Disney Enterprises, Inc. et al v. Hotfile Corp. et al

Filing 52

RESPONSE in Opposition re 50 MOTION to Dismiss 1 Complaint, MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW OF DEFENDANTS HOTFILE CORPORATION AND ANTON TITOV TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT filed by Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., Disney Enterprises, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, Universal City Studios Productions LLLP, Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.. (Stetson, Karen)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 1:11-cv-20427-JORDAN

DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.,
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION,
UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS PRODUCTIONS LLLP,
COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., and
WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
HOTFILE CORP., ANTON TITOV, and
DOES 1-10.
Defendants.
/

PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT

JENNER & BLOCK LLP
Steven B. Fabrizio (Pro Hac Vice)
Duane C. Pozza (Pro Hac Vice)
Luke C. Platzer (Pro Hac Vice)
1099 New York Ave., N.W.
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA, INC.
Karen R. Thorland (Pro Hac Vice)
15301 Ventura Blvd.
Building E
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

GRAY-ROBINSON, P.A.
Karen L. Stetson (FL Bar No. 742937)
1221 Brickell Avenue
Suite 1600
Miami, FL 33131
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... iii
INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT ..................................................................................1
ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................................4
I.

THE COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM FOR DIRECT INFRINGEMENT. ...............4
A. The Complaint Properly Pleads Direct Infringement of the Distribution
Right. ................................................................................................................................5
B. The Complaint Properly Pleads Direct Infringement of the Reproduction
Right. ................................................................................................................................8

II.

THE COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM FOR SECONDARY INFRINGEMENT. .....9
A. The Complaint Properly Pleads Unlawful Inducement of Infringement. ..................9
B. The Complaint Properly Pleads Contributory Infringement. ...................................14
C. The Complaint Properly Pleads Vicarious Infringement. .........................................16

III. THE COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM AGAINST TITOV. .......................................18
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................20

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) ...........................................................................14
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) .......................................14, 17
Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., No. Civ. A. 03-2670 (JBS), 2006 WL 842883
(D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006) .............................................................................................................16
Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ................. passim
Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) .................. passim
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) ..................................................................................3, 19
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) .....................................................................3
BGW Design Ltd., Inc. v. Service America Corp., No. 10-20730-Civ, 2010 WL 5014289
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2010) .............................................................................................................9
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009) ......................................................4
Cable News Network, L.P. v. GoSMS.com, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4812(LMM), 2000 WL
1678039 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2000) ...........................................................................................20
Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829
(11th Cir. 1990)........................................................................................................................14
Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931(WHP), 2009 WL 3364036
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009) ...................................................................................................6, 7, 8
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) ....................5, 16
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW(JCx), 2009 WL
6355911 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) ...................................................................9, 10, 11, 12, 19
Faulkner v. National Geographic Society, 211 F. Supp. 2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d,
409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005).......................................................................................................14
Foreign Imported Productions and Publishing, Inc. v. Grupo Industrial Hotelero, S.A.,
No. 07-22066-CIV, 2008 WL 4724495 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2008) ..........................................19
Gyasi v. M/V Andre, No. 07-23282-Civ, 2008 WL 162644 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2008) ....................4
Harrison v. Benchmark Electronics Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) .............3, 10

iii

Hermeris, Inc. v. Brandenburg, No. 10-2531-JAR, 2011 WL 231463
(D. Kan. Jan. 23, 2011) ............................................................................................................15
Home Design Services, Inc. v. Stone Creek Homes, Inc., No. Civ. A. 08-02662, 2009 WL
4016054 (D. Colo. Nov. 13, 2009) ..........................................................................................19
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) ................................................14
Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ...........................13
J&J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Walia, No. 10-5136 SC, 2011 WL 902245
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2011) ........................................................................................................20
Lifetime Homes, Inc. v. Walker Homes, Inc., No. 205CV479FTM29DNF, 2006 WL
889986 (M.D. Fla. April 6, 2006) ............................................................................................19
Marrari v. Medical Staffing Network Holdings, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 1169
(S.D. Fla. 2005)........................................................................................................................18
Marvin Music Co. v. BHC Ltd. Partnership, 830 F. Supp. 651 (D. Mass. 1993) ..........................20
Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)........................ passim
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.. 454 F. Supp. 2d 966
(C.D. Cal. 2006) ......................................................................................................................17
Mozingo v. Correct Manufacturing Corp., 752 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1985) .....................................18
Netbula, LLC v. Chordiant Software, Inc., No. C 08-00019 JW, 2009 WL 750201
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2009) .......................................................................................................20
New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) .......................................................................5
Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Bung Enterprises, No. 97-8511-GAF (VAPx), 1999 WL
34975007 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1999) .......................................................................................15
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) .................................5, 15, 17
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997) .......6, 7
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Starware Publishing Corp., 900 F. Supp. 438
(S.D. Fla. 1995)........................................................................................................................18
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997), aff’d,
168 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1999) .................................................................................................6, 8
Puleo v. SMG Property Management, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-86-Orl-22DAB, 2008 WL
3889727 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2008) ..........................................................................................4

iv

Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010) ........................................................................4, 18
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ..........................................................................................6
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) ...................14, 15, 16
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Associated Telephone Directory Publishers,
756 F.2d 801 (11th Cir. 1985) .................................................................................................18
Sweetwater Investors, LLC v. Sweetwater Apartments Loan LLC, No. 1:10-CV-223WKW, 2010 WL 4904673 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 24, 2010) .......................................................8, 20
United States v. Baxter International, Inc., 345 F.3d 866 (11th Cir. 2003) ........................8, 11, 20
Ventrassist Pty Ltd. v. Heartware, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (S.D. Fla. 2008) ..........................15
Vilceus v. City of West Palm Beach, No. 08-80968-CIV, 2009 WL 2242604
(S.D. Fla. July 27, 2009) ............................................................................................................4
Watts v. Florida International University, 495 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2007)........................4, 19, 20
STATUTES
17 U.S.C. § 106 ................................................................................................................................5
17 U.S.C. § 106(3) .......................................................................................................................4, 5
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) ......................................................................................................................5
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) ...............................................................................................................11
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) ...............................................................................................................11
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) ................................................................................................................11
OTHER AUTHORITIES
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Operation In Our Sites” Targets Internet
Movie Pirates, available at www.ice.gov/news/ releases/1006/100630/losangeles.htm ...........2

