Jeudy v. Attorney General, Department of Justice
Filing
70
ORDER granting 40 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Paul C. Huck on 11/7/2011. (kfn)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 10-22873-CIV-HUCK/BANDSTRA
SAONARAH JEUDY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ERIC HOLDER, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Saonarah Jeudy, an African-American female, brings this action against the Attorney General
pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Ms. Jeudy asserts claims of unlawful race, sex, and disability
discrimination based on the denial of her requests for a reasonable accommodation and subsequent
termination of her employment from the Federal Bureau of Prisons. She also contends that her
requests for an accommodation were denied and she was terminated in retaliation for complaining
about sexual harassment by a supervisor. The case is presently before the Court on Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. #40). Defendant seeks summary judgment on all counts set
forth in Ms. Jeudy’s Third Amended Complaint (D.E. #35). For the reasons discussed below,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in full.1
1
Defendant objects to the statement of material facts included in Ms. Jeudy’s Response in
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. #53). Local Rule 7.5(c) requires
the statement of material facts submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment to
“correspond with the order and with the paragraph numbering scheme used by the movant.” S.D.
Fla. L.R. 7.5(c). Defendant asserts that, rather than responding to Defendant’s statement of material
facts, Ms. Jeudy included “her own independent Statement that is sprinkled with passing objections
to Defendant’s paragraphs that Plaintiff arguably ‘disputes.’” Reply Mem. in Further Supp. of Def.’s
Mot. for Summ. J. (D.E. #55) at 1. Defendant also contends that the paragraphs of his statement of
material facts to which Ms. Jeudy offers no response should be deemed admitted. Id. at 2 n.1. The
Court, however, must review the record to determine whether the movant’s statement is supported
by the evidence. See S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.5(d). Thus, while Ms. Juedy has not complied with Local Rule
7.5 to the letter, the Court will look to the record in determining whether, when viewed in the light
1
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Ms. Jeudy began working for the Federal Bureau of Prisons on June 11, 2006, as a
probationary correctional officer at the Federal Detention Center in Miami, Florida. Ms. Jeudy
contends that, shortly after her employment commenced, she was subjected to sexual harassment by
a supervisor, Lieutenant Kevin Burden. Specifically, Ms. Jeudy claims that Lieutenant Burden made
several inappropriate comments regarding her physical appearance. See Jeudy Dep. at 52:11–22
(A70)2 (“He just made a comment like, you have the most beautiful soft skin and whatever. . . . And
he would come to my post and make comments all the time . . . .”). She also contends that he
telephoned her while she was working and whispered into the phone without identifying himself.
See Jeudy Sworn Statement at 9 (A24). Additionally, on one occasion, Lieutenant Burden called Ms.
Jeudy into his office to put his shoe back on his foot. See Jeudy Dep. at 50:18–51:9 (A70). The
alleged harassment continued until Ms. Jeudy complained in March 2007. See November 29, 2007
Letter from Teri Guttman Valdes to Roy E. Ferguson at 1 (A14). Ms. Jeudy spoke to Lieutenant
Miller, various co-workers, and union officials about the Lieutenant Burden’s harassment. Id.
In early 2007, Ms. Jeudy became pregnant. During her pregnancy, Ms. Jeudy experienced
pelvic pain, which she attributed to fibroids in her uterus, and requested an accommodation due to
her pregnancy. Specifically, Ms. Jeudy informed Lieutenant Hicks that she was pregnant and asked
if she could be placed on the night shift. Jeudy Dep. at 69:10–14 (A74). According to Ms. Jeudy,
she requested this shift because she “wanted to be on the shift with less activity.” Id. at 64:21–22
(A72); see also id. at 71:22–72:1 (A74) (Q: And the only accommodation you asked for was to be
changed to the midnight shift? A: Right, because inmates are sleeping. If I am throwing up, they
wouldn’t see it, and if I am in pain, I could deal with my pain.”).3 Lieutenant Hicks told her to speak
most favorable to Ms. Jeudy, the evidence and reasonable factual inferences drawn therefrom present
a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. The following factual
background is either undisputed or read in the light most favorable to Ms. Jeudy, as is required at
the summary judgment stage.
2
An Exhibit Appendix, comprised of documents labeled A-000001 through A-000088, was
filed with the Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. # 411). Both parties cite to pages contained in the Exhibit Appendix as “A ___.” For ease of reference,
the Court cites to the Exhibit Appendix in the same manner.
3
While Ms. Jeudy specifically requested a shift change, she also stated, in her deposition,
that she suggested additional types of accommodations, such as being placed at the front desk or in
the phone room. See Jeudy Dep. at 72:3–14 (A74).
2
with the other rookie officers to see if someone would switch with her. See id. at 69:14–16 (A74).
Ms. Jeudy was unable to find an officer to switch shifts with her. See id. at 69:18–19 (A74).
Ms. Jeudy also testified that she spoke to Captain Edward Felz about her pregnancy
approximately three times between February and May 2007. Id. at 79:9–12 (A76). In May 2007,
after conferring with Eric Young, the president of the union responsible for representing correctional
officers, Ms. Jeudy submitted a doctor’s note in support of her requests for an accommodation. The
note stated that Ms. Jeudy was under the care of Dr. Susan Davila for “a pregnancy complicated by
hyperemesis & pelvic pain” and that Ms. Jeudy “should not repetitively climb stairs and should be
accommodated.” See Dr. Davila Note (A88). Ms. Jeudy’s requests were denied.
