Kardonick v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. et al

Filing 453

MEMORANDUM in Support re 452 Cross MOTION to Strike 451 MOTION for Summary Judgment MOTION to Dismiss 451 MOTION for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Mr. Grant's Request for Summary Judgment by Chase Bank USA, N.A., JP Morgan Chase & Co.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Campbell, Dennis)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
Case No. 1:1O-cv-2323SIHOEVELER

DAVID KARDONICK., JOHN DAVTD, and
MICHAEL CLEMINS. individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated and the
general public,
Plaintiffs.
V.

JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. and CHASE
BANK USA, NA.

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR
CROSS-MOTION TO STRIKE OR DISMISS PLEADING By TREVOR GRANT AND
IN OPPOSITION TO MR. GRANT’S REQUEST FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Robert D. Wick
Andrew Soukup
COVINGTON & BURUNG LLP
Attorneys for Defendants
1201 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.
Washington. D.C. 20004
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]

Dennis M. Campbell
CAMPBELL LAW FIRM. PLLC
Attorney for Defendants
95 Merrick Way, Suite 514
Coral Gables. Florida 33134
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]

—1—

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pa2e
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
BACKGROUND

2

A.

Overview of the

B.

Mr. Grant’s Objection To the Kardonick Settlement

3

C.

Mr. Grant’s Appeal Is Dismissed, and lie Files A New Pleading

4

Kurdonick

Lawsuit

2

PROCEDURAL STANDARD

5

ARGUMENT

6

I.

ALTERNATIVELY, MR. GRANT’S PLEADING SHOULD BE DISMISSED
UNDER FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12

7

Mr. Grant Failed To Properly Serve Chase

7

B.
III.

6

A.

11.

MR. GRANT’S PLEADING SHOULD BE FILED IN A NEW ACTION AND
STRICKEN FROM THIS DOCKET

Mr. Grant’s Pleading Fails To State A Claim For Relief

9

TO THE EXTENT THIS COURT MAY CONSTRUE MR. GRANT’S
PLEADING AS A MOTiON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT SHOULD
DENY THE MOTION

CONCLUSION

11
12

11

Defendants JPMorgan Chase & Co. & Chase Bank USA, N.A. (together.
Chase’) submit this memorandum in support of its cross-motion to strike or dismiss (Dkt.
# 452) and in opposition to Mr. Grant’s request for summary judgment (Dkt, # 451).
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In September 2011. this Court granted final approval to a nationwide class action
settlement. One of the pro se objectors to that class-action settlement, Trevor Grant. appealed
this Courfs final approval order.

By May 10. 2012. the Eleventh Circuit had dismissed the

appeals filed by Mr. Grant and other objectors, and the case filed in this docket was closed by the
clerk of court.
Nevertheless, nearly three months after the Eleventh Circuit dismissed his appeal.
Mr. Grant filed a pro se pleading in this docket that he says is an attempt to “fil[e] a law suit”
against Chase. (Dkt. #451. at 1.) The only thing that is clear from Mr. Grant’s pleading is that it
has nothing to do with the products that were the subject of the nationwide class action
settlement.

Instead, it relates to a separate product that was not at issue in the underlying

litigation.
As explained below, this Court should either strike or dismiss Mr. Grant’s
pleading. Mr. Grant has attempted to assert new claims against Chase; to do so, he must file his
complaint under a new docket number. sign his pleading. and pay a filing fee (or obtain the
Court’s permission to proceed in Jorma pauperis). Mr. Grant has done none of these things. and
therefhre his pleading should he stricken.
dismissed.

Alternatively. Mr. Grants pleading should he

Mr. Grant never served Chase with a summons and a copy of his Complaint.