v

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs’ Complaint against Hotfile Corp. (“Hotfile”) and Anton Titov (“Titov”)
properly pleads that Defendants are liable for copyright infringement, and provides specific
factual allegations well beyond what the Federal Rules require. As a result, in their Motion to
Dismiss (“MTD”), Defendants are forced to mischaracterize or ignore key allegations in the
Complaint, misstate the relevant law, and improperly ask the Court to accept Defendants’
implausible inferences – inferences that directly conflict with Plaintiffs’ properly-pleaded facts.
While Defendants would have the Court accept that Hotfile is nothing but a passive webhost, the
Complaint pleads detailed facts showing the exact opposite.
Indeed, allegations comparable to those that Defendants argue are insufficient to state a
claim have resulted in findings of liability against notorious Internet infringers as reflected in
Napster, Grokster, Usenet, Fung, and Lime Group, among others. While Defendants try to
distinguish these cases as involving more incriminating evidence, they forget that nearly all of
that evidence was in the defendants’ sole possession and came to light only through discovery –
and that what is relevant here is what is alleged in the Complaint, not Defendants’ denials.
Ultimately, Defendants ask this Court to ignore the allegations Plaintiffs have pleaded,
bypass discovery and even summary judgment, and sit as a trier of fact, drawing inferences in
Defendants’ favor. That clearly is an impermissible use of a motion to dismiss on the pleadings.
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
In this action, major motion picture studios and content owners are seeking relief against
Defendants for the operation of the “Hotfile” website, which Plaintiffs allege is engaged in
intentional, unabashed theft of Plaintiffs’ and others’ copyrighted works for profit. See, e.g.,
Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 27.
The Complaint alleges that Hotfile’s “business model critically depends on attracting
users to download high-value copyrighted content, such as plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.”
Compl. ¶¶ 25, 37, 39. Users pay Hotfile monthly “Premium” subscription fees to download files
from the site at high speeds; users can also download at lower speeds for free. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 24.
Hotfile maximizes the number of users who purchase “Premium” subscriptions by taking
steps to ensure that it has files on its servers that will attract users in high numbers. Compl. ¶¶
25, 34, 62. The Complaint alleges that Hotfile knows that such files are overwhelmingly
infringing, and intends to both foster and profit from that infringement. Compl. ¶¶ 44, 61.

1

Hotfile ensures the presence of such desirable infringing content on its site through a series of
payment incentives, called its “Affiliate” program, that pay users who upload files to the site
once those files have “been downloaded at least 1,000 times.” Compl. ¶ 29; see also Compl. ¶¶
30-31. Hotfile’s similar “Referral” program pays pirate website operators to “post[] links that
direct users to Hotfile-hosted content when those users, in turn, purchase Hotfile subscriptions.”
Compl. ¶ 35. Through this “Referral” program, the Complaint alleges, Hotfile “effectively
partners, and acts in concert, with a vast array of pirate link sites and other affiliates to advertise
and promote the infringing content on Hotfile’s servers.” Compl. ¶ 36.1
Nominally, Hotfile’s “Affiliate” and “Referral” programs are based on volume – the
more “popular” a file to downloaders, the more Hotfile pays. But the Complaint alleges that
words like “interesting” and “popular” are nothing but well-understood euphemisms: “[a]ll of
Hotfile’s financial incentives are designed to encourage both uploading and promotion of what
Hotfile euphemistically refers to as ‘interesting’ content, by which Hotfile means, and which
Hotfile users understand to be, copyrighted entertainment content.” Compl. ¶ 34. In particular,
the rules of the “Affiliate” program “aggressively encourage[] the uploading of very large
content files of the sort that are typically associated with full-length motion pictures and
television programs.” Compl. ¶ 31. The Complaint also alleges that Hotfile’s economic
incentives work as intended: the “overwhelming majority of content publicly available on Hotfile
consists of infringing copies of popular copyrighted works, such as motion pictures and
television programs.” Compl. ¶ 44. This infringing content “acts as a ‘draw’ to attract millions
of downloading users, to whom Hotfile can sell ‘Premium’ memberships.” Compl. ¶ 34; see
also Compl. ¶ 25. Defendants, according to the Complaint, have “full knowledge” of this
infringement, operate the site with the intention of fostering the infringement, and exploit the
infringement to sell subscriptions. Compl. ¶¶ 44, 61.
Allegations of Defendants’ knowledge and encouragement of infringement are coupled
1

Defendants’ bare denial “that any such sites are controlled by Hotfile,” MTD at 3, ignores the
allegation that Defendants partner with such sites and pay them to promote infringing traffic.
See Compl. ¶¶ 35-36. Although of no moment to this motion, Defendants’ suggestion that
Plaintiffs do not sue pirate link sites, see MTD at 3, is untrue. In addition to civil litigation,
many such sites have been subject to criminal enforcement. See, e.g., U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, “Operation In Our Sites” Targets Internet Movie Pirates, available at
www.ice.gov/news/ releases/1006/100630/losangeles.htm (June 30, 2010) (government press
release on criminal enforcement).
2

with allegations that Defendants “purposely stymie efforts by copyright owners to limit
infringement and fail to take simple steps to mitigate infringement.” Compl. Heading E; see also
Compl. ¶¶ 37-38. In particular, the Complaint alleges that Defendants (i) frustrate copyright
enforcement by allowing users to create multiple “links” to the same file, thereby allowing
infringement to continue even if some of those links are identified and removed by copyright
owners, Compl. ¶ 38; (ii) outsource information location tools (that help users find infringing
content) to pirate link sites paid by Defendants, thereby frustrating copyright owners’ ability to
locate infringing material on the site, Compl. ¶¶ 22, 35-36; and (iii) fail to take “simple measures
to stop, or substantially mitigate, the massive infringement” on the site. Compl. ¶¶ 39-42. The
Complaint alleges that Defendants do or fail to do these things “because they want and need []
infringement to make their business profitable.” Compl. ¶ 43.
As for Defendant Titov, the Complaint alleges that he “manages the operations of
Hotfile” and “personally directed and participated in, exercised control over, and benefited from
the specific infringement-inducing conduct of Hotfile,” Compl. ¶ 45, as well as the other “acts of
infringement complained of in this Complaint,” Compl. ¶ 12. This includes “the adoption of a
business plan dependent upon massive copyright infringement” and “the design and
implementation of Hotfile’s ‘Affiliate’ and ‘Referral’ programs, which actively encourage
copyright infringement.” Compl. ¶ 45. Titov, as alleged, also has acted as a financial conduit for
the company by personally paying users of Hotfile’s “Affiliate” program. Compl. ¶ 45.
LEGAL STANDARD
The “liberal pleading standard” of Rule 8 requires nothing more than “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that [the pleader] is entitled to relief,” sufficient to give the
defendant “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Harrison v.
Benchmark Elecs. Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d 1206, 1214 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks
omitted). While a mere “formulaic recitation of the elements” of a claim is insufficient under
Rule 8, a plaintiff need state “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face,” a standard that does not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-55, 570 (2007). All that is required is to “plead[] factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

