Espinoza et al v. Galardi South Enterprises, Inc. et al
Filing
191
ORDER denying 166 Motion to Compel Arbitration; denying 168 Motion to Compel Arbitration. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman on 12/31/2015. (tr00)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
CASE NO. 14‐21244‐CIV‐GOODMAN
[CONSENT CASE]
JASZMANN ESPINOZA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GALARDI SOUTH
ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________/
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
Defendant Fly Low, Inc. moves to compel arbitration against opt‐in claimants1
Shavone Moore, Jordan Hargraves, Krystall Wright and Ashley Delgado pursuant to
the requirements of an arbitration policy that each claimant signed. [ECF Nos. 166;
168].2 Plaintiffs do not dispute that each of these opt‐in claimants signed the arbitration
Each of the claimants has opted into [ECF Nos. 137‐3; 137‐11; 137‐12; 142‐1] the
Fair Labor Standards Act collective action that the Court previously certified [ECF No.
116].
2
Defendant initially filed a motion to compel concerning only claimants Moore,
Hargraves and Wright [ECF No. 166]; however, one week later, Defendant filed a
supplemental motion to compel claimant Delgado to arbitration and adopting the
reasoning set forth in the original motion. Plaintiff responded to both motions in a
single document [ECF No. 172] and Defendant filed a single reply memorandum [ECF
1
agreements at issue, which Defendant attached [ECF Nos. 166‐1; 166‐2; 166‐3; 168‐1] to
the motions to compel. However, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should not enforce the
agreements in accordance with its responsibility to police collective actions. The
Undersigned agrees. Accordingly, for the reasons outlined below, the Undersigned
DENIES Defendant’s motions to compel arbitration.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. General Factual Background
Plaintiffs are dancers who are suing Defendants for, among other things,
minimum wage and overtime violations arising from their work3 at Defendant Fly Low,
Inc. d/b/a King of Diamonds (“Defendant” or “KOD”), a strip club. [ECF No. 14].
Plaintiffs allege claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and Florida law.
[Id., at pp. 19‐24]. The Court previously granted conditional certification of an FLSA
collective action against Defendants. [ECF No. 116]. More than 20 claimants have opted
into this collective action. [ECF Nos. 123; 126; 128; 129; 137; 142; 149; 151].
No. 177] in support of both motions. The Undersigned is accordingly issuing a single
ruling on both motions.
3
The Court understands why Plaintiffs contend that they “worked” at KOD, while
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs “performed” at KOD. For purposes of this Order, the
Court uses those words interchangeably. Put another way, by using the word
“perform” or “work,” the Court is not implying either way whether Plaintiffs were
employees or independent contractors.
2
B. The Instant Motion
After this action was filed (April 8, 2014), Defendants began requiring all dancers
to sign arbitration agreements. [ECF Nos. 78, pp. 23‐24; 89‐1, pp. 4‐5]. In theory, these
arbitration agreements would prevent dancers from opting into this lawsuit, or any
other similar lawsuit. If a dancer refused to sign the arbitration agreement, then she was
not allowed to perform at KOD. [ECF Nos. 78, pp. 23‐24; 89‐1, pp. 5‐6]. 4 Opt‐in
claimants Moore, Hargraves, Wright and Delgado all signed these identical agreements
in either late April 2014 or May 2014, after this action was filed. [ECF Nos. 166‐1; 166‐2;
166‐3; 168‐1].
In the ruling on Plaintiffs’ motion for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction, the Undersigned “decline[d] to find, at th[e] time, that all of
KODʹs arbitration agreements are per se unenforceable.” Espinoza v. Galardi S. Enter.,
Inc., No. 14‐21244, 2014 WL 6473236, *8 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2014). Instead of making a
4
Defendant presents a more‐nuanced position in its response to Plaintiffs’ request
for admissions, denying that “it advised each and every entertainer to whom it
presented an arbitration agreement that she could not continue to work at KOD unless
she signed an arbitration agreement.” [ECF No. 89‐1, p. 6]. However, Defendant states
in the very next sentence that if “the entertainer asked KOD whether signing the
arbitration agreement was a condition of their continuing to perform at KOD, or if she
declined to sign the agreement, then KOD admits she was likely informed that signing
the agreement was a condition of continuing to perform at KOD.” [Id.].