On May 11, 2007, Ms. Jeudy attended Annual Refresher Training at the Federal Detention
Center. See May 14, 2007 Felz Mem. (A4). Captain Felz and approximately thirty other staff
members were present. Id. During training, Ms. Jeudy’s cell phone rang, and, at Captain Felz’s
direction, Ms. Jeudy removed her phone from the institution. Id. She later apologized to Captain
Felz for the incident. Id. At her deposition, Ms. Jeudy acknowledged that she should not have had
her phone at work while she was in the building, but stated that during the training session everyone
had their phones, including Captain Felz. Jeudy Dep. at 47:17–48:20 (A69).
Three days later, on May 14, 2007, while conducting rounds during the 4:00 p.m. count,
Lieutenant Burden noticed that a cell door in Ms. Jeudy’s unit was ajar and unlocked. See May 14,
2007 Burden Mem. (A5). According to Lieutenant Burden, Ms. Jeudy stated that “she could not
secure the unit because she had been ill in the restroom, and could not secure her unit in time for the
4:00 p.m. count.” Id. In her deposition, Ms. Jeudy confirmed that one of the doors in her unit was
not properly secured and that she was vomiting and sick. See Jeudy Dep. at 60:4–23 (A71). She
contends, however, that the door that was not properly secured was to a cell for inmates with
disabilities and that no one was in that cell at that time. See id. at 60:6–25 (A71). This incident was
documented in a memorandum from Lieutenant Burden to Captain Felz and on Ms. Jeudy’s
performance log. See May 14, 2007 Burden Mem. (A5); May 14, 2007 Performance Log (A53).
By letter dated June 6, 2007, the warden, Loren A. Grayer, advised Ms. Jeudy that she would
be removed, during probation, from her position as a correctional officer effective June 8, 2007. See
June 6, 2007 Letter from Loren A. Grayer, Warden, to Saonarah Jeudy (A1–3). Ms. Jeudy was
terminated because of the May 11, 2007 and May 14, 2007 incidents described above. See id. At
the time of her termination, Ms. Jeudy was not present at the Federal Detention Center. She was on
3
leave because she fell at work on May 29, 2007. See Jeudy Sworn Statement at 27–28 (A42–43).
Accordingly, the termination letter was mailed to her residence. See id. After Ms. Jeudy’s
termination, Charles Laugh, a union officer, informed the warden that, prior to Ms. Jeudy’s
termination, Officer Felz stated: “Can you believe that girl got pregnant during her probationary
period.” Aff. of Charles Laugh (D.E. #53-1) at 1.4
Ms. Jeudy initiated the present suit on August 6, 2010. In her Third Amended Complaint,
she alleges five distinct claims. In Count I, Ms. Jeudy contends that Defendant violated the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by failing to accommodate her alleged disability—her pregnancy—and
by terminating her as a result of that alleged disability. Count II provides that Defendant
discriminated against Ms. Jeudy based on her race because white male officers received reasonable
accommodations and were not terminated for committing violations similar to those committed by
Ms. Jeudy. The allegations of Count III and Count IV mirror the allegations in Count II, except that
the purported discrimination is based on gender (Count III) and pregnancy (Count IV) instead of
race. Finally, in Count V, Ms. Jeudy asserts that her requests for a reasonable accommodation were
denied and she was terminated in retaliation for reporting sexual harassment by Lieutenant Burden.5
Defendant seeks summary judgment on all counts.
II.
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). Here, Defendant “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for [his] motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which [he] believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
4
As noted in Defendant’s presently pending Motion in Limine (D.E. # 61), the Laugh
Affidavit attributes the above statement to a “Captain Feldman.” There is no mention of a “Captain
Feldman” in the record. The record, however, makes clear that there is a Captain Felz and that
Captain Felz is the individual who allegedly made this statement. See Jeudy Sworn Statement at 20
(A35), 31 (A46); Dep’t of Justice Final Agency Decision (D.E. # 35-1) at 17. In Plaintiff’s Response
to Defendant’s Motion in Limine (D.E. #63), Ms. Jeudy acknowledged that the individual’s last
name was inadvertently typed as “Feldman” instead of “Felz” in the Laugh Affidavit.
5
While Ms. Jeudy’s retaliation claim is based on the sexual harassment by Lieutenant
Burden and her objections thereto, there is no separate claim regarding the alleged sexual harassment
itself. See April 20, 2011 Letter from Teri Guttman Valdes to Christopher Macchiaroli (A62)
(“Please be advised that Plaintiff is not proceeding forward with a ‘sexual harassment’ species of sex
discrimination claim in this matter. Rather, the sexual harassment and her objections and reporting
of that harassment form the basis for her retaliation claims.”).
4
The burden then shifts to Ms. Jeudy to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993). Ms. Jeudy may not simply rest
upon the allegations of her Third Amended Complaint. Rather, she “has a duty to present affirmative
evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson v.
Napolitano, No. 09-60744-CIV-HUCK, 2010 WL 431898, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2010) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). Additionally, a mere “scintilla” of
evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “A genuine issue for trial exists only if
sufficient evidence is presented favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that
party.” Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1284–85. Furthermore,
while this Court must construe the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in Ms.
Jeudy’s favor, summary judgment may be granted where the evidence favoring Ms. Jeudy is “merely
colorable or is not significantly probative.” See id. at 1285.
As noted above, Ms. Jeudy’s Third Amended Complaint contains several claims based on
various types of discrimination.