3

There is no “probability requirement at the pleading stage,” Watts v. Florida
International University, 495 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556); courts “accept[] as true the facts as set forth in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). A
plaintiff need not “rule out every possible lawful explanation for the conduct he challenges,”
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 597 (8th Cir. 2009), and is “not required to set
forth every fact on which he relies.” Puleo v. SMG Prop. Mgmt., Inc., No. 6:08-cv-86-Orl22DAB, 2008 WL 3889727, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2008). Rule 8 “instead simply calls for
enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the
necessary element.” Watts, 495 F.3d at 1295-96 (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as
here, “the information supporting the complainant’s case is under the exclusive control of the
defendant,” “[c]ourts typically allow the pleader an extra modicum of leeway.” United States v.
Baxter Int’l., Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 881 (11th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are
“viewed with disfavor and rarely granted.” Gyasi v. M/V Andre, No. 07-23282-civ, 2008 WL
162644, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2008) (quoting Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc.,
116 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1997)).
ARGUMENT
I. THE COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM FOR DIRECT INFRINGEMENT.
Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for direct infringement is
emblematic of the infirmity of Defendants’ motion. Defendants ignore altogether Plaintiffs’
principal claim – that Defendants have directly infringed Plaintiffs’ exclusive right under the
Copyright Act to distribute their works. Compl. ¶¶ 48-52; 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). Defendants do
not address Plaintiffs’ distribution claim at all. Instead, Defendants address a phantom claim –
that Plaintiffs have not made – for direct infringement of the right to reproduce based on the
uploading of copyrighted works. MTD at 5-8.2 Thus, Defendants’ motion should be denied
because Defendants do not address the direct infringement claims Plaintiffs in fact have made.
No more should be necessary. Cf. Vilceus v. City of West Palm Beach, No. 08-80968-CIV, 2009
WL 2242604, at *5 n.1 (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2009) (where “[t]here is no legal argument presented”
2

E.g., MTD at 5 (Hotfile itself does not “select[] and instigat[e] unauthorized copying of
particular files”); id. at 7 (“Hotfile itself is [not] volitionally copying”); id. at 7 (“nothing
plausibly suggest[s] that Hotfile itself is doing the posting” of infringing files) (emphasis added).
4

to dismiss claim, the “[c]ourt will not consider dismissal”). On the merits, which Defendants
have not addressed, Plaintiffs plainly have properly pleaded claims for direct infringement.
A. The Complaint Properly Pleads Direct Infringement of the Distribution Right.
By transmitting electronic copies of Plaintiffs’ motion pictures to their users, Defendants
directly infringe Plaintiffs’ exclusive right under the Copyright Act to “distribute copies … of the
copyrighted work to the public.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). In New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S.
483 (2001), the Supreme Court held that database operators were directly liable for distribution
of copyrighted works when the operators automatically sent copies to users who had selected the
works for download. Id. at 504; id. at 498 (holding that “by selling copies of the Articles
through the NEXIS Database,” defendants “‘distribute copies’ of the Articles ‘to the public by
sale’”). That is precisely what Defendants stand accused of doing here, and Plaintiffs have
properly pleaded that claim. See Compl. ¶¶ 2, 21, 27, 48-52.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs must plead that Defendants engaged in a volitional act,
arguing that “[t]he volitional action requirement … is now established law.” MTD at 6. Here,
Defendants paint with too broad a brush. Some courts addressing the reproduction right have
held that a volitional act is required. However, that is hardly established law, let alone in the
very different context of the distribution right. Each exclusive right under the Copyright Act is
distinct, with its own requirements. E.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 201(d)(2). In Cartoon Network LP,
LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Cablevision”), on which
Defendants rely, the Second Circuit expressly limited its ruling to the reproduction right; the
court emphasized that its “conclusion . . . that the customer, [and] not Cablevision, ‘does’ the
copying does not dictate a parallel conclusion that the customer, and not Cablevision, ‘performs’
the copyrighted work” because the “definitions that delineate the contours of the reproduction
and public performance rights vary in significant ways.” Id. at 131 (emphasis added). Further,
another Circuit Court has held that the direct infringer of the “public display” right is the
operator of the server hosting the content (like Defendants here), even though it is the user who
initiates the display through a request to the server. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508
F.3d 1146, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Amazon”). The “contours of the reproduction and
[distribution] rights” likewise “vary in significant ways.” Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 131. Indeed,
in Tasini, the Court rejected the dissent’s argument that users, rather than the database operator,
were the ones engaging in distribution. See 533 U.S. at 518 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

5

Only a handful of courts have considered “volition” in the context of a distribution claim.
Moreover, with their errant focus on a non-existent reproduction claim, Defendants fail to
mention that, in closely analogous circumstances, almost all of the cases considering volition and
distribution claims either found the defendant liable for directly infringing the distribution right,
or denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F.
Supp. 2d 124, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Usenet”) (defendant liable for directly infringing
distribution right); Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931(WHP), 2009 WL
3364036 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009) (“MP3Tunes”) (motion to dismiss denied); Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (“Webbworld”), aff’d,
168 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (defendants held liable); Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997)
(“Hardenburgh”) (same).3
To the extent volition must be plead, Plaintiffs have pleaded facts that more than
demonstrate Defendants’ volitional conduct in distributing Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works. The
Complaint alleges that the “infringing files reside on servers controlled by Hotfile Corp. [and
that] Hotfile Corp. causes and effects the infringing act of transmitting copies of those works
from its servers to the computers of its users.” Compl. ¶ 49. The Complaint further alleges that:
Hotfile Corp. does more than merely respond to user requests in a passive,
content-neutral, and automated manner. …Hotfile Corp. plays an active role in
ensuring that it has the most popular content on its servers and that the URL links
to those infringing content files are widely disseminated on the Internet, and
advertised and promoted by pirate link sites, so the maximum number of Hotfile
users will access and download the infringing content.
Compl. ¶ 49. In particular, the Complaint alleges that:
•

Defendants populate Hotfile with desirable files to distribute to Hotfile users by paying
“Affiliates” to upload infringing works to its system, see Compl. ¶¶ 28-34, and that
Defendants have knowingly and intentionally structured their “Affiliates” program to
ensure that large copyrighted files that represent television and motion picture content
are available for download from Hotfile’s service. See Compl. ¶ 31.

•

After users upload files to Hotfile, Defendants make “additional copies” of those files,
which are “not made by or at the request of Hotfile users,” to “facilitate and expedite”

3

Only in Netcom was the claim for direct infringement of the distribution right denied. See
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371-72 (N.D. Cal.
1995). But that was on a motion for a preliminary injunction and involved a defendant that, in
stark contrast to Hotfile, was found to be a truly passive conduit of the copyrighted works.
6

Hotfile’s “distribution.” See Compl. ¶ 50.
•

Defendants pay infringing “pirate link sites” to promote links that direct users to
download the files from Hotfile. See Compl. ¶¶ 22, 35-36.

