EGI-VSR, LLC v. Coderch Mitjans

Filing 391

Order On Objections to Magistrate Judge Order, overruling 385 Appeal/Objection of Magistrate Judge Order to District Court. Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr on 1/26/2021. See attached document for full details. (pcs)

Case 1:15-cv-20098-RNS Document 391 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/27/2021 Page 1 of 3

United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
EGI-VSR, LLC, Petitioner,
v.
Juan Carlos Celestino Coderch
Mitjans, Respondent.

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Civil Action No. 15-20098-Civ-Scola
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Order On Objections to Magistrate Judge Order
On September 17, 2020, the Court referred the Plaintiff’s motion for
protective order and the Defendant’s motion to compel to Magistrate Judge
Alicia M. Otazo-Reyes, to be heard and determined, consistent with 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(A), Federal Rule 72, and Rule 1(C) of the Local Magistrate Judge
Rules. This matter is now before the Court upon the Defendant’s objections to
the Magistrate Judge’s discovery order (ECF No. 384) granting the Plaintiff’s
motion for protective order (ECF No. 353) and denying the Defendant’s motion
to compel (ECF No. 362). The Court affirms the Magistrate Judge’s order (ECF
No. 384.)
Where a magistrate judge issues a non-dispositive order, the Court
reviews that order under a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(a). A number of courts have said that a ruling can be shown to be
clearly erroneous only when it can be concluded that the challenged decision is
not “just maybe or probably wrong; it must strike us with the force of a fiveweek-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.” TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, 572 F.3d 186, 194
(4th Cir. 2009). Put another way, a finding is clearly erroneous, when “although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 425 F.3d 1325, 1351-52 (11th Cir.
2005). An order is contrary to the law when it fails to apply or misapplies
relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure. Barr v. One Touch Direct, LLC,
No. 8:15-cv-2391, 2017 WL 749503, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 2017). Despite the nondispositive nature of the Magistrate Judge’s order, the Defendant nonetheless
urges this Court to conduct a de novo review on the ground that Magistrate
Judge Otazo-Reyes “prejudge[d] the merits” of certain new defenses the
Defendant intended to raise before the Court prior to the Court acting upon the
Eleventh Circuit’s limited mandate. (ECF No. 385, at 10-11.) Under either
standard of review, the Court affirms the Magistrate Judge’s ruling for the
reasons set forth below.

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The Court has reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s order, the parties’
briefing, and the relevant legal authorities and finds Magistrate Judge OtazoReyes’s order to be well-reasoned and cogent and compelling. The Court agrees
with the Magistrate Judge that under the mandate rule, the Court’s role is
circumscribed. “The mandate rule requires a district court to strictly comply
with the terms of a circuit court’s opinion when a case is remanded” and “may
not alter, amend, or examine the mandate, or give any further relief, but must
enter an order in strict compliance with the mandate.” Rhiner v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., No. 15-cv-14332, 2018 WL 10076759, at *2 (S.D. Fla. April 23,
2018) (White, Mag. J.), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL
10076760 (May 31, 2018) (Rosenberg, J.). When the circuit court issues a
limited mandate, the “trial court is restricted in the range of issues it may
consider . . . [r]uling on matters outside the scope of a limited mandate
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Irey, 458 F. App’x 854,
855-56 (11th Cir. 2012).
Here, the Eleventh Circuit remanded this matter to the Court for the
limited purpose of “recalculate[ing] the purchase price of [EGI’s] shares using
the January 13, 2012, conversion date” and “enter[ing] an order requiring both
Mr. Coderch and EGI to perform their obligations under Section 10 of the [VSR]
Shareholders’ Agreement.” (ECF No. 384, at 8.) The Defendant has received all
the discovery that is relevant and proportional to this mandate, as noted by
Magistrate Judge Otazo-Reyes. The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge OtazoReyes that discovery beyond this purpose is “neither relevant nor proportional
to the needs of the case.” (ECF No. 384, at 8.) While the Defendant argues that
“new evidence” provides an exception to the mandate rule, the Defendant
misconstrues that exception. The exception the Defendant points to permits
the Court to deviate from the circuit’s mandate, where a “subsequent trial”
produces “substantially different evidence.” Barber v. Int’l Bhd. Of Boilermakers,
841 F. 2d 1067, 1072 (11th Cir. 1988); see also Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 664
F.3d 883, 891 (11th Cir. 2011). Here, there has been no subsequent trial that
produced substantially different evidence sufficient for the Court to deviate
from the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate. Application of the mandate rule serves
the important purpose of creating “efficiency, finality and obedience within the
judicial system.” United States v. Stein, 964 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2020).
For the Court to reopen proceedings beyond the Eleventh Circuit’s limited
mandate would be an abuse of discretion.
For the reasons set forth above, Magistrate Judge Otazo-Reyes’s ruling is
affirmed in its entirety. The Defendant’s objections are overruled. (ECF No.
385.)

Case 1:15-cv-20098-RNS Document 391 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/27/2021 Page 3 of 3

Done and ordered at Miami, Florida, on January 26, 2021.
________________________________
Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge