Disney Enterprises, Inc. et al v. Hotfile Corp. et al
Filing
232
RESPONSE in Opposition re 217 MOTION to Strike and Memorandum of Law of Defendants Hotfile Corporation and Anton Titov to Strike Plaintiffs' Putative "Rebuttal" Report of Dr. Richard Waterman Before the Close of Expert Discovery on January 17, 2012 and Motion f >PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' REBUTTAL REPORT OF DR. RICHARD WATERMAN< filed by Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., Disney Enterprises, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, Universal City Studios Productions LLLP, Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2)(Stetson, Karen)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 11-20427-WILLIAMS/TURNOFF
DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.,
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION,
UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS PRODUCTIONS LLLP,
COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., and
WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HOTFILE CORP., ANTON TITOV, and
DOES 1-10.
Defendants.
/
HOTFILE CORP.,
Counterclaimant,
v.
WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC.,
Counterdefendant.
/
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS’
REBUTTAL REPORT OF DR. RICHARD WATERMAN
Defendants have no basis to move to exclude the identified portions of the rebuttal report
of plaintiffs’ statistical expert Dr. Richard Waterman on the ground that it is not a proper
rebuttal. In his rebuttal report, Dr. Waterman directly responded to a report submitted by
defendants’ expert Prof. Boyle, who opined that the use of the Hotfile site for non-infringing
activities over Hotfile’s existence was “substantial,” both quantitatively and qualitatively. Dr.
Waterman explained in rebuttal that Prof. Boyle’s conclusion was undermined by the study Dr.
Waterman disclosed in his initial report, and he provided additional explanation about
conclusions bearing directly on the quantification of the extent of non-infringing versus
infringing uses of Hotfile over time. Thus, Dr. Waterman’s rebuttal report was a straightforward
rebuttal to the “subject matter” of Prof. Boyle’s report. It was also not “new” – it simply applied
the methodology discussed in Dr. Waterman’s deposition and addressed by defendants’ own
expert Dr. Daniel Levy in his rebuttal. Dr. Waterman’s rebuttal report is plainly permissible
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. In any event, defendants suffer no prejudice from Dr. Waterman’s
rebuttal opinions here: (i) defendants have already introduced a report by their expert, Dr. Levy,
on the same issues they claim are “new,” and Dr. Waterman is entitled to address Dr. Levy’s
criticism in his actual testimony with or without a rebuttal report; (ii) Dr. Waterman’s rebuttal
relies in part on newly developed evidence and he is not foreclosed from further consideration of
that evidence in his testimony; and (iii) defendants still have the opportunity to depose Dr.
Waterman on his rebuttal report, just as other rebuttal experts have been deposed by both sides in
this case. Defendants’ motion is meritless and should be denied.
BACKGROUND
Both sides have submitted initial reports, and now rebuttal reports, providing opinions on
the extent to which Hotfile is used for infringing activities. On Nov. 18, 2011, plaintiffs’
statistical expert Dr. Waterman submitted an initial report concluding, based on his analysis of
the Hotfile site, that “approximately 90.3% of all daily downloads of files on Hotfile were
downloads of infringing or highly likely infringing content.” Mot. Ex. A at 3 (emphasis added).1
Dr. Waterman’s conclusions were based on drawing a statistically representative sample from
the month prior to the litigation, January 2011. Dr. Waterman’s initial report did not purport to
limit his conclusions to a specific time period.
Also on Nov. 18, defendants’ expert Prof. James Boyle submitted a report analyzing the
extent of non-infringing uses of the Hotfile site over the lifetime of Hotfile. Prof. Boyle
1
Dr. Waterman’s study in this case is highly similar to studies that he and others have conducted
in other online infringement cases. These studies have been cited as powerful evidence by courts
in finding operators of online websites or services to be liable for infringement. See, e.g., MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 922-923 & 940-941 (2005);
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW (JCx), 2009 WL 6355911, at
*8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009); Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 13132 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 412
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). Moreover, as with the study here, each of these studies has been based on
analyzing a snapshot of content available or downloaded at a particular point in time.