Ms. Jeudy’s claim of disability discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act, her claims of race and sex discrimination under Title VII, and her claim of
retaliation under Title VII will be addressed in turn.
A.
Disability Discrimination
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 “prohibits federal agencies from discriminating in
employment against otherwise qualified individuals with a disability.” Shannon v. Postmaster Gen.
of the U.S. Postal Serv., 335 F. App’x 21, 24 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d
1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000)). To succeed on a discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she was: (1) disabled or “regarded as” disabled; (2) a qualified
individual; and (3) discriminated against because of his or her disability.6 Id. Ms. Jeudy contends
that she was discriminated against when her requests for a reasonable accommodation due to a
disability or perceived disability—her pregnancy—were denied. She also claims that she was
terminated because of this disability or perceived disability. An individual is disabled under the
Rehabilitation Act if that individual (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
6
“Discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act are governed by the same standards
used in ADA [Americans with Disability Act] cases.” Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir.
2000). “Cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act are precedent for cases under the ADA, and
vice-versa.” Id. at 1305 n.2.
5
one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is “regarded as”
having such an impairment. Id. at 24; Cash, 231 F.3d at 1305.
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant argues that Ms. Jeudy’s claims under the
Rehabilitation Act must fail because her pregnancy does not constitute a disability under federal law.
Defendant correctly contends, and Ms. Jeudy concedes, that pregnancy is not normally considered
a disability. See Third Am. Compl. (D.E. #35) at 3; Farrell v. Time Serv. Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1295,
1298 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“It is clearly established that pregnancy per se does not constitute a disability
under federal law.”); Bryson v. Mau, Inc., No. 8:09-321-HMH-BHH, 2010 WL 1542506, at *3
(D.S.C. Mar. 25, 2010) (“With near unanimity, federal courts have held that a pregnancy is not a
‘disability’ under the ADA, absent some atypical complication.”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Villarreal v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (“[P]regnancy
and related medical conditions do not, absent unusual circumstances, constitute a ‘physical
impairment’ under the ADA.”).
Whether a person is disabled, however, must be determined on a case-by-case basis. See
Garrett v. Univ. Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 507 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Each claim
of disability must be considered on a case-by-case basis. When the symptoms of an impairment vary
widely from person to person, an individualized assessment of the effect of an impairment is
particularly necessary.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Here, Ms. Jeudy argues
that she did not experience a typical pregnancy. She alleges that she suffered from complications
during her pregnancy—specifically, pelvic pain that resulted from the presence of fibroids in her
uterus.7 See Third Am. Compl. (D.E. #35) at 3.
She further claims that such complications
substantially limited her in the major life activity of walking, standing, or otherwise ambulating. Id.
Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy contends that she is disabled for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. The
issue before the Court, therefore, is whether Ms. Juedy has presented sufficient evidence to raise a
7
Defendant argues that Ms. Jeudy’s medical records establish that she suffered from pelvic
pain unrelated to any pregnancy for years and that there is no connection between Ms. Jeudy’s
fibroids and her purported pelvic pain. See Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (D.E. #41-1)
at 7–8. Accordingly, Defendant contends that Ms. Jeudy’s allegation that she should have received
an accommodation based on her pregnancy is disingenuous. Id. at 9. While it is questionable,
therefore, whether the pain Ms. Jeudy experienced during her pregnancy was the result of the
presence of fibroids in her uterus during that pregnancy or whether it was due to some medical
condition completely unrelated to pregnancy or fibroids, the Court must assume, for purposes of this
analysis, that the pelvic pain Ms. Jeudy experienced during her pregnancy was in fact caused by
fibroids in her uterus, as Ms. Jeudy claims.
6
genuine issue of material fact as to whether her pregnancy and its related complications amount to
an impairment and whether such impairment substantially limited her ability to walk, stand, or
otherwise ambulate. Ms. Jeudy has not met this burden.
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that Ms. Jeudy can establish that her pregnancy related
complications constitute an impairment, she has failed to present sufficient evidence to show that
this impairment substantially limited her ability walk, stand, or otherwise ambulate. A person is
“substantially limited” if he or she is “unable to perform a major life activity that the average person
in the general population can perform” or “significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or
duration under which [he or she] can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform
that same major life activity.” Simpson v. Ala. Dep’t of Human Res., 311 F. App’x 264, 267 (11th
Cir. 2009).8 Factors relevant to determining whether an individual is substantially limited include
the nature and severity of the impairment, its duration or expected duration, and its permanent or
long-term impact. Id. The evidence submitted by Ms. Jeudy on this issue consists of a doctor’s note
stating that she suffered from “a pregnancy complicated by hyperemesis & pelvic pain” and that she
“should not repetitively climb stairs and should be accommodated” and Ms. Jeudy’s own contention
that she experienced “severe pain” during her pregnancy. See Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J. (D.E. #53) at 5. This is simply insufficient to survive summary judgment.
While Ms. Jeudy argues that she experienced “severe pain” due to her pregnancy related
complications, her actual deposition testimony reflects that her impairment was not of the nature,
severity, or duration necessary to be considered substantially limiting. In her deposition, Ms. Jeudy
stated that she “had pain with the fibroids, off and on,” that “[t]he pain wasn’t an ongoing thing all
8
This definition of “substantially limited” originates from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations promulgated to implement the equal employment
provisions the ADA. The definition of “substantially limited” has subsequently changed due to the
enactment of major changes to the ADA by Congress, which went into effect on January 1, 2009.
