Sodikart USA v. Geodis Wilson USA, Inc.
Filing
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ORDER Granting Defendant's 6 Motion to Dismiss. Closing Case. Motions Terminated: 6 MOTION to Dismiss the State Court Complaint contained within the Notice of Removal 1 Notice of Removal (State Court Complaint) Based Upon the Doctrine of Res Judicata filed by Geodis Wilson USA, Inc.. Signed by Judge Beth Bloom on 8/8/2014. (ral) NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014-69.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 14-CIV-22461-BLOOM/Valle
SODIKART USA,
Plaintiff,
v.
GEODIS WILSON USA, INC.,
Defendant.
_____________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Geodis Wilson USA, Inc.’s Motion to
Dismiss, ECF No. [6]. The Court has reviewed the motion, all supporting and opposing filings,
and the record in this case, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons that
follow, the Court now GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The instant litigation arises out of Plaintiff Sodikart USA (“Plaintiff”) utilization of
Defendant Geodis Wilson USA’s (“Defendant”) freight services for the shipment of goods from
France to Phoenix, Arizona in February, 2013. See ECF No. [1-1] at ¶¶ 6-7. At some point
during the shipping process, the goods, as well as additional parts, were severely damaged,
rendering the goods inoperable and resulting in a substantial monetary loss. Id. at ¶¶ 11-13.
Prior to the loss, Plaintiff initiated a business relationship with Defendant that had been ongoing
for a period of three years. Id. at ¶ 18. Notably, the Plaintiff contends that it represented to
Defendant that the price for the shipment of each good would include complete insurance against
any loss. Id. For three years, Plaintiff operated under the assumption that the millions of dollars
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of goods shipped with Defendant were insured. Id. It was not until Plaintiff sought to file a
claim based on this alleged insurance did it discover that this was not the case. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.
After notifying Defendant of the damage, Defendant asserted that no such insurance existed and
it was otherwise not responsible for the loss suffered. Id. at ¶¶ 16-18.
Consequently, on June 5, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant action in the Circuit Court of the
11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, alleging a violation of the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq. (Count I), and bringing an
additional claim for common-law fraud (Count II). See ECF No. [1]; ECF No. [1-1] at ¶¶ 19-34.
Defendant then removed the case to this Court based on the Court’s diversity jurisdiction on July
2, 2014. ECF No. [1]. Prior to the amendment deadline imposed by Rule 15 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff amended its Complaint, voluntarily dismissing Count II for
common-law fraud, leaving only its claim under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act (“FDUTPA”). See ECF No. [5].
However, this is not the first instance of this matter being presented in this Court. On
July 23, 2013, prior to the initiation of the instant action, Plaintiff filed a complaint with this
Court alleging a singular claim under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (the “Prior
Case”). See Sodikart USA v. Geodis Wilson USA, Inc., No. 13-22626, ECF No. [1] (S.D. Fla.
July 23, 2013) (Complaint). Although the Prior Case, which remains ongoing, states a different
cause of action, the Defendant and factual allegations contained therein are identical to those
found within the present Complaint. Compare ECF No. [1] with Sodikart, No. 13-22626, at ECF
No. [1] (Complaint).
Moreover, a review of the procedural posture of the Prior Case is
warranted. On February 24, 2014, Plaintiff sought leave to amend its complaint in the Prior Case
to add new claims against Defendant for fraud and punitive damages. See Sodikart, No. 13-
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22626, at ECF No. [26] (Order on Appeal). Based on Plaintiff’s representations, namely, that the
parties had agreed to the amendment, the Honorable Judge William C. Turnoff, United States
Magistrate Judge, granted the motion.
Id.
Shortly thereafter, Defendant appealed Judge
Turnoff’s decision on the grounds that it had never agreed to allow Plaintiff’s amendment,
accusing Plaintiff’s counsel of deceiving the Court and “ambushing” the Defendant. Id. As a
result, the Honorable Judge Kathleen M. Williams, the United States District Judge then assigned
to the case, reversed Judge Turnoff’s decision, disallowing Plaintiff’s amendment as untimely
and without consent of opposing counsel. Id. Subsequently, Plaintiff attempted to amend the
Court’s scheduling order so as to permit amendment. See id. at ECF No. [27]. In its motion to
amend the scheduling order, Plaintiff asserted that it did not learn of the facts forming the basis
of its fraud claim until four days prior to the initial amendment deadline. Id. In denying the
motion, Judge Williams noted that Plaintiff could have nonetheless made a timely motion to
amend the scheduling order upon learning of the additional facts.
Id. at ECF No. [30].
Accordingly, Plaintiff was not permitted to amend the Prior Case’s complaint, failing to
diligently prosecute its claim. See id.
Save for one sentence, the fraud allegations contained within Plaintiff’s failed amended
complaint are identical to those in Plaintiff’s Complaint herein. Compare ECF No. [1] with
Sodikart, No. 13-22626, at ECF No. [18-1] (First Amended Complaint). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s
claim under FDUTPA merely incorporates the same exact factual assertions found in the
complaint before the Court in the Prior Case.
Defendant avers that the instant action is
Plaintiff’s attempt to circumvent their untimely amendment and Judge Williams’ decisions in the
Prior Case. See ECF No. [6]. Therefore, Defendant asserts that this litigation is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. Id.