Moreover, his 20-page pleading does not contain a single plausible allegation of \\rongdoing
lLaIflst

C hasL and

it

does not

gi L

Ch e taii notice of v hat the

claim is and the Lrounds

upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic (‘otp. v. Twotnhlv. 550 U.S. 544. 555 (2007). For these
reasons. this Court should grant Chase’s cross-motion.
Although 4r. Grants pleading resembles a complaint, the docket entry
accompanying Mr. Grant’s pleading described his pleading as a “Motion for Summary
Judgment.” To the extent that this Court may decide to construe Mr. Grant’s pleading as a
motion for summary judgment. it should deny the motion. Mr. Grant has failed to explain why
he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a). Mr. Grant also failed to
demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Local R. 56.1(a).
BACKGROUND
A.

Overview of the Kardoi,ick Lawsuit
Beginning in September 2010. several class-action lawsuits were tiled against

Chase challenging the manner in which Chase marketed and administered “payment protection”
plans to Chase credit card holders. Payment protection plans

—

which federal regulations refer to

as debt cancellation contracts” and “debt suspension agreements,” see 12 C.F.R.

§ 37.1(a) are
—

optional features of a credit card account that permit cardholders to cancel or suspend their
obligation to repay credit card debts under certain circumstances.

Federal law authorizes

national banks like Chase to offer payment protection plans. See 12 C.F.R.

§ 37.1(a). The

lawsuits filed against Chase were consolidated into a single proceeding in this Court.
On December 21. 2010, the parties flied with the district court a settlement
areement that resolved all of the asserted claims on a nationwide class basis. (Dkt. # 16.) On
September 16. 2011, following a hearing, this Court entered an order finally approving the
settlement. (Dkt.

384.) This Court certified the following settlement class:

All Chase Cardholders who were enrolled or billed for a Payment
Protection Product at any time between September 1, 2004 and
November 11. 2010. Excluded from the class are all Chase
Cardholders whose Chase Credit Cards Accounts that were
enrolled or billed for a Payment Protection Product were
discharged in bankruptcy.

(Id.. 1 3.) The settlement agreement defines the term ‘Payment Protection Product” as follows:
[A]ll debt cancellation and suspension products currently or
previously offered by Chase (whether directly or indirectly through
a co-brand, private label, or other partner), including, but not
limited to. Chase Payment Protector. Chase Payment Advantage.
Account Protection Plan. Total Protection Plan, Account Security
Plan, Account Ease, and any Chase business card or private label
account debt suspension or cancellation product. by whatever
name any of the foregoing products are or were known. Payment
Protection Product” does not include a non-credit card product
offered by a Chase aftliate.
(Dkt # 16, Section 11(gg).)
A handful of individuals filed appeals challenging this Court’s final approval
order. All of those appeals were dismissed by May 10. 2012. (Dkt. #‘s 449. 450.) This action
was closed that same date, when the Eleventh Circuit issued its mandate. (Set’ Dkt. # 450.)
B.

Mr. Grant’s Objection To the Kardoiiick Settlement.
Trevor Grant. who is proceeding pro Se, was one of the individuals who objected

to and subsequently appealed this Court’s final approval order. However. Mr. Grant has never
been enrolled in or billed for a payment protection product.
thereinafter Fink Dccl.”) ¶
called LiiPlus. (Id.

¶44

3)I

(Declaration of Marc Fink

Instead. Mr. Grant was enrolled in a credit insurance product

6: sec also Dkt, #451. at 8.)

A true and correct copy of the Declaration of Marc Fink, which was filed in the Eleventh
Circuit on March 15. 2012. is attached hereto as Exhibit I

Individuals who enrolled in credit insurance products are not included in the class
definition and are not bound by the settlement or the Final Approval Order. Credit insurance
products entail purchasing from a third party insurer a right to receive financial benefits if
certain contingencies occur.

Payment protection products are not credit insurance products

because payment protection involves an agreement by the creditor itself
party
Ark.