2
concluded that “there was a high volume of usage of the Hotfile system for activities that were
either clearly non‐infringing or highly likely to be non‐infringing,” Mot. Ex. B at 1, that “[u]sing
the Hotfile system to share non‐infringing software files was also a popular usage of the system
in relative and absolute terms,” id., and that “non‐infringing content is frequently uploaded and
downloaded on Hotfile and those uses are substantial both in terms of raw numbers, and in terms
of the most common uses of the Hotfile system,” id. at 18 (emphasis added). Thus, Prof. Boyle,
in his initial report, purported to opine generally about the noninfringing uses of Hotfile. He
disclaimed using a statistical methodology – which is a weakness of his study – but there is no
doubt that Prof. Boyle purported to speak broadly about the claimed noninfringing uses of
Hotfile.
At Dr. Waterman’s deposition on November 29, defendants pressed on the question of
whether Dr. Waterman reached conclusions about infringement on Hotfile for the month from
which the sample was taken or for a broader period. Dr. Waterman testified that the study
clearly applied to January 2011, and that he believed that if there were no “watershed events” in
the site’s history prior to January 2011 and “there was stability in the nature of the site, then I
would feel quite comfortable that the results that I had for January told me something about what
was going on prior to that month . . . .” Mot. Ex. C (Waterman Tr.) at 104:24 – 106:2. The
week after his deposition, from December 5 to 8, plaintiffs deposed Hotfile’s principal witness
Anton Titov over four days of depositions. In his deposition, Mr. Titov testified about the
history of Hotfile’s operations and the meaning of key data that defendants had produced.2
On January 6, 2012, plaintiffs served Dr. Waterman’s rebuttal report, as well as rebuttal
reports of Dr. Ian Foster and Mr. Scott Zebrak, which challenged Prof. Boyle’s conclusion that
the non-infringing uses of Hotfile were substantial. Dr. Waterman explained that Prof. Boyle
provided no evidence that the identified non-infringing uses of Hotfile were substantial from a
“quantitative perspective.” Mot. Ex. D at 2. Dr. Waterman then explained how the statistical
conclusions he drew about January 2011 could in fact be extrapolated to other time periods based
on the available data. Id. at 3-4. Also on January 6, defendants submitted two rebuttal reports.
One, from Dr. Daniel Levy, addressed the issue of whether the conclusions from the January
2011 statistical sample provided any information about time periods other than January 2011.
2
The plaintiffs had previously deposed Mr. Titov only for a few hours on a limited set of ESI
issues. Otherwise, these were the first depositions that plaintiffs took in the case.
3
Mot. Ex. H at 4-5, 8-12. The other, from Prof. Boyle, identified and attempted to quantify noninfringing uses of Hotfile not discussed in his initial report, “temporary personal storage and
archival backup,” and criticized Dr. Waterman for failing to examine those uses. Rebuttal
Report of Professor James Boyle at 4, 8-10 (attached hereto as Exhibit 1).
Under the parties’ agreed schedule in this case, expert depositions have been conducted
after each round of reports, and four of the experts on each side (including Prof. Boyle) have
now been deposed twice. Thus, defendants have the opportunity to depose Dr. Waterman again,
but they have opted to postpone taking that deposition while this motion is pending.
LEGAL STANDARD
Parties may offer rebuttal evidence that is “intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence
on the same subject matter identified by another party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(a)(2) (emphasis
added). Courts have broadly construed the phrase “same subject matter,” and held that
construing it narrowly “would impose an additional restriction on parties that is not included in
the Rules.” TC Systems Inc. v. Town of Colonie, New York, 213 F. Supp. 2d 171, 180 (N.D.N.Y.
2002). Moreover, district courts have broad discretion in determining what is proper rebuttal
evidence that will be admitted. Johnson v. Petsmart, Inc., No. 6:06-cv-1716-Orl-31UAM, 2007
WL 3024029, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2007) (citing Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Canyon Television
and Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1991)). Exclusion of expert testimony
on procedural grounds is a “drastic remedy.” S.W. v. City of New York, No. CV 2009-1777
(ENV) (MDG), 2011 WL 3038776, at *3-*4 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2011) (quotation omitted).
ARGUMENT
I.