At the evidentiary hearing the Court held concerning Plaintiffs’ motion for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, Defendant’s general manager,
who directly implemented the arbitration policy, answered unequivocally in the
affirmative when asked on the record “if they didnʹt sign it, they were fired.” [ECF No.
78, p. 23‐24].
3
blanket determination, the Undersigned opted instead to “examine the enforceability of
the arbitration agreement on an individualized basis when, and if, defendants move to
compel arbitration against an opt‐in dancer who has signed such an agreement.” Id.
Defendant now moves to compel arbitration against four opt‐in claimants who signed
the agreement. [ECF Nos. 166; 168]
Plaintiffs oppose the motion. [ECF No. 172]. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’
dissemination of these post‐lawsuit agreements (and the subsequent attempt to enforce
the agreements against these four opt‐in claimants) is an impermissible attempt to
interfere with the proposed class.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Legal Standard
Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), requires that a court, upon
motion by a party to an action in federal court, stay the action if it involves an “issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. The FAA mandates
that a contract clause requiring the parties to “submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and
enforceable[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 2. “A prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to achieve
‘streamlined proceedings and expeditious results.’” Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357‐
58 (2008) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633
(1985).
4
Congress enacted the FAA to “declare ‘a national policy favoring arbitration of
claims that parties contract to settle in that manner.’” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49,
58 (2009) (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008)). The Supreme Court has
interpreted this to mean that courts must “rigorously enforce” arbitration agreements.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985).
In the context of a collective action, there are two general, and different, ways in
which a court may declare invalid, or not enforce, arbitration agreements entered into
by plaintiffs (and potential class members) after the action was initiated. First, a court
may find the arbitration agreements unconscionable, procedurally or substantively.
Abdul‐Rasheed v. KableLink Commcʹns, LLC, No. 8:13‐CV‐879‐T‐24 MAP, 2013 WL
6182321, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2013) (denying FLSA defendants’ motion to compel
arbitration because, in part, the court found the arbitration agreements procedurally
and substantively unconscionable). Second, a court may exercise its collective action
managerial responsibilities by refusing to enforce the arbitration agreements as a way to
correct defendants’ pre‐certification misconduct. Billingsley v. Citi Trends, Inc., 560 F.
Appʹx 914, 919, 922‐24 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s decision to not enforce
arbitration agreements on the ground that it was a proper exercise of district court’s
responsibility to manage collective actions).
Here, Plaintiffs have not argued that KOD’s arbitration agreements are
procedurally or substantively unconscionable. Rather, they have argued that the Court
5
should exercise its discretion to manage this collective action and declare invalid and
not enforce KOD’s arbitration agreements. Accordingly, the Court is focusing solely on
that issue and makes clear that nothing in this Order relates to any finding that the
arbitration agreements at issue are, or are not, unconscionable.
The FLSA permits a plaintiff to bring a collective action on behalf of himself and
other similarly‐situated employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The purposes of § 216(b)
collective actions are “(1) reducing the burden on plaintiffs through the pooling of
resources, and (2) efficiently resolving common issues of law and fact that arise from
the same illegal conduct.” Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1264–65
(11th Cir. 2008) (citing Hoffman La Rouche, Inc. v. Sperling, 492 U.S. 165, 170 (1989)).
An FLSA class action, unlike a Federal Rule of Procedure 23 class action, includes
only those plaintiffs who affirmatively opt into the action by filing their consent in
writing with the court in which the action is brought. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
Consequently, the benefits of a collective action “depend on employees receiving
accurate and timely notice . . . so that they can make informed decisions about whether
to participate.” Rojas v. Garda CL Se., Inc., 297 F.R.D. 669, 673 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (citing
Hoffman‐La Rouche, 493 U.S. at 170).
