Disney Enterprises, Inc. et al v. Hotfile Corp. et al

Filing 301

MOTION for Summary Judgment >WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION (PUBLIC REDACTED VERSION)< by Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.. Responses due by 3/15/2012 (Attachments: # 1 Affidavit Declaration of Scott A. Zebrak in Support of Warner's Motion for Summary Judgment (public redacted version), # 2 Exhibit A to Declaration of S. Zebrak, # 3 Exhibit B to Declaration of S. Zebrak, # 4 Affidavit Declaration of Dr. Ian Foster in Support of Warner's Motion for Summary Judgment (public redacted version), # 5 Exhibit A to Declaration of I. Foster, # 6 Affidavit Declaration of david Kaplan in Support of Warner's Motion for Summary Judgment (public redacted version), # 7 Affidavit Declaration of Kerry Hopkins in Support of Warner's Motion for Summary Judgment (public redacted version), # 8 Exhibit A to Declaration of K. Hopkins, # 9 Affidavit Declaration of Jennifer Yeh in Support of Warner's Motion for Summary Judgment (public redacted version), # 10 Exhibit A to Declaration of J. Yeh, # 11 Exhibit B to Declaration of J. Yeh, # 12 Exhibit C to Declaration of J. Yeh, # 13 Exhibit D to Declaration of J. Yeh, # 14 Exhibit E to Declaration of J. Yeh, # 15 Exhibit F to Declaration of J. Yeh, # 16 Exhibit G to Declaration of J. Yeh, # 17 Exhibit H to Declaration of J. Yeh, # 18 Exhibit I to Declaration of J. Yeh, # 19 Exhibit J to Declaration of J. Yeh, # 20 Exhibit K to Declaration of J. Yeh, # 21 Exhibit L to Declaration of J. yeh, # 22 Exhibit M to Declaraton of J. Yeh, # 23 Exhibit N to Declaration of J. Yeh, # 24 Exhibit O to Declaration of J. Yeh, # 25 Exhibit P to declaration of J. Yeh, # 26 Exhibit Q to Declaration of J. Yeh, # 27 Text of Proposed Order)(Stetson, Karen)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 11-20427-WILLIAMS/TURNOFF
DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.,
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION,
UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS PRODUCTIONS LLLP,
COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., and
WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HOTFILE CORP., ANTON TITOV, and
DOES 1-10.
Defendants.

/

HOTFILE CORP.,
Counterclaimant,
v.
WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC.,
Counterdefendant.

/

WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

PUBLIC REDACTED VERSION

Table Of Contents
Table of Authorities ........................................................................................................................ ii
Citation Legend .............................................................................................................................. iv
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1
Summary of Argument ....................................................................................................................1
Statement of Facts ............................................................................................................................3
A.

The Problem and Scale of Piracy on Hotfile and Other Download Hubs. ..............3

B.

Warner’s Antipiracy System. ...................................................................................4
1.

Warner Has Taken Great Care an Developing and Operating Its
System. .........................................................................................................4

2.

Warner Promptly Identifies and Addresses Opportunities to
Improve Its System. .....................................................................................6

C. Hotfile’s

Counterclaim.............................................................................................7

Argument .........................................................................................................................................7
I.

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. ..................................................................7

II.

HOTFILE CANNOT MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROVING WARNER MADE A
“KNOWING MISREPRESENTATION” IN ANY TAKEDOWN NOTICE. ....................8
A.
B.

III.

Hotfile Cannot Present Any Evidence of a “Knowing Misrepresentation.” ............9
Hotfile’s Constructive Knowledge Argument Flies in The Face of The
Statutory Standard and Has Already Been Rejected..............................................10

HOTFILE CANNOT MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROVING ANY OF THE
COUNTERCLAIM NOTICES CAUSED “INJURY” TO HOTFILE. .............................11
A.

“Injury” Is An Element of A Section 512(f) Claim. ..............................................11

B.

Hotfile Has Acknowledged That It Has No Evidence of Actual Injury. ...............11

C.

Hotfile’s Damages Expert Does Not Prove Injury; He Merely Assumes It. .........12

D.

By Hotfile’s Own Admission, The Counterclaim Files Did Not Cause
Injury. ....................................................................................................................14

Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................16
i

Table Of Authorities
CASES
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) ....................................................................8
Biosafe-One, Inc. v. Hawks, 524 F. Supp. 2d 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ................................................7
Cabell v. Zimmerman, 09 civ. 10134 (CM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25486 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 12, 2010)............................................................................................................................8
Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (D. Colo. 2005) ..............................9
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993)............................................................8
Floyd v. McNeil, Case No. 4:10cv289-RH/WCS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150619 (N.D.
Fla. Dec. 5, 2011).......................................................................................................................8
Garcia v. INS, 31 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1994) ....................................................................................9
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) ....................................................................14
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-3783 JF, 2010 WL 702466 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25,
2010) ..................................................................................................................................11, 12
Martinez v. Rabbit Tanaka Corp., Case No. 04-61504-CIV, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
97084 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2006) .................................................................................................14
Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America, Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) .......................8, 10
Suite v. INS, 594 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1979) ........................................................................................9
Third Educational Group, Inc. v. Phelps, 675 F. Supp. 2d 916 (E.D. Wis. 2009) ..........................8
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2008) ...................................9
United States v. Konstantakakos, 121 F. App’x 902 (2d Cir. 2005) ...............................................9
Warner Brothers Entertainment, Inc. v. Free-TV-Video-Online.info, CV 08-8484-JFW,
ECF No. 124 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2010).......................................................................................5
STATUTES
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) ................................................................................................................13
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) ...............................................................................................................14
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) ..........................................................................................................10
ii

