Wooden et al v. National Football League

Filing 1

COMPLAINT --Class Action against All Plaintiffs. Filing fee $ 350.00 receipt number 113C-4398627, filed by Shawn Wooden, Ryan Fowler. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet)(Rosenthal, Stephen)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Miami Division

SHAWN WOODEN; and RYAN
FOWLER; individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
COMPLAINT - CLASS ACTION

Defendant.
/

COMPLAINT
The Plaintiffs Shawn Wooden and

Ryan Fowler (the "Representative Plaintiffs"),

individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, sue the Defendant National Football
League (the "NFL" or the "League"), and state as follows:
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1.

This action arises from the concussion crisis afflicting former professional football

players in the National Football League (the "NFL" or the "League").

For close to a century,

evidence has linked concussions and long-term neurological problems,

and specialists in brain

trauma have been warning about the risks of permanent brain damage from repetitive concussions
for decades. The NFL - as the organizer and purveyor of a professional sport in which head

trauma is a regular and repeated occurrence - was aware of these risks but deliberately ignored and
concealed them. Rather than warn its players that they risked permanent brain injury if they
returned to play too soon after sustaining a concussion, the NFL actively deceived players,
resulting in the players’ belief that concussions did not present serious, life-altering risks.
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2.

The NFL, through its own initiative and voluntary undertaking, created the Mild

Traumatic Brain Injury Committee (the "MTBI Committee" or the "Committee") in 1994, The

Committee was ostensibly created to research and ameliorate the impact of concussions on NFL
players.
3.

Despite clear medical evidence that on-field concussions led directly to brain

injuries and frequently had tragic repercussions for its retired players, the NFL failed to protect
other players from suffering a similar fate, and failed to inform players of the true risks associated
with such head trauma.

Instead, the NFL purposefully misrepresented and/or concealed medical

evidence on the issue. While athletes who had suffered concussions in other professional sports
were being restricted from returning to play for full games or even seasons, NFL players who had
suffered concussions were regularly being returned to play after having suffered a concussion in
that same game or practice.
4.

The NFL’s active and purposeful concealment of the severe neurological risks

associated with concussions exposed players to dangers they could have avoided had the League
provided them with accurate information. Many of these players, since retired, have suffered
severe and permanent brain damage as a result of the NFL’s acts and/or omissions. In fact, the
MTBI Committee’s concealment of relevant medical evidence over the years has caused an

increased risk of life-threatening injury to players who were being kept in the dark.
5.

The Representative Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly

situated, are bringing this action for injunctive relief in the form of medical monitoring with
respect to brain injuries caused by repeated traumatic brain and head impacts received during the
period when they were playing professional football.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the

parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy in this action exceeds $75,000.00
dollars, exclusive of costs, interest, and attorneys’ fees,
7.

This Court also has original jurisdiction over this action under the Class Action

Fairness Act of 2005. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2) and (6), this Court has original

jurisdiction because there are more than one hundred (100) class members and because the amount
in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs, for the class claim, and at
least one of the Plaintiffs is a resident of a different state than the Defendant.
8.

This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant because it has substantial

and continuous business contacts with the State of Florida, including but not limited to its having

three (3) franchises which play in Florida, and derives substantial revenue from its contacts with
Florida.
9.

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U. S.C. § 1391 (a)(2) because a substantial part of the

events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this judicial district, and because under 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c) Defendant is a corporation subject to personal jurisdiction in this District.

PARTIES
10.

Plaintiff Shawn Wooden is a resident and citizen of the State of Florida. He

played in the NFL from 1996 to 2004 for the Miami Dolphins and Chicago Bears.
ii.

Plaintiff Fowler is a resident and citizen of the State of Tennessee. He played in

the NFL from 2004 to 2009 for the Tennessee Titans, Dallas Cowboys and New York Jets.
11

Defendant NFL, which maintains its principal place of business at 280 Park

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Avenue, 15th Floor, New York, New York 10017, is an unincorporated association consisting of
thirty-two (32) member football teams.
13.

The NFL regularly conducts business in Florida, including, but not limited to the

organizing and overseeing of games for the Miami Dolphins, Tampa Bay Buccaneers, and
Jacksonville Jaguars teams, and selecting Florida cities to host the Super Bowl in Florida in 1968,

IlL
professional football league in the United States. As such, the NFL promotes, organizes, and
regulates the sport of professional football in the United States.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

15.

This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b).
16.

The Representative Plaintiffs bring this action for injunctive relief in the form of

medical monitoring on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (the "Class"), with

respect to which the NFL has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class.
17.

This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy,

predominance, and superiority requirements of Rule 23.

18.

The Class is defined as:
All retired NFL players who played prior to the 2010 NFL season and who,
during their NFL careers, suffered a concussion and were returned to
contact play within ten (10) days of having suffered the concussion, and
who, as of the date of class certification, are neither (a) advancing an
individual personal injury claim for money damages against the NFL, nor
(b) a salaried employee of the NFL.

19.

Any differences in the laws of states that permit medical monitoring can be

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accommodated through the creation of subclasses, which Plaintiffs shall identify in their motion
for class certification.

20.

Excluded from the Class is the NFL, its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, members,

officers and directors, any entity in which the NFL has a controlling interest, governmental
entities, and all judges assigned to hear any aspect of this litigation, as well as their immediate
family members.
21.

The Representative Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify or amend the definition of

the proposed Class before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate.
22.

The Class is so numerous and geographically so widely dispersed that

joinder of all

members is impracticable.
23.

There are questions of law and fact common to the Class, and those common

questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members.
24.

The questions of law and fact common to the Class include but are not limited to the

following:

i.

Whether the Representative Plaintiffs and the Class were exposed to
a greater than normal risk of brain injury following a return to
contact play too soon after suffering an initial concussion;

ii.

Whether that greater than normal exposure level was caused by the
NFL’s negligent misconduct;

iii.

Whether the Representative Plaintiffs and the Class have an
increased risk of developing latent neurological disorders as a
proximate result of the increased exposure;

iv.

Whether a monitoring procedure exists that makes the early
detection of those diseases or symptoms possible;

V.

Whether that prescribed monitoring regime is reasonably necessary
according to contemporary scientific principles; and

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vi.

25,

Whether the Representative Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to
the medical monitoring relief that they seek herein.

The Representative Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class that they

represent, and the Representative Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
proposed Class. The Representative Plaintiffs, like all Class members, have been damaged by the
NFL’s misconduct related to the concealment of the severe neurological risks associated with
concussions. Further, the factual basis of the NFL’s misconduct is common to all Class members,

and represents a common thread of negligent misconduct resulting in injury to all members of the

26.

The Representative Plaintiffs have suffered the hanrn alleged and have no interests

antagonistic to the interests of any other Class member.
27.

The Representative Plaintiffs are committed to the vigorous prosecution of this

action and have retained competent counsel experienced in the prosecution of class actions.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs are adequate representatives

and will fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the Class.
28.

The monitoring is medically reasonable and necessary and will allow the Class to

29.

A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient

adjudication of this controversy. Given the complex legal and factual issues involved,
individualized litigation would significantly increase the delay and expense to all parties and to the

30.

Individualized litigation would also create the potential for inconsistent or

contradictory rulings.

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31.

By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides

the benefits of adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL COUNTS

The NFL

The organization oversees America’s most popular spectator sport, acting as a trade

33.

association for thirty-two (32) franchise owners.
34.

The NFL governs and promotes the game of football, sets and enforces rules and

League policies, and regulates team ownership.
35.

It

generates

revenue mostly through marketing sponsorships, licensing

merchandise, and by selling national broadcasting rights to the games. The teams share a
percentage of the League’s overall revenue.
Owing in part to its immense financial power and monopoly, status in American

36.

football, the NFL has enormous influence over the education of team physicians, trainers, coaches,
and football players at all levels of the game concerning the assessment and impact of football
related injuries.

Concussions and CTE Generally
37.

It has been well known for nearly a century that concussions and repetitive head

injuries cause a myriad of long-term sequelae.
38.

The American Association of Neurological Surgeons defines a concussion as "a

clinical syndrome characterized by an immediate and transient alteration in brain function,
including an alteration of mental status and level of consciousness, resulting from mechanical
aTIuuiIiB!

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39.

The injury generally occurs when the head either accelerates rapidly and then is

stopped, or is rotated rapidly. The results frequently include, among other things, confusion,

blurred vision, memory loss, nausea, and sometimes unconsciousness.
40.

Medical evidence has shown that symptoms of a concussion can reappear hours or

days after the injury, indicating that the injured party has not healed from the initial blow.
41.

According to neurologists, once a person suffers a concussion, he is up to four (4)

times more likely to sustain a second one. Additionally, after suffering even a single concussion,
a lesser blow may cause the injury, and the injured person requires more time to recover. This

goes to the heart of the problem: players returning to play before allowing their initial concussion
to heal fully.

