Lacy v. BP p.l.c., Ltd et al

Filing 177

OMNIBUS ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS granting 68 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 69 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 69 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granti ng 82 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 101 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 163 Motion to Dismiss. Closing Case. Motions Terminated: 161 MOTION to Vacate 160 Order on Motion for E xtension of Time to Answer RE: Complaints, filed by Franklin R. Lacy, 125 MOTION to Delay Decision on all BP and Halliburton Defendants' Motions for Dismissal until after January 15, 2013 or after the Court has Ruled on this Motion and set a date, whichever comes first filed by Franklin R. Lacy, 117 Defendant's MOTION to Set Aside Default and Special Appearance filed by Applied Drilling Technology, Inc., 162 MOTION for Default Judgment filed by Franklin R. Lacy, [1 01] MOTION TO DISMISS 67 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by BP Holdings North America Ltd., 128 MOTION to Compel Defendant Halliburton Company to Respond with particularity as approved by the Court to Plain tiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents or in the Alternativealternative Plaintiff Moves that all filed by Franklin R. Lacy, 127 MOTION to Compel BP Defendants to Respond Separately with Particularity a s Approved by the Court to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and REQUEST for Production of Documents or in the alternative Plaintiff Moves that all dates on the Sch filed by Franklin R. Lacy, 69 MOTION TO DISMISS 67 Amended Complai nt FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 67 Amended Complaint filed by Bob Dudley, BP Products North America Inc., BP P.L.C., BP Exploration & Production, Inc., BP Oil International Limit ed, Carl-Henric Svanberg, BP America, Inc., 82 MOTION TO DISMISS 67 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by BP Company North America Inc., BP America Production Company, BP Corporation North America Inc., [176 ] UNSTIPULATED Amended MOTION for Substitution of Counsel filed by Applied Drilling Technology, Inc., Transocean Ltd., 129 MOTION to Compel Defendant Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. to Respond with Particularity as approved by the Court to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents or in the Alternative Plaintiff Moves that a filed by Franklin R. Lacy, 137 MOTION to Strike 129 MOTION to Compel Defendant Halliburton En ergy Services, Inc. to Respond with Particularity as approved by the Court to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents or in the Alterna filed by Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 110 MOTION for Def ault Judgment filed by Franklin R. Lacy, 163 Defendant's MOTION to Dismiss 67 Amended Complaint filed by Applied Drilling Technology, Inc., 115 Defendant's MOTION to Set Aside Default by Special Appearance filed by Transocean Ltd., 68 MOTION TO DISMISS 67 Amended Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION filed by Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., Halliburton Company, 146 MOTION for Default and Respons e re 137 MOTION to Strike 129 MOTION to Compel Defendant Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. to Respond with Particularity as approved by the Court to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Request filed by Franklin R. Lacy, [ 148] MOTION for Reconsideration re 143 Order on Motion to Stay, filed by Franklin R. Lacy, 175 UNSTIPULATED Joint MOTION for Substitution of Counsel filed by Transocean Ltd.. Signed by Judge Marcia G. Cooke on 6/29/2015. (tm) NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014-69.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 11-Civ-21855-COOKE/TURNOFF
FRANKLIN R. LACY,
Plaintiff,
v.
BP, PLC; TRANSOCEAN LTD; APPLIED
DRILLING TECHNOLOGY, INC.;
CHALLENGER MINERALS, INC.,
HALLIBURTON COMPANY; CARL-HENRIC
SVANBERG; BOB DUDLEY; BP
AMERICA, INC.; BP PRODUCTS
NORTH AMERICA, INC.; BP
EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION INC.; BP
OIL INTERNATIONAL LTD;
HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES,
INC.; BP CORPORATION NORTH
AMERICA, INC.; BP COMPANY NORTH
AMERICA, INC.; BP AMERICA
PRODUCTION COMPANY; and, BP
HOLDINGS NORTH AMERICA, LTD.
Defendants.
_______________________________________________/
OMNIBUS ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ multiple Motions to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 68, 69, 82, 101, 163). Plaintiff has responded in
opposition to the Motions, (ECF Nos. 74, 79, 83, 105, 166), and Defendants have replied.
(ECF Nos. 76, 77). After reviewing the pleadings, the record, and the relevant legal
authorities, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is dismissed, with prejudice, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s lawsuit, filed pro se, arises out of the fire and explosion aboard the Deep
Water Horizon oil rig and the resulting oil spill out of the Macondo Well. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants BP p.l.c. (“BP”), Transocean Ltd. (“Transocean”), Halliburton Company