Dr. Waterman’s Opinions Were Properly Included in a Rebuttal Report.
Dr. Waterman’s rebuttal report plainly rebuts evidence on the “same subject matter” of
defendants’ report from their expert, Prof. Boyle: the extent of infringement versus noninfringement on Hotfile. Prof. Boyle offers opinions about whether the use of Hotfile for noninfringing activities constituted a “high volume,” were “a popular usage of the system in relative
and absolute terms,” and “were substantial both in terms of raw numbers, and in terms of the
most common uses of the Hotfile system.” Supra 2-3. In doing so, Prof. Boyle looked at the
popularity of certain files across Hotfile’s entire existence. See Mot. Ex. B at 2, 6, 10-12, 15, 17;
Boyle Dep. Tr. at 61:19 – 62:8 (attached hereto as Exhibit 2). At his deposition he repeatedly
made clear that he was attempting to show that the non-infringing uses he identified were
4
substantial for purposes of the Court evaluating Hotfile’s inducement liability and its “substantial
non-infringing uses defense.” E.g., Ex. 2 (Boyle Dep. Tr.) 40:10-19 (“I understood my
instructions to be to examine the use of the Hotfile system in order to offer to the court material
that might be useful in the court’s determination of whether or not Hotfile had substantial,
noninfringing uses as a service…and also to find out the kind of uses in terms of its distribution
of noninfringing content that might be relevant to a court's determination over several
inducement viability set forth in the Grokster case.”); id. at 39:20-23; 41:18-24; 55:8-56:11;
57:15 – 58:14; 61:19 – 62:8; 104:4 -22; 126:15-23; 165:4 – 166:6.
Dr. Waterman’s rebuttal properly criticizes Prof. Boyle for opining on whether the uses
of Hotfile were substantially non-infringing without using a statistical methodology. It also
rebuts Prof. Boyle’s conclusions by providing further support for Dr. Waterman’s conclusions
that January 2011 data are relevant to the period before January 2011. Mot. Ex. D at 2. The
subject matter is the same: the overall use of Hotfile for infringing versus non-infringing uses.
(Dr. Waterman focuses on the prevalence of infringing activity and Prof. Boyle on noninfringing activity, but these are flip sides of the same inquiry.) The fact that Dr. Waterman uses
a different methodology than Prof. Boyle does not mean that each is providing testimony on a
different “subject matter” – indeed, Dr. Waterman’s rebuttal report criticizes Prof. Boyle for not
using a statistical methodology to reach his conclusions. Id. at 2 (“from a quantitative
perspective, there is no basis for concluding that the downloads that Prof. Boyle identified are
‘substantial’ in terms of the predominant uses of the site”). The fact that Prof. Boyle did not use
statistical evidence does not mean that statistical evidence cannot be used to rebut him.
Courts are clear that rebuttal experts need not use the same methodology to discuss a
subject matter as the experts they rebut. See TC Systems, 213 F. Supp. 2d 171 at180 (permitting
expert rebuttal and rejecting argument that rebuttal experts must use the “same methodology” or
be in the same field of study as initial expert); Park West Radiology v. CareCore Nat. LLC, 675
F. Supp. 2d 314, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (refusing to strike rebuttal report where expert had
employed new methodology in order to rebut opposing expert). Further, there is nothing
impermissible about Dr. Waterman building upon his initial report in rebuttal. See Lalli v. U.S.
Life Ins. Co., No. 10-3591 (SRN/LIB), 2011 WL 2601795, at *2 (D. Minn. July 1, 2011)
(permitting rebuttal expert report where it “more fully explains both Plaintiff’s and [Defendant’s]
existing theories of what happened to [Plaintiff]” in order to rebut defendant’s expert and thus
5
was “not a new theory of the case”); S.W., 2011 WL 3038776, at *4 (elaboration on original
report in rebuttal in response to opposing experts is permissible). The only case cited by
defendants on this point, see Mot. at 11, n.6 (citing IBM Corp. v. Fasco Indus., Inc., No. 9320326, 1995 WL 115421, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 1995)), is inapposite, as the Court in that
case excluded rebuttal expert reports on entirely different topics (e.g., damages) than the
opposing party’s expert reports. That is not the case here.
