Ramirez v. Field Office Director United States Citizenship and Immigration Services et al

Filing 18

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS granting 14 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Closing Case. Motions Terminated: 14 Defendant's MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Field Office Director United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Secretary U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Attorney General of the United States. Signed by Judge Marcia G. Cooke on 1/13/2016. (tm) NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014-69.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 15-21462-Civ-COOKE/TORRES
GILBERTO IVAN RAMIREZ,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ANOUCHKA CASTRO, Field Office
Director, Miami Field Office, U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (“USCIS”); ERIC
HOLDER, Attorney General, U.S. Department
of Justice; JEH JOHNSON, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security,
Defendants.
_________________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS MATTER is before me on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Petition for
Review of Naturalization Application For Failure to State a Claim (“Motion”). (ECF No.
14). I have reviewed the Motion, related filings, and the pertinent authority. For the reasons
stated below, Defendants’ Motion is granted.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Gilberto Ivan Ramirez (“Ramirez”) petitions this Court for de novo review of
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ denial of his naturalization application. See 8
U.S.C. § 1421(c). At issue is when a conviction arises for an aggravated felony under the
definitions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8) (as
amended by the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101–649, Title V, 104 Stat. 4978, 5051
(Nov. 29, 1990)). On November 29, 1990, Congress amended the INA to statutorily preclude
aliens from fulfilling the “good moral character” naturalization requirement if they were
convicted of an aggravated felony after the date of the bill’s passage, including aliens who
had been charged of an aggravated felony but not yet convicted. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8); 8
C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(1)(ii). The parties dispute whether Ramirez’s conviction for an
aggravated felony occurred before or after November 29, 1990.
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On June 16, 1989, Ramirez was arrested and later charged in this district with two
felony counts related to cocaine distribution. Pl.’s Ex. at 1 – 2, ECF No. 1-3. Ramirez was
denied bail on June 22, 1989 based on flight risk concerns and remained in federal custody
throughout his criminal proceedings. Pet. ¶¶ 9 – 11, ECF No. 1. A detention order was
formally entered into the record on June 26, 1989. Id. ¶ 10. A grand jury indicted Ramirez on
both felony charges on June 28, 1989. Pl.’s Ex. at 1 – 2. On July 23, 1990, Ramirez entered
into a plea agreement where he pled guilty to one of the felony charges—possession of and
intent to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine—and the other felony charge was
dismissed. Pl.’s Ex. at 6 – 8. Both parties agree that Ramirez pled guilty to an aggravated
felony under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Ramirez’s original sentencing hearing of November 1990
was rescheduled for January 1991 at the request of Ramirez’s counsel. Pet. ¶ 13. The district
court ultimately accepted Ramirez’s guilty plea in January 1991 and sentenced Ramirez to
one hundred months imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Pet. ¶ 16. The
Court’s sentencing judgment was formally entered into the record on January 28, 1991. Pl.’s
Ex. at 4.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In order
to state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the [ ] claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (citations omitted).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
At this stage in the litigation, a court must consider the factual allegations in the
Complaint as true and accept all reasonable inferences therein. Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty.,
Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994). Still, the Court may grant a motion to dismiss
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when, “on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations
will support the cause of action.” Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992
F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993).
III.

DISCUSSION

The parties disagree about when Ramirez’s conviction arose under the INA. The
INA defines “conviction” for aliens as follows:
[A] formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication
of guilt has been withheld, where— (i) a judge or jury has found the alien
guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has
admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has
ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty
to be imposed.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(a).
Defendants chiefly argue that Ramirez’s sentencing in January 1991 is the date of the
“formal judgment of guilt” and that the additional prongs of the definition do not apply
since an “adjudication of guilt” was not “withheld” here. To buttress their point,
Defendants rely on the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Mejia Rodriguez v. U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 629 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2011). There, the appeals court
held that a guilty plea coupled with a later sentence of time served was a “conviction” under
the INA’s “formal judgment of guilt” provision. Mejia Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 629 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2011). The appeals court noted that the remaining
portion of the INA’s definition and its two-part test did not apply since the lower state court
“did not expressly withhold adjudication” in the underlying criminal case. Id. at 1226.
For his part, Ramirez contends that the definition’s two-part test regarding guilty
pleas and “some form of punishment” should apply regardless of whether he received a
“formal judgment of guilt” or an “adjudication of guilt [that] has been withheld.” Assuming
the two-part test applies, Ramirez believes that his detention order from June 1989
constitutes “some form of punishment,” and that his subsequent guilty plea from July 1990
is the operative time in which a “conviction” arose under the INA. Ramirez cites to the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Cole v. U.S. Attorney General, 712 F.3d 517
(11th Cir. 2013), which uses the INA definition’s two-part test even though the underlying

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case involved a guilty plea and formal sentencing. See Cole v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 712 F.3d 517,
525 (11th Cir. 2013).
Regardless of how Ramirez’s conviction is analyzed—be it as a “formal judgment of
guilt” like in Meija Rodriguez or under a two-part test that identifies a guilty plea and “some
form of punishment” like in Cole—I find that he was convicted after his formal sentencing in
January 1991. It is well-established, and the parties do not dispute, that a guilty plea alone
does not effectuate a judgment or a form of punishment under the INA. See Puello v. Bureau
of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 327 – 31 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing the word
“conviction” in the INA). Ramirez’s subsequent sentencing and entry of it on the criminal
case docket serves as both the “formal judgment of guilt” and “some form of punishment”
under the INA. I need not decide which analytical approach is correct since the outcome is
the same here.
I do not find persuasive Ramirez’s argument that the district court judge’s detention
order constituted “some form of punishment” prior to his guilty plea. Even though the
INA’s two-part “conviction” test does not stipulate a temporal requirement between an
alien’s guilty plea and his punishment, common sense dictates that the punishment should
at minimum relate to a judge’s finding of guilt or an alien’s guilty plea. Here, the pretrial
detention order was based on Ramirez being a flight risk. It was unrelated to any finding of
guilt and predated Ramirez’s guilty plea. Whatever analytical differences arise in the Meija
Rodriguez and Cole cases, both cases held that a conviction arose after an alien’s guilty plea
and a sentencing judgment was entered. See Cole, 712 F.3d at 524 – 26; Meija Rodriguez, 629
F.3d at 1227 – 28. I have found no case law that suggests a pretrial detention order
effectuates a “conviction” under the INA once a guilty plea or a finding of guilt is made.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Review
of Naturalization Application For Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 14) is GRANTED.
This case is DISMISSED without prejudice. All pending motions, if any, are DENIED as
moot. The Clerk of the Court shall CLOSE this case.

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DONE and ORDERED in chambers at Miami, Florida, this 13th day of January
2016.

Copies furnished to:
Edwin G. Torres, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Counsel of record

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