Shea v. BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc.
Filing
33
ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration. Signed by Judge K. Michael Moore on 3/7/2013. (rg1)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DJSTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 1:12-cv-23324-KMM
THOMAS E. SHEA, individually, and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BBVA COMPASS BANCSHARES, INC.,
Defendant.
---------------------------------,j
ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL
ARBJTRATION
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to CompeI Arbitration
and Dismiss Action (ECF No. 13). Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 21) and Defendant filed
a Reply (ECF No. 22). The Motion is now ripe for review. UPON CONSIDERATION of the
Motion, the Response, the Reply, the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully
advised in the premises, this Court enters the following Order.
J. BACKGROUND 1
This is an action for a violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §
227 (the "TCPA"). Plaintiff is an individual and a citizen of the State of Florida. CompI.,
~
5.
Defendant is an Alabama banking corporation with its prineipal place of business in Alabama.
Compl.,
~
6. Defendant conducts general banking services, such as receiving deposits, making
loans, and fumishing checking accounts, at numerous locations throughout the United States.
See DecI. of Houston,
~~
3-5 (ECF No. l3-2). This Court has federal question jurisdiction, 28
The facts herein are taken from Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendant's Motion to
Compel, Plaintiff's Response, and Defendant's Reply.
I
1
US.C. § 1331, because the Comp1aint alleges a vioIation of the TCPA. See Mims v. Arrow Fin.
Servs., LLC, _ US. _, 132 S. Ct. 740, 753, 181 L. Ed2 881 (2012).
The TCP A prohibits "any person . . . to make any call (other than a call made for
emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any
automatic teIephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice ... to any telephone
number assigned to a ... cellular telephone service ...." Duran v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 878
F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1316 (S.D. FIa. 2012) (quoting 47 U.s.c. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). "This TCPA
provision aIso applies to text messages." Buslepp v. Improv Miami, Inc., No. 12-CV-60171,
2012 WL 4932692, at *2 (S.D. FIa. Oct. 16,2012) (citing Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.,
569 F.3d 946,952-53 (9th Cir. 2009»). "In order to establish a violation of the TCPA, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that a defendant called or texted a number assigned to a cellular telephone
service using an automatic dialing system." Id. (citing Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 857
F. Supp. 2d 1316,1319 (S.D. FIa. 2012)). The TCPA, however, "exempts those calls 'madewith
the prior express consent of the called party.'" Buslepp v. B&B Entertainment. LLC, No. 12-CV
60089, 2012 WL 4761509, at *5 (S.D. FIa. Oct. 5, 2012) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A»).
"'Express consent is [c]onsent that is clearIy and unmistakabIy stated. ", Id. (quoting SatterfieId,
569 F .3d at 955). The defendant has the burden of establishing this affirmative defense. See
BresIow, 2012 WL 1448444, at *3.
Plaintiff alleges that on August 24, 2012, Defendant sent Plaintiff a text message to his
eellular phone. Compl., ~ 20. The text message stated: "New Updated BBVA Compass Android
app with Bill Pay. http://bbvacompass.comJmobile/android2/?b=1 Msg&Data Rates May Apply.
Text HELP for heIp, STOP to eancel."
Compl.,
~
21.
Plaintiff alleges that identical text
messages were sent to other individuaIs by Defendant's use of an automatie telephone dialing
2
system. Compl.,
~
22.
Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated Section
227(b)(I)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by sending unsolidted commercial text messages to Plaintiffs
wireless cellular device without his prior consent and through use of an automatic dialing
system. Compl., ~~ 35-40. Plaintiff additionally seeks to bring this claim on behalf of all other
individuals to whom Defendant sent a text message, actual and statutory damages, an injunction
barring Defendant from engaging in similar conduct, and an award of attomey' s fees and costs.
Compl., at 9. 2
Defendant filed the instant Motian to Compei pursuant to Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (the "FAA"), seeking an order compelling
arbitration of the TCPA claim. Defendant alleges that on October 12, 2007, Plaintiff opened a
personal deposit account with Defendant.