Specifically, Congress “expressly instructed courts that ‘[t]he definition of disability in [the ADA]
shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals.’” Fikes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 322 F. App’x
882, 883 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122
Stat. 3553 (2008)). In Fikes, an unreported opinion, the Eleventh Circuit held that such changes are
not retroactive and looked to the ADA “as it was in effect at the time of the alleged discrimination.”
Id.; see also Tarmas v. Sec’y of Navy, No. 10-15370, 2011 WL 2636866, at *6 n.9 (11th Cir. July
6, 2011) (“[T]his court has never held that the ADAAA is retroactively applicable. Other circuits
have concluded that the amendments are not retroactively applicable.”). As the alleged
discrimination in this case took place in 2007, this Court looks to the law as it existed at that time.
7
day long, it was off and on,” and that “the pain comes in and out.” Jeudy Dep. at 28:18–19 (A65),
72:1–2 (A74); 73:19–20 (A75). Additionally, she testified that she was “getting better with the
fibroids” until she fell at work on May 29, 2007. Id. at 45:5–11 (A69) (“Q. The pain you were
having, was that because of your pregnancy or because of the fall? A. Both. Q. Okay. A. Mainly
because of the fall, because I was getting better with the fibroids, and once I fell, it all started again,
the pain came back.”).
Such testimony indicates that, at most, Ms. Jeudy was at times limited by the pain caused by
the fibroids in her uterus. That Ms. Jeudy suffered some limitation, however, is not enough; the
limitation must be substantial. See Fikes, 322 F. App’x at 884 (finding claims that plaintiff “suffers
pain when sitting or standing for ‘long periods’ and also when he bends, kneels, walks, lifts, or
climbs ‘excessively’” insufficient to show he was substantially limited in major life activities of
walking and working); Allen v. U.S. Postmaster Gen., 158 F. App’x 240, 243 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“[A]lthough Allen’s foot injuries prevent her from walking long distances without rests on account
of pain, the record does not demonstrate that she was substantially limited in the major life activity
of walking.”); Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 1997) (“We have found few
cases defining what constitutes a substantial limitation on a person’s ability to walk. What cases do
exist, though, make clear that moderate difficulty or pain experienced while walking does not rise
to the level of a disability.”) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy’s deposition
testimony is insufficient to create a factual dispute as to whether her impairment substantially limited
a major life activity.
Similarly, the doctor’s note upon which Ms. Jeudy relies lends little support to her claims.
The note simply provides that Ms. Jeudy “should not repetitively climb stairs and should be
accommodated.” Davila Note (A88). It contains no details about how the pregnancy related
complications actually hindered her ability to walk, stand, or otherwise ambulate. Nor does her
doctor indicate that any tests were performed to establish the extent to which Ms. Jeudy was limited
in her ability to walk, stand, or otherwise ambulate or in any manner quantify the degree of
limitation. See Garrett, 507 F.3d at 1315 (“For several reasons, this evidence of Garrett’s
impairments and limitations fails to raise an issue of triable fact that she was disabled. . . . [W]e note
the lack of any objective evidence of the extent of Garrett’s limitation. While Dr. Miller asserts that
Garret was precluded from performing medium or heavy jobs, he has not referenced any objective
8
criteria supporting his conclusion. He did not identify any test that he performed, or required Garrett
to perform, to determine the extent of her limitations.”).
Furthermore, the fact that the note solely provided that Ms. Jeudy should not “repetitively”
climb stairs, and did not contain a more significant restriction on her movement in general,
establishes that, at most, Ms. Jeudy suffered from a diminished activity tolerance with respect to her
ability to walk. This is not enough to create a factual issue for a jury. See Hillburn v. Marata Elecs.
N. Am., 181 F.3d 1220, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that an assertion of a “diminished activity
tolerance” is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact); Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC, 234
F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that Hilburn “held that a diminished activity tolerance for
normal daily activities such as lifting, running and performing manual tasks, as well as a lifting
restriction, did not constitute a disability under the ADA”).
Though she ultimately bears the burden of establishing her disability, Ms. Jeudy presents only
minimal evidence as to how her alleged impairment affected her ability to walk, stand, or otherwise
ambulate. All she offers in opposition to summary judgment is her own subjective testimony and
the doctor’s note described above, neither of which is significantly probative on the issue of
substantial limitation. She does not address any impact her complications had on her daily life
outside of work, and, as to her job, Ms. Jeudy contends that she fully performed the duties required
of her as a correctional officer. See Jeudy Dep. at 81:7–24 (A77). Thus, while Ms. Jeudy’s
pregnancy related complications may have caused pain and may have affected, to some degree, her
ability to walk, stand, or otherwise ambulate, she has not produced sufficient evidence from which
a jury could reasonably conclude that she was substantially limited. See Brockman v. Snow, 217 F.
App’x 201, 209 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff’s evidence fell “far short of showing that she
was substantially limited in a major life activity,” where such evidence consisted of a doctor’s note
recommending bed rest and a claim that plaintiff was instructed not to walk long distances, and
where plaintiff’s own actions—including performing her normal work functions—contradicted her
assertion of a substantial limitation).9 Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy has failed to raise a genuine issue of
9
Alternatively, Ms. Jeudy argues that she was “regarded as” disabled by Defendant. There
is simply no basis in the record, however, to conclude that Defendant regarded Ms. Jeudy as having
a disability. “The mere fact that an employer is aware of an employee’s impairment is insufficient
to demonstrate that the employer regarded the employee as disabled.” Luna v. Walgreen Co., 575
F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (quoting Sutton v. Lader, 185 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11th Cir.