(“Halliburton”), and their subsidiaries established a website to request that “vendors send
them solutions for stopping the disastrous oil spill and/or clean up [sic] the environment.”
(Am. Compl. 3, 5). Without citing to specific language from the website, Plaintiff further
alleges that Defendants offered to pay an uncapped fee to vendors upon a successful
submission, calculated as a percentage of the total savings attributable to the vendor’s
solution. (Id. at 4).
Plaintiff concedes that BP communicated to him that it had rejected his submission.
(Id.) However, he claims that Defendants then secretively used his model, saving themselves
“an amount approaching $40.9 billion.” (Id. at 3, 4). Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks $6 billion
in damages from Defendants, as well as “interest at 18% per annum from July 17, 2010 and
50% punitive damages” for Defendants’ alleged fraud, civil theft, and breach of implied
contract. (Id. at 6, 7).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Choice of Law
Florida's choice-of-law rules govern this case. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941) (holding that federal courts sitting in diversity apply the conflict of laws
rules of the state in which they sit). Under Florida law, “a court makes a separate choice of
law determination with respect to each particular issue under consideration.” Trumpet Vine
Investments, N.V. v. Union Capital Partners I, Inc., 92 F.3d 1110, 1115 (11th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff does not state what law governs his claims and his Complaint is factually deficient
to the extent that it precludes a thorough conflict of laws analysis. However, under the
circumstances, and for the reasons stated below, I find that Florida law is most appropriate
for each of Plaintiff’s three claims.
To determine what law governs tort claims, Florida courts apply “the ‘most
significant relationship’ test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §
145.” Id. Section 148 of the Restatement provides the choice of law principles applicable to
claims of fraud and states:
(2) When the plaintiff's action in reliance took place in whole or in part in a state other
than that where the false representations were made, the forum will consider such of the
following contacts, among others, as may be present in the particular case in
determining the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties:

(a) the place, or places, where the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the defendant's
representations,
(b) the place where the plaintiff received the representations,
(c) the place where the defendant made the representations,
(d) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of businessof
the parties,
(e) the place where a tangible thing which is the subject of the transaction between the
parties was situated at the time, and
(f) the place where the plaintiff is to render performance under a contract which he has
been induced to enter by the false representations of the defendant.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 148 (1971).
Plaintiff alleges “the consortium committed fraud in deliberately making false
statements for their [sic] gain,” but refers only to one statement made by Mr. Hymers, the
managing patent attorney of BP International Ltd., on February 7, 2011. (Am. Compl. 5, 6).
Plaintiff claims that Mr. Hymers’ statement—“Regardless, none of your suggestions were
progressed beyond the first state of the assessment process and thus none were passed to
those developing the equipment and process implemented on the Macondo Well”—was
“blatantly false” and “fraudulent.” (Id. at 5).1 Plaintiff does not say how or where he relied
on this statement, but the location of reliance is an important factor in determining what law
applies to the fraud claim. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 148(2)(a) (1971).
If Plaintiff did rely on the above statement to his detriment, he likely did so in Florida.2
Weighing the aforementioned factors with limited facts and evidence, I have determined
that Florida law governs Plaintiff’s fraud claim, as Florida appears to have the most
“significant relationship” to this cause of action.
The “most significant relationship” test also applies to Plaintiff’s civil theft or
conversion claims.3 Trumpet Vine, 92 F.3d at 1115; Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 147 comment h. Plaintiff’s claim of civil theft or conversion presumably relates to
the design documents attached to the Complaint. (Am. Compl. 17, 18, 25). However,

1

Mr. Hymers included this statement in a letter sent “via post and email” from his address in Middlesex,
United Kingdom to Mr. Lacy’s address in Tampa, Florida. (Am. Compl. 37).
2

With regard to this cause of action, Mr. Lacy never claims that he travelled or acted outside of the state of
Florida.
3

Plaintiff alleges “theft/larceny,” which are crimes. (Am. Compl. 6). I will address these allegations as the
torts of civil theft and conversion.

Plaintiff never claims he sent those documents to Defendants. Therefore, the state that has
the “most significant relationship” to the alleged civil theft or conversion is Florida, where
Plaintiff may have created those documents. Accordingly, Florida law governs Plaintiff’s
civil theft or conversion claim. Trumpet Vine, 92 F.3d at 1115-16.
For conflict of laws issues arising out of contract, Florida applies the lex loci contractus
rule. Trumpet Vine, 92 F.3d at 1119. Under this rule, the law of the place where the contract
is made governs the obligations of contract. Jemco, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 400 So. 2d
499, 500 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981). A contract is made where the last act necessary to complete
the contract is performed. Id. Plaintiff does not address any of the elements of express or
implied contract, including formation or reliance. Therefore, Plaintiff’s contract claim fails
in such a way as to prevent the Court from determining which law governs. Accordingly,
the Court will apply Florida law for the purpose of laying out the fundamental elements of
contract.
B. Pleading Standards
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To meet this pleading standard, and
thereby survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead claims that are not just
conceivable, but “plausible” on their face. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility
standard requires factual allegations that are sufficiently developed, allowing the court to
draw the “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
A plaintiff alleging state law fraud claims must satisfy the heightened pleading
standard of Rule 9(b), which requires that a plaintiff state the circumstances with
“particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); FindWhat Investor Group v.FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d
1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011). Rule 9(b) “plainly requires a complaint to set forth (1) precisely
what statements or omissions were made in which documents or oral representations; (2)
the time and place of each such statement and the person responsible for making (or, in the
case of omissions, not making) them; (3) the content of such statements and the manner in
which they misled the plaintiff; and (4) what the defendant obtained as a consequence of the