In doing so, Plaintiff agreed to be bound by the
Consumer Deposit Account Agreement (the "Deposit Agreement"). See Deposit Agreement,
Decl. of Houston, Ex. 2. 3 The Deposit Agreement was subsequently amended multiple times,
the last of which became effective on June 2011, prior to Plaintiffs termination of his deposit
account. See Decl. of Houston, Ex. 3. Additionallyon October 12,2007, PIaintiffregistered to
use online banking serviees offered by Defendant. In order to have access to such services,
Plaintiff agreed to the terms and conditions contained in Defendant's Agreement and Disclosure
Statement for Online Banking (the "Online Banking Agreement").
See Online Banking
The TCP A allows a party to sue to recover its "actual monetary loss" or "to receive $500 in
damages" per violation. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). A party may also sue to enjoin violations of
the statute. 47 U.S.e. § 227(b)(3)(A), (C). If a plaintiff establishes that the vialations were
willful or knowing, the plaintiffis entitled to treble damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
3 "Motions to compeI arbitratian are treated generally as motions to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdietion pursuant to FederaI Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)." Bell v. Atlantic
Trueking Co., No. 09-CV-406J32MCR, 2009 WL 4730564, at *2 (M.D. FIa. Dec. 7, 2009).
"Courts have deemed a motion seeking to compeI arbitratian as a factual attack as it asserts that a
provision of an extrinsic document, an arbitratian clause contained within the body of a contract,
deprives the court of its power to adjudicate the plaintiffs claims." Id. at *3.
2
3
Agreement, Decl. of Houston, Ex. 6. Subsequently on September 22, 2011, Plaintiffregistered
to use Defendant' s online banking services on his cellular phone through the use of a mobile
banking application. In order to do so, Plaintiff agreed to the terrns and conditions contained in
Defendant's Mobile Banking Addendum to Agreement and Disclosure Statement for Online
Banking. See Addendum, Dec1. of Houston, Ex. 7.
The Deposit Agreement and Online Banking Agreement (collectively, the "Agreements")
each contain an arbitration provision (the "Arbitration Provision") which states, in relevant part,
By opening or maintaining the account, you agree that if a dispute, claim or
controversy of any kind arises out of or relates to this Agreement or to your
account or any transaction involving your account, either you or we can choose
to have that dispute resolved by binding arbitration. This arbitration provision
limits your ability to litigate elaims in court and your right to a jury trial. You
should review this section carefuily. You will not have the right to participate
as a class representative or member of any c1ass of claimants for any claim
subject to arbitration ....
. . . . At the option of the first to commence arbitration, you or we may choose
to have the arbitration conducted by JAMS ADR ("JAMS") or the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA"), or you and we may agree upon a different
arbitrator. In any event, any arbitration under this Agreement shall be
conducted in writing in accordance with the applicable arbitration rules of the
arbitrator or arbitration organization ("Rules"). If an arbitrator other than the
AAA is chosen, the Rules of the AAA will be applied to any circumstances
that is not addressed by the Rules of the chosen arbitrator. In the event of any
inconsistency between this Agreement and the rules to be used for arbitration,
such inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of this Agreement. This
arbitration provision is made pursuant to a transaction involving interstate
commerce, and the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA") shall apply to the
construction, interpretation, and enforceability of this Agreement
notwithstanding any other choice of law provision contained in this
Agreement.
***
.... This arbitration provision shall survive terrnination of this Agreement
and the c10sing of your Account.
4
Deposit Agreement, at 16-18 (emphasis omitted).4
Defendant now seeks to compei arbitration of this dispute under the Arbitration
Provision pursuant to Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the FAA. Defendant argues that the Complaint,
which asserts a single count for a violation ofSection 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA, is a dispute
between the Parties conceming their business relationship covered by the Arbitration Provision.