•

And Defendants further “exercise[] active control over the distribution process,
regulating the volume and speed of transmissions to users who have not yet purchased
‘Premium’ subscriptions.” Compl. ¶ 49; see also Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23-24.
As the Usenet court ruled, “volitional conduct” turns on whether defendants have taken

roles that “transform” them “from passive providers of a space in which infringing activities
happened to occur to active participants in the process of copyright infringement.” Usenet, 633
F. Supp. 2d at 148 (quotation marks omitted). Taken together, Defendants’ actions, as alleged,
paint a picture of Hotfile as an online service that is far from “merely a ‘passive conduit’” for
infringement by others, but is itself “actively engaged in the process” of infringing distribution.
Id. at 149.
In important ways, the allegations against Defendants directly parallel the facts in Usenet.
In Usenet, as with Hotfile, “users [we]re the ones who decide[d] what to upload and download.”
MTD at 9. Nevertheless, the Usenet court found sufficient volition because defendants knew
music files were popular and took technical steps to enhance their service’s ability to store music
files for users to download. See Usenet, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 148. Thus, the Usenet defendants
were not mere passive conduits: although they did not encourage users to upload infringing
content, they took steps to facilitate access to infringing content they knew to be popular. Hotfile
does more. Here, Defendants take affirmative steps to ensure that users upload popular
infringing files (like the defendants in Hardenburgh, 982 F. Supp. at 506), and that the URL
links for those files are disseminated far and wide.4 MP3tunes is also instructive. There, even
though “the user pushe[d] the button to upload . . . or stream songs,” the court denied defendants’
motion to dismiss based on allegations that “MP3tunes knows many of the songs on
sideload.com are infringing” and that “MP3tunes provides a service that collects and organizes
links to music files for its customers to listen to and download into their lockers.” MP3Tunes,

4

Defendants’ suggestion that the Usenet defendants had a process of “human review” of files
before they were posted and made available for download, MTD at 9 n.4, is flatly wrong. There
was no such “human review” in Usenet. Defendants juxtapose Hardenburgh and Usenet to
imply that the “human review” was comparable in both cases. In fact, the only human
intervention in Usenet was “to remove access to certain categories of content, and to block
certain users.” 633 F. Supp. 2d at 148. Discovery will likely show the same for Hotfile.
7

2009 WL 3364036, at *3. The court concluded that “[t]aken as a whole, these allegations
plausibly suggest volitional conduct.” Id.; see also Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. at 549-53 (similar).
The detailed allegations in the Complaint, based on what is publicly observable about
Defendants’ system, certainly at least “plausibly suggest volitional conduct”; nothing more is
required at the pleading stage. Additional evidence to buttress those allegations and further show
Defendants’ volitional conduct can only be revealed through discovery of Defendants’ system.
See Baxter, 345 F.3d at 881 (“extra modicum of leeway where the information supporting the
complainant’s case is under the exclusive control of the defendant”); Sweetwater Investors, LLC
v. Sweetwater Apartments Loan LLC, No. 1:10-CV-223-WKW, 2010 WL 4904673, at *7 (M.D.
Ala. Nov. 24, 2010) (where the relevant evidence is primarily within defendants’ control, “the
better course is to deny the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and to permit the structure of the . . . claims to
evolve through the discovery process”).
B. The Complaint Properly Pleads Direct Infringement of the Reproduction Right.
Plaintiffs have in fact pleaded a reproduction claim, but not on the theory Defendants
address in their motion. Contrary to Defendants’ mischaracterization, Plaintiffs are not claiming
that Defendants are directly liable for creating the unauthorized copies of copyrighted works that
users upload onto the Hotfile site. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants are secondarily liable for
those unauthorized copies. What Plaintiffs allege is that after those unauthorized copies are
uploaded onto Hotfile, Defendants themselves subsequently make additional infringing copies of
those works in order to facilitate and expedite distribution of the works to Hotfile users
(“Subsequent Copying”). Compl. ¶ 50. The Complaint makes this clear:
In order to facilitate and expedite distribution of infringing files to Hotfile users,
Hotfile Corp. also makes additional unauthorized copies of plaintiffs’
copyrighted works, including those on Exhibit A, on its own servers in violation
of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106.
Compl. ¶ 50 (emphasis added). Defendants do not address this claim at all. Nevertheless, the
Complaint pleads that the Subsequent Copying is a “volitional act” of Defendants: “These
unauthorized copies are not made by or at the request of Hotfile users, but rather through the
decisions and actions of Hotfile Corp., for its own business purposes.” Compl. ¶ 50.5 No more

5

Defendants argue that this allegation “is directly contradicted” by other allegations that users
decide what to upload and download from Hotfile. MTD at 8. But that argument is based on a
mischaracterization of Plaintiffs’ reproduction claim. The claim that Defendants volitionally
8

is necessary at the pleading stage. Nor would more be possible without discovery into the
technical operation of Defendants’ system.
II. THE COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM FOR SECONDARY INFRINGEMENT.
Defendants do not deny that thousands of Plaintiffs’ motion pictures and television
programs have been infringed on Hotfile. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6, 48-50, 60. The Complaint
properly states a claim that Defendants are secondarily liable for such infringement, as they (i)
operate Hotfile so that it will be used to infringe, (ii) know about and materially contribute to
such infringement, and (iii) have failed to exercise their right and ability to limit such activity
while financially benefiting from it. Each of these doctrines, alone, gives rise to secondary
liability; the Complaint properly alleges all three.
A. The Complaint Properly Pleads Unlawful Inducement of Infringement.
The Complaint alleges that Defendants operate Hotfile with the object and purpose of
fostering copyright infringement. Compl. ¶ 60. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in MetroGoldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005) (“Grokster”), this
gives rise to secondary liability for “inducement” of infringement. Id. Inducement has three
elements: (1) “distribut[ion of] a device” or operation of a service (2) with the “object” or intent
that it be used to infringe, and (3) “resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” Id. Having
an improper objective to infringe, which is the only element Defendants dispute, can be “shown
by clear expression or other affirmative steps.” Id. at 937. As the Supreme Court made clear,
such improper intent does not require direct or public messages to users overtly encouraging
infringement, and can be proven through any combination of evidence probative of an improper
objective to foster infringement. Id. at 938; see also Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung,
No. CV 06-5578 SVW(JCx), 2009 WL 6355911, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) (“Fung”)
(“improper purpose can be shown in a variety of ways; the factors considered by the Supreme
Court in Grokster were not exhaustive or exclusive”). “The intent of the parties,” moreover, “is
a factual matter and therefore should not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.” BGW Design Ltd.,
Inc. v. Service Am. Corp., No. 10-20730-civ, 2010 WL 5014289, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2010).
The Complaint properly alleges that Defendants have such “improper objective” here.
As alleged, the evidence of Defendants’ unlawful inducement includes:

engage in the Subsequent Copying is not contradicted by or inconsistent with an allegation that
users decide what to upload in the first instance.
9

