Miami Yacht Charters, LLC, et al v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh Pennsylvania

Filing 79

ORDER denying 63 Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendant's Second Amended Affirmative Defenses. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman on 5/29/2012. (dkc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 11-21163-CIV-GOODMAN

[CONSENT CASE]

MIAMI YACHT CHARTERS, LLC,
and ALBERTO LAMADRID,

Plaintiffs,
v.
NATIONAL UNION FIRE
fNSURANCE COMPANY OF
PITTSBURGH PENN SYLVANIA ,
Defendant.
______________________________1

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
STRIKE DEFENDANT'S SECOND AMENDED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

This cause is before the Court on Plaintiffs ' Motion to Strike Defendant's Second
Amended Affirmative Defenses .

[ECF No . 63] .

The Court reviewed the motion and

Defendant' S response [ECF No. 66] and, for the reasons below, the Court DENIES the motion.

1.

INTRODUCTION

This is an action for alleged breach of an insurance contract filed by Plaintiffs, the owners
of an insured yacht, against Defendant, the yacht insurer. Plaintiffs have moved to strike: (1)
Defendant's second amended affirmative defenses 6 and 7 as insufficiently pled under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b); (2) paragraphs 18, 20, and 21 of affirmative defense 7 as
containing immaterial and impertinent allegations; and (3) affirmative defenses 8 through 15 as
improperly raised without leave of the Court. [ECF No. 63].

II.

ANALYSIS

a. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 6
The Court DENIES the motion to strike this affirmative defense because it concludes it
does not allege fraud when properly construed. The defense here concerns misrepresentations or
failures to disclose material facts "regardless of the intent."
supplied)].

[ECF No. 61, p. 2 (emphasis

Indeed, the latest version of this defense neither contains the word "fraud" nor

expressly alleges "mistake" - two defenses which would need to be stated with "particularity"
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The "regardless of the intent" language did not
appear in earlier versions of this defense.
In response to the motion to strike, Defendant further clarifies that this defense "is not an
allegation of fraud" and Defendant explains that it is instead merely attempting to raise the
(alleged) maritime insurance law principal that "any material misrepresentation of fact,
regardless of intent and regardless of whether it was made before or after a loss, voids the policy
of marine insurance from its inception." [ECF No. 66, p. 5]. Defendant also contends that the
specific maritime insurance policy applicable to this case contains a provision embodying this
principal. I In addition, Defendant cites a case supporting this principle in the maritime insurance
contract application context. Specifically, in Steelmet. Inc. v. Caribe Towing Corporation, 747
F.2d 689, 695 (11 th Cir. 1984), the Eleventh Circuit cited with approval a line of cases holding
that "nothing is better established in the law of marine insurance than that 'a mistake or
commission material to a marine risk, whether it be willful or accidental, or result from mistake,
negligence or voluntary ignorance, avoids the policy, and the same rule obtains, even though the

Defendant does not specifically identify it as such, but it appears that Defendant
reproduced this alleged contractual provision in paragraph 25 of affirmative defense 7. [ECF
No. 61, p. 4].
2

insured did not suppose the fact to be material."

ld. (additional quotation marks omitted;

emphasis supplied).
The Court agrees with Defendant's construction that this affirmative defense concerns
only unintentional, negligent or innocent misrepresentations or failures to disclose. The Court
notes, however, that the parties have not fully briefed the issue of whether any misrepresentation
or failure to disclose material facts in support of an insurance claim can void a maritime
insurance contract and Defendant has not specifically identified what portion of the contract
supports this defense. The Court is therefore at this time not judging the viability of this defense
and will do so only if this defense is actually contested, for example, in a summary judgment
motion or at trial.
b. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 7

Plaintiffs contend that this affirmative defense lacks detail sufficient to satisfy Rule 9(b)
because Defendant did not describe "how the misrepresentations mislead Defendant, or what, if
anything Defendant contends Plaintiffs obtained by making these statements." [ECF No . 63, p.
3].

However, the Court DENIES the motion to strike defense 7 because it concludes

Defendant's allegations satisfy Rule 9(b).
Plaintiff Alberto

Lamadrid

This affirmative defense alleges that individual

gave deposition

testimony

and

both

Plaintiffs submitted

documentation in support of a revised damages estimate in excess of $300,000.00 but that
Lamadrid later acknowledged at a second deposition that the sum included repairs unrelated to
the damage the insured ship suffered as a result of the incident at issue. [ECF No . 61,

~~

19-24].

Moreover, the affirmative defense also states that Plaintiffs provided the testimony and
documents "as a means of defrauding the Defendant in order to underwrite the extensive
renovation of his vessel and to have the Defendant pay for improvements totally unrelated to the
3

incident." [ld. at

~

29]. There is more than adequate detail to meet Rule 9(b)'s particularity

requirement.
The Court also DENIES the motion to strike paragraphs 18, 20, and 21 of affirmative
defense 7.

The Court reviewed these paragraphs and concludes they do not contain any

immaterial or impertinent allegations.
c.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 8 THROUGH 15

Plaintiffs correctly note that Defendant raised these additional defenses without leave of
court. However, the Court DENIES the motion to strike and exercises its discretion to permit
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

Defendant to raise these additional defenses.

The eight "new"

affirmative defenses are simply more-specific versions of Defendant's original amended
affirmative defense 3. Defense number 3 states that "[t]he policy of marine insurance referenced
in the Plaintiffs' Complaint does not afford any coverage for the incident described therein."
[Compare ECF No. 38-3,

~

13 (amended defense 3), with ECF No. 61,

13 (second amended

defense 3)]. Second amended affirmative defenses 8 through 15 merely specify the particular
reasons why Defendant contends the policy does not provide coverage for the incident at issue in
this lawsuit.
While technically unauthorized, these amendments narrow the defenses at issue in this
lawsuit and therefore provide Plaintiffs with greater clarity as to exactly why Defendant believes
no coverage exists.

At the same time, by filing these second amended defenses, Defendant

outlined the parameters of affirmative defense 3 - and that defense is therefore no longer
susceptible to an interpretation which would include any reasons for the lack of coverage not
specifically identified in defenses 8 through 15.

Finally, the Court notes that any prejudice

Plaintiffs may believe this ruling will cause them is ameliorated by the Court's recent ruling
4

providing Plaintiffs with a second opportunity to take the deposition of Defendant's corporate

f~

representative. [See ECF No. 68].
DONE and ORDERED, in Chambers, in Miami, Florida, this

Jona
Copies furnished to:

All Counsel of Record

5

~ day of May, 2012.

oodman
States Magistrate Judge