While the fact that Dr. Waterman rebuts Prof. Boyle on the same subject matter is
sufficient to show that Dr. Waterman’s rebuttal testimony is permissible, defendants are
additionally mistaken that his opinion as to periods of time prior to January 2011 is “new.” See,
e.g., Mot. at 10, 12. Dr. Waterman’s initial report does not limit the time periods of Hotfile as to
which he is drawing conclusions about infringement levels. Mot. Ex. A at 3, 7-8. At his
deposition, defendants’ counsel questioned Dr. Waterman at length on this topic, and Dr.
Waterman repeatedly stated that his statistical conclusions about January 2011 could be
extrapolated to other months based on additional information. See supra 3; Mot. Ex. C
(Waterman Tr.) at 83:22 – 84:9 (“I would say to the extent that the world was similar before
January, for example, December, that . . . if I had no reason to believe that the world had
changed dramatically, . . . that there was no event of interest that would change behavior, then
that the results that I provided would give one a sense of what was likely happening prior to that
point.”); id. at 84:11 – 85:10 (“the extent to which a month of December of 2010 or November
2010 would be expected to be similar or, as I would say, I have no reason to believe that the
world changed in some dramatic fashion, there was no massive event of interest, then my sense
would be that this would give me good understanding of what was – what was likely to have
happened beforehand”); id. at 104:24 – 106:2.
In their motion, defendants cite passages from his deposition in which defendants’
counsel repeatedly asked Dr. Waterman, again and again, whether he was limiting his opinion to
January 2011. Mot. at 4-5. However, these isolated quotes lack context – Dr. Waterman had
already explained repeatedly in response to the same line of questioning, earlier in the
deposition, that his study sampled January 2011 but likely had broader applicability. See supra
3. Recognizing this point, defendants’ expert Dr. Levy submitted a report arguing that the
conclusions of Dr. Waterman’s study should be limited to January 2011. Mot. Ex. H at 12
(acknowledging that, “[w]hen comparing January 2011 to prior months, Dr. Waterman states that
6
he has ‘no reason to believe that the world changed (in) some dramatic fashion,” but disagreeing
with his conclusion); id. at 10, 12 (analyzing similar trending data also considered by Dr.
Waterman in his rebuttal report, but reaching a different conclusion). In short, the two experts
have a substantive disagreement on this issue. The fact that Dr. Waterman further explained his
reasoning based on additional data in an otherwise proper rebuttal report is not grounds for
striking it. See 103 Investors I, L.P. v. Square D Co., 372 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004)
(reversing district court’s exclusion of rebuttal report because it “did not espouse a new theory”
as further explanation of theory discussed in initial report is not “new”); Crowley v. Chait, 322 F.
Supp. 2d 530, 551 (D.N.J. 2004) (refusing to “automatically exclude anything an expert could
have included in his or her original report” from a rebuttal report because “[s]uch a rule would
lead to the inclusion of vast amounts of arguably irrelevant material in an expert’s report on the
off chance that failing to include any information in anticipation of a particular criticism would
forever bar the expert from later introducing the relevant material.”).3
II.
In Any Event, Defendants are Not Prejudiced By Any Discussion in Dr. Waterman’s
Rebuttal Report.
As explained above, the fact that Dr. Waterman’s report rebutted Prof. Boyle’s report on
the same subject matter is sufficient grounds to deny defendants’ motion. But, even accepting
defendants’ constrained theory of the “same subject matter” (and the Court should not), there
would be no grounds for striking the rebuttal report under Rule 37. Defendants are not
prejudiced by admission of Dr. Waterman’s testimony in his report.
First, defendants have already submitted a report from Dr. Levy on the same points that
they argue are “new” in Dr. Waterman’s rebuttal. Mot. Ex. H at 4-5, 8-12. Defendants will be
entitled to further dispute Dr. Waterman’s conclusions about periods outside of January 2011 at
trial. Moreover, Dr. Levy did not even submit an initial report – the first time he disclosed any
opinions was in a rebuttal report. Thus, neither Dr. Waterman nor plaintiffs have had any
opportunity to “rebut” Dr. Levy’s many unfounded opinions. In order to fairly address Dr.