II. ANALYSIS
"Under the Federal Arbitration Act [J, a written agreement to arbitrate in 'a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce' is "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. '"
Obremski v. Springleaf Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 12-CV-1594T33AEP, 2012 WL 3264521, at *1
(M.D. Fia. Aug. 10,2012) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2);
al so Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace COIp.,
428 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2005). '''[U]pon being satisfied that the issue involved ... is
referable to arbitration under such an agreement, [the Court] shall on application of one of the
parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordanee with the terms
of the agreement.'" Obremski, 2012 WL 3264521, at *1 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3).
Section 4 of the FAA provides for orders compelling arbitration when one party has
failed, negleeted, or refused to comply with an arbitration agreement. Thus, a district court must
compeI arbitration and stay the underlying action if the parties had an earlier agreement to
arbitrate their dispute. 9 U.S.C. § 3; see Goodman Ltd. P'ship v. THF Constr., Inc., 321 F.3d
1094, 1095 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[A] district court must grant a motion to compei arbitration ifit is
satisfied that the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute."). "StilI, '[w]hile there is a
4 The Online Banking Agreement also contains an arbitration provision that is substantially
similar to the one contained in the Deposit Agreement. See Online Banking Agreement, at 33
35. Additionally, each previous version of the Agreements also eontained a similar arbitration
provision. See Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 691 F.3d 1224, 1235 n.11 (lI th Cir. 2012)
(finding that a changes-to-agreement clause in a wireless telephone agreement is enforceable).
5
liberai federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, the FAA's strong proarbitration policy
only applies to disputes that the parties have agreed to arbitrate. '" Mims v. Global Credit &
Collection Corp., 803 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1353 (S.D. FIa. 2011) (quoting Becker v. Davis, 491
F.3d 1292, 1298 (11 th Cir. 2007)).5
"In reviewing a motion to compeI arbitration, a district court must consider three factors:
(1) whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists, (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists,
and (3) whether the right to arbitrate was waived." Integrated Security Servs. v. Skidata, Inc.,
609 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1324 (S.D. FIa. 2009) (citing Sims v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 336 F.
Supp.2d 1311, 1326 (S.D. Fia. 2004).6
Plaintiff only presents two argument s in opposition to Defendant's Motion to Compe1. 7
Plaintiff elaims that (1) Plaintiff termin at ed his account so the Agreements cannot bind him to
arbitrate his elaim; and (2) Plaintiffs TCPA elaim is not covered by the Arbitration Provision.
As discussed below, both elaims are without merit.
5 "In other words, arbitration of a dispute should only be ordered where the court is satisfied that
neither the formation of the parties' arbitration agreement nor its enforceability or applicability
to the dispute is in issue. Where a party contests either or both matters, the court must resolve the
disagreement." Solymar Inv., Ltd. v. Banco Santander S.A., 672 F.3d 981, 990 (11th Cir. 2012)
(citing Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, _ V.S. _' 130 S.Ct. 2847, 2855,
177 L.Ed.2d 567 (2010)).
6 The third factor regarding whether the right to arbitrate was waived is not at issue between the
Parties and is not further discussed.
7 Plaintiffs failure to oppose numerous argument s contained in Defendant's Motion to CompeI
results in a waiver of those clairns. For example, Plaintiff does not challenge the formation of
the Agreements or the Arbitration Provision, the Agreements involve a transaction involving
interstate commerce, the Arbitration Provision is govemed by the FAA, the Arbitration Provision
incorporates the rules of the FAA and JAMS, and the incorporation of such rules delegates
gateway determination to an arbitrator. Additionally, Plaintiff apparently concedes that he
waived the right to bring elass elaims under the Agreements. See Def. Mot. to CompeI, at 18
20; see also Pendergast, 691 F.3d at 1234-36 (upholding a elass action waiver and arbitration
clause contained in the parties' agreement). Accordingly, Plaintiffs elass action allegations in
the Complaint will be stricken and this Court will compeI Plaintiff s elaims to arbitration on an
individualized basis. Compl., ~~ 25-34.