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi) .........................................................................................................15
17 U.S.C. § 512(f) ..............................................................................................................1, 2, 8, 11
17 U.S.C. § 512(f)(1) .....................................................................................................................14
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3) ....................................................................................................................10
OTHER AUTHORITIES
3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (2011) ........................................9
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ..........................................................................................................................7

iii

CITATION LEGEND
For the purposes of Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment
and Statement of Uncontroverted Facts in support thereof, the following abbreviations shall be
used:
1.

“Counterclaim” shall refer to the Second Amended Answer, Affirmative

Defenses, and Counterclaim of Defendant Hotfile Corporation to Plaintiffs’ Complaint dated
October 27, 2011 (Dkt. # 161).
2.

“Foster Decl.” shall refer to the declaration of Dr. Ian Foster, Director of the

Computation Institute at Argonne National Laboratory and the University of Chicago, dated
February 10, 2012, filed herewith.
3.

“Hopkins Decl.” shall refer to the Declaration of Kerry Hopkins, the Senior

Director of Intellectual Property at Electronic Arts, Inc. (“EA”), dated February 9, 2012, filed
herewith.
4.

“Joint Motion” shall refer to the Joint Motion and Memorandum of Law of the

Parties for Voluntary Dismissal of Second and Third Counts of Hotfile’s First Amended
Counterclaim and for Amendment of First Count, dated September 22, 2011 (Dkt. # 151).
5.

“Kaplan Decl.” shall refer to the declaration of David Kaplan, the Senior Vice

President, Intellectual Property Counsel, Worldwide Antipiracy Operations of Plaintiff and
Counterdefendant Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., (“Warner”), dated February 8, 2012, filed
herewith.
6.

“Order Granting Joint Motion” shall refer to the Order on Joint Motion for

Voluntary Dismissal of Second and Third Counts of Hotfile’s First Amended Counterclaim and
for Amendment of First Count, and for Extending Time To Answer, dated October 5, 2011 (Dkt.
# 155).
7.

“SUF” shall refer to specific paragraph numbers of uncontroverted facts in

Warner’s Statement of Uncontroverted Facts.
8.

“Yeh Decl.” shall refer to the Declaration of Jennifer V. Yeh in Support of

Warner Bros. Entertainment’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dated February 9, 2012, filed
herewith.

iv

9.

“Yeh Ex. __,” shall refer to exhibits attached to the Yeh Declaration, and, if

appropriate, pinpoint citations to the page number(s), and paragraph or line numbers, internal to
the cited document.
10.

“Zebrak Decl.” shall refer to the declaration of Scott Zebrak, dated February 9,

2012, filed herewith.

v

Introduction
Defendant Hotfile Corp. (“Hotfile”) filed a counterclaim against plaintiff Warner Bros.
Entertainment Inc. (“Warner”) alleging that Warner sent copyright infringement notices to
Hotfile identifying files that Warner knew it did not own. In fact, of the innumerable takedown
notices Warner sent to Hotfile, covering roughly a million files, a tiny percentage contained
errors. However, Section 512(f) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), the statute
on which Hotfile bases its counterclaim, deliberately sets a high bar for claims against copyright
owners for mistakes in DMCA notices. Section 512(f) provides a cause of action only when a
copyright owner “knowingly materially misrepresents … that material or activity is infringing.”
17 U.S.C. § 512(f). The facts here are not in dispute. Hotfile cannot meet its burden of proving
Warner “knowingly misrepresented” anything in even a single takedown notice. Any mistakes
were just that – mistakes. Nor does Hotfile have any evidence that it was “injured” by those few
mistakes, which is an independent element of a Section 512(f) claim. Hotfile has now had its
opportunity to take discovery and can present no facts in support of its counterclaim. Hotfile’s
counterclaim should be dismissed and summary judgment entered for Warner.
Summary of Argument
Warner operates one of the most sophisticated systems in the world to identify instances
of online infringement of Warner’s copyrighted entertainment properties. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 3; see
generally id. ¶¶ 5-13. Using its system, Warner sends millions of notices a year to sites like
Hotfile that enable and foster copyright infringement on scales that are unimaginable. Kaplan
Decl. ¶ 4. Warner’s system is extraordinarily accurate and reliable. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 14. No
system, however is or can be completely error-free, especially when operating at the volume
necessitated by the massive infringement on Hotfile. Hotfile itself proves this. With teams of
lawyers manually reviewing just a few hundred files, Hotfile still made a number of errors in
presenting the counterclaim files, claiming that Warner wrongfully took down 19 files even
though those files are properly owned by Warner. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 22. Yet, it would be frivolous
to suggest, based on a handful of errors, that Hotfile “knowingly misrepresented” facts to the
Court. Whether computer or human, mistakes happen.
The fact is, Hotfile brought its counterclaim against Warner not to redress a genuinely
perceived wrong. Hotfile’s own damages expert concedes that, even accepting his flawed
damage “model,” Hotfile’s expert fees alone are a multiple of any amount Hotfile could hope to
1

