F.3d
1340, 1345 n.7 (11th Cir. 2007). I find that my Order does not contain a material error of law with
regard to the decision that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Ms. Huang’s Motion for
Reconsideration of this issue is denied.
Second, Ms. Huang argues that courts do not require exhaustion when to do so may result in
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Section 1421(c) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person whose application for naturalization . . . is denied,
after a hearing before an immigration officer under section 1447(a) of this Title, may seek review of such
denial before the United States district court . . ..”
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Section 1429 provides, in relevant part, “no application for naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney
General if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued

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undue prejudice. In my Order, I found:
Here, Congress has specifically mandated by statute that a person seeking review
of the denial of a naturalization application must submit to ‘a hearing before an
immigration officer under section 1447(a)’ before she may seek de novo review in
a federal district court. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). ‘[S]tatutorily created exhaustion
requirements bind the parties and the courts. When a statute requires exhaustion,
a petitioner’s failure to do so deprives [a court] of jurisdiction.’ Richardson v.
Reno, 162 F.3d 1338, 1374 (11th Cir. 1998), judgment vacated on other grounds,
526 U.S. 1142, 119 S. Ct. 2016, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1029.
Order, p. 4. Ms. Huang fails to raise any new arguments or point to new legal authority
that places in question this Court’s reasoning in holding that Ms. Huang must exhaust her
administrative remedies. I also note that in Karam the Eleventh Circuit similarly held
that Section 1421(c) provides a statutory exhaustion requirement that binds the parties
and the courts; failure to exhaust such a requirement deprives a court of jurisdiction. 373
F. App’x at 957-58. I find that my Order does not contain a material error of law with
regard to the decision that Ms. Huang failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Ms.
Huang’s Motion for Reconsideration of this issue is denied.
Finally, Ms. Huang argues that this Court made a legal error in noting that she
could file another complaint after the conclusion of removal proceedings. Ms. Huang
points out that if the immigration court decides to remove Ms. Huang, she may seek
review of this decision before the Board of Immigration Appeals, and then the Eleventh
Circuit. Whether or not Ms. Huang may file a new complaint does not alter this Court’s
ruling that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore Ms. Huang’s
argument in this respect is not “of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to
reverse its prior decision.” Burger King Corp., 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1369.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
(ECF No. 59) is DENIED.
under the provisions of this chapter or any other Act.”

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DONE and ORDERED in chambers, at Miami, Florida, this 29th day of July 2011.

Copies furnished to:
The Hon. Ted E. Bandstra
Counsel of Record

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