As the Eleventh Circuit explained, “[b]ecause formal notice to putative FLSA
collective members is provided after conditional certification has been approved by the
district court, pre‐certification, ex parte communication with putative FLSA collective
6
members about the case has an inherent risk of prejudice and opportunities for
impropriety.” Billingsley, 560 F. Appʹx at 921. As such, trial courts have considerable
discretion to “facilitat[e] notice to potential plaintiffs” and “broad authority” to exercise
control over the collective action and to govern the conduct of counsel and parties in the
collective action, so as to avoid any “such prejudice and impropriety and to ensure the
potential plaintiffs have a fair opportunity to opt‐in to a FLSA collective action.” Id.
(citing Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981); Hoffmann–La Roche, 493 U.S. at 169–
71; Kleiner v. First Natʹl Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1200 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Using that broad and considerable discretion, other courts have refused to
enforce arbitration agreements foisted on potential FLSA plaintiffs where the
agreements were confusing, misleading, coercive, and clearly designed and
implemented to unfairly thwart potential FLSA plaintiffs’ ability to opt‐in. Billingsley,
560 F. Appʹx at 919, 922‐24 (affirming district court’s decision to not enforce arbitration
agreements on the ground that it was a proper exercise of district court’s responsibility
to manage collective actions); Carter v. Doll House II, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 3d 1351 (N.D. Ga.
2014) (exercising discretion and refusing to enforce strip club’s arbitration agreements
to prevent unfairness and confusion);5 see also Williams v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc.,
5
The district court’s decision in Carter, a similar case to the one here, was vacated
in part by the Eleventh Circuit because the district court “made factfindings based on
inferences from dates rather than live testimony.” Carter v. Doll House II, Inc., 608 F.
App’x 903, 904 (11th Cir. 2015). The district court’s legal findings, particularly
concerning its managerial powers in a collective action, were not challenged however.
7
No. CIV.A. 10‐7181, 2011 WL 2713741, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2011); but see Stevenson v.
Great Am. Dream, Inc., No. 1:12‐CV‐3359‐TWT, 2014 WL 186101, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 16,
2014) (granting strip club’s motion to compel arbitration against dancer in FLSA
collective action and declining to exercise discretion to not enforce arbitration
agreement).
B. Analysis
Plaintiffs do not contend that the arbitration agreements at issue here are
unconscionable (and, in fact, go out of their way to emphasize this by including a
section headlined “Unconscionability Analysis Not Implicated”). [ECF No. 172, pp. 5‐6].
Instead, Plaintiffs exclusively invoke the Court’s authority to police collective actions by
“prevent[ing] confusion and unfairness” and “ensur[ing] that the potential plaintiffs
have a fair opportunity to opt‐in to [this] FLSA collective action.” Billingsley, 560 F.
App’x at 921.
While collective actions “serve an important function in our system of civil
justice,” they simultaneously present “opportunities for abuse as well as problems for
courts and counsel in the management of cases.” Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99‐
100 (1981) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class actions); see Hoffmann‐La
Roche, 493 U.S. at 171 (1989) (extending Gulf Oil to collective actions). Specifically, FLSA
collection actions “depend on employees receiving accurate and timely notice
concerning the pendency of the collective action, so that they can make informed
8
decisions about whether to participate.” Id. at 170. “Because formal notice to putative
FLSA collective members is provided after conditional certification has been approved
by the district court, pre‐certification, ex parte communication with putative FLSA
collective members about the case has an inherent risk of prejudice and opportunities
for impropriety.” Billingsley, 560 F. App’x at 921 (emphasis added). Cf. Kleiner, 751 F.2d
at 1203 (In a Rule 23 class action, the Eleventh Circuit found that “[u]nsupervised,
unilateral communications with the plaintiff class sabotage the goal of informed consent
by urging exclusion on the basis of a one‐sided presentation of the facts, without
opportunity for rebuttal. . . . Concomitantly, a solicitations scheme relegates the
essential supervision of the court to the status of an afterthought.”)