recover on its counterclaim. Yeh Ex. A (Lynde dep.) at 282:9-25. Hotfile is pursuing its
counterclaim as a defensive tactic: so Hotfile can argue that there is some comparison between a
handful of mistakes by Warner and the massive infringement on Hotfile. But there is no
comparison. Plaintiffs’ copyright case is not about a handful of mistakes Hotfile made in
handling DMCA notices. Hotfile actively encourages copyright infringement and built its
business to profit from that infringement. Indeed, rather than terminating “repeat infringers” as
required under the DMCA, Hotfile pays its repeat infringers to upload infringing content.
Hotfile’s counterclaim against Warner is baseless. Section 512(f), by design, is intended
to address only the most deliberate and egregious of misrepresentations in DMCA notices. By
statute, Hotfile must demonstrate, as to each alleged notice, both that Warner made a “knowing
misrepresentation” and that Hotfile was “injured by such misrepresentation.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(f).
On facts not in dispute, Hotfile cannot do either.
, Hotfile has not and cannot come forward with any evidence that Warner ever sent a

First

DMCA notice with “actual subjective knowledge” (the governing standard) that the notice
contained an error. See infra at 9. Even Hotfile’s corporate representative, in deposition,
conceded that Hotfile could not contend that Warner sent any notice knowing that it contained an
error. Yeh Ex. B (Titov dep.) at 156:4-23.
Unable to adduce any evidence that Warner made a “knowing misrepresentation,” Hotfile
argues for a constructive knowledge theory that has been rejected repeatedly. According to
Hotfile, because Warner’s antipiracy system involves substantial automation, Warner “knew”
that its system would inevitably result in some errors, and any mistakes therefore are tantamount
to “knowing misrepresentations.” This argument flies in the face of the statutory standard and,
not surprisingly, finds no support in law. It is also factually untenable. Any system – regardless
of whether it is fully automated, fully manual, or some combination – will result in errors.
Hotfile concedes as much. Yeh Ex. B (Titov dep.) at 157:22-158:6 (no matter the system,
“mistakes happen”). Hotfile’s argument turns a “knowing misrepresentation” standard into a
strict liability standard.
Second

, “injury” is an element of a claim under Section 512(f), and Hotfile cannot

demonstrate that it has suffered any cognizable injury as a result of the takedown notices for the
counterclaim files. In fact, the counterclaim notices are truly de minimis in context of the
millions of infringement notices Hotfile has received. Hotfile admits that it has no evidence of
2

any injury in fact as a result of the counterclaim file takedown notices. See infra Part II. Hotfile
concedes that if a file is in fact copyright infringing, then Hotfile is not injured by removal of the
file, even if the notice was sent by the wrong copyright owner. See infra 14. Hotfile further
agrees that if a user had “three strikes” under Hotfile’s post-litigation repeat infringer policy
without counting the counterclaim notices – i.e., if the user was subject to three copyright
infringement notices and should have been terminated anyway – then Warner bears no
responsibility for the termination of the user. See infra 15. Therein lies the dispositive flaw in
Hotfile’s “injury” theory. Virtually all of the counterclaim files are either blatantly copyright
infringing or were uploaded by Hotfile users who had three or more strikes without counting the
counterclaim notices. See infra 15. Since Hotfile has expressly disclaimed “injury” from
removing infringing files or terminating repeated copyright infringers, the relatively few
mistaken notices that are the subject of Hotfile’s counterclaim did not cause Hotfile any injury.
Statement of Facts
A. The Problem and Scale of Piracy on Hotfile and Other Download Hubs.
The volume of copyright infringement occurring through the Hotfile website is
staggering. Every day, millions of files are downloaded from Hotfile, and more than 90% of
them are copyright infringing. Yeh Ex. C ¶¶ 5, 11.1 Every day, new infringing copies of
Warner’s motion pictures and television programs are uploaded to Hotfile. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 4.
The same is true for other “download hubs” like Hotfile that encourage infringement in similar
ways. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 4.
Trying to keep up with this volume of infringement is well beyond a full-time job. In
addition to retaining outside antipiracy vendors, Warner has

in-house employees

substantially or entirely devoted to addressing online infringement of Warner properties. Kaplan
Decl. ¶ 4. It is a never-ending effort, in part because sites like Hotfile encourage infringement 24
hours a day, 365 days a year.

1

Yeh Ex. C is an expert report submitted by Dr. Richard Waterman in this case. Dr. Waterman
will be submitting a declaration in support of Plaintiffs’ upcoming motion for summary
judgment on the copyright claims to be filed on February 17, 2012.
3