—

-

rather than a third

to forgive or mitigate debt under certain circumstances. See e.g.. Firs!
Taylor,

i\ii

1 Bank f F.

907 F.2d 776. 780 (8th Cir. 1990). For this reason, credit insurance products are

distinct from payment protection products as a matter of law.’ Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Debt Cancellation Contracts and Debt Suspension Agreements. 67 Fed. Reg. 58,962,
58.964 (Sept. 19. 2002): see also Ta’lor. 907 F.2d at 779-80 (holding that payment protection
products “do not constitute the ‘business of insurance”).
C.

Mr. Grant’s Appeal Is Dismissed, and He Files A New Pleading.

Both class counsel and counsel for Chase spoke with Mr. Grant on multiple
occasions to explain to him that he was not a member of the class.

Mr. Grant refused to

voluntarily dismiss his appeal. Accordingly. Chase filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Grant’s appeal.
See No. 11-14538 (11th Cir. Mar. 15. 2012). On April 27. 2012, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed
Mr. Granfs appeal because he failed timely to file a brief or excerpts from the record. See No.
11-14538(11th Cir. Apr. 27. 2012).
Nearly three months after the Eleventh Circuit dismissed his appeal and the

Kardonick litigation definitively ended. Mr. Grant

—

again proceeding pro se

tiled a nev

pleading in this Court. (See Dkt. 4 451.) Mr. Grant’s pleading is hard to ftllow, but he purports
to tile a la\ suit against Chase. the American Bankers Life Assurance Company, and the
American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida. (hi. at 1.) Mr. Grant, who is not a registered
Fl I— uce did not eix t. this lLad1ng on C hase

Mr. Grant’s pleading does not clearly specify what Chase has done wrong. Mr.
Grant repeatedly refers to federal and state law, but he does not state what conduct Chase

engaged in that purportedly violated these laws. In addition, portions of Mr. Grant’s pleading
refer to pavrnent protection’ plans (Id. at 9-10. 12). but Mr. Grant was never enrolled in such a
plan (Fink Dccl.

¶1 3-6). Among other things, Mr. Grant asks this court to certify a class and to

award $5 million in damages. (Dkt. #451. at 2.)
Mr. Grant’s pleading is dated July 16, 2012, and it was received by the Clerk’s
office on July 20. 2012. In docketing Mr. Grant’s pleading on the Court’s ECF system. the
Clerk’s office designated Mr. Grant’s pleading as a “Motion for Summary Judgment.” (See Id.
(docket text)) However. Mr. Grant’s pleading does not contain a caption or otherwise indicate
the purpose of his pleading. and he expressly invites this court to enter judgment “without regard
to the standards for summary Judgment contained in RULE 56(c) OF THE federal RULES of
civil procedure.” (Id. at 13.)
PROCEDURAL STANDARD

‘[Ejven pro se litigants must meet certain minimal standards of pleading.” St.
John v. United Slates, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1323 (S.D. Fla. 1999).

Thus. courts are “not

required to abrogate the basic pleading essentials or conjure up unplead allegations simply
because the Plaintiff is proceeding

pro

se.” Id. “[Tihe leniency afforded pro ce litigants does

not give courts license to serve as de facto counsel or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading
in order to sustain an action.” Schu/er r. Ingram & Assocs.. 441 F. App’x 71 2. 716 n.3 (11th Cir.
2001), and “pro ce litigants are still required to conform to the procedural rules.” Dennis v.
ot\. .lIia,ni. 2008 WE 783737. at

*2

(S.D. Fla. Mar. 21. 2008).

(‘fly

ARGUMENT
I.

MR. GRANT’S PLEADING SHOULD BE FILED IN A NEW ACTION AND
STRICKEN FROM THIS DOCKET.
Mr. Grant’s pleading makes clear that he seeks to “fil[ej a law suit.” (Dkt. # 451.

at I.) Accordingly. he must file a complaint and a civil cover sheet under a new docket number.

See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 3: Local R. 3.3. Mr. Grant must also either pay a S350 filing fee to initiate
a new case or file a motion to proceed

in

/örma pauperis.