3
Defendants also move to strike other portions of Dr. Waterman’s rebuttal report that they omit
for “brevity.” Mot. at 8. These include Dr. Waterman’s opinions as to downloads that may have
not been recorded in the data file that Dr. Waterman analyzed. Mot. Ex. D at ¶ 9. These
portions are permissible for the reasons discussed above and in the following section. Further,
Dr. Waterman’s discussion in those portions is based on subsequent deposition testimony that
postdates his initial report. See id.; Mot. at 14 n. 7 (citing one excerpt of relevant deposition
testimony).
7
Levy’s opinion on the merits, Dr. Waterman has to be able to address Dr. Levy’s criticisms at
trial, meaning that the issue of whether the January 2011 data provides information about overall
level of infringement in periods prior to January 2011 will be an issue on which both experts can
provide testimony at trial. It would be pointless to strike a rebuttal report providing an
explanation that, in any event, could be readily addressed at trial. See In re Prempro Products
Liability Litig., 514 F.3d 825, 831-32 (8th Cir. 2008) (expert may testify at trial in response to
testimony which expert has not previously been able to address); Fritz v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., Civ. A. No. 90-7530, 1992 WL 96285, at *3 (E.D. Pa. April 23, 1992) (same); Mead
Johnson & Co. v. Barr Labs, 38 F. Supp. 2d 289, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same).4
Second, Dr. Waterman’s rebuttal cites to new evidence about Hotfile’s operations that
was unavailable until after his initial report was submitted, and defendants cannot dispute that
Dr. Waterman was entitled to review and incorporate additional facts that had been developed
since the time of his first report. In their motion, defendants point to examples of disclosures
relevant to his rebuttal reports that were available prior to his initial report. Mot. at 13-14.
However, Dr. Waterman considered substantial additional evidence that was not available at the
time of his initial report. In particular, Dr. Waterman testified that he would need to look at the
evidence relevant to whether there had been “watershed” events in the history of Hotfile in
determining the applicability of January 2011 data to other periods. While plaintiffs had
piecemeal evidence about those events, the plaintiffs’ development of that evidence was only
preliminary until the four-day deposition of Mr. Titov in early December. Dr. Waterman
considered Mr. Titov’s testimony from those four days in assessing whether there had been
dramatic changes in Hotfile’s operations prior to January 2011. See Mot. Ex. D at 4, ¶ 6, Mot.
Ex. G (listing Mr. Titov’s deposition testimony as a basis for rebuttal opinion). Testimony
addressing facts that were unknown or unavailable at the time of an expert’s initial report may be
4
Likewise, defendants’ experts can address Dr. Waterman’s rebuttal points in order to defend
their opinions at trial. Defendants’ argument that their experts will have no opportunity to
address Dr. Waterman’s rebuttal points is unfounded. Further, defendants’ argument that they
were prejudiced by not being able to ask plaintiffs’ fact witnesses questions about the course of
Hotfile’s development, see Mot. at 15-16, is facially baseless. The plaintiffs are not in
possession of information about Hotfile’s development, and have been prevented by defendants’
“Highly Confidential” designations under the Protective Order from even seeing the data
considered by Dr. Waterman. Those depositions could not have uncovered any evidence
remotely related to the application of Dr. Waterman’s statistical analysis.
8
properly included in a rebuttal report. See S.W., 2011 WL 3038776, at *4 (experts may include
rebuttal testimony discussing items “that had not been produced at the time they served their
initial reports” because “this constitutes information that was previously unknown or unavailable
to them”); Akers v. United States, Civ. No. 01-1348-HU, 2003 WL 25694925, at *3 (D. Or. May
20, 2003) (expert may include rebuttal testimony “based on receipt of additional discovery
materials” where “[d]iscovery was ongoing when he made his initial report”).