“To avoid such prejudice and impropriety and to ensure the potential plaintiffs
have a fair opportunity to opt‐in to a FLSA collective action, the district court has the
discretion to facilitat[e] notice to potential plaintiffs and broad authority to exercise
control over the collective action and to govern the conduct of counsel and parties in the
collective action.” Billingsley, 560 F. App’x at 921 (citing Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 100 (class
actions); Hoffmann‐La Roche, 493 U.S. at 169‐71 (affirming the power of district courts to
exercise control over collective actions)) (internal quotations omitted). “A district courtʹs
authority to control counselsʹ conduct in a § 216(b) collective action includes the
authority to prevent confusion and unfairness concerning an FLSA collective action.” Id.
(citing Hoffmann‐La Roche, 493 U.S. at 169–71).
9
In Billingsley, the defendant implemented a retroactive arbitration policy after an
FLSA lawsuit was filed (and contemporaneous to the court’s scheduling of the
collective action certification process), which targeted potential members of the
collective action. 560 F. App’x at 917‐19. In particular, the defendant held two‐on‐one
private, backroom meetings with putative collective action claimants, where the
potential claimants were presented with an arbitration agreement to sign that was a
condition of their continued employment. Id. at 918‐19. The district court found the
meetings to be “highly coercive” and interrogation‐like.” Id. at 919. Furthermore, the
district court concluded that the defendant’s roll‐out of the arbitration policy “was a
hurried reaction specifically targeted at curtailing [the] litigation.” Id. Accordingly, the
district court invoked its broad authority to manage parties and counsel in an FLSA
collective action, determining that the defendant’s conduct undermined the court’s
authority to manage the collective action and correcting the effect of the defendant’s
improper conduct by refusing to enforce the arbitration agreements. Id. at 922.
The Billingsley court deemed the defendant’s efforts to impose arbitration
agreements “confusing, misleading, coercive, and clearly designed to thwart unfairly
the right of [potential claimants] to make an informed choice as to whether to
participate in [the] FLSA collective action.” Id. Not every one of those elements is
present here.
10
First, as the Undersigned previously concluded in the Order on Plaintiffs’ motion
for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, “the Court does not find
the arbitration agreements misleading or confusing. . . . KODʹs arbitration agreements
are not in condensed type space. They are easily understood, as evidenced by [now‐
terminated Plaintiff Shanice Bain’s] understanding of the agreement after reading it.
And they require any dancer to sign the agreement before becoming effective.” 2014
WL 6473236, at *8.
Second, “based on . . . [the] testimony [of three Plaintiffs at the evidentiary
hearing], the Court cannot say . . . that KOD has implemented the arbitration
agreements in an ‘interrogation‐like’ manner, like in Billingsley.” Id. As described above,
in Billingsley, the defendant rolled out the arbitration policy with intimidating backroom
meetings targeted only at potential class members. 560 F. App’x at 918‐19. “Here, it
appears that dancers were given an opportunity to read the agreement without being
led into back rooms or with KOD managers or employees hovering over them. Indeed,
[Plaintiff Seleta] Stanton was able to take the agreement to the dressing room, and she
read it in privacy. [Plaintiff Tiffany] Thompson was permitted to take pictures of the
agreement so that she could send it to an attorney.” Espinoza, 2014 WL 6473236, at *8.
Despite the absence of an interrogative, intimidating atmosphere and any
confusion inherent in the agreement, Defendants’ arbitration policy was clearly coercive
and admittedly designed to undermine this litigation. While Defendants decry the
11
absence of affidavits or other evidence of an intimidating process of arbitration
implementation,6 the evidence of an abusive, manipulative arbitration rollout for the
purpose of undermining this litigation is undisputed.