Mr. Grant has not done any of these things. Mr. Grant has not paid his filing fee.
nor has he filed a motion to proceed in ,förma pauperis. Instead, Mr. Grant seeks to avoid these
2
and other requirements by filing his claims in the Kardonick docket. Defendants are not aware
of any authority permitting an individual who was not a party to a previous lawsuit to avoid
filing fee requirements by filing a pleading in an unrelated docket. The appropriate course is to
strike Mr. Grant’s pleading and order him to comply with this Court’s rules for initiating a new
lawsuit. See, e.g., Dupree v. Palmer. 284 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2002) (parties must pay tiling fee
at time suit is initiated).
Mr. Grant’s pleading also should be stricken because he did not sign his pleading,
as required by Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11(a). Mr. Grant’s signature is necessary to certif\ that his
pleading “is not being presented for any improper purpose” and that his “claims, defenses, and
other legal contentions are warranted by existing law.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11(b). Rule 11 is clear
that a court “must strike an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected after being
called to the
2

.

.

.

party’s attention.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11(a): sec a/so DiProleno v. .41/en. 2009

It is not clear that Mr. Grant could demonstrate that he is entitled to avoid this Court’s
$350 civil case filing fee by filing a motion to proceed in/örmapauperis. Mr. Grant previously
paid. without objection. a $455 tiling fee to appeal this Courts final approval order to the
Eleventh Circuit. See No. 11-14538 (11th Cir. Oct. 3. 2011) (docket text indicating “fee paid”).

WL 1405447. at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May’ 18. 2009) (“the plain language of Rule 11(a) requires that
the Court strike the complaint, since Plaintiff did not promptly correct the error after it was
brought to his attention”).
Mr. Grant’s pleading also contains numerous other deficiencies that warrant

striking the pleading. For example, Mr. Grant seeks to certify this action as a class action. (Dkt.
# 451. at 2.) However, the pleading is not designated as a “class action.” and it does not contain
class action allegations, both of which are required by Local Rule 23.1. See Brueggemann v.
V(’OA Select, Inc.. 2009 WI. 1873651. at *8 (S.D. Fla. Jun. 30. 2009) (ordering parts to file new

complaint in compliance with Local Rule 23.1); Young

i

Bellsouth Telecomrns., Inc., 2001 WL

36260499. at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 25. 2001) (dismissing complaint that failed to comply with
Local Rule 23.1). Mr. Grant also failed to comply with the form for pleadings set forth in Local
Rule 5.1(a). AFHoldings, LLC v. Does 1-162, 2012 WL 488217, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2012)
(noting that requirements of Local Rule 5.1(a) ‘exist for a reason” and ordering party to comply
with rules).
For all these reasons, this Court should grant Chases motion to strike.
II.

ALTERNATIVELY, MR. GRANT’S PLEADING SHOULD BE DISMISSED
tINDER FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12.
Alternatively, this Court should dismiss Mr. Grant’s pleading because Mr. Grant

failed to comply with Rules 4 and 8 of the Federal Rules ot Civil Procedure.
A.

Mr. Grant Failed To Properly Serve Chase.

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(5) permits this Court to dismiss any claims for
insufficient service of process.”

Dismissal on those grounds is warranted here because no

summons has been issued and because Chase has not been properly served uith a complaint.

First, Mr. Grant has not served Chase with a summons. Rule 4 provides that ‘[a]
summons

...

must be issued for each defendant to be served.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 4(b). Here. Mr.

Grant has not served Chase with any summons, much less a summons that that is ‘signed by the
clerk” and “bear[sj the court’s seal.”

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 4(a)(1)(F). (G).

Nor is there any

indication that he presented a “properly completed” summons to the Clerk for a signature. Fed.
R. Civ. Pro. 4(b). When, as here. a party has not served with a summons. this Court should
dismiss any claims for relief.