fraud.” Id. Failure to meet this higher standard is grounds for dismissal. Id. (quoting Corsello
v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1012 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)).
Although a pro se litigant's pleadings are construed more liberally than pleadings
drafted by attorneys, “this leniency does not give the court license to serve as de facto
counsel for a party ... or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an
action.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)
(citations omitted). “Where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a
plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district court
dismisses the action with prejudice.” Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991). A
district court need not, however, “allow an amendment . . . where an amendment would be
futile.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001).
III.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state claims that are plausible on their face
against any Defendant. I will address each of Plaintiff’s claims in turn.
A. Breach of Implied Contract
First, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege the elements of a contract implied in law, or
quasi contract, namely that: “(1) the plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant; (2)
the defendant has knowledge of the benefit; (3) the defendant has accepted or retained the
benefit conferred and (4) the circumstances are such that it would be inequitable for the
defendant to retain the benefit without paying fair value for it.” Commerce P'ship 8098 Ltd.
P'ship v. Equity Contracting Co., 695 So. 2d 383, 386 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
Plaintiff fails to include any factual allegations in his Amended Complaint that are
“plausible” enough to allow a “reasonable inference” of the existence of any of the four
elements of quasi contract. In fact, Plaintiff concedes that his Amended Complaint lacks the
detail necessary to allege how Defendants purportedly used his idea, and admits that his
submission did not provide BP with sufficient detail to implement his idea. (ECF No. 72 at
38-39). However, Plaintiff asks that the court overlook the “brevity” of his submission to
Defendants because “Defendants’ submission form was extremely limiting.” (Id.). In any
event, Plaintiff’s conclusion that “Defendants obviously incorporated Plaintiff’s solutions” is
unsupported by any plausible factual allegation. (Id.). Without any showing of actions or
statements that could give rise to a contract implied in law, Plaintiff’s breach of contract

claim cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.
B. Civil Theft or Conversion
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also fails to allege a plausible claim of civil theft or
conversion by any of the Defendants. Under Florida Law, a claimant must prove the
statutory elements of theft, as well as criminal intent, to establish a cause of action for civil
theft. Fla. Stat. § 772.11 (1997); Gersh v. Cofman, 769 So. 2d 407, 409 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
A person commits theft if he “knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use,
the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently: (1) deprive the
other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property, or (2) appropriate the
property to his or her own use or to the use of any person not entitled to the use of the
property.” Fla. Stat. § 812.014 (2011).
Plaintiff attaches a number of unspecified figures and drawings to his Amended
Complaint, but fails to specify whether he sent those figures and drawings to BP or any of
the other Defendants, either through use of their submission forms or through another form
of correspondence. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims do not allow for a reasonable inference
that Defendants used his submissions or that they had the criminal intent necessary for a
civil theft claim. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim of civil theft does not meet the pleading
standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal, and cannot survive Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss.
C. Fraud
Finally, Plaintiff’s fraud claims do not meet the heightened pleading standard
articulated by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Florida law, the
elements of fraud are: “(1) a false statement concerning a specific material fact, (2) the
maker's knowledge that the representation is false, (3) an intention that the representation
induces another's reliance, and (4) consequent injury by the other party acting in reliance on
the representation." Lopez-Infante v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 809 So. 2d 13, 15 (Fla. 3d DCA
2002).
Plaintiff cites to a BP rejection letter he received, concluding that the statements
therein are “blatantly false” and “fraudulent.” (Am. Compl. 5). However, the pleading
requirements set forth in Twombly and Iqbal do not permit courts to proceed on
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements . . . .” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff completely fails to address the elements of
fraud, and does not articulate any statements or circumstances to even remotely support
those elements.
D. CONCLUSION
Therefore, due to a complete lack of plausible factual allegations, Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint cannot survive Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. Moreover, I find that
additional amendments to Plaintiff’s already amended Complaint would be futile.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 68, 69, 82, 101, 163) are
GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 67) is DISMISSED with prejudice.
3. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.
4. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE and ORDERED in chambers, at Miami, Florida, this 29th day of June 2015.

Copies provided to:
William C. Turnoff, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Counsel of Record
Franklin R. Lacy, pro se