(i) the overwhelming infringing content available on, and downloaded from,
Hotfile; (ii) the operation of “Affiliate” and “Referral” programs structured to
encourage users and website operators to upload popular copyrighted content files
and to advertise and promote the availability of that infringing content; (iii) a
business model that depends on massive infringement of copyrighted works,
including plaintiffs’ copyrights; (iv) technical measures designed to facilitate the
widespread dissemination of copyrighted content, even after copyright owners
have requested takedown of the infringing content; and (v) defendant’s failure to
use any of the readily-available means to curtail infringement on the Hotfile
website.
Compl. ¶ 60; see also id. ¶¶ 3, 24-33, 35-44. This is quintessential evidence of inducement as
acknowledged by virtually every court to find a defendant liable under this theory. See, e.g.,
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937-40; Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481, 509
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Usenet, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 151-54; Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *11-*15.
Indeed, in none of these other cases has the adjudicated infringer provided overt economic
incentives to infringe as Hotfile does. The Complaint more than sufficiently “give[s] the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Harrison, 593
F.3d at 1214 (quotation marks omitted).
Defendants contend (1) that the Complaint fails to plead “clear expression” of infringing
intent, MTD at 10-11, and (2) that their actions are “at least consistent with actions of a
legitimate hosting service.” MTD at 11 (emphasis in original). But those arguments ignore
critical allegations of the Complaint entirely, and rest on a series of implausible excuses, i.e.,
inferences in Defendants’ favor, that this Court cannot credit on a motion to dismiss.
1. Clear Expression: Contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, MTD at 10-11, Plaintiffs are
under no obligation to plead specific “clear expression[s]” of Defendants’ wrongful intent. As
Grokster stated, an “advertisement or solicitation that broadcasts a message designed to stimulate
others to commit violations” may be the “classic instance” of inducement, but it is not the only
one. 545 U.S. at 937. The Court went on to explain that “[t]he function of the message in the
theory of inducement is to prove by a defendant’s own statements that his unlawful purpose
disqualifies him from claiming protection . . . .” Id. at 938; see also id. (“Proving that a message
was sent out . . . is the preeminent but not exclusive way of showing that active steps were taken
with the purpose of bringing about infringing acts.”). For that reason, the Court emphasized,
purely internal communications are just as relevant as advertisements and solicitations. Id.

10

The “clear expressions” the court found relevant in Grokster, for instance, were
marketing materials and business plans that were never disseminated to the public. See id. at
938. Such internal documents and communications are “under the exclusive control of the
defendant[s]” and not reasonably available to Plaintiffs prior to discovery. Baxter Int’l., Inc.,
345 F.3d at 881. Defendants’ citation to highly incriminating admissions in Fung, Usenet, Lime
Group, and Grokster, MTD at 10-11, only emphasizes this point. In most instances, the cited
incriminating statements were made in internal or private communications, which plaintiffs in
those cases obtained only through discovery.6
2. Other Affirmative Steps: Here, Defendants’ actions speak for themselves. See p. 10
supra. Defendants’ motion hypothesizes innocent and implausible explanations for the way
Defendants have operated the Hotfile service. See MTD at 11-14. But on a motion to dismiss,
Plaintiffs, not Defendants, are entitled to have inferences drawn in their favor. Defendants’
excuses, moreover, directly conflict with or ignore the allegations in the Complaint. For
example:
Claimed DMCA Compliance. Defendants contend that they “take[] pains to comply with
the DMCA,” that plaintiffs have “concede[d]” such compliance, and that such compliance is
“incompatible with the Studio’s active inducement theory.” MTD at 11-12. But the Complaint
alleges the exact opposite. The Complaint specifically alleges that Defendants fail to terminate
repeat infringers as required by 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). Compl. ¶ 42.7 The Complaint also
alleges that Defendants (i) fail to remove infringing material from their system even when they
have actual or red flag knowledge, (ii) financially benefit from infringement while declining to
exercise their right and ability to mitigate it, and (iii) induce infringement on a massive scale.
See Compl. ¶¶ 3, 24-44, 60-62. Any one of those facts would disqualify Defendants from any
DMCA safe harbor. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)-(B). Defendants, the Complaint alleges, fail
to comply with the DMCA in every one of those ways. Compl. ¶ 3, 24-42, 60-62. Defendants
simply ignore these well-pleaded allegations.
6

For example, in Usenet, the colorful “get your pirate on” statement cited by Defendants, MTD
at 10, was not a public advertisement but rather a private employee email produced in discovery.
See Usenet, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 152.

7

That Defendants “reserve[] the right . . . to terminate infringing users,” MTD at 11, says
nothing. Section 512(i)(1)(A) requires that such a policy be “reasonably implemented,” id., and
the Complaint alleges that Defendants have failed to do so. See Compl. ¶ 42.
11

Defendants ask the Court to infer their innocent intent in the face of all allegations to the
contrary because, Defendants claim (without evidence), “Hotfile takedowns [sic] specifically
identified infringing links.” MTD at 11. This bald, self-serving statement is unavailing. First,
many adjudicated infringers claim and present evidence that they comply with copyright owner
takedown notices, as did the defendants in Fung and Usenet, for example. Link-by-link
takedowns are neither sufficient under the DMCA nor incompatible with inducement liability.
Any savvy massive inducer of copyright infringement would readily block individual links in
response to copyright owner notices as superficial window dressing. Indeed, Hotfile’s link-bylink takedown response is the equivalent of Hotfile telling Plaintiffs to empty a swimming pool
with a teaspoon while Hotfile continues to fill it with a fire hose. See Compl. ¶ 37. Second,
contrary to Defendants’ assertion, MTD at 12, the Complaint does not “concede” anything about
Hotfile’s takedown practices; those practices will be the subject of discovery. What Defendants
characterize as a concession – i.e., the allegation that “[e]ven if” Hotfile blocks access to
specifically identified links, it “has implemented technical features to ensure continued
infringing access to plaintiffs’ content” – is plainly not a concession but an accusation that
Defendants’ takedown practices are, at best, disingenuous. Compl. ¶ 38 (emphasis added).
Defendants’ assertion that the Court should draw an inference of innocent intent from that
allegation is untenable.
Outsourcing Search Functions. Defendants also ask the Court to infer innocent intent
from Hotfile’s lack of a “search” function, since, according to Defendants, a service encouraging
infringement would want to help users find infringing material. MTD at 12-13. But the
Complaint specifically alleges that Defendants do help users find infringing material by paying
blatantly infringing “pirate link sites” to index, organize and promote URL links to Hotfilehosted content, and that Hotfile does this instead of offering a searchable index “to conceal the
scope of its infringement.” See Compl. ¶¶ 22, 35-36. Again, incredibly, contrary to the express
Complaint allegations, Defendants impermissibly ask the Court to accept that “[n]ot having a
search box permits Hotfile to be used for private storage of files or limited sharing . . . (e.g., as
among family).” MTD at 13. Defendants ask for this inference in the face of express Complaint
allegations that Hotfile actively discourages private storage of files and aggressively encourages
mass distribution – not “limited sharing” – including by paying users only when their files are
downloaded several thousands of times. See Compl. ¶¶ 3-4, 29, 32-33.
12