42.

Clinical and neuropathological studies by some of the nation’s foremost experts

have demonstrated that multiple concussions sustained during an NFL player’s career can cause
severe cognitive problems such as depression and early-onset dementia.

43.

Repeated head trauma can also result in so-called "Second Impact Syndrome," in

which re-injury to a person who has already suffered a concussion triggers swelling that the skull
cannot accommodate.
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Encephalopathy ("CTE"), a progressive degenerative disease of the brain.
45.

CTE involves the build-up of toxic proteins in the brain’s neurons. This build-up

results in a condition whereby signals sent from one cell to thousands of connecting cells in
various parts of the brain are not received, leading to abnormal and diminished brain function.

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46.

CTE is found in athletes (and others) with a history of repetitive concussions.

Conclusive studies have shown this condition to be prevalent in retired professional football

players who have a history of head injury.
47.

This head trauma, which includes multiple concussions, triggers progressive

degeneration of the brain tissue. These changes in the brain are thought to begin when an
athlete’s brain is subjected to trauma, but symptoms may not appear until months, years, or even
decades after the last concussion or the

end of active athletic involvement. The brain

degeneration is associated with memory loss, confusion, impaired judgment, paranoia,
impulse-control problems, aggression, depression, and eventually progressive dementia.
48.

The University of North Carolina’s Center for the Study of Retired Athletes

published survey-based papers in 2005 through 2007 that found a strong correlation between
depression, dementia, and other cognitive impairment in NFL players and the number of
concussions those players had received.
49.

To date, neuropathologists have performed autopsies on over twenty-five (25)

former NFL players. Reports indicate that over ninety percent (90%) of the players had CTE.
The NFL’s Knowledge of the Dangers and Risks Associated with Concussions
50.

For decades, the NFL has been aware that multiple blows to the head can lead to

long-term brain injury, including but not limited to memory loss, dementia, depression, and CTE
and its related symptoms.
51.

CTE was first addressed in a 1928 article written by pathologist Harrison Martland,

discussing ’Punch Drunk" syndrome in a group of athletes exposed to repetitive brain trauma (the
"Martland study"). The article was published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association.

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52.

The Martland study was the first to link sub-concussive blows and "mild

concussions" to degenerative brain disease.
53.

In or about 1952, the Journal of the American Medical Association published a

study of encephalopathic changes in professional boxers.
54.

That same year, an article published in the New England Journal of Medicine

recommended a three-strike rule for concussions in football (i.e., recommending that players cease
to play football after receiving their third concussion.)
55.

In 1973, a potentially fatal condition known as "Second Impact Syndrome"in

which re-injury to the already-concussed brain triggers swelling that the skull cannot
accommodatewas
56.

discovered. It did not receive this name until 1984.

Upon information and belief, Second Impact Syndrome has resulted in the deaths

of at least forty (40) football players.

57.

Between 1952 and 1994, numerous studies were published in medical journals

including the Journal of the American Medical Association, Neurology, and the New England
Journal of Medicine, warning of the dangers of single concussions, multiple concussions, and/or

football-related head trauma from multiple concussions. These studies collectively established
that:
i.

repetitive head trauma in contact sports has dangerous long-term
effects on the brain;

ii.

post-mortem evidence of CTE was present in numerous cases of
boxers and contact-sport athletes;

iii.

there is a relation between neurologic pathology and length of career
in athletes who play contact sports;

iv.

immediate retrograde memory issues occur following concussions;
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V.

vi.

head trauma is linked to dementia; and

vii.

58.

mild head injury requires recovery time without risk of subjection to
further injury;

a football player who suffers a concussion requires significant rest
before being subjected to further contact.

By 1991, three distinct medical professionals/entities, all
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Neurology, and the Colorado Medical Societydeveloped return-to-play criteria for football

players suspected of having sustained head injuries.
59.

Upon information and belief, by 1991, the National Collegiate Athletic Association

("NCAA") football conferences and individual college teams’ medical staffs, along with many
lower-level football groups (e.g., high school, junior high school, and pee-wee league) had
adopted return-to-play criteria to protect football players even remotely suspected of having

sustained concussions.
60.

In 1999, the National Center for Catastrophic Sport Injury Research at the

University of North Carolina conducted a study involving eighteen thousand (18,000) collegiate
and high school football players. The research showed that once a player suffered one
concussion, he was three times more likely to sustain a second in the same season.
61.