1999)). While Defendant had knowledge that Ms. Jeudy was pregnant and, arguably, that she was
suffering from complications, Ms. Jeudy has offered no evidence to indicate that Defendant regarded
her pregnancy or its complications as disabling.
9
material fact as to whether her pregnancy and its attendant complications amount to a disability, and
her claims under the Rehabilitation Act fail as a matter of law.10
B.
Race and Sex Discrimination
Ms. Jeudy also alleges that she was subjected to discrimination in violation of Title VII. Title
VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual because of that
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). As noted
above, Ms. Jeudy’s Third Amended Complaint contains one count of race discrimination (Count II).
It also contains two counts of sex discrimination, one based simply on gender (Count III) and one
based on the fact that Ms. Jeudy was also pregnant (Count IV).11 Specifically, Ms. Jeudy contends
that she was discriminated against based on her race and sex because other employees—those who
were not African American, pregnant, or female—received requested accommodations and were not
terminated for allegations similar to those that formed the purported basis for Plaintiff’s termination.
Because the Title VII disparate treatment analysis is the same irrespective of whether the alleged
violation is based on race or sex, the Court can analyze these three claims together.
Where, as here, a summary judgment motion is before the Court in a Title VII case involving
circumstantial evidence, the Court analyzes the case within the confines of the burden-shifting test
set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Greer v. Birmingham
Beverage Co., 291 F. App’x 943, 944 (11th Cir. 2008). Under this framework, Ms. Jeudy must first
present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to determine that she has satisfied the elements of
her prima facie case of discrimination. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802). If
Ms. Jeudy meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to Defendant to “articulate a legitimate,
10
Because Ms. Jeudy has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her
pregnancy constituted a disability under the Rehabilitation Act, the Court need not decide whether
Ms. Jeudy was a qualified individual or whether she was actually discriminated against on the basis
of such disability. Similarly, because the Court need not reach the discrimination prong of Ms.
Jeudy’s Rehabilitation Act claim, it is also unnecessary to address whether Ms. Jeudy failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies on the requests for accommodation made before May 1, 2007,
as Defendant contends. See Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (D.E. # 41-1) at 13.
11
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), provides that the
prohibition against sex-based discrimination in Title VII “applies with equal force to discrimination
on the basis of ‘pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.’” Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc.,
209 F.3d 1319, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). “The analysis required for
a pregnancy discrimination claim is the same type of analysis used in other Title VII sex
discrimination suits.” Id.
10
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision.” Id. The burden then shifts back to Ms.
Jeudy to show that the reasons articulated by Defendant are pretextual. Id.
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, Ms. Jeudy must show that: “(1) she
is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) her
employer treated similarly situated employees outside of her protected class more favorably than she
was treated; and (4) she was qualified to do the job.” Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., 447 F.3d 1319,
1323 (11th Cir. 2006); Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 2004) (same).
Defendant does not dispute that Ms. Jeudy satisfied the first and fourth elements of her prima facie
case. Thus, the Court need only address whether Ms. Jeudy was subjected to an adverse employment
action and, if so, whether Defendant treated a similarly situated employee outside of her protected
class more favorably. Ms. Jeudy states that the denial of her requests for an accommodation and her
subsequent termination both constitute adverse actions. Defendant contends, however, that the
denial of a request for an accommodation does not amount to an adverse employment action for
purposes of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J. (D.E. #41-1) at 18.
To establish an adverse employment action under Title VII’s substantive provision, “an
employee must show a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.”
Davis v. Town of Lake Park Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001).
Furthermore, “the employee’s subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer’s
action is not controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a
reasonable person in the circumstances.”
Id.
The denial of Ms. Jeudy’s requests for an
accommodation did not impact the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment, but simply
maintained the status quo. Ms. Jeudy was required to do nothing more than perform her job duties
in the same manner, to the same extent, and under the same conditions as she had before she
requested an accommodation.
Moreover, no reasonable person could find the denial of Ms. Jeudy’s request for an
accommodation materially adverse. “Employers have no duty to accommodate an employee if the
employee is not disabled under the ADA.” Swain v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sch. Bd., 146 F.3d 855, 858
(11th Cir. 1998). As previously discussed, Ms. Jeudy’s pregnancy related complications do not
amount to a disability. Ms. Jeudy, therefore, was not entitled to any accommodation. Surely a
reasonable person could understand that an employee might not receive a requested accommodation
11
where an employer is under no obligation to provide one. Accordingly, the denial of Ms. Jeudy’s
requests for an accommodation does not amount to an adverse employment action sufficient to
support a prima facie case of discrimination.
Ms. Jeudy’s termination, however, does constitute an adverse employment action, and Ms.
Juedy has therefore satisfied the second element of her prima facie case. Accordingly, the issue
becomes whether Ms. Jeudy can show that a similarly situated employee outside of her protected
class was treated more favorably than she was treated. To satisfy this final element of her prima
facie case, Ms. Jeudy must identify an non-protected employee—an employee who is not a pregnant
African-American female—who engaged in misconduct that was the same as or similar to the
misconduct upon which Ms. Jeudy’s termination was based but who was not similarly terminated.
See Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999). The quantity and quality of a
comparator’s misconduct must be “nearly identical” to Ms. Juedy’s misconduct “to prevent courts
from second-guessing employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges.” Id.12
As noted previously, the June 6, 2007 letter notifying Ms. Jeudy of her termination specifies
two events that contributed to the decision to terminate her. The first is the May 11, 2007 incident
in which Ms. Jeudy’s cell phone rang during a training session for staff members. In the letter, the
warden stated that the introduction of contraband, including cellular phones, into the institution is
in violation of the Standards of Employee Conduct. See June 6, 2007 Letter from Loren A. Grayer,
Warden, to Saonarah Jeudy at 1 (A1). The second event, and arguably the more serious violation,
involved Ms. Jeudy’s failure to properly secure her unit during the 4:00 p.m. count on May 14, 2007.
With respect to this violation, the warden noted that “[t]he Bureau is responsible for the safety and
security of staff and inmates” and that Ms. Jeudy’s “action was in direct violation of [her] Post
Orders.” Id. at 2 (A2). Accordingly, for Ms. Jeudy to satisfy the final element of her prima facie
12
Identifying a proper comparator is necessary regardless of whether the Title VII plaintiff
actually committed the violations alleged. See Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d
1306, 1311 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998), superceded in part by 151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[N]o
plaintiff can make out a prima facie case by showing just that she belongs to a protected class and
that she did not violate her employer’s work rule. The plaintiff must also point to someone similarly
situated (but outside the protected class) who disputed a violation of the rule and who was, in fact,
treated better.”); Miller-Goodwin v. City of Panama City Beach, Fla., 385 F. App’x 966, 971 n.2
(11th Cir. 2010) (“[R]egardless of whether [the plaintiff] committed the alleged rule violations, she
is still required to show that a similarly situated male who committed the same rule violations
received more favorable treatment than her.”).
12
case, she must identify an employee outside her protected class whose misconduct is “nearly
identical” to the conduct discussed in the June 6, 2007 letter.
Ms. Jeudy has failed to identify such a comparator. While she alleges that “everybody” had
their cell phones during the May 11, 2007 training session, including Captain Felz, and contends that
the backup officer who was assisting her with the May 14, 2007 count also should have been
subjected to discipline, she cannot identify any employee who was charged with committing both
of the violations upon which her termination was based or who committed two “nearly identical” or
extremely similar violations. Moreover, Ms. Jeudy has failed to identify any employee who
committed two such violations within three days of each other—not to mention during a
probationary period—as she was charged with doing. Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy has not identified a
similarly situated employee outside of her protected class who was treated more favorably than she
was treated, as is necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Summary judgment
is therefore appropriate. See Bush v. Houston Cnty. Comm’n, 414 F. App’x 264, 267 (11th Cir.
2011) (recognizing, in pretext analysis, that “[e]mployees who have committed multiple policy
violations are not similarly situated to employees who committed only one such violation.”); Silvera
v. Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff and
proposed comparator, who were both arrested for similar offenses, were not similarly situated where
the plaintiff had three additional arrests); Maniccia, 171 F.3d at 1369 (finding that a female plaintiff
was not similarly situated to male comparators where each of the male comparators was involved
in a “single incident of misconduct or alleged misconduct,” and the plaintiff “committed at least four
policy violations”); Jones, 137 F.3d at 1313 (noting that “Plaintiff’s multiple instances of
misconduct on the same day may simply have been the ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’”).
Even assuming, however, that Ms. Jeudy can establish a prima facie case, her race and sex
discrimination claims must fail because she cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext.
As noted above, Defendant asserts two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Ms. Jeudy’s
termination—the May 11, 2007 cell phone incident and the May 14, 2007 breach of security. See
Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (D.E. # 41-1) at 16–17. Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy must
present enough evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether each of Defendant’s proffered
reasons is pretext for discrimination. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024–25 (11th
Cir. 2000) (“If the plaintiff does not proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether each of the defendant employer’s articulated reasons is pretextual, the
13
employer is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim.” (citing Combs v. Plantation
Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1529 (11th Cir. 1997))).
To establish pretext, Ms. Jeudy must demonstrate that Defendant’s proferred reasons were
not the true reasons for her termination. See Ekokotu v. Boyle, 294 F. App’x 523, 526 (11th Cir.
2008) (quoting Jackson v. State of Ala. Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005)). She
may do so “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.” Id. (quoting Jackson, 405 F.3d at 1289). At the summary judgment stage, “the district
court must evaluate whether the plaintiff has demonstrated such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for
its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Id. (quoting Jackson,
405 F.3d at 1289); see also Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538.
While the warden ultimately effectuated Ms. Jeudy’s termination, he did so based on reports
provided by Ms. Jeudy’s supervisors. See Reply Mem. in Further Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ.
J. (D.E. #55) at 3 (“Defendant concedes that Loren A. Grayer—then prison Warden—relied on two
separate memoranda detailing Plaintiff’s admitted violations of security protocols when terminating
Plaintiff during her probationary period.”). Specifically, Captain Felz reported the May 11, 2007
charge of misconduct regarding Ms. Jeudy’s cell phone, and Lieutenant Burden documented the
breach of security on May 14, 2007. See May 14, 2007 Felz Mem (A4); May 14, 2007 Burden Mem.
(A5); May 14, 2007 Performance Log (A53). Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy attempts to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to pretext by demonstrating that her supervisors’ reports, which supplied the
two reasons for her termination, are unworthy of credence.