Paying Affiliates to Upload Files and Promote Downloads. Likewise, Defendants
impermissibly ask the Court to infer that rewarding the uploading of “popular” content cannot
denote an intent to encourage infringement. MTD at 13. But Defendants’ suggested inference
both ignores reality and would require the Court to reject multiple express allegations to the
contrary. The Complaint alleges that, as a result of Defendants’ economic incentives to upload
“popular” content, “the overwhelming majority of content publicly available on Hotfile consists
of infringing copies of popular copyrighted works, such as motion pictures and television
programs”; that Defendants know it; that Hotfile and its users use terms like “interesting” and
“popular” as euphemisms for “popular copyrighted entertainment content”; and that Defendants
pay affiliates to upload and promote infringing content with such knowledge. See Compl. ¶¶ 34,
37, 44.8
Business Model. Even less convincing is Defendants’ assertion that their business model
is inconsistent with an intent to infringe because they receive subscription rather than advertising
revenue. See MTD at 14. As the Complaint alleges, Defendants’ incentive to infringe arises
because “the lure of [] copyrighted works . . . entice[s] users to pay defendants for the privilege
of accessing and downloading the works from defendants’ computer servers,” and “Hotfile’s
business model critically depends on attracting users to download high-value copyrighted
content, such as plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.” Compl. ¶¶ 3, 25. This is virtually identical to
the situation in Usenet. See 633 F. Supp. 2d at 156 (“the greater the volume of downloads (the
majority of which has been shown to be infringing), the greater the Defendants’ income” from
subscriptions).
Other Indicia of Intent to Which Defendants Offer No Response. Defendants do not
respond meaningfully, or at all, to detailed allegations regarding several other key indicia of their
improper purpose. They ignore, deny or gloss over as unsupported the allegations: that they
have stymied copyright owners’ enforcement efforts, Compl. ¶ 38; that they do not terminate
repeat infringers, Compl. ¶ 42; that the Complaint alleges that they do “not filter content,”
compare MTD at 12 with Compl. ¶ 41; and that Hotfile users overwhelmingly use the service to

8

Contrary to Defendants’ unsupported assertion, the “premium content” program in Io Group,
Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“Veoh”), is nothing
like Defendants’ “Rewards” program. Nor, unlike here, was there any allegation in Veoh that
infringing files were uploaded through the “premium content” program. Id.
13

infringe. MTD at 14 & Compl. ¶¶ 44, 60-61. Defendants cannot credibly claim that the
Complaint does not properly allege a claim for inducement.
B. The Complaint Properly Pleads Contributory Infringement.
The Complaint likewise plainly states a claim for “contributory infringement” – which
imposes liability on a party who “with knowledge of the infringing activity, . . . materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another.” Lime Group, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 517 (quotation
marks omitted); see generally Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d
829, 845 (11th Cir. 1990) (same). For purposes of contributory copyright infringement, “actual
knowledge is not required. All that must be shown for contributory infringement is that
[defendant] had reason to know” of the infringing activity. Cable/Home Commc’n Corp., 902
F.2d at 846 (citing Casella v. Morris, 820 F. 2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987)); see also, e.g.,
Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Society, 211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[k]nowledge
of the infringing activity may be actual or constructive”) (quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 409
F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“Willful blindness is knowledge, in copyright law . . . as it is in the law generally”); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Contributory liability
requires that the secondary infringer ‘know or have reason to know’ of direct infringement”)
(citation omitted).
There can be no serious dispute that the Complaint properly pleads a claim for
contributory infringement. The Complaint alleges facts constituting material contribution to
infringing conduct, Compl. ¶¶ 20-21, 23, 28-33, 61, and it further alleges that Defendants have
both actual and constructive knowledge of infringement, Compl. ¶¶ 37, 44, 61. That is all that is
required to state a claim. See generally Usenet, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 155; Lime Group, 715 F.
Supp. 2d at 515.
Defendants’ argument to the contrary improperly conflates two concepts: the wellestablished common law standard for contributory infringement, and an affirmative defense
derived from Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(“Sony”). But Defendants’ reliance on Sony at the pleading stage is misplaced.
First, Sony provides an affirmative defense; Defendants bear the burden of proof. See
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citing Bateman
v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F. 3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239

14

F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Bung Enterprises, No. 97-8511-GAF
(VAPx), 1999 WL 34975007, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1999). It is “well settled that
plaintiff[s] [are] not required to negate an affirmative defense in [their] complaint[s].”
Ventrassist Pty Ltd. v. Heartware, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1286-87 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (citation
omitted; alterations in original).
Second, Defendants’ suggestion that the Complaint somehow relies on “an inference” of
knowledge based simply on the structure of the Hotfile system, MTD 14-15, flies in the face of
the well-pleaded allegations that Defendants themselves “have full knowledge” of the
infringement. Compl. ¶¶ 44, 61. Moreover, although Plaintiffs are not required to plead actual
knowledge of specific infringements,9 the Complaint includes such allegations. It alleges that
Defendants have actual knowledge of the massive copyright infringement occurring on the
Hotfile site, including of specific infringements by way of formal notices from copyright owners,
and by “keep[ing] track of each content file in sophisticated databases.” Compl. ¶¶ 37, 44, 61.10
Third, the premise of Sony was that “[t]he only contact between [the defendant] and the
users … occurred at the moment of sale,” with the defendant having no further “direct
involvement with the allegedly infringing activity” afterwards. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 438. Sony
does not apply where a defendant maintains an “ongoing relationship” with the infringers during
the course of the infringement, as these Defendants do. See Usenet, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 156
9

In Grokster, the Supreme Court explained that the Ninth Circuit, relying on Napster, had erred
by interpreting Sony to require actual knowledge of specific infringements. 545 U.S. at 933-34.
Accord Usenet, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 154 (“knowledge of specific infringements is not required to
support a finding of contributory infringement”); Lime Group, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 515 (“actual or
constructive knowledge of the infringing activity” is all that is required for contributory
infringement). Amazon, therefore, erred by continuing to apply the Napster specific knowledge
standard, see 508 F.3d at 1171, and no courts outside of California appear to have applied this
rule post-Grokster.
10