A 2000 study, which surveyed 1,090 former NFL players, found that more than

sixty percent had suffered at least one concussion, and twenty-six percent had suffered three or
more, during their careers. Those who had sustained concussions reported more problems with
memory, concentration, speech impediments, headaches, and other neurological problems than
those who had not been concussed.

II

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62.

In 2004, a convention of neurological experts in Prague met with the aim of

providing recommendations for the improvement of safety and health of athletes who suffer
concussive injuries in ice hockey. rugby, football, and other sports based on the most up-to-date
research. These experts recommended that a player never be returned to play while symptomatic,
and coined the phrase, "when in doubt, sit them out."
63.

This echoed similar medical protocol established at a Vienna conference in 2001.

These two conventions were attended by predominately American doctors who were experts and
leaders in the neurological field.

64.

Upon information and belief, in literally hundreds upon thousands of games and

practices, concussed playersincluding those knocked entirely unconsciouswere returned to
play in the same game or practice.

65.

Indeed, while the NFL knew for decades of the harmful effects of concussions on a

player’s brain, it actively concealed these facts from coaches, trainers, players, and the public.
The NFL Voluntarily Undertakes the Responsibility
of Studying Concussions
Yet Conceals the Long-Term Effects of Concussions

66.

As described above, the NFL has known for decades that multiple blows to the head

can lead to long-term brain injury, including, but not limited to, Inemory loss, dementia,
depression, and CTE and its related symptoms.
67.

Rather than take immediate measures to protect its players from these known

dangers, the NFL instead formed a committee to study the issue in 1994, This Committee, the
Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee (the "MTBI Committee" or the "Committee"),

voluntarily undertook the responsibility of studying the effects of concussions on NFL players.

UN

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68.

Through its creation of the MTBI Committee, the NFL affirmatively assumed a

duty to use reasonable care in the study of concussions and post-concussion syndrome in NFL
players, and to use reasonable care in the publication of data from the MTBI Committee’s work.
69.

Rather than exercising reasonable care in these duties, the NFL immediately

engaged in a long-running course of negligent conduct.
70.

The MTBI Committee’s stated goal was to present objective findings on the extent

to which a concussion problem existed in the League, and to outline solutions, The MTBI
Committee’s studies were supposed to be geared toward "improv[ing] player safety" and for the
purpose of instituting "rule changes aimed at reducing head injuries."
71.

By 1994, when the NFL formed the MTBI Committee, independent scientists,

doctors, and neurologists alike were already convinced that all concussionseven seemingly mild
oneswere

serious injuries that can permanently damage the brain, impair thinking ability and

memory, and hasten the onset of mental decay and senility, especially when they are inflicted
frequently and without time to properly heal.
72.

The MTBI Committee was intended to be independent from the NFL, consisting of

a combination of doctors and researchers.
73.

In actuality however, the MTBI Committee was not independent, it consisted of at

least five members who were already affiliated with the NFL.
74,

The Committee was headed by Dr. Elliot Peliman, a rheumatologist who lacked

any specialized training or education relating to concussions, and who reportedly had previously
been fired by Major League Baseball for lying to Congress regarding his resume. Dr. Pellman
would go on to chair the MTBI Committee from 1994-2007, and his leadership of the Committee

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came under frequent harsh outside criticism related to his deficient medical training, background,
and experience.
75.

The NFL failed to appoint any neuropatholo gist to the MTBI Committee.

76.

From its inception in 1994, the MTBI Committee allegedly began conducting

studies to determine the effect of concussions on the long-term health of NFL players. NFL
Commissioner Roger Goodell ("Goodell") confirmed this in June 2007 when he stated publicly

that the NFL had been studying the effects of traumatic brain injury for "close to 14 years. . .
77.

The MTBI Committee did not publish its first findings on active players until 2003.

In that publication, the MTBI Committee stated, contrary to years of (independent) findings, that
there were no long term negative health consequences associated with concussions.

78.

The MTBI Committee published its findings in a series of sixteen papers between

2003 and 2009. According to the MTBI Committee, all of their findings supported a conclusion
that there were no long term negative health consequences associated with concussions. These
findings regularly contradicted the research and experiences of neurologists who treat sports
concussions and the players who endured them.
79.

Completely contrary to public findings and conclusions, the NFL’s team of

hand-picked experts on the MTBI Committee did not find concussions to be of significant concern
and felt it appropriate for players suffering a concussion to continue playing football during the

same game or practice in which one was suffered. This recommendation and practice by the
NFL, promoted by the MTBI Committee, was irresponsible and dangerous.
80.