B. Warner’s Antipiracy System.
Part of Warner’s effort to stop online infringement of its content involves sending
takedown notices to sites like Hotfile. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 4. Because Hotfile does not have a search
feature on its website, but rather pays third party websites to host “links” to content stored on
Hotfile, sending notices to Hotfile involves searching websites across the Internet to identify
Warner content. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 3. A virtual cottage industry of pirate “link sites” has developed
to host and promote “links” to infringing content on download hubs like Hotfile. Kaplan Decl.
¶ 3. Warner searches these link sites for links to Warner content and sends notices to Hotfile and
similar sites based on those links. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 3.
Given the extraordinary volume, Warner, as do many professional antipiracy vendors,
deploys automated systems wherever reasonable to identify infringing copies of its content and
send takedown notices. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 5. Although Hotfile tries to make much of the automated
nature of Warner’s system, such systems are common. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 5. Likewise, in the
normal course, Warner identifies links to infringing content on Hotfile without downloading the
files. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 17. Again, contrary to Hotfile’s criticisms of this methodology, identifying
files without downloading the content is common practice, not just in the motion picture
industry, but across all content industries. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 17. As Hotfile has acknowledged, it
would be impossible to download each file for the thousands of notices Warner sends on a daily
basis. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 17; Counterclaim ¶ 21. Nor is it necessary. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 17.
1. Warner Has Taken Great Care in Developing and Operating its System.
Warner uses a system of

to help search link sites

for links to infringing copies of its content. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 7.
not arbitrarily search “the Internet” for links; to the contrary,
Warner is very selective about which sites are searched. Warner manually identifies specific link
sites that are notorious for hosting links to infringing content and little else. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 6.
Currently, Warner searches only about

of the most notorious link sites, even though the

universe of websites that contain links to infringing content on Hotfile and similar sites is far
larger. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 6. These

link sites are not legitimate websites by any

stretch. Indeed, several notorious pirate link sites have been shut down by federal law
enforcement; others have been found liable for copyright infringement in civil actions. E.g., Yeh
4

Ex. D (DOJ Press Release announcing seizures); Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v. Free-TVVideo-Online.info, CV 08-8484-JFW, ECF No. 124 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2010) (granting motion
for summary judgment). In other words, as a threshold, Warner begins by manually identifying
link sites that offer little but pirated content. For each link site to be searched, Warner

Kaplan Decl. ¶ 12. The net result of this process is a
complex search algorithm for each title that is designed to minimize the risk that unintended files
will be identified. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 13.
Many link sites enable searching by genre of content, such as movies, music, games,
software, etc. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 9. The sites are organized this way to make searching them more
reliable for users. Warner’s system also takes advantage of this additional information whenever
available. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 9.

5

Warner takes care to ensure, as much as possible, that its system only identifies and sends
notices on infringing Warner content. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 13. At several places in the process,
Warner makes decisions that result in

excluding (not sending notices on) infringing

Warner content so as to avoid potentially misidentifying content. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 13. The
cumulative effect of these decisions is a system that, by design, favors excluding files rather than
potentially misidentifying files. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 13.3
2. Warner Promptly Identifies and Addresses Opportunities to Improve its System.
Warner actively seeks to improve the quality of its system. Kaplan Decl. ¶¶ 15-16.
Warner regularly reviews reports of takedowns and investigates anything that looks out of the
ordinary. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 16. Warner also has processes in place – and has improved those
2

For a movie, there are typically many links on a post page. This is for two reasons. First, a
single movie is often divided up into many pieces before being uploaded to a site like Hotfile,
and each piece has its own link. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 10. Users need to download all the links to get
the whole movie. Second, a post page typically will contain links to the movie hosted on
multiple different download hub websites, and each download hub website will have its own set
of links. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 10.

3

In addition to its own internal system, Warner also works with professional antipiracy vendors
who send notices on its behalf. Kaplan Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6. Indeed, some of the takedowns
complained of by Hotfile in its counterclaim were not even generated by Warner’s internal
system at all. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 20.
6

processes over time – to spot check results and affirmatively look for errors. Kaplan Decl. ¶¶ 1516. Without fail, when Warner has learned of an error – through one of these processes or
otherwise – Warner not only has taken steps to fix the problem, but also has sought to learn from
the error to improve the overall reliability of the system. Kaplan Decl. ¶¶ 15-16. Where Warner
has not been able to immediately identify or fix a problem, it has stopped searching for a title or
has

. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 15. In fact, when Warner learned of Hotfile’s

counterclaim, it took its entire system offline and double-checked
brought the system back online

it

and only after satisfying itself that the system

was reliably identifying Warner content. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 16.
C. Hotfile’s Counterclaim.
Hotfile actively began planning for a counterclaim “almost immediately upon being
sued” by plaintiffs. Yeh Ex. B (Titov dep.) at 159:6-10.
Yeh Ex. B (Titov dep.) at 165:13-18.
Yeh Ex. B (Titov dep.) at 162:5-163:2, 165:13-18,
& Yeh Ex. E. This process culminated in Hotfile filing a counterclaim on August 22, 2011, and
a first amended counterclaim on September 12, 2011. Neither of those, however, identified the
specific notices that Hotfile claims contain “knowing misrepresentations.” That was a fatal
defect under Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires claims of fraud and
misrepresentation to be plead with particularity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). As a result, Warner
and Hotfile stipulated that Hotfile would file a second amended counterclaim, after Hotfile took
even more time to identify any and all Warner notices that Hotfile contends violate Section
512(f). Pursuant to that stipulation, which was entered by the Court on October 4, 2011, the files
identified in Exhibits A-D of Hotfile’s second amended counterclaim constitute the “definitive
list” of files that make up Hotfile’s counterclaim. Joint Motion; Order Granting Joint Motion;
see also Counterclaim ¶ 40.
Argument
I.