The Complaint additionally alleges facts demonstrating that Defendants have actual
knowledge of further specific infringements on their system due to the Defendants’ policy of
“intentionally attempt[ing] to stymie plaintiffs’ copyright enforcement efforts by … permitting
registered users to upload a single copy of a work but then make five additional separate copies
of the work on Hotfile’s servers, each with a different URL link.” Compl. ¶ 38. When specific
links are removed as infringing, Defendants have actual, specific knowledge that all other copies
of the same file replicated through this feature are infringing too. See Hermeris, Inc. v.
Brandenburg, No. 10-2531-JAR, 2011 WL 231463, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 23, 2011) (defendant
operating multiple websites had specific knowledge of infringement where it had received
notification that same copyrighted material on another website was infringing).
15

(“Defendants maintain an ongoing relationship with their users . . . Sony’s insulation from
contributory liability is inapplicable”); Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., No. Civ-A-032670 (JBS), 2006 WL 842883, at *15 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006) (rejecting Sony defense because
“Defendants are not distributors of a device or product that has non-infringing uses like in
Grokster and Sony” but “an ongoing business”); Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 133 (lack of “ongoing
relationship” between product distributor and product user was critical factor in Sony). Hotfile is
a service with an ongoing relationship to the infringement, not a product as in Sony. Hotfile’s
continuous, ongoing relationship with its infringing users and its ongoing involvement in the
infringement occurring on and through its website render Sony inapposite.
C. The Complaint Properly Pleads Vicarious Infringement.
The Complaint also states a claim for vicarious infringement, namely “profiting from
direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at
930. Hotfile does both.
The “direct financial interest” and “legal right” elements are properly pleaded in the
Complaint and Defendants do not suggest otherwise. See Compl. ¶¶ 3, 23, 25-27, 39-43, 62.
The Complaint also alleges in detail that Hotfile has the “ability” to monitor and limit
infringement on its system, yet fails to take any steps to “stop or limit” infringement. Grokster,
545 U.S. at 930. Among other things, the Complaint alleges that Hotfile:
•

Has the ability to block infringing users from its site yet does not. See Compl. ¶ 42.

•

Has “complete control of its physical premises (i.e., the servers, databases and software
that comprise and control the Hotfile system), as well as the activities occurring on its
system.” Compl. ¶ 23.

•

“[P]hysically stores the content files on its servers, keeping track of each content file in
sophisticated databases, and could remove or disable access to infringing content files if
it chose to do so; it could also prevent content files from being stored in the first place,
and from being distributed to the general public.” Compl. ¶ 23.

•

“[C]ould . . . substantially mitigate the massive public distribution of copyrighted
content by password-protecting the ability to download files, thereby ensuring that only
the account-holder (or those individually authorized by the accountholder) could make
copies of the files uploaded by the account-holder.” Compl. ¶ 40.

•

“[C]ould use . . . readily available and effective technological solutions (including
without limitation keyword filtering, audio fingerprinting, and video fingerprinting),”
which are “easy-to-implement infringement-mitigating technologies that are widely
used to prevent online copyright infringement.” Compl. ¶ 41.

•

Could cease paying users and pirate link sites to use and promote the use of Hotfile for
16

infringement. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 35-36.
These allegations are more than sufficient to allege that Hotfile has failed to exercise its
ability to “stop or limit” infringement. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 (emphasis added). Accord
Lime Group, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 518 (“substantial evidence that LW had the right and ability to
limit the use of its product for infringing purposes, including by (1) implementing filtering; (2)
denying access; and (3) supervising and regulating users”); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023 (“[t]he
ability to block infringers’ access to a particular environment for any reason whatsoever is
evidence of the right and ability to supervise”); Usenet, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 157 (finding ability to
control where “Defendants expressly reserve the right, in their sole discretion, to terminate,
suspend or restrict users’ subscriptions, thereby limiting their access to uploading or
downloading content to or from Defendants’ servers” and “Defendants likewise have the right
and ability to block access to articles stored on their own servers that contain infringing
content”).
Relying entirely on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1173-74,
Defendants implausibly assert that they lack any “practical ability to make determinations about
whether the files [they host] infringe any of the millions of copyrights that exist in the world.”
MTD at 16. At the outset, their reliance on Amazon is misplaced. There, Google was found to
lack the ability to control infringement happening on “third-party websites,” not Google’s
system. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1173-74 (emphasis added). Hotfile, by contrast, hosts and thus can
directly control the infringing activity itself. See id. at 1174 (distinguishing Google from Napster
because the latter was “a closed system requiring user registration, and could terminate its users’
accounts and block their access to the . . . system” and therefore “had the right and ability to
prevent its users from engaging in the infringing activity”) (quoting Napster, 239 F.3d at 102324) (internal citations omitted); Usenet, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 157-58. If Defendants’ excuse were
to be credited, moreover, then no mass infringer could ever be vicariously liable, as Defendants’
excuse applies equally to – and has been asserted by – almost every operator of a system that
facilitates massive infringement. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd..
454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 988 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s argument that it “did not know
that the popular music and movies traded on its network were copyrighted” because “it is
common knowledge that most popular music and movies are copyrighted”).
At the pleading stage, Plaintiffs are entitled to have their claims regarding the availability

17

and effectiveness of various supervisory and anti-piracy methods that Defendants could have
used, but failed to, taken as true. See Compl. ¶¶ 39-42; Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d at 705;
accord, e.g., Marrari v. Med Staffing Network Holdings, 395 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1181 (S.D. Fla.
2005) (defendants “might ultimately demonstrate that they lacked the requisite power or control,
. . . [but] such a factual inquiry would be inappropriate at this time”).
III. THE COMPLAINT STATES A CLAIM AGAINST TITOV.
There are “two tests to determine personal liability for copyright infringement”
committed by a corporation. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Starware Publ’g Corp., 900 F. Supp. 438,
440-41 (S.D. Fla. 1995). Under the first, “the officer to be held personally liable must have some
direct, personal participation in the tort, as where the defendant was the ‘guiding spirit’ behind
the wrongful conduct . . . or the ‘central figure’ in the challenged corporate activity.” Mozingo v.
Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Escude Cruz v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir. 1980) (ellipsis in original)). Under the
second, “[a]n individual, including a corporate officer, who has the ability to supervise infringing
activity and has a financial interest in that activity, . . . is personally liable for the infringement.”
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801, 811 (11th
Cir. 1985) (quotation marks omitted). The Complaint specifically pleads facts about Titov’s
involvement that meet both of those tests, including that he:
•

“manages the operations of Hotfile,” Compl. ¶ 45;

•

was responsible for “the adoption of a business plan dependent upon massive copyright
infringement,” id.;

•

was responsible for “the design and implementation of Hotfile’s ‘Affiliate’ and ‘Referral’
programs, which actively encourage copyright infringement,” id.;

•

was responsible for “the implementation of technical features to frustrate copyright
owner enforcement efforts,” id.;

•

was responsible for “Hotfile’s refusal to implement any of the readily available
technologies to mitigate the infringement,” id.;

•

“himself has paid at least some of Hotfile’s uploading users,” id.; and

•

“is the President and sole officer and director of Hotfile’s hosting provider Lemuria,” a
company “Titov established . . . to avoid interruption of critical Internet hosting services
to Hotfile, after Hotfile’s previous online service provider received a subpoena
concerning Hotfile’s infringements.” Id.