The MTBI Committee’s methodology and the conclusions reached in their research

were criticized by independent experts due to the numerous flaws in the study design,

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methodology, and interpretation of the data, which led to conclusions at odds with common

81.

For example, in 2004 the MTBI Committee published a conclusion in which it

claimed that the Committee’s research found no risk of repeated concussions in players with

previous concussions and that there was no "7- to 10- day window of increased susceptibility to
sustaining another concussion."
82.

In a comment to this publication, one independent doctor wrote that "[t]he article

sends a message that it is acceptable to return players while still symptomatic, which contradicts
literature published over the past twenty years suggesting that athletes be returned to play only
after they are asymptomatic, and in some cases for seven days."

83.

As further example, an MTBI Committee conclusion in 2005 stated that "[t]here

was no evidence of any adverse effect" of a player returning to play in the same game after having
suffered a concussion. "These data suggest," the Committee reported, "that these players were at

no increased risk" of subsequent concussions or prolonged symptoms such as memory loss,
headaches, and disorientation.

84.

Yet, a 2003 NCAA study of 2,905 college football players found just time opposite:

"Those who have suffered concussions are more susceptible to further head trauma for seven to 10
days after the injury."
85.

Other contrary conclusions that the MTBI Committee published over several years

include but are not limited to the following:
i.

an October 2006 article by Drs. Peilman and Viano stated that
because a "significant percentage of players returned to play in the
same game [as they suffered a concussion] and the overwhelming
majority of players with concussions were kept out of
football-related activities for less than 1 week, it can be concluded
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that mild [concussions] in professional football are not serious
injuries;"

ii.

that NFL players did not show a decline in brain function after a
concussion;

iii.

that there were no ill effects among those who had three or more
concussions or who took hits to the head that sidelined them for a
week or more;

iv.

V.

86.

that "no NFL player experienced the second-impact syndrome or
cumulative encephalopathy from repeat concussions;" and

that NFL players’ brains responded and healed faster than those of
high school or college athletes with the same injuries.

The Committee’s papers (the "Pellman Papers") received significant criticism in

the media from independent doctors and researchers, and were met with skepticism in peer review
segments following each article’s publication.

87.

Renowned experts Dr. Robert Cantu and Dr. Julian Bailes wrote harshly critical

reviews of the studies’ conclusions.
88.

The Peliman Papers were also criticized in the popular press by ESPN and the New

York Times when repeated inconsistencies and irregularities in the MTBI Committee’s data were

revealed.

neuropsychological tests done on NFL players in the results of the Committee’s studies on the
effects of concussions.

The article further revealed that Dr.

Peilman, had fired a

neuropsychologist for the New York Jets, Dr. William Barr, after Dr. Barr voiced concern that Dr.
Peilman might be picking and choosing what data to include in the Committee’s research to get
results that would downplay the negative effects of concussions.

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90.

As described in the following paragraphs, when faced with studies which

implicated a causal link between concussions and cognitive degeneration, the NFL, through the
MTBI Committee, continued to produce contrary findings which were false, distorted, and
deceiving, all in an effort to conceal and deceive players and the public at large.
91.

Between 2002 and 2007, Dr. Bennet Omalu examined the brain tissue of deceased

NFL players, including Mike Webster, Terry Long, Andre Waters, and Justin Strzelczyk. Dr.
Omalu concluded that the players suffered from CTE. Some of his findings were published in
Neurosurgery articles.
92.

In response to Dr. Omalu’s articles, the MTBI Committee wrote a letter to the

editor of Neurosurgery asking that Dr. Omalu’s article be retracted.
93.

In 2005, a clinical study performed by Dr. Kevin Guskiewicz found that retired

players who sustained three or more concussions in the NFL had a five-fold prevalence of mild
cognitive impairment in comparison to NFL retirees without a history of concussions. In doing
this research, Dr. Guskiewicz conducted a survey of over 2,550 former NFL athletes. The MBTI
Committee attacked and undermined the study, stating: "We want to apply scientific rigor to this
issue to make sure that we’re really getting at the underlying cause of what’s happening. . . . You
cannot tell that from a survey."
94.

In August 2007, the NFL, in keeping with its deceit, issued a concussion pamphlet

to players which stated: "Current research with professional athletes has not shown that having
more than one or two concussions leads to permanent problems if each injury is managed properly.
Research is currently underway to determine if there are any long-term effects of
concussion[ s] in NFL athletes,"

it’

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95.