Third, just as plaintiffs had the opportunity to do with Prof. Boyle’s rebuttal report,
defendants have the opportunity to depose Prof. Waterman on any matters set forth in his rebuttal
report. In this case, the parties have agreed to conduct depositions after each round of reports,
and each of the four other experts who presented both opening and rebuttal reports have been redeposed. The opportunity to further depose Dr. Waterman here cures any potential prejudice to
defendants. See S.W., 2011 WL 3038776, at *4 (no prejudice to including newly developed facts
in rebuttal report where opposing party could depose expert on rebuttal report); Park West
Radiology, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 326 (same). In fact, striking Dr. Waterman’s rebuttal report when
defendants have the opportunity to submit both initial and rebuttal reports on the extent of
infringing uses of Hotfile would treat the parties differently and prejudice the plaintiffs. For all
of defendants’ criticisms of Dr. Waterman, Prof. Boyle disclaimed studying a key alleged noninfringing use of Hotfile – “personal storage” – in his opening report, and provided opinions
about that use of Hotfile only in his rebuttal report. In Prof. Boyle’s deposition taken after his
initial report, defendants in fact instructed Prof. Boyle not to answer questions about use of
personal storage on Hotfile, claiming it was work product related to the rebuttal report. Ex. 2
(Boyle Dep. Tr.) at 48:10-15; 178:12-22; 198:24 – 199:2. As anticipated at that deposition, Prof.
Boyle’s rebuttal report in fact includes the opinion that personal storage is yet another substantial
non-infringing use of Hotfile, and plaintiffs recently deposed him on that very topic. Likewise,
the defendants will have the opportunity to depose Dr. Waterman on his rebuttal report.
CONCLUSION
The Defendants’ Motion to Strike should be denied.
Dated: January 23, 2012
Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Karen L. Stetson
Karen L. Stetson
GRAY-ROBINSON, P.A.
9
1221 Brickell Avenue
16th Floor
Miami, Fl 33131
Telephone: (305) 461-6880
Facsimile: (305) 461-6887
MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA, INC.
Karen R. Thorland (Pro Hac Vice)
15301 Ventura Blvd.
Building E
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Phone: (818) 995-6600
Fax: (818) 285-4403
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
Steven B. Fabrizio (Pro Hac Vice)
Duane C. Pozza (Pro Hac Vice)
Luke C. Platzer (Pro Hac Vice)
1099 New York Ave., N.W.
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
Telephone: (202) 639-6000
Facsimile: (202) 639-6066
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 11-20427-WILLIAMS/TURNOFF
DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.,
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION,
UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS PRODUCTIONS LLLP,
COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., and
WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HOTFILE CORP., ANTON TITOV, and
DOES 1-10.
Defendants.
/
HOTFILE CORP.,
Counterclaimant,
v.
WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC.,
Counterdefendant.
/
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY on this 23rd day of January, 2012, I served the following document on all
counsel of record on the attached service list via the Court’s CM/ECF filing system:
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Rebuttal Report of Dr.
Richard Waterman
I further certify that I am admitted to the United States Court for the Southern District of Florida
and certify that this Certificate of Service was executed on this date.
By: /s/ Karen L. Stetson
Karen L. Stetson
11
SERVICE LIST
Disney Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Hotfile Corp. et al.
CASE NO. 11-CIV-20427-WILLIAMS-TURNOFF
FARELLA BRAUN + MARTEL LLP
Anthony P. Schoenberg
tschoenberg@fbm.com
Roderick M. Thompson
rthompson@fbm.com
N. Andrew Leibnitz
aleibnitz@fbm.com
Deepak Gupta
dgupta@fbm.com
Janel Thamkul
jthamkul@fbm.com
235 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, CA 94104
Phone: 415-954-4400
RASCO KLOCK
Janet T. Munn
jmunn@rascoklock.com
283 Catalonia Ave., Suite 200
Coral Gables, FL 33134
Phone: 305-476-7101
Fax: 305-476-7102
Attorney for Defendants Hotfile Corp. and
Anton Titov
Attorneys for Defendants Hotfile Corp. and
Anton Titov
BOSTON LAW GROUP, PC
Valentin Gurvits
vgurvits@bostonlawgroup.com
825 Beacon Street, Suite 20
Newton Centre, MA 02459
Phone: 617-928-1804
Attorneys for Defendants Hotfile Corp. and
Anton Titov
12
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