In other words, the Complaint alleges detailed facts supporting its conclusion that Titov
“personally directed and participated in, exercised control over, and benefited from the specific
18

infringement-inducing conduct of Hotfile that has resulted in the massive infringement of
plaintiffs’ copyrights.” Id.
These allegations state a claim under both the “guiding spirit” and “ability to supervise
and financial interest” tests. At the pleading stage, a complaint need do no more than plead
“enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the
necessary element.” Watts, 495 F.3d at 1295-96 (quotation marks omitted). The Complaint, at a
minimum, provides “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Titov’s alleged degree of control, and specific allegations regarding his role in designing
Hotfile’s infringing business plan, affiliate programs, and technical features, qualify him as a
“central figure” or “moving force” behind the site’s direct and secondary infringement.11 The
allegations regarding Titov’s command over Hotfile’s operations, moreover, combined with the
many specific corporate policies he is alleged to have designed and implemented, see Compl. ¶
45, sufficiently plead a similar right to supervise here. Courts routinely deny motions to dismiss
much thinner allegations. For example, in Foreign Imported Productions and Publishing, Inc. v.
Grupo Industrial Hotelero, S.A., No. 07-22066-CIV, 2008 WL 4724495 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 24,
2008), the plaintiffs had done no more than allege that two individuals were employees of a
company and had control over content on the company’s website. Id. at *14. In denying a
motion to dismiss, the Court noted that it “must not only accept all of the factual allegations in
the Complaint as true,” but also “evaluate all inferences derived from those facts in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003));
see also Lifetime Homes, Inc. v. Walker Homes, Inc., No. 205CV479FTM29DNF, 2006 WL
889986, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2006) (denying motion to dismiss in copyright infringement
action); Home Design Servs., Inc. v. Stone Creek Homes, Inc., 2009 WL 4016054 (D. Colo. Nov.
13, 2009) (complaint merely alleging right and ability to supervise was “plausible on its face”).
Defendants’ argument to the contrary – and each of the (out-of-circuit, unpublished)
11

Defendants misstate the law in footnote 6 of their motion when arguing that “cases holding
corporate directors, officers or shareholders personally liable for infringement have only done so
where the individual was personally involved in procuring, creating, and/or selling infringing
materials and/or where the individual did not contest personal liability.” Personal liability is of
course warranted in the circumstances Defendants reference, but it is by no means limited to
those circumstances. See, e.g., Usenet, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 158-59; Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at
*5; Lime Group, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 521-23.
19

cases on which Defendants rely – depends on the mistaken contention that the Complaint
“merely recites the bare elements of the legal standard.” Mot. to Dismiss, at 17.12
The Complaint further alleges Titov’s financial interest in Hotfile’s infringement (and
that of its users). That Titov would pay money out of his own account to users under the
“Affiliate” program, Compl. ¶ 45, without more, creates a plausible inference of Titov’s financial
interest. His “multiple roles in [Hotfile’s] management and ownership” further suggest that he
has “a substantial financial stake in the infringing activity.” Marvin Music Co. v. BHC Ltd.
P’ship, 830 F. Supp. 651, 655 (D. Mass. 1993).13 This is enough to “raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Watts, 495 F.3d at
1295-96 (internal quotation marks omitted).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs, for the reasons stated, respectfully request that the Court deny Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss.

Dated: April 14, 2011

By: s/ Steven B. Fabrizio
Steven B. Fabrizio

12

E.g., The plaintiff in Netbula, LLC v. Chordiant Software, Inc., No. C 08-00019 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 20, 2009), pointed only to an individual’s status as CEO and shareholder. 2009 WL
750201, at *3. The plaintiff in Cable News Network, L.P. v. GoSMS.com, Inc., 00 Civ.
4812(LMM), 2000 WL 1678039, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2000), made no “allegations of acts of
infringement, supervision or control over the direct infringers, or contribution to the
infringement.” Likewise, in J&J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Walia, No. 10-5136 SC, 2011 WL
902245, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2011), the plaintiff provided no “facts to suggest that [the
individual defendants] had supervisory authority over the alleged interception and publication of
the program or that they directly benefitted financially from that activity.”
13

Evidence concerning specific payments to Titov is entirely within Defendants’ control and
undoubtedly will be uncovered during discovery. And, indeed, in other court filings, Defendants
have admitted Titov is an owner (shareholder) of Hotfile. Docket No. 30, Ex. A ¶ 2. No plaintiff
could allege financial benefit with more specificity at this stage, and the pleading standard does
not require Plaintiffs to do so. See Baxter Int’l, 345 F.3d at 881; Sweetwater Investors LLC,
2010 WL 4904673, at *7.
20

GRAY-ROBINSON, P.A.
Karen L. Stetson (FL Bar No. 742937)
1221 Brickell Avenue
Suite 1600
Miami, FL 33131
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA, INC.
Karen R. Thorland (Pro Hac Vice)
15301 Ventura Blvd.
Building E
Sherman Oaks, CA 91403

JENNER & BLOCK LLP
Steven B. Fabrizio (Pro Hac Vice)
Duane C. Pozza (Pro Hac Vice)
Luke C. Platzer (Pro Hac Vice)
1099 New York Ave., N.W.
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

21

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 1:11-cv-20427-JORDAN

DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.,
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION,
UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS PRODUCTIONS LLLP,
COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., and
WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
HOTFILE CORP., ANTON TITOV, and
DOES 1-10.
Defendants.
/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 14th Day of April, 2011, I served the foregoing Plaintiffs’
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint on all counsel of record on
the attached Service List via the Court’s CM/ECF filing system, and caused the same counsel to
be served via electronic mail.
s/ Karen L. Stetson
Karen L. Stetson

SERVICE LIST
Disney Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Hotfile Corp. et al.
CASE NO. 11-CIV-20427-JORDAN

RASCO KLOCK
Janet T. Munn
[e-mail]
283 Catalonia Ave., Suite 200
Coral Gables, FL 33134
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]

FARELLA BRAUN + MARTEL LLP
Anthony P. Schoenberg
[e-mail]
Roderick M. Thompson
[e-mail]
N. Andrew Leibnitz
[e-mail]
Deepak Gupta
[e-mail]
Janel Thamkul
[e-mail]
235 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, CA 94104
Phone: [phone]

Attorney for Defendants Hotfile Corp. and
Anton Titov
Served via ECF and electronic mail by
agreement

Attorneys for Defendants Hotfile Corp. and
Anton Titov
Served via ECF and electronic mail by
agreement

2