Wilshire Insurance Company v. Casablanca On The Bay, Inc. et al

Filing 183

ORDER denying 156 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law; denying 156 Motion for New Trial; denying 169 Motion to Amend/Correct ; denying 170 Motion to Remand to State Court. Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr on 8/14/2017. (pes)

United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Wilshire Insurance Company,
Plaintiff,
v.
Casablanca on the Bay, Inc. and
others, Defendants.

)
)
) Civil Action No. 15-21644-Civ-Scola
)
)
)

Omnibus Order Denying Casa Market and Casa Grill’s Motions
The jury in this case returned a verdict in favor of third-party plaintiff
Julia Padron on her claim against third-party defendants Casablanca Seafood
Bar & Grill, Inc. (“Casa Grill”) and Casablanca Fish Market, Inc. (“Casa
Market”) finding them both vicariously liable for a car accident involving Lazaro
E. Sanchez. Casa Market and Casa Grill now attack that verdict under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 50 and, alternatively, Rule 59. Both arguments fail and
Casa Market and Casa Grill’s Rule 50 and 59 motions (ECF No. 156) are
denied. Additionally, Casa Market and Casa Grill have also asked the Court to
“dismiss and remand” Padron’s remaining claims (ECF No. 170) and requested
leave to file an amended answer (ECF No. 169). Both of these motions (ECF
Nos. 169 & 170) are denied as well.
1. Background
To recap, on December 23, 2013, a truck driven by Lazaro E. Sanchez
and a car driven by Padron collided. After Padron filed suit in state court
against Lazaro E.’s1 employer, Defendant Casablanca on the Bay, Inc. (“Casa
Bay”), Plaintiff Wilshire Insurance Company filed a declaratory action in this
Court against Casa Bay and Padron. Wilshire sought a declaration of “no
coverage” under a commercial general-liability insurance policy it issued to
Casa Bay for the relief sought by Padron in state court. In response, Padron
filed a counterclaim against Wilshire, a cross claim against Casa Bay, and
third-party claims against Casa Market and Casa Grill, two entities affiliated
with Casa Bay and all owned by members of the Sanchez family. In count one
There are multiple Sanchezes in this case and therefore those family members will be
referred to by their first names. Additionally, there are multiple Lazaro Sanchezes:
Lazaro E. Sanchez, the driver of the truck, Lazaro Sanchez, Jr., the driver’s father and
an owner of the various Casablanca entities involved in this action, and Lazaro
Sanchez, Sr., Lazaro Jr.’s father.

1

of her complaint, Padron seeks a declaration from the Court that: Lazaro E.
“was in the course of employment with one or more” of the Casablanca entities;
and Wilshire owes a duty of indemnification to one or more of the Casablanca
entities for the damages Padron sustained in the accident. (Padron’s
Counterclaim, ECF No. 9, 7.) In counts two and three, Padron seeks damages
from all three Casablanca entities for the injuries she sustained as a result of
the accident. (Id. at 8–9.)
For various reasons, the Court bifurcated the trial in this matter. Just
before the trial was set to commence, Wilshire, Casa Bay, and Padron reached
a settlement. This left only Padron’s allegations of vicarious liability against
Casa Market and Casa Grill to be determined at the then upcoming trial. After
a two-day trial, the jury found both entities vicariously liable for Sanchez’s
involvement in the collision. The jury found Casa Market vicariously liable
because Lazaro E. was acting within the scope of his employment and found
Casa Grill liable because he was acting within the scope of his agency.
After the parties had rested, and prior to closing arguments, Casa Market
moved, ore tenus, for a judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(a). Casa Grill joined Casa Market’s motion, echoing Casa
Market’s arguments: Padron had failed to adduce evidence sufficient to support
a finding that Lazaro E. was acting within the scope of his employment when
his truck collided with Padron’s car. The Court denied the parties’ motions,
finding substantial evidence had been presented to support a finding of
vicarious liability under either an employment or an agency theory. Casa Grill
and Casa Market now ask the Court to, among other things, enter judgment as
a matter of law, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. For the reasons that
follow, the Court denies both requests.
2. The Court denies Casa Market and Casa Grill’s motion for judgment
as a matter of law.
A. Legal Standard
“A district court should grant judgment as a matter of law when the
plaintiff presents no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to
find for him on a material element of his cause of action.” Pickett v. Tyson Fresh
Meats, Inc., 420 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005); Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) (a court
may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law on an issue if “the court
finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary
basis to find for the [nonmoving] party on that issue.”). Although courts should
“look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the
non-movant must put forth more than a mere scintilla of evidence suggesting

that reasonable minds could reach differing verdicts.” Abel v. Dubberly, 210
F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2000). A Rule 50 motion should be denied “if the
plaintiff presents enough evidence to create a substantial conflict in the
evidence on an essential element of the plaintiff's case.” Pickett, 420 F.3d at
1278. The “standard for judgment as a matter of law . . . mirrors the standard
for summary judgment under Rule 56. Thus, the court must review all of the
evidence in the record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, but making no credibility determinations or weighing any
evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000)
(citations omitted). “The court must affirm the jury verdict unless there is no
legal basis upon which the jury could have found for the plaintiff.” Peer v.
Lewis, No. 06-60146-CIV, 2008 WL 2047978, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 13, 2008)
(Torres, J.), aff'd, No. 08-13465, 2009 WL 323104 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2009)
(alterations adopted) (quoting Telecom Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d
820, 830 (11th Cir.2004)); see also Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441
(11th Cir.1997) (“A mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient to support a jury
verdict.”).
B. Discussion
In their motion, Casa Grill and Casa Market submit that Padron did not
present any evidence showing that Lazaro E. was acting within the scope of his
employment or agency with either company. Instead, according to Casa Market
and Casa Grill, all that Padron was able to establish was, at most, that Lazaro
E. “was in the process of doing something for Casablanca on the Bay, Inc.,” a
separate company. (Def.’s Mot. at 5.) However, there was evidence adduced at
trial that could readily support the jury’s findings that, at the time of the
accident, Lazaro E. was both: (1) acting