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Hotfile bears the burden of proving every element of its counterclaim. E.g., Biosafe-One,

Inc. v. Hawks, 524 F. Supp. 2d 452, 468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Accordingly, to be entitled to
summary judgment, Warner “simply may show[] – that is, point[] out to the district court – that
7

there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Fitzpatrick v. City of
Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted) (alterations in
original). Thereafter, Hotfile must “come forward with evidentiary material demonstrating a
genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Floyd v. McNeil, Case No. 4:10cv289-RH/WCS, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150619, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2011) (quotation marks omitted). In doing so,
Hotfile “must show more than the existence of a metaphysical doubt regarding the material
facts.” Id. “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)
(citations omitted).
II.

HOTFILE CANNOT MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROVING WARNER MADE A
“KNOWING MISREPRESENTATION” IN ANY TAKEDOWN NOTICE.
Section 512(f) of the DMCA creates a cause of action against anyone who, in a DMCA

notice, “knowingly materially misrepresents … that material or activity is infringing.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(f). This is a “subjective good faith standard” and imposes liability “only for knowing
misrepresentations” regarding infringement. Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391
F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004).
Courts have consistently held that liability attaches under 512(f) only upon a showing of
actual, subjective knowledge of a material misrepresentation in a takedown notice – that the
falsehood was intentional. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, Section 512(f) does not support
liability when “an unknowing mistake is made, even if the copyright owner acted unreasonably
in making the mistake. Rather, there must be a demonstration of some actual knowledge of
misrepresentation on the part of the copyright owner.” Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1005 (emphasis added)
(internal citation omitted). Any attempt to “[m]easure[] compliance with a lesser ‘objective
reasonableness’ standard would be inconsistent with Congress’s apparent intent that the statute
protect potential violators from subjectively improper actions by copyright owners.” Id.
Subsequent to Rossi, every court that has examined the standard for knowledge under
512(f) has followed the Rossi rationale to require actual, subjective knowledge. See, e.g., Cabell
v. Zimmerman, 09 civ. 10134 (CM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25486, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12,
2010) (“as a prerequisite to liability under section 512(f), a defendant must have actual
knowledge that it is making a misrepresentation of fact”); Third Educ. Grp., Inc. v. Phelps, 675
F. Supp. 2d 916, 927 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (requiring “a demonstration that the actor had some actual
8

knowledge of the misrepresentation” in the takedown notice); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto,
558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (512(f) liability attaches “only if the owner did not
possess a subjective good faith belief that its copyright was being infringed”); Dudnikov v. MGA
Entm’t, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1012 (D. Colo. 2005) (“as long as MGA acted in good faith
belief that infringement was occurring, there is no cause of action under § 512(f)”). See also 3
Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 12B.08[A] & n.8 (2011) (only
“mendacious individual[s]” may be held liable for damages pursuant to 512(f); “[i]nnocent
misrepresentations are not subject to those damages”).
This interpretation of Section 512(f) is supported by interpretations of comparable
“knowing misrepresentation” statutes across the federal landscape. For example, in Garcia v.
INS, the Seventh Circuit equated “knowledge of the falsity of a representation” with willful
misrepresentation, which requires “subjective intent.” 31 F.3d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 1994)
(quotation marks omitted); see also Suite v. INS, 594 F.2d 972, 973 (3d Cir. 1979) (interpreting
“willful” as requiring “voluntary and deliberate activity,” which the court equated with
“knowledge of the falsity of a representation”). And in United States v. Konstantakakos, the
Second Circuit recognized that “knowingly subscrib[ing] as true, any false statement with
respect to a material fact” has been interpreted to prohibit only “deliberate falsehoods.” 121 F.
App’x 902, 905-06 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (unpublished).
A.

Hotfile Cannot Present Any Evidence Of a “Knowing Misrepresentation.”

This much is not subject to dispute: After full discovery, Hotfile cannot point to a single
piece of evidence to show that Warner acted deliberately or with actual subjective knowledge
that any individual takedown notice contained a material error. SUF ¶ 1. Hotfile admits as
much. Asked at deposition whether Hotfile “believe[d] Warner took down material that it didn’t
own on purpose,” Hotfile’s own corporate representative, defendant Anton Titov, could only
answer: “I don’t know about the motives of Warner doing so.” SUF ¶ 1(a). When asked more
specifically whether Hotfile believed that “Warner saw a file, recognized that it wasn’t one of
their properties, but sent a notice through the special rights holder’s account, knowing that it
wasn't their property,” Mr. Titov, speaking as Hotfile’s corporate representative, responded: “I
don’t know.” SUF ¶ 1(a).
Hotfile cannot present any evidence because none exists. The uncontroverted testimony
from Warner’s head of antipiracy operations, David Kaplan, establishes that any errors in the
9

counterclaim notices were the result of unintentional mistakes, nothing more. SUF ¶ 1(b).
Warner has never sent a takedown notice without believing the notice to be accurate in all
material respects. Kaplan Decl. ¶¶ 14, 19. The absence of evidence as to any deliberate
misrepresentation by Warner is fatal to Hotfile’s counterclaim.
B.

Hotfile’s Constructive Knowledge Argument Flies in the Face
Of the Statutory Standard and Has Already Been Rejected.