In a statement made around the time that the concussion pamphlet was released,

NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell said, "We want to make sure all NFL players . . . are fully

informed and take advantage of the most up to date information and resources as we continue to
study the long-term impact on concussions." The NFL decided that the "most up to date
information" did not include the various independent studies indicating a causal link between
multiple concussions and cognitive decline in later life.
The NFL’s Belated Acknowledgement of the Concussion Crisis

96.

Facing increasing media scrutiny over the MTBI Committee’s questionable

studies, Dr. Peliman eventually resigned as the head of the Committee in 2007. He was replaced
as head by Dr. Ira Casson and Dr. David Viano, but remained a member of the Committee.
97.

Dr. Casson continued to dismiss outside studies and overwhelming evidence

linking dementia and other cognitive decline to brain injuries. When asked in a 2007 public
interview whether concussions could lead to brain damage, dementia, or depression, Dr. Casson
denied the linkage six separate times.
98.

In June 2007, the NFL convened a concussion summit for team doctors and

trainers. At the summit, Dr. Casson told team doctors and trainers that CTE has never been
scientifically documented in football players.
99.

When Boston University’s Dr. Ann McKee found CTE in the brains of two more

deceased NFL players in 2008, a MTBI Committee representative characterized each study as an
"isolated incident" from which no conclusion could be drawn.
100.

In 2008, under increasing pressure, the NFL commissioned the University of

Michigan’s Institute for Social Research to conduct a study on the health of retired players. Over
1,000 former NFL players took part in the study. The results of the study, released in 2009,
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reported that "Alzheimer’s disease or similar memory-related diseases appear to have been
diagnosed in

the league’s former players vastly more often than in the national

population-..-including a rate of 19 times the normal rate for men ages 30 through 49."
101.

The NFL, who commissioned the study, responded to these results by claiming

that the study was incomplete, and that further findings would be needed. Other experts in the
field found the NFL’s reaction to be "bizarre," noting that "they paid for the study, yet they tried to
distance themselves from it,"

102.

After the results of this study were released, Representative John Conyers, Jr.,

Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, called for hearings on the impact of head injuries
sustained by NFL players.
103.

At the first hearing in October 2009, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell

acknowledged that the NFL owes a duty to the public at large to educate them as to the risks of

concussions due to the League’s unique position of influence: "In addition to our millions of fans,
more than three million youngsters aged 6-14 play tackle football each year; more than one million

high school players also do so and nearly seventy five thousand collegiate players as well. We
must act in their best interests even if these young men never play professional football."
104.

Also at the October hearing, NFL Players’ Association Executive Director

DeMaurice Smith stated, "[T]here have been studies over the last decade highlighting [connection
between on-field injury and post career mental illness].

Unfortunately, the N.F.L. has diminished

those studies, urged the suppression of the findings and for years, moved slowly in an area where
speed should have been the impetus."
105.

Dr. Casson gave testimony at these hearings, and continued to deny the validity of

other non-NFL studies, stating that "[t]here is not enough valid, reliable or objective scientific
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evidence at present to determine whether or not repeat head impacts in professional football result

106. In 2007, in a televised interview on HBO’s Real Sports, Dr. Casson definitively and
unequivocally stated that there was no link between concussions and depression, dementia,
Alzheimer’s disease, or "anything like [that] whatsoever."
107.

Shortly after the 2009 congressional hearings, however, the NFL announced that it

would impose its most stringent rules to date on managing concussions, requiring players who
exhibit any significant sign of concussion to be removed from a game or practice and be barred
from returning the same day.

108. On or about December 20, 2009, the NFL publicly acknowledged for the first time,
through its spokesman Greg Aiello, that "concussions can lead to longterrn problems."

player head injuries. Representative Conyers noted that "until recently, the NFL had minimized
and disputed evidence linking head injuries to mental impairment in the future."

110. The NFL’s belated change of policy contradicted past recommendations by its
MTBI Committee which had recommended as safe the League’s practice of returning players to
the game after a concussion. In fact, the Committee had published a paper in 2005 that stated
"[p]layers who are concussed and return to the same game have fewer initial signs and symptoms
than those removed from play.

Return to play does not involve a significant risk of a second

injury either in the same game or during the season."
111.