See Martinez v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2012 WL

1162360. at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19. 2012) (granting motion to dismiss when defendant not served
with summons that was signed by the clerk).
Second. Mr. Grant has not served Chase with a copy of his pleading. Rule 4(c)( 1)
provides that [a] summons must be served with a copy of the complaint.” Mr. Grant has not
satisfied any of Rule 4(h)’s requirements to effect service upon corporate entities.

To the

contrary, the only notice Chase received of Mr. Grant’s claims came on July 23, 2012. when
Chase’s counsel received an ECF notification that Mr. Grant’s pleading had been filed. It is well
established that when. as here. a party has not waived service under Rule 4(d). a court should
grant a motion to dismiss for improper service even if that party has actual notice of the lawsuit.
3
See Vai 1 Dcv. Co. v. Triad Holding Corp.. 930 F.2d 253. 256 (2d Cir. 1991) (“actual notice” of
action does not cure insufficient service); Way v. Mueller Brass Co.. 840 F.2d 303. 306 (5th Cir.
1988

actual notice “is insufficient to satisfy Rule 4s requirements’).

If Mr. Grant contends that he has properly served Chase, he must submit an affidavit
providing proolof service .5cc Fed, R. Civ. Pro. 4(1).

B.

Mr. Grant’s Pleading Fails To State A Claim For Relief.

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 1 2(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint that fails to state
a claim for relief. This Court should do so here.
Rule 8 requires Mr. Grant to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). This means that Mr.

Grant’s

pleading must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true. to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its own face.” Ashcrofi v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In other words, “[tb
survive a motion to dismiss. a complaint must allege both a cognizable legal theory and
sufficient facts to support it.” Go/din v. Boce Group. L.C.. 773 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378 (S.I). Fla.
Mar. 29. 2011); see also Pvawah v. Bank of America. 2012 WL 2917852. at

*

I (M.D. Fla. July

17, 2012) (granting motion to dismiss complaint that “fails to set forth specific facts linking the
Defendant’s acts or omissions to the alleged violations”). These requirements are necessary to
give the defendant “fair notice of what the

...

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twoinbly, 550 U.S. 544. 555 (2007).
Rule 8’s pleading requirements have not been satisfied here. Although Mr. Grant
seeks $5 million in damages, nowhere in his pleading does he allege facts sufficient to show that
it is “plausible” that he is entitled to such relief from any entity, much less Chase. For example.
Mr. Grant references his credit insurance policy (Dkt. # 451. at 4-8, 15). but he does not allege
that he as denied insurance benefits he was entitled to receive. Similarly. Mr. Grant attaches

four credit card statements from January to April 2009 reflecting various charges to his account
(id.

at

1 7-20). but he does not identify what charges

if any

Chase improperly imposed on his

account.

Other
wrongful conduct.

portions

of

Mr. Granfs pleading do

l-or example. Mr.

Grant refirences a

not

put

Chase

on

notice

of

any

Texas Life. Accident. Health and

Hospital Service Insurance Guaranty Association, but the documentation he attaches to his
pleading suggests that that Association simply provides backup insurance protection if an
insurance company has been declared insolvent or ordered liquidated. (hf at 3.) Similarly. Mr.
Grant’s pleading also references claims involving ‘payment protection” plans (id. at 9-10, 12).
even though Mr. Grant was never enrolled in a payment protection plan (Fink Dccl.
¶ 3-6) and
even though any payment protection claims were released in the Kardonick settlement (Dkt.
#384.J 16).
Even if Mr. Grant’s pleading could somehow be construed to allege that Chase
committed any wrongdoing. any such allegations would appear to fall outside the statute of
limitations. Mr. Grant references the Truth and Lending Act (Dkt. # 451, at 10) and Delaware’s
breach-of-contract law (Id. at 11). But claims under both laws must be asserted within one year
and three years. respectively. See 15 U.S.C.
violations); 10 Del. Code
claims).

§ 1640(e) (one-year statute of limitations for TILA

§ 8106(a) (three-year statute of limitations for breach of contract

iVr. Grant does not allege that Chase engaged in wrongful conduct within the

limitations period. To the contrary, the most recent billing statement Mr. Grant attaches to his
pleading is dated May 4, 2009, but Mr. Grant filed his pleading on July 20, 2012. more than
three years later.
In short, based on Mr. Grant’s pleading. Chase lacks “fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomb’. 550 U.S. 544.
555 (2007), This Court should therefore dismiss Mr. Grant’s pleading for failure to state a claim.
See. e.g.. Si. .Iohn. 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1323 (courts are “not required to abrogate the basic pleading

essentials or conjure up unplead allegations simply because the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se).

III.

TO THE EXTENT THIS COURT MAY CONSTRUE MR. GRANT’S PLEADING
AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT SHOULD DENY THE
MOTION.
When docketing Mr. Grant’s pleading, the Clerk characterized Mr. Grant’s

pleading as a ‘Motion for Summary Judgment.” Mr. Grant himself is not clear if he is asking
this Court to enter summary judgment. Co,npare Dkt. # 451. at 11 (“I ASKING THE COURT
FOR A FULL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY COURT”). with id. at 13 (asking this Court to
grant Mr. Grant’s prayer for relief ‘without regarding to the standards for summary judgment
contained in RULE 56(c) OF THE federal Rules of Civil procedure”). If this Court construes
Mr. Grant’s motion as a motion for summary judgment, it should deny the motion.
Under Rule 56. a party is entitled to summary judgment only “if the mov ant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a). Mr. Grant’s pleading does not satisfy
either of these two requirements.

As an initial matter. Mr. Grant has not demonstrated that

‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Mr. Grant must cit[eJ to particular parts of
materials in the record” to “support his assertion” that “a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c)(1)(A). Indeed, Local Rule 56.1 requires him to submit a
“statement of material facts as to which it is contended that there does not exist a genuine issue
to he tried.” Local R. 56.1(a). Mr. Grant has done none of these things, and he attaches no
4
declaration or other proof of the hearsay assertions made in his pleading.

Under these

circumstances, courts deny motions for summarY judgment. See. e.g.. Ocean ‘s 11 Bar & Grill.

For the reasons explained in Part II.B above. Chase is unable to prepare a responsive
statement of material facts. This is especially true here because the materials Mr. Grant has
submitted with his pleading have not been “presented in a form that would be admissible in
evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c)(2).

Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Corp. RRG, 2012 WL 2675435. at *3 (S.D. FIa. Jul. 6. 2012) (denying
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment for failing to comply with Local Rule 56.1 because
Plaintiff has not met its burden to inform the court of the basis for its motion”). Ct (rii v.
1dvance Stores Co., Inc.. 842 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Ha. 2012) (‘Plaintiff has admitted (by
violating Local Rule 56.1(a)) that there is nothing in the record to substantiate [his] claims.”).
Finally, Mr. Grants pleading does not explain why he is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. It is not accompanied by a memorandum of law that cites supporting authorities.
as required by Local Rule 7.1(a).

For these reasons. to the extent this Court may decide to

construe Mr. Grant’s pleading as a motion for summary judgment, the motion should be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. Chase respectfully requests that the Court grant its
cross-motion by (1) striking Mr. Grant’s pleading and/or (2) dismissing Mr. Grant’s claims.
Chase also respectfully requests that the Court deny Mr. Grant’s request for summary judgment.

Dated: August 6. 2012

Respectfully submitted.