6
First, Plaintiff alleges that he tenninated his account and the Agreements prior to
Defendant's conduct that violated the TCPA. See Pl. Resp., 8-10. Aecordingly, Plaintiff claims
that the Agreements expired and cannot fonn the basis of an agreement to arbitrate. PI. Resp., at
8. This Court, however, finds that an arbitrator should address Plaintiffs challenge to the
underlying Agreements because Plaintiff is not challenging the Arbitration Provision.
Any
'''challenge to the validity of a contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause,
must go the arbitrator.'"
Cheek Cashing v.
Integrated Security Servs., 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1325 (quoting Buekeye
Cardegn~
546 U.S. 440, 449, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006)).
Indeed, "'unIess the ehallenge is to the arbitration elause itself, the issue of the contraet's validity
is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance' because 'as a matter of substantive federal
arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract. '" Id.
(citing Cardegna, 546 U.S. at 440, 126 S. Ct. at 1206). Thus, the validity of the Agreements after
Plaintiff closed his account with the Defendant is a decision for the arbitrator. See Rent-ACenter, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010) (holding that unIess there was a
challenge to the delegation provision specifically, the Court must enforce that provision, leaving
any ehallenge to the validity of the agreement for the arbitrator).8
Second, Plaintiff argues that the TCPA elaim is outside of the scope of the Arbitration
Provision. See Pl. Resp., at 3-8. Again, this Court finds that Plaintiffs elaim eonceming the
To the extent that Plaintiff is arguing that there is no written agreement to arbitrate, then this
decision is for a court to decide on a motion to compeI. See Lambert v. Austin Ind., 544 F.3d
1192, 1195 (llth Cir. 2008). As diseussed in/ra, this argument is without merit because the
arbitration provision survived the tennination of the Agreements. Moreover, as discussed infra,
the incorporation of the rules of the AAA and JAMS into the delegation provision further
demonstrates that this decision is for the arbitrator. See Tenninix Int'! Co. LP, 432 F.3d at 1332
("By ineorporating the AAA Rules, ineluding Rule 8, into their agreement, the parties elearly
and unmistakably agreed that the arbitrator should decide whether the arbitration elause is
valid.").
8
7
arbitrability of the TCPA claim should be addressed by an arbitrator instead of this Court.
"Generally, arbitrability is a question for the trial court-and not the arbitrator-unless the
parties 'clearly and unrnistakably' provide otherwise." Bhim v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 655 F.
Supp.2d 1307, 1310 (S.D. FIa. 2009) (citing First Options ofChi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 US. 938,
944 (1995)); see also Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2777 (stating that "parties can agree to
arbitrate 'gateway' questions of 'arbitrability,' such as whether the parties have agreed to
arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy"). However, when parties
explicitly incorporate rules that ernpower an arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the
incorporation serves as clear and unrnistakable evidence of the parties' intent to delegate such
issues to an arbitrator. Terrninix Int'} Co. LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P'ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1332
(Ilth Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (holding that the incorporation of the AAA rules into an
arbitration provision serves as clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed an
arbitrator would decide gateway deterrninations).
Here, this Court finds clear and unrnistakable evidence of the Parties' intent to delegate
the issue of arbitrability of the clairns to the arbitration panel. See 24 Go Wireless, Inc. v. AT&T
Mobitity II, LLC, No. II-CV-20930, 2011 WL 2607099, at *2 (S.D. FIa. 2011) (stating that "the
parties clearly and unrnistakably agreed to submit that issue to arbitration as weB by expressly
incorporating the rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") into the arbitration
provision of their Agreement");
also Senior Servs. of Palm Beach LLC v. ABCSP Inc., No.
12-CV-80226, at *2-3 (S.D. FIa. June 7, 2012). The Parties explicitly incorporated the rules of
the AAA and JAMS into the Arbitration Provision.