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II. DISCUSSION
The doctrine of res judicata bars a subsequent action when the prior decision: (1) was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) was a final judgment on the merits; (3)
involved the same parties or their privies; and (4) involved the same causes of action. Trustmark
Ins. Co. v. ESLU, Inc., 299 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing In re Piper Aircraft Corp.,
244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001)). The bar does not require that the literal causes of action
be identical, rather, it encompasses those claims that could have been raised previously. Id; see
also Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2003). Therefore, a court
focuses on whether the prior and present actions “arise out of the same nucleus of operative fact,
or [are] based upon the same factual predicate,” such that the two cases are essentially the same
“claim.” In re Piper, 244 F.3d at 1297 (citation omitted).
It must be noted that Plaintiff does not directly dispute that any of the four conditions are
not met. See ECF No. [10]. Instead, Plaintiff contends that a federal court exercising its diversity
jurisdiction must apply state law. Id. According to Plaintiff, under Florida law, the cause of
action must be identical for res judicata’s bar to apply. Id. In support of this contention, Plaintiff
directs the Court to Harley v. Health Ctr. of Coconut Creek, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (S.D.
Fla. 2007), wherein the court stated that under Florida law, “if the cause of action is not the
same, res judicata will not bar issues which could have been raised in the prior suit but were
not.” Id. at 1369. Plaintiff has misinterpreted the law in two regards.
First, a federal court sitting in diversity applies federal law governing res judicata when
deciding whether to invoke the doctrine’s preclusive effect to a prior federal court decision, such
as the case here. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. J. Transp., Inc., 880 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.2
(11th Cir. 1989). In Empire Fire, the Eleventh Circuit noted that while some case law indicates
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that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction is to apply the law of the state where it sits to
determine the effect of res judicata, “this view is erroneous.” Id. It is true that the Court in
Harley, a federal court sitting in diversity, applied Florida law pertaining to res judicata, that case
is ultimately distinguishable. In Harley, the Court noted that “[i]n determining the preclusive
effect of a state court judgment on an ongoing federal proceeding, federal courts apply the state's
law of preclusion.” Harley, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 1368 (emphasis added). Here, the Court is not
presented with a situation where it is necessary to ascertain the impact of a state court judgment;
the prior decision of concern originates from a federal court. Hence, Harley is inapposite.
Second, Florida law does not require the causes of action to be duplicative; in fact, the Court in
Harley noted that “[t]he determining factor in deciding whether the cause of action is the same is
whether the facts or evidence necessary to maintain the suit are the same in both actions,” not
that the claims are brought under the exact same statute or theory of liability. Id. at 1369
(quoting Atl. Shores Resort, LLC v. 507 S. St. Corp., 937 So. 2d 1239, 1243 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA
2006)).
Therefore, the Court applies the federal interpretation of res judicata, which requires that
a plaintiff’s present claims could have been raised in the previous action due to the fact that they
arise out of, or are based upon, the same factual predicate. In re Piper, 244 F.3d at 1297. As
previously noted, the factual circumstances giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim in the instant case and
the Prior Case are identical; no additional facts have been submitted. The Court finds that res
judicata exists as all four conditions have been met.
The Court takes pause only with respect the second requirement, that is, whether Judge
Williams’ repeated denial of Plaintiff’s untimely attempts at amendment constitutes adjudication
on the merits. In Hrabe v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (M.D. Ala. 1999), the
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Middle District of Alabama adopted the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in noting “that denial of leave
to amend [a complaint] constitutes res judicata on the merits of the claims which were the subject
of the proposed amended pleading.” Id. at 1301 (quoting King v. Hoover Group, Inc., 958 F.2d
219 (8th Cir.1992)). The logic contained therein is persuasive. Plaintiff’s amendment was
deemed untimely and the mere addition of a claim will not somehow distinguish the present
action from the Prior Case when both are based on the same exact set of facts. As previously
noted, Plaintiff’s claims under the FDUTPA simply incorporate the same factual background
present in the case at bar without adding any additional factual assertions that would lead the
Court to believe that this is an entirely new cause of action; Plaintiff merely recites the elements
necessary to state a claim under the FDUTPA devoid of further factual enhancement. Compare
ECF No. [1-1] at ¶¶ 19-25 with Sodikart, No. 13-22626, at ECF No. [1] (Complaint). As the
Middle District of Alabama noted in Hrabe,
This is not a situation in which legal or procedural hurdles
prevented the plaintiff from timely asserting its theory; rather, the
plaintiff could have introduced the theory earlier but, for whatever
reason, opted not to do so. One who has a choice of more than one
remedy for a given wrong may not assert them serially, in
successive actions, but must advance all at once on pain of bar.
This rule applies equally to situations in which a claimant fails to
raise an alternate theory in a timely fashion.
Id. at 1301-02 (quoting Agrilectric Power Partners, Ltd. v. General Elec. Co., 20 F.3d 663, 665
(5th Cir.1994)) (internal formatting and quotation removed). Plaintiff was fully apprised of any
and all facts upon which it premises its claim under FDUTPA well before the instant litigation
was filed. Accordingly, the Court finds that Judge Williams’ denial of Plaintiff’s amendment in
Sodikart USA v. Geodis Wilson USA, Inc., No. 13-22626, ECF No. [26] (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2014)
(Order on Appeal), constitutes a final judgment on the merits. The doctrine of res judicata
applies and Plaintiff is not entitled to a second bite of the apple where such claims should have
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been brought in the previously-filed litigation but were not due to Plaintiff’s own lack of
diligence and timeliness. See also Interstate Pipe Maint., Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F.2d 1495,
1496 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that res judicata applied where the plaintiff conceded that the
additional claims should have been brought in the previous litigation but were not because of
untimely amendment). Plaintiff will be able to continue litigating their claim in the appropriate
case, that being, the first-filed Prior Case.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendant Geodis Wilson USA,
Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [6], is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk is ordered to CLOSE
THIS CASE.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 8th day of August, 2014.
____________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
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