First, like in Billingsley and Abdul‐Rasheed,7 Defendants, after an FLSA collective
lawsuit was underway, presented an arbitration agreement to potential opt‐in claimants
that waived their right to join an FLSA collective action and was a condition of
continued employment. See 560 F. App’x at 919 (the defendants “informed the
[potential claimants] that the arbitration agreement was a condition of continued
employment”); 2013 WL 6182321, at *2 (“if the [potential claimants] did not sign the
[arbitration agreement] within 30 days, Defendants told [claimants] that Defendants
would no longer give them any work.”). The evidence on the record is clear that if
employees did not sign the arbitration agreement, then they would no longer be able to
perform at KOD. [ECF Nos. 78, pp. 23‐24; 89‐1, pp. 5‐6].
6
As the Undersigned previously found, there is clearly no intimidation and no
“interrogation‐like” meetings in this action, nor do Plaintiffs even allege that in their
response to the motion to compel arbitration.
7
In Abdul‐Rasheed, as the Undersigned noted above, the district court refused to
enforce arbitration agreements in an FLSA collective action because of a finding that the
agreements were themselves unconscionable under Florida law, and separately, “that
the arbitration provision and collective action waiver . . . [were] abusive in that it
threatens the proper functioning of the litigation.” 2013 WL 6182321, at *3.
12
As the Undersigned noted above, Defendants’ General Manager affirmed at the
evidentiary hearing that this was the policy. [ECF No. 78, p. 24].8 While KOD states this
policy in a more‐nuanced manner in its response to requests for admission [ECF No. 89‐
1, pp. 5‐6], 9 the Undersigned finds, based on the testimony of the witnesses at the
evidentiary hearing (including the confirmation from named Plaintiffs who refused to
sign the agreement that they were, in fact, no longer provided the opportunity to work
[See e.g. ECF No. 78, p. 65]),10 in combination with Defendants’ own admission, that
Defendants did in fact make the signing of the subject arbitration agreement a condition
of continuing employment. The Undersigned finds the implementation of this policy to
be, like in Billingsley and Abdul‐Rasheed, “coercive” and “abusive.”
8
Q.
Okay. And you understood that it was a condition of employment
or to continually perform as a dancer that they sign this arbitration
agreement. In other words, if they didnʹt, they were out the door; is that
right?
A.
Yes.
[ECF No. 78, p. 24].
9
“If, however, the entertainer asked KOD whether signing the arbitration
agreement was a condition of their continuing to perform at KOD, or if she declined to
sign the agreement, then KOD admits she was likely informed that signing the
agreement was a condition of continuing to perform at KOD.” [ECF No. 89‐1, p. 6].
10
Q.
Were you ever specifically told that you were fired by anybody?
A.
Yes.
[ECF No. 78, p. 65 (testimony of Plaintiff Stanton)].
13
While the Court previously abstained from ruling on the per se unenforceability
of the arbitration agreements partially because of a lack of pinpoint specificity on the
timing of Defendants’ arbitration policy formulation and rollout, which clouded the
issue of Defendants’ intent, the record is now clear on Defendants’ purpose. In response
to Plaintiffs’ requests for admissions, Defendants unequivocally admit that (1)
“[s]ubsequent to April 8, 2014, KOD presented entertainers with an agreement to
arbitrate disputes arising between entertainers and KOD[;]”(2) “KOD’s post‐April 8,
presentation of agreements to arbitrate disputes between KOD and its entertainers was
motivated, at least in part, by the filing of this civil action[;]” and (3) “KOD’s post‐
April 8, 2014 presentation to its entertainers of agreements to arbitrate disputes between
KOD and its entertainers was intended, at least in part, to dissuade entertainers from
participating in this civil action.” [ECF No. 89‐1, p. 5] (emphasis added). Thus, like in
Billingsley and Abdul‐Rasheed, Defendants clearly intended to undermine the proper
functioning of this litigation.