See~,
Deposit Agreement, at 16. Both of
these rules deIegate the issue of the arbitrability of a dispute to the arbitrator. For example, the
AAA RuIes provide that "[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own
8
jurisdiction, including any objections with respeet to the existence, seope or validity of the
arbitratian agreement." AAA, Commereial Arbitratian Rules, Rule 7(a).9
Aeeordingly, any
argument that the Plaintiffs TCPA claim is not arbitrable and autside of the seope of the
Arbitratian Provision must be presented to the arbitrator. See GHM (South Beach) LLC V. Setai
Owners LLC, No. 12-CV-21932-KMM (S.D. Fia. Sept. 20, 2012) (holding that the arbitratian
panel should decide arbitrability because the parties agreed to apply the rules of the International
Chamber of Commerce); Mereury Teleo Gm., Inc. v. Empresa De Teleeommunieaeiones De
Bogota, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (S.D. Fia. 2009) (holding that the arbitratian panel should decide
arbitrability beeause the parti es agreed to apply the rules of the Arbitration and Coneiliation
Center of the Bogota Chamber of Commerce). Aeeordingly, this Court finds that Defendant's
Motian to CompeI should be granted and an arbitrator should decide these gateway
deterrninations according to the Parties' Arbitratian Provision.
Even if this matter were properly before this Court, the undersigned would stiIl find that
Defendant's Motian to CompeI should be granted. lO
First, despite Plaintiffs claim that he
terrninated the Agreements, the Arbitration Provision is stiIl valid and enforeeable against
Plaintiffs TCPA claim. See Auchter v. Zagloul, 949 So. 2d 1189, 1194 (FIa. Dist. Ct. App.
Likewise, the JAMS rules provide that "[j]urisdictional and arbitrability disputes, including
disputes over the forrnation, existence, validity, interpretation or seope of the agreement under
which Arbitratian is sought, and who are proper Parties to the Arbitration, shall be submitted to
and ruled on by the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator has the authority to deterrnine jurisdiction and
arbitrability issues as a preliminary matter." JAMS, Comprehensive Arbitratian Rules &
Proeedures, Rule 11 (e).
10 "Generally, when deciding whether the parties in a case have agreed to arbitrate eertain
questions, including the validity and enforeeability of their arbitration elause, courts 'should
apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the forrnation of contracts.'" Senior Servs. of
Palm Beach LLC, No. 12-CV-80226, 2012 WL 2054971, at *2 (S.D. FIa. June 7, 2012) (citing
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 D.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985
(1995)). "This is because arbitratian itself 'is a matter of contract.'" Id. (eiting Rent-A-Center,
130 S. Ct. at 2772).
9
9
2007) ("Arbitration provisions are to be construed to require arbitration of disputes arising after
the cancellation of the underlying contract unIess such disputes are specifically excluded from
arbitration.").
Indeed, the Arbitration Provision expressIy provides that it survives the
termination of the Agreements and the closing of an account with Defendant.
See~,
Deposit
Agreement, at 18. ("This arbitration provision shall survive termination of this Agreement and
the closing of your Account."). Thus, the Parties have a valid agreement in writing to arbitrate
any disputes arising from the Agreements and Plaintiffs account. See Lambert, 544 F.3d at
1195 ("Accordingly, the FAA requires a court to either stay or dismiss a lawsuit and to compeI
arbitration upon a showing that (a) the plaintiff entered into a written arbitration agreement that
is enforeeable 'under ordinary state-law' contract principles and (b) the elaims before the court
fall within the scope of that agreement." (quoting 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4)).11
Second, Plaintiffs
dispute clearly arises from the Parties' contractual relationship as embodied by the Agreements
and relates to Plaintiffs account with Defendant. The Eleventh Circuit has typically "focused on
foreseeability as proper standard for resolving the scope of an arbitration elause that eovers
disputes 'arising out of or pursuant to' the contract between the parties."
Hemispherix
Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Inv., 553 F.3d 1351, 1367 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
Telecom Halia, SpA v. Wholesale Telecom Corp., 248 F.3d 1109, 1116 (11th Cir. 2001)); see
also Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204, 1218-1221 (11th Cir. 2011)).