In 2010, the NFL re-nained the MTBI Committee to the "Head, Neck, and Spine

Medical Committee" and announced that Dr. Peliman would no longer be a member of the panel.
Drs. H. Hunt Batjer and Richard Ellenbogen were selected to replace Drs. Casson and Viano.
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111 Under its new leadership, the Committee admitted that data collected by the NFL’s
formerly appointed brain-injury leadership was "infected," and said that their Committee should

be assembled anew.
113.

Dr. Batjer was quoted as saying, "[w]e all had issues with some of the

methodologies described, the inherent conflict of interest that was there in many areas, that was not
acceptable by any modem standards or not acceptable to us. I wouldn’t put up with that, our
universities wouldn’t put up with that, and we don’t want our professional reputations damaged by
conflicts that were put upon us."
114.

In June 2010, scientific evidence linked multiple concussions to yet another

degenerative brain diseaseAmyotrophic Lateral

115.

Sclerosis ("ALS"), commonly referred to as

In October 2011, Dr. Mitchel Berger of the Head, Neck, and Spine Medical

Committee announced that a new study was in the planning process. He admitted that the MTBI
Committees previous long-range study was useless because "[t]here was no science in that." Dr.
Berger further stated that data from the previous study would not be used. "We’re really moving
on from that data. There’s really nothing we can do with that data in terms of how it was collected
and assessed."
116.

Now, the NFL requires its member teams to have concussion experts on the

sidelines during games to clear players suspected of concussions prior to their return to play.
117.

Notwithstanding this new policy, on October 23, 2011, San Diego Charger Kris

Dielman plainly suffered a concussion early in a game and could be seen staggering back to the
huddle. Despite the obvious brain injury, Mr. Dielman was neither evaluated by a doctor nor held
out for even one play. He suffered grand mal seizures on the team’s plane ride home.
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118.

Ten days later, in November of 2011, the League’s injury and safety panel issued a

directive telling its game officials to watch closely for concussion symptoms in players.
119.

On or about December 21, 2011, the NFL alerted all thirty two teams that, effective

immediately, an independently certified athletic trainer would be assigned to monitor all suspected
concussion.-related injuries.

The independent trainers are paid by the NFL and approved by the

NFL Players’ Association.

The trainers’ sole purpose is to oversee the treatment of possible

concussions and ensure that medical staff on each sideline are following proper League protocol

and testing for any head trauma.
120.

Why League policy changes, accurate information sharing, strict fines and

warnings were not recommended by the NFL’s so called "expert" committee soon after its creation
in 1994 is difficult to comprehend. That it took sixteen (16) years to admit that there was a

problem and to take real action to address that problem is willful and wanton and exhibits a
reckless disregard for the safety of its players and the public at large.
THE REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFFS’ SPECIFIC FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff Shawn Wooden’s Concussion History in the NFL and Injuries
121.

Plaintiff Sean Wooden played in the NFL from 1996 to 2004.

122, Plaintiff Wooden sustained numerous diagnosed and undiagnosed concussions
while playing in the NFL.

123.

Plaintiff Wooden was returned to play too soon after having suffered his

concussions and subsequently suffered other head injuries or blows to the head.
124.

At no time did the NFL inform Plaintiff Wooden that he risked severe and

permanent brain damage by returning to play too soon after sustaining a concussion. The NFL’s
failure was a substantial cause of his current injuries.
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125. As a result of the numerous concussions suffered during his playing career,
Plaintiff Wooden suffers from, inter alia, problems with short-terrn memory and migraine

headaches. Plaintiff Wooden is also at heightened risk of developing further adverse neurological
symptoms in the future.

Plaintiff Ryan Fowler’s Concussion History in the NFL and Injuries

127. Plaintiff Fowler sustained numerous diagnosed and undiagnosed concussions while

playing in the NFL.
128

Plaintiff Fowler was returned to play too soon after having suffered his concussions

and subsequently suffered other head injuries or blows to the head.
129.

At no time did the NFL inform Plaintiff Fowler that he risked severe and permanent

brain damage by returning to play too soon after sustaining a concussion. The NFL’s failure was a

substantial cause of his current injuries.
130.

As a result of the numerous concussions suffered during his playing career,

Plaintiff Fowler suffers from, inter alia, mood swings. Plaintiff Fowler is also at heightened risk
of developing further adverse neurological symptoms in the future.