From the start, Hotfile has known full-well that there is no evidence of any knowing
misrepresentation by Warner. Hotfile’s strategy throughout discovery was to attempt to put
Warner’s antipiracy system on trial. Hotfile complains that Warner’s system is too automated
and that Warner does not download and review the contents of each file before sending a notice.
But what Hotfile complains about are effectively industry norms – not just in the motion picture
industry, but in most copyright industries. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 17.4 More to the point, the nature of
Warner’s system is immaterial under Section 512(f). The only fact that is legally material is
whether Warner had actual subjective knowledge that a particular notice contained material
errors and deliberately sent the notice anyway. It is undisputed that no such fact exists. SUF ¶ 1.
Hotfile’s argument comes down to this: Warner understood that its system would result
in some errors and therefore every error constitutes a knowing misrepresentation. But that is an
argument for constructive knowledge and is incompatible with the Section 512(f) statutory
standard. E.g., Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1005 (rejecting a constructive knowledge standard); see supra
8-9. The undeniable fact is that any system of identifying infringing content is bound to produce
some errors, whether the system is fully automated, fully manual, or a hybrid, and regardless of
whether the system involves downloading every file. The DMCA incorporates this truism into
its standard for sending notices. A copyright owner need only have a “good faith belief” that a
noticed file is infringing. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (titled “Elements of Notification”). The
DMCA further provides for a “counter notification” process for users to challenge a takedown
notice if they believe it to have been sent in error. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3).5 As Hotfile
4

Hotfile’s criticisms are not even factually accurate – many of the takedown notices of which
Hotfile complains were located and generated by one of Warner’s vendors using human review.
Kaplan Decl. ¶ 20.

5

Not surprisingly, as of the filing of plaintiffs’ complaint, Warner had sent Hotfile hundreds of
thousands of takedown notices. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 14. Yet, in all that time, no Hotfile user ever
sent a counter notice claiming Warner had made a mistake. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 14.
10

acknowledges, “mistakes happen”; no matter what the system, “there will still likely be errors.”
Yeh Ex. B (Titov dep.) at 157:22-158:6.
Every copyright owner that sends DMCA notices in any meaningful volume “knows”
that some notices inevitably will contain errors. Hotfile’s theory would thus turn a “knowing
misrepresentation” standard into a strict liability standard. Hotfile’s brand of constructive
knowledge has been rejected repeatedly. Supra 8-9. It should be rejected here as well.
III.

HOTFILE CANNOT MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROVING ANY OF THE
COUNTERCLAIM NOTICES CAUSED “INJURY” TO HOTFILE.
Hotfile’s counterclaim should be dismissed for an independent reason: Hotfile cannot

meet its burden of proving “injury” as a result of any of the counterclaim notices.
A. “Injury” Is an Element Of a Section 512(f) Claim.
Even if Hotfile could prove a knowing misrepresentation – which it cannot – Section
512(f) allows a claim only if the service provider “is injured by such misrepresentation, as the
result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling
access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). Thus, “injury” is
an element of a Section 512(f) claim, and Hotfile bears the burden of proving injury caused by
the counterclaim notices. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-3783 JF, 2010 WL
702466, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2010) (plaintiff must “establish the damage element under
§ 512(f)”).
Clearly the DMCA contemplates that not every mistaken takedown notice will cause
injury; otherwise the express statutory requirement of proving injury would be superfluous. To
sustain a claim under Section 512(f), the injury caused by the mistaken notice must be actual and
economic, beyond the fees and costs associated with investigating and filing a 512(f) claim.
Lenz, 2010 WL 702466, at *10. Hotfile cannot meet its burden of proving injury.
B. Hotfile Has Acknowledged That it Has No Evidence of Actual Injury.
In a 17-page counterclaim filled with inflammatory and unsubstantiated factual
allegations, it is telling that the sum total of Hotfile’s claimed “injury” is limited to the following
conclusory allegation:
Hotfile has been injured by Warner’s wrongful conduct in at least the
following ways: (1) interference with valuable relationships with customers
whose files were wrongly deleted by Warner, (2) lost income from
11

customers who terminated premium accounts, (3) damage to its reputation
and goodwill, and (4) costs incurred in investigations and attorneys fees to
uncover the full magnitude of Warner’s DMCA abuse.
Counterclaim ¶ 38. Discovery has revealed that Hotfile has no evidence to back up that
conclusory allegation.
Both Hotfile and its damages expert, Dr. Matthew Lynde, have admitted that they are not
aware of any complaints received from Hotfile users related to the takedowns of the
counterclaim files. SUF ¶ 2(a). Neither Hotfile nor Dr. Lynde could identify even one user who
terminated their premium subscription to the Hotfile service because of a notice sent on any of
the counterclaim files. SUF ¶ 2(b). Nor were they aware of any Hotfile users who failed to sign
up for a premium account as a result of a notice sent on any of the counterclaim files. SUF
¶ 2(c). Similarly, both Hotfile and Dr. Lynde admitted that they were not aware of any evidence
that any of the counterclaim notices had any impact at all on Hotfile’s “reputation and goodwill.”
SUF ¶ 2(d).6
The lack of injury-in-fact cannot be a surprise. The relative handful of files Hotfile
identifies in its counterclaim are truly de minimis in context of the millions of takedown notices
Hotfile received. Compare Foster Decl. ¶ 5 (Hotfile received takedown notices on ten million
files) with Counterclaim Exs. A-D. As discussed below, moreover, virtually all of the
counterclaim files either are blatantly copyright infringing or were uploaded by repeat copyright
infringers. See infra 15. Absent evidence of actual injury caused by the counterclaim notices,
Hotfile’s counterclaim must be dismissed.
C. Hotfile’s Damages Expert Does Not Prove Injury; He Merely Assumes It.
With no actual evidence, Hotfile hired an economist to “model” Hotfile’s so-called
injury. The problem is that Dr. Lynde did not determine that the counterclaim notices in fact
caused any injury; he also does not provide any evidence of injury on account of the
counterclaim notices. Hotfile’s damages expert simply assumes injury.
Dr. Lynde calculated the profits Hotfile has lost since February 1, 2011, i.e., after
plaintiffs filed their copyright action. Yeh Ex. F. After plaintiffs filed this action, Hotfile, for
6