Ms. Jeudy attempts to discredit Captain Felz’s report of the May 11, 2007 charge of
misconduct in two ways. First, though admitting that she knew she should not have had her cell
phone while she was in the building, Ms. Jeudy testified that everybody brought his or her cell phone
into training, including Captain Felz. See Jeudy Dep. at 47:12–48:22 (A69). Second, Ms Jeudy
contends that, shortly before she was terminated, Captain Felz stated to Charles Laugh: “Can you
believe that girl got pregnant during her probationary period? See Aff. of Charles Laugh (D.E. #531) at 1; Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (D.E. #53) at 1–2, 6, 9.
14
Arguably, the fact that Captain Felz punished Ms. Jeudy for her cell phone violation but did
not similarly punish others for the same violation,13 combined with his comments about Ms. Jeudy’s
pregnancy, potentially raises an issue as to whether Captain Felz reported Ms. Jeudy because she
actually violated policy or because of some underlying discriminatory motive. This, in turn, calls
into question one of the reasons proffered by the warden as grounds for Ms. Jeudy’s termination.
As noted above, however, Ms. Jeudy must present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to each of Defendant’s articulated reasons for the employment decision
in order to survive summary judgment. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024–25; see also Combs, 106
F.3d at 1543 (holding that, because the plaintiff failed to rebut one of the three reasons articulated
by the defendant, the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law). Thus, even assuming
that Ms. Jeudy has in fact produced sufficient evidence to create a jury question as to whether the
May 11, 2007 cell phone incident was a legitimate reason for her termination or pretext, she must
also refute Defendant’s second legitimate reason for her termination—failing to properly secure her
unit during the 4:00 p.m. count on May 14, 2007.
Ms. Jeudy simply fails to present evidence sufficient to raise a factual issue as to whether this
proffered reason is pretext for discrimination. She presents no evidence to indicate that Lieutenant
Burden’s report is unworthy of credence or to call into question the underlying violation she is
accused of committing. While Ms. Jeudy testified that Officer Mendez, a white male officer who
assisted her with the 4:00 p.m. count, also should have been disciplined, Ms. Jeudy acknowledged
that “each officer is responsible for his or her own unit.” See Jeudy Dep. at 62:5–63:21 (A72). It
is undisputed that the unit for which Ms. Jeudy was responsible was the unit that was not properly
secured. See May 14, 2007 Burden Mem. (A5) (“Officer Juedy was the officer assigned to the
unit.”). Accordingly, Officer Mendez is not a valid comparator for purposes of showing pretext.
13
Identifying a similarly situated comparator is an integral part of establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination, which, as discussed above, Ms. Jeudy cannot do. Assuming, however, that
Ms. Jeudy can establish a prima facie case, the Court can also consider comparator evidence in its
examination of pretext. See Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1276–77; see also Ekokotu
v. Fed. Express Corp., 408 F. App’x 331, 338 (11th Cir. 2011). Here, Ms. Jeudy attempts to
establish a valid comparator by testifying that, during training, “everybody had their cell phones.”
Jeudy Dep. at 48:18–19 (A69). It is important to note, however, that she does not identify any
particular individual who had a cell phone at training—and, more specifically, one whose cell phone
actually rang during training—but was not similarly reprimanded. Furthermore, she does not specify
whether the employees who attended the training with their cell phones were outside of her protected
class or whether any were in their probationary period. She merely contends that “everybody” at
training had a cell phone. Id. Thus, Ms. Jeudy has not actually identified valid comparators.
15
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, Ms. Jeudy does not contend that her unit was,
in fact, fully and properly secured. Rather, she admits that one of the doors in her unit was not
secured, but argues that, because this door was to a cell for inmates with disabilities and no one was
in the cell at that time, it did not matter that she failed to properly secure it. See Jeudy Dep. at
60:4–61:1 (A71-72) (“Q: There were no prisoners in that cell, so there was no real worry that it
wasn’t closed? A: The inmates are held in a single cell, meaning, that room, it’s a single cell. There
are no inmates in there. Mind you, I have to lock up at least 100 different cells, and I have ten
minutes to do so. At the same time, I was throwing up and sick. So I closed the cells that the
inmates were in. If a cell doesn’t have an inmate in it, why close it?”).
A plaintiff however, “is not allowed to recast an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory
reasons or substitute his business judgment for that of the employer.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030;
see also Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Federal courts do
not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Provided that the proffered reason is one that might motivate a
reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and the employee
cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030.
A correctional officer’s failure to properly secure his or her unit in a federal detention center is
certainly a reason that might motivate those in charge of the facility to terminate or otherwise
discipline the offending officer—irrespective of whether the cell left open actually houses inmates
at that particular time. Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact
with respect to each of Defendant’s proffered reasons for her termination, and summary judgment
is therefore warranted.14
14
While not directly relevant to the analysis of Ms. Juedy’s race or sex discrimination claims
discussed above, it is also notable that, throughout her deposition, Ms. Jeudy contends that she was
actually terminated because she fell at work and because Defendant did not want to compensate her
while she was out on leave. See Jeudy Dep. at 48:23–49:2 (A69–70) (“Q. Do you think you were
fired for the simple mistake? A. I think I was fired because of the slip-and-fall injury, the fact that
they had to pay me 75 percent of my pay while I’m on Workers’ Comp. That’s why I was
terminated.”). If Ms. Jeudy truly believes that she was terminated because Defendant did not want
to pay her while she was on leave, it casts additional doubt on the contention that Ms. Jeudy was in
fact terminated for the discriminatory reasons alleged in this action.