COUNT I.CLASS ACTION CLAIM FOR MEDICAL MONITORING
131, The Representative Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference all prior

paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
132. As a result of the NFL’s negligent misconduct, the Representative Plaintiffs and the
Class have been exposed to a greater than normal risk of brain injury following a return to contact
play too soon after suffering an initial concussion, thereby subjecting them to a proven increased
risk of developing the adverse symptoms and conditions described above.
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133

The Representative Plaintiffs and the Class have not yet fully begun to evidence

many of the longterm physical and mental effects of the concussive injuries they sustained while
playing in the NFL, which may remain latent and go undetected for some period of time.
134. These latent brain injuries require specialized testing that is not generally given to
the public at large.
135

The available monitoring regime is specific for individuals exposed to concussions,

and is different from that normally recommended in the absence of exposure to this risk of harm.
The medical monitoring regime includes, but is not limited to, baseline exams and diagnostic
exams which will assist in diagnosing the adverse health effects associated with concussions.
This diagnosis will facilitate the treatment and behavioral and/or pharmaceutical interventions that
will prevent or mitigate the various adverse consequences of the latent neurodegenerative
disorders and diseases associated with the repeated traumatic head impacts that these players
experienced while playing in the NFL,
136 The

available monitoring regime is

reasonably necessary according to

contemporary scientific principles within the medical community specializing in the diagnosis of
head injuries and their potential link to, inter alia, memory loss, early onset dementia, CTE,
Alzheimer-like syndromes, and similar cognition-impairing conditions.
137. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiffs seek
certification of a medical monitoring class in this matter, consisting of:
All retired NFL players who played prior to the 2010 NFL season and who,
during their NFL careers, suffered a concussion and were returned to
contact play within ten (10) days of having suffered the concussion, and
who, as of the date of class certification, are neither (a) advancing an
individual personal injury claim for money damages against the NFL, nor
(b) a salaried employee of the NFL.

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138 By monitoring and testing these former NFL players, the risk of each such player

suffering the long term injuries, disease, and losses, as described above, will be significantly
reduced.
139.

Because the NFL has until now failed to properly, reasonably, and safely monitor,

test, and/or otherwise study whether and when a player has suffered a concussion to minimize the
risk of long-term injury or illness, medical monitoring is the most appropriate method to determine
whether a particular individual is now at risk of long-term injury or illness associated with a
concussive event.
140.

Accordingly, the NFL should be required to establish a medical monitoring

program that includes, inter alia:
Establishing a trust fund, in an amount to be determined, that will
pay for the medical monitoring, as necessary and appropriate, of all
retired NFL players who played prior to the 2010 NFL season and
who, during their NFL careers, suffered a concussion and were
returned to contact play within ten (10) days of having suffered the
concussion, and who, as of the date of class certification, are neither
(a) advancing an individual personal injury claim for money
damages against the NFL, nor (b) a salaried employee of the NFL;
and
ii.

141

Notifying in writing all Class members that they should have
frequent medical monitoring.

The Representative Plaintiffs and Class members have no adequate remedy at law

because monetary damages alone cannot compensate them for the risk of long-term physical and
economic losses due to concussive injuries. Without a Court-approved medical monitoring
program as described herein, or established by the Court, the Representative Plaintiffs and Class
members will continue to face an unreasonable risk of injury and disability, and any potential
damages they suffer will be exponentially increased due to a lack of timely diagnosis.
MR

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WHEREFORE, the Representative Plaintiffs individually and on behalf of the proposed
Class, demand a jury trial on all claims so triable, and pray for judgment as follows:

Certification of the proposed Class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23;
ii,

Designation of Plaintiffs as representatives of the proposed Class
and designation of the Representative Plaintiffs’ counsel as Class
counsel;

iii,

The establishment of a medical monitoring program/regime which
includes, among other things, those measures described above;

iv.

Costs and disbursements incurred by the Representative Plaintiffs in
connection with this action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees
and costs pursuant to applicable law; and

V.

Such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated this 24 1h day of January, 2012.
Respectfully submitted,

PODHURST ORSECK, P.A.
25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800
Miami, FL 33130
Telephone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]
By:

/s/ Stephen F. Rosenthal
STEVEN C. MARKS
Fla. Bar. No. 516414
Email: s arks phrt.csm
STEPHEN F. ROSENTHAL
Fla. Bar No. 0131458
Email: srosenthalipodhurst.cpm
RICARDO M. MARTINEZ-CID
Fla. Bar No. 383988
Email: dost.cpi
RAMON A. RASCO
Fla. Bar No. 0617334
Email: rrasco(dipodhurst.co
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Podhurst Orseck, P.A.
25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800, Miami, FL 33130, Miami 305.358.2800 Fax [phone]

Fort Lauderdale 954.463.4346

www.podhurst.com