The district court in Carter inferred the defendants’ intent (i.e. interfering with
the ongoing collective action) by chronology alone. 69 F. Supp. 3d at 1358 (“Given the
timing of the Agreement (post‐filing, pre‐certification), its immediate implementation
(the Agreement applies if a dancer continues to work at Stilettos), and its repressive
terms (retroactive application, waiver of claims not brought to arbitration, and a
prohibition of collective action), the Court finds that it has been designed to unfairly
14
thwart Carterʹs and potential opt‐in plaintiffsʹ rights.”). The Eleventh Circuit vacated
the district court’s ruling solely on the basis of that court’s inferences made from an
insufficient factual record. 608 F. App’x at 904. Unlike the trial court in Carter, the
Undersigned did not need to make inferences concerning Defendants’ intent;
Defendants clearly admitted their purpose of undermining this litigation.
Defendants point to Geter v. Galardi S. Enter., Inc.11 and Stevenson to support their
motion, but both of those cases are inapposite. Geter features the very same arbitration
agreements and policy implementation by the same Defendants that are present here.
2015 WL 1268276. While the district court in Geter granted Defendants’ motion to
compel arbitration against two opt‐in plaintiffs, that court rejected the plaintiffs’
objections on different grounds than are present here. In fact, the Geter court did not
substantively address the propriety of Defendants’ arbitration policy with regard to its
potential for undermining the collective action litigation per Billingsley. The Geter court
found the arbitration agreements enforceable because the plaintiffs’ argument to the
contrary was enjoined by judicial estoppel; the court was precluded from making
factual findings as to Defendants’ means of arbitration implementation (i.e. whether it
was coercive, manipulative, interrogation‐like, etc.) because the plaintiffs’ denied that
the two opt‐in claimants even signed the agreements in the first place. 2015 WL
11
No. 14‐21896‐CIV, 2015 WL 1268276 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2015) (FLSA collective
action case filed by a second group of dancers against the same Defendants filed in this
District in close proximity to the current action, which features many overlapping
issues).
15
1268276, at *3. Plaintiffs here do not contest that the four opt‐in claimants at issue here
actually signed the agreement, and so the Geter ruling is inapplicable.
Likewise, in Stevenson, where a district court in the Northern District of Georgia
enforced arbitration agreements signed by dancers after an FLSA collective action was
underway, the court addressed a separate issue than the one at issue here. 2014 WL
186101.
As noted above, there are two ways in which a court may declare invalid, or not
enforce, arbitration agreements entered into by potential class members after the action
was initiated. In the first approach (the one that Plaintiffs explicitly declined to invoke
[ECF No. 172, pp. 5‐6]), a court may find the arbitration agreements unconscionable,
procedurally or substantively. Abdul‐Rasheed, 2013 WL 6182321, at *3. In Stevenson, the
district court addressed only this first test, the unconscionability argument, concluding
that, under Georgia law, the arbitration agreements in question were not
unconscionable. 2014 WL 186101, at *2‐3. Unconscionability is not at issue here.12
12
Defendant further invokes unconscionability through references to Caley v.
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2005), in which the Eleventh Circuit
found that having a worker sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of continued
employment lawful. However, Caley is not applicable for two reasons. First, the
Eleventh Circuit’s ruling concerned the conscionability of having an employee sign such
an agreement generally. Id. at 1377. And second, the arbitration policy in Caley was
implemented more than a year before the plaintiffs filed their lawsuits. Id. at 1364‐66
(Complaints filed on November 17, 2003 and arbitration policy mailed to employees on
July 15, 2002).
16
Accordingly, to “prevent confusion and unfairness” and “ensure that the
potential plaintiffs have a fair opportunity to opt‐in to [this] FLSA collective action,” the
Court will exercise its managerial powers. Billingsley, 560 F. App’x at 921 (citations
omitted). Thus, the Court refuses to enforce the arbitration agreements [ECF Nos. 166‐1;
166‐2; 166‐3; 168‐1] against opt‐in claimants Moore, Hargraves, Wright and Delgado.
III.
CONCLUSION
The Undersigned hereby DENIES Defendant’s motions to compel arbitration.
DONE and ORDERED, in Chambers, in Miami, Florida, December 31, 2015.
Copies furnished to:
All Counsel of Record
17
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