11 Despite Plaintiffs clairns, Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (1991), does not
support his elaim that the Agreements cannot be used to compeI arbitration of his TCPA claim.
See Pl. Resp., at 8-10. The Parties explicitly agreed that the Arbitration Provision wouId remain
effeetive despite the termination of PIaintiffs account and the Agreements. Contra Klay v. All
Defendants, 389 F.3d 1191, 1203 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Because arbitration is strictly a matter of
contract, we cannot compeI arbitration for disputes which arose during time periods in whieh no
effective contract requiring arbitration was governing the parties." (citing Brandon, Jones,
Sandall, Zeide, Kohn, Chalal & Musso, P.A. v. MedPartners, Inc., 312 F.3d 1349, 1358 (11th
aIso In re Bailey, No. 09-AD-4002LWD, 2009 WL 8592798, at *3-4 (Bankr.
Cir. 2002)));
SD. Ga. Oct. 8, 2009) (citation ornitted).
10
Accordingly, this Court finds that the TCPA elaim falls squarely under the broad language of the
Arbitration Provision. See Schatt v. Aventura Limousine & Transportation Serv., Inc., No. 10
CV-22353, 2010 WL 4942654, at *4 (S.D. FIa. Nov. 30,2010) (stating that "the phrase 'arising
out of or relating to' the contract has been interpreted broadly as to encompass virtually all
disputes between contracting parties." (quoting Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633,636
(FIa. 1999))); see also Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1221-22 (11 th Cir.
2002) (rejecting argument that arbitration provision was too broad and holding that agreement to
arbitrate "all claims between the parties" applied not just to elaims arising out of the parties'
contract). The Arbitration Provision committed both parties to arbitrate a "dispute, elaim or
controversy of any kind aris[ing] out of or relat[ing] to this Agreement or to your account or any
transaction involving your account ...." Deposit Agreement, at 16. Thus, Plaintiff's elaim
under the TCPA that he was illegally sent a text message to his cellular phone elearly involves
his account with the Defendant and the Parties' relationship as defined by the Agreements. This
is especially true since Defendant alleges that it had prior consent to send a text message to
Plaintiff conceming the update to its banking app1ication since Plaintiff previously signed up for
online banking services on his cellular phone through use of its banking application. Def. Reply,
at 4--5. Accordingly, Plaintiff's TCPA c1aim is subject to the Arbitration Provision and is a
c1early foreseeable result of the performance of the Parties' actions pursuant to the Agreements
and related to Plaintiff's account with Defendant. See Integrated Security Servs., 609 F. Supp.
2d at 1325. 12 Thus, even if this Court were to address the merits of DefendanCs Motion to
12 "Courts, moreover, favor arbitration, ... and resolve any doubts about the scope of arbitrable
issue in favor of arbitration." Campbell's Foliage, Inc. v. Federal Crop Ins., No. 11-CV-21666
AJJ, at 2 (S.D. Fia. Aug. 4,2011) (citing Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581
(2008); World Rentals & Sales, LLC v. Volvo Constr. Equip. Rents, Inc., 517 F.3d 1240, 1245
(11 th Cir. 2008)).
11
Compel, this Court finds that it should be grant ed because Defendant has demonstrated that there
is a valid written agreement to arbitrate and that an arbitrable issue exists.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion to CompeI Arbitration and
Dismiss Action (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED IN PART.\3 This matter is hereby STAYED. The
Parties are instructed to file a notice with this Court within fourteen (14) days of a final decision
by the arbitration panel. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to administratively CLOSE this
case. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this?iL day of March, 2013.
K. ICHAEL MOORE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:
All counsel of record
13 This Court dec1ines Defendant's request to dismiss the Complaint, see Def. Mot. to Compel, at
20-21, and finds that a stay of the proceedings is appropriate and will not impede judicial
economy. See 9 US.e. § 3.
12
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