The cost of investigating and filing a claim under 512(f) is of course not sufficient “injury” to
state a claim under Section 512(f). Lenz, 2010 WL 702466, at *10. If it were, the “injury”
requirement would be meaningless.
12

the first time, began systematically terminating at least one category of infringers, repeatedly
infringing Hotfile uploaders. Yeh Ex. B (Titov dep.) at 335:15-19; Yeh Ex. G (Titov ESI dep.)
at 54:11-57:11.
Yeh Ex. B (Titov dep.) at 210:5-8;
335:15-19; 325:12-326:19.7 Promptly following the adoption of the three-strikes rule on
February 18, 2011, Hotfile was forced to terminate thousands of users as repeat copyright
infringers – over 22,000 Hotfile users. Foster Decl. ¶ 9. Word that Hotfile was terminating
repeat infringers spread like wildfire in the pirate community and users began to leave Hotfile in
droves. Yeh Exs. K-M (user and media accounts of Hotfile’s new termination policy); see also
id. H-J (user emails to Hotfile complaining about new policy). Hotfile’s user traffic plummeted
over 40% by some accounts. Yeh Ex. N (Alexa report).

Yeh Ex.

O (Hotfile’s Suppl. Response to Interrogatory No. 6).

Yeh Ex. B (Titov dep.) at 179:11-17; 182:2-10;
Yeh Ex. B (Titov dep.) at 179:11-180:18; 181:6-18; Yeh
Decl. Exs. K-M (user and media accounts of Hotfile’s new termination policy) & P (Hotfile’s
website announcement of new policy); and Hotfile received copyright infringement notices on
well over a million files just since plaintiffs had filed their complaint, Foster Decl. ¶ 5. In this
context, the suggestion that a relative few mistaken takedown notices caused injury to Hotfile is
not credible; it is at best sheer speculation.
Dr. Lynde did not even attempt to analyze the counterclaim notices to try to understand
whether any of the notices might have had an impact on Hotfile. Yeh Ex. A (Lynde dep.) at
92:14-93:4; 24:15-26:9. Instead, Lynde made an assumption. He assumed that all of Hotfile’s
lost profits were attributable in equal proportion to each copyright infringement notice Hotfile
received during the post-February 2011 period. Yeh Ex. A (Lynde dep.) at 75:5-75:17; 83:87

To be eligible for any DMCA “safe harbor” a service provider must adopt and reasonably
implement a policy to terminate “repeat infringers.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). As will be
discussed in plaintiffs’ forthcoming motion for summary judgment, Hotfile’s complete failure to
implement a policy pre-complaint makes Hotfile ineligible for any DMCA “safe harbor.”
13

84:13 & Yeh Ex. F (Lynde Rpt., Schedule 1). With that assumption, Dr. Lynde assumed the
very conclusion on which he purports to opine. He assumed his ultimate conclusion. From that
assumption, the rest of Dr. Lynde’s “analysis” is just arithmetic. Once he assumed each
takedown notice was responsible for an equal pro rata portion of Hotfile’s lost profits, Dr. Lynde
then simply allocated a portion of the lost profits to the counterclaim notices. Yeh Ex. Q (Lynde
Rpt.) ¶ 31. That is all he did. Dr. Lynde did not analyze the counterclaim notices for any actual
impact; he did not attempt to determine whether Hotfile was in fact injured at all by any of the
counterclaim notices. Yeh Ex. A (Lynde dep.) at 92:14-93:4; 24:15-26:9; 28:11-29:5. He
assumed his conclusion.
That is not evidence, expert or otherwise. “[H]is ultimate opinion on damages amounts
to nothing more than his own ipse dixit. Such an opinion is the product of an unreliable and
inadmissible methodology.” Martinez v. Rabbit Tanaka Corp., Case No. 04-61504-CIV, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97084, at *40-41 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2006); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a
district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit
of the expert”).8
D. By Hotfile’s Own Admission, the Counterclaim Files Did Not Cause Injury.
In the end, Dr. Lynde’s assumptions are irrelevant, as both Hotfile and Dr. Lynde admit
that Hotfile was not injured by the counterclaim notices. First, Hotfile and Dr. Lynde agree that
Hotfile is not injured by the removal of a file that is in fact copyright infringing, even if the
takedown notice is sent by the wrong copyright owner. SUF ¶ 3. According to Dr. Lynde, “if
it’s a copyrighted material that shouldn’t be on the website, yes. It doesn’t matter who sends the
notice in terms of economic impact.” SUF ¶ 3(b).9 Second, Hotfile and Dr. Lynde further agree
8

There are innumerable other flaws in the manner in which Dr. Lynde calculated “lost profits”
and purported to “allocate” them to the counterclaim notices. Those flaws are not material for
present purposes, although they result in a dramatic overstatement of “damages” even accepting
Dr. Lynde’s overall model. Warner of course reserves it right to more thoroughly address the
flaws in Dr. Lynde’s analysis at the appropriate time, if necessary.
9

Section 512(f) embodies the same principle. Notwithstanding the many different factual
representations required to be included in a DMCA notice, see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A), Section
512(f) creates a cause of action only for knowing misrepresentations that “material or activity is
infringing.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(f)(1) (emphasis added). Misrepresentations other than that a file is
infringing are not covered by Section 512(f).
14

that Warner is not the cause of, or responsible for, the termination of a Hotfile user who had
“three strikes” from infringement notices without counting the Warner counterclaim notices.
SUF ¶ 4. Said Mr. Titov: “Hotfile doesn’t consider [itself] to be entitled for income from
repeated copyright infringers.” SUF ¶ 4(a). Thus, as it must, Hotfile disclaims any injury from
the removal of copyright infringing files or from the termination of repeat copyright infringers.
But after eliminating the counterclaim files falling into these categories, there is nothing
left of Hotfile’s asserted injury or counterclaim. In Exhibits A-D, the counterclaim identifies 890
files. As confirmed by stipulation of the parties, those Exhibit A-D files constitute the
“definitive list” of files that make up Hotfile’s counterclaim against Warner. None of those 890
files could have caused injury to Hotfile:

1011

10

Warner has rights to distribute EA works in Brazil. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 21. In early 2011, Warner
and EA were conducting a joint antipiracy operation. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 21. The objective was to
identify infringing EA titles online, but not necessarily send takedown notices on those works.
Kaplan Decl. ¶ 21. Some notices were inadvertently sent to Hotfile during a short period in early
February. Kaplan Decl. ¶ 21. However, those noticed files were in fact infringing copies of EA
works and EA ratified and retroactively authorized Warner to send the notices. SUF ¶ 7(b).
Those were proper DMCA notices, as Hotfile itself has admitted. Yeh Ex. B (Titov dep.) at
233:17-234:6.
11

Hotfile’s expert Dr. Lynde admitted that any harm from de minimis termination of nonpremium (and therefore non-paying) users would be at best “indirect” and “difficult to establish,”
and he acknowledged that he made no effort to calculate what that harm would be. Yeh Ex. A
(Lynde dep.) at 21:25-22:13; 27:21-29:5; 87:21-88:5.
15

Hotfile witnesses admitted that Hotfile had no evidence that any of the counterclaim
notices caused injury to Hotfile. An analysis of the counterclaim files confirms as much.
Because “injury” is an element of a cause of action under Section 512(j), Hotfile cannot state a
claim based on the counterclaim notices.
Conclusion
Hotfile has had its opportunity to try to discover a factual basis for its counterclaim. It
has not done so and cannot meet its burden of proving that Warner made a “knowing
misrepresentation” in, or that Hotfile was “injured” by, any of the counterclaim notices. For the
foregoing reasons, Warner requests that the Court grants Warner’s motion for summary
judgment and dismiss Hotfile’s counterclaim.

Dated: February 10, 2012

Miam
Telephone:
Facsim

Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/________________
Karen L. Stetson
GRAY-ROBINSON, P.A.
1221 Brickell Avenue
16th Floor
i, Fl 33131
[phone]
ile: [phone]

MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION
JENNER & BLOCK LLP
OF AMERICA, INC.
Steven B. Fabrizio (Pro Hac Vice)
Karen R. Thorland (Pro Hac Vice)
Duane C. Pozza (Pro Hac Vice)
15301 Ventura Blvd.
Luke C. Platzer (Pro Hac Vice)
Building E
1099 New York Ave., N.W.
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Suite 900
Phone: [phone]
Washington, DC 20001
Fax: [phone]
Telephone:
[phone]
Facsim
ile: [phone]
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th Day of February, 2012, I served the following
documents on all counsel of record on the attached service list via their email address(es)
pursuant to the parties’ service agreement:
Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of
Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
Proposed Order on Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Declaration of Jennifer V. Yeh in Support of Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, and accompanying Exhibits A-Q
Declaration of David Kaplan in Support of Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.’s Motion for
Summary Judgment
Declaration of Kerry Hopkins in Support of Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, and accompanying Exhibit A
Declaration of Scott Zebrak in Support of Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, and accompanying Exhibits A-B
Declaration of Dr. Ian Foster in Support of Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, and accompanying Exhibit A

By: /s/ ____________________
Karen L. Stetson

17

SERVICE LIST
Disney Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Hotfile Corp. et al.
CASE NO. 11-CIV-20427-JORDAN

FARELLA BRAUN + MARTEL LLP
Anthony P. Schoenberg
[e-mail]
Roderick M. Thompson
[e-mail]
N. Andrew Leibnitz
[e-mail]
Deepak Gupta
[e-mail]
Janel Thamkul
[e-mail]
235 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, CA 94104
Phone: [phone]

RASCO KLOCK
Janet T. Munn
[e-mail]
283 Catalonia Ave., Suite 200
Coral Gables, FL 33134
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
Attorney for Defendants Hotfile Corp. and
Anton Titov

Attorneys for Defendants Hotfile Corp. and
Anton Titov

BOSTON LAW GROUP, PC
Valentin Gurvits
[e-mail]
825 Beacon Street, Suite 20
Newton Centre, MA 02459
Phone: [phone]
Attorneys for Defendants Hotfile Corp. and
Anton Titov

18