Robert D. Wick (admitted pro hue ‘ice)
Andrew Soukup (admitted pro hue vice)
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
Attorneys for Defendants
1201 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W.
Washington. D.C. 20004
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]

Dennis M. Campbell
CAMPBELL LAW FIRM, PLLC
Attorney for Defendants
95 Merrick Way, Suite 514
Coral Gables. Florida 33 134
Telephone: [phone]
Facsimile: [phone]

By:

Dennis M. Campbell
J)ennis M. Campbell
Florida Bar No. 271527
Email: dcampbel l,camphell lawfirrn .net
5/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

6th

day of August, 2012, 1 electronically filed

the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF.

I also certify that the

foregoing document is being served this day on all counsel of record or pro se parties identified
on the attached Service List in the manner specified, either via transmission of Notices of
Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those counsel or
parties who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing.

By:

—

s/ Dennis M. Campbell
Dennis M. Campbell

Service List

Aggie Vutaj
34 Merrill St.
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Betty Eskine
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5572 N. Nantucket
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(7hlorinea .Tamison
4953 Woodland Ferry Rd
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Christopher Jestak Beittenmiller
I 165 F. lenipieton PT
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Cindy Nunn
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4053 Dunhaven Rd.
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Clyde Cook
106 Smith Hill Loop
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Cynthia M. Bracken
17304 Northway Circle
Boca Raton, FL 33496-5909
David C. Disher
1064 Portway Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45255
Dennis Everette
11-15 Clinton Street
Apartment #6b
Newark.NJ07102
Diana K. Buck
4516 Linden Avenue
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Donald T. Murphy
41 LoughlinRd.
Lot 70
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Dorothy Brantley
7431 Castleview Ln
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Glenda L. Taylor
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Javier Cervantes
1 963 Keltic Lodge Dr.
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John Rice
6109 Ridgeview Avenue
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Kenneth D. \Vright
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Manijeh Sabi
420 Sand Creek Rd. Apt 609
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Margaret E. Wheeler
572 Herman Nerren Road
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Mary Watson
717 Barbados Dr.
Williamstown, NJ 08094
Melanie Foster
P0 Box 1093
Upland. CA 91785
Michael J. Flynn, Jr
12070 Tift Circle
I
4
jrianuo. UTi. ‘‘IO/
‘.o..O
Naomi I)ickson
P0 Box 166
Vian, OK 74962
Pamela \Vhiteside
4407 Eastridie Dr.
Rokford, IL 61107

Patsy M Loga
P0 Box 1313
Ponchatoula. LA 70454
Pavel Guller
1 775 West 6 Street
Brooklyn. NY 1 1223
Preston Eskine
527 Maple Ave
Harvey. LA 70058-4219

Raymond E. Johnson
726 Garrett A. Morgan Blvd
Landover, MD 20785
Richard Jamison
4953 Woodland Ferry Rd
Seaford, DE 19973
Robert Dickerson
87 Darling Street
Central Falls, Ri 02863
Robert G Champagne
8 Marie Anne Ct
Woonsocket. RI 02895-3922

Rosemarie Venkatram
3044 Third Ave
Apt 4D
Bronx. NY 10451
Saboree Gardhari 14115
18th Axenue Apt 1 D
Flushing. NY 11354
Shari \I Pace
539 6th Avenue Fl
IoX Island, WA 983 33-9740
Stanle. R \Ianske
(1454 tS Highway 136
Eecumseh, NE 68450-8009

Stephanie L Diers P0
Box 142
Glencoe. CA 95232
Steven Miller
16772 W 70th Ave
Arvada. CO 80007-7038
Susan Nil Borden
2194 Main St
Buffalo. NY 14214-2635
Thomas L. Cox Jr
4934 Tremont
Dallas, TX 75214
Trevor Grant
P0 Box 3278
Conroe. TX 77305
Victor Belanger
17 Newton St.
Belmont. MA 02478-3252
Victor F Capurso
3 7-40 76th Omar
2nd Floor, Rear Room
New York City, NY 11372
Walter Harwood
291 8 Arrowhead Dr. Augusta.
GA 30909-2004

\Villiam Koths
110 Hankins Hollow En.
Tennessee Rdg. TN 371 78