16
C.
Retaliation
Finally, Ms. Jeudy contends that Defendant retaliated against her for complaining about
sexual harassment by Lieutenant Burden. This claim differs from her claims of race and sex
discrimination in that Ms. Jeudy does not allege that the denial of her requested accommodation and
subsequent termination were in and of themselves discriminatory actions, but rather that such actions
amounted to discrimination because they were taken in response to Ms. Jeudy’s decision to report
sexual harassment. See Third Am. Compl. (D.E. #35) at 11. Ms. Jeudy’s retaliation claim, however,
fails for the same reasons as the claims of race and sex discrimination claims discussed above.
The Court analyzes Ms. Jeudy’s retaliation claim under the same burden-shifting framework
applied to Title VII’s substantive provision. See Harrison v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 378 F. App’x
950, 954 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that “Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims may be proven
using circumstantial evidence and applying the burden shifting framework established in McDonnell
Douglas Corporation v. Green”). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Ms. Jeudy must
show (1) that she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) that there was some causal relationship between the two events.
Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Holifield v. Reno,
115 F.3d 1555, 1566 (11th Cir. 1997) (providing elements of a prima facie case of retaliation).
Ms. Jeudy’s contention that the denial of her requests for an accommodation amounts to an
adverse action fares no better in the retaliation context. In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), the Supreme Court broadened the type of conduct considered
actionable in Title VII retaliation claims. See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 973 (11th Cir.
2008) (“Under the holding in Burlington, the type of employer conduct considered actionable has
been broadened from that which adversely affects the plaintiff’s conditions of employment or
employment status to that which has a materially adverse effect on the plaintiff . . . .”).15 Now, to
establish the adverse employment action element of a prima facie case of retaliation, “a plaintiff must
show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which
in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15
The standard announced in Burlington does not impact the adverse action standard
applicable to claims of discrimination under Title VII’s substantive provision. See Crawford, 529
F.3d at 974 n.14 (“It should be noted, however, that while the new standard enunciated in Burlington
applies to Title VII retaliation claims, it has no application to substantive Title VII discrimination
claims; the prior standard remains applicable to such claims.”).
17
Even under this standard, however, the denial of Ms. Juedy’s requests does not constitute a
materially adverse employment action. As noted above, it is simply not reasonable for an employee
to find the denial of an accommodation materially adverse where he or she is not disabled or
“regarded as” disabled, where the employee has not provided sufficient documentation of any
disability to his or her employer, and where he or she is therefore not entitled to any accommodation
by law. See Swain, 146 F.3d at 858; see also Seldon v. Total Sys. Servs. Inc., 653 F. Supp. 2d 1349,
1378–79 (holding, on a retaliation claim, that “under the particular circumstances presented by this
case—where Plaintiff has not demonstrated her entitlement to an accommodation, has not
communicated to her employer the specific facts regarding her specific need of an accommodation,
and where no change in job duties or hours was made—no reasonable person could conclude that
[the supervisor’s] failure to adjust Plaintiff’s schedule to accommodate her unspecified ‘health
problems’ was materially adverse.”); Ragin v. E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 05 Civ. 6496(PGG),
2010 WL 1326779, at *20 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 31, 2010) (discussing Seldon and concluding, in the
context of a retaliation claim, that “the alleged failure to quickly accommodate Plaintiff’s condition
does not constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII, because Plaintiff’s condition did
not qualify her as disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act”). Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy’s
termination is the only employment action sufficient to establish the adverse action prong of her
prima facie case.
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that Ms. Jeudy can meet the other two elements of her
prima facie case,16 her retaliation claim must fail because she cannot establish a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the reasons provided for her termination are pretextual. As discussed
above, even if Ms. Jeudy can raise a question of fact regarding whether the introduction of her cell
phone into the facility was a legitimate reason for her termination, she has failed to present any
evidence that the Defendant’s second legitimate reason for her termination, her failure to properly
secure her unit on May 14, 2007, is pretext for prohibited retaliatory conduct. As noted above, Ms.
Jeudy admits that she did not fully secure her unit. See Jeudy Dep. at 60:4–61:1 (A71–72). She
simply contends that the way in which she violated protocol—failing to secure a door to a vacant
cell—cannot create a basis for her termination. It is not enough, however, for Ms. Jeudy to simply
16
Defendant contends that Ms. Jeudy cannot establish a causal relationship between her
verbal complaint of sexual harassment and her termination. See Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J. (D.E. #41-1) at 14–16. He does not contest that Ms. Jeudy engaged in a protected activity
by reporting the alleged sexual harassment.
18
disagree with the wisdom behind Defendant’s business decisions, and it is not appropriate for this
Court to reexamine such decisions. See Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470; Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030.
Because Ms. Jeudy has not produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that both
reasons provided by Defendant in support of Ms. Jeudy’s termination are pretextual, summary
judgment is appropriate. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1037; Combs, 106 F.3d at 1539–43.
III.
CONCLUSION
As discussed above, Ms. Jeudy has failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether she suffered from a disability under the Rehabilitation Act.
Similarly, even assuming that Ms. Jeudy can establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on
race, sex, and retaliation under Title VII, she has failed to adduce enough evidence to create a factual
question as to whether both of the stated reasons for her termination were pretextual. Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in full. The Court will issue a separate
order entering final judgment in favor of Defendant and closing this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Miami, Florida, November 7, 2011.
________________________
Paul C. Huck
United States District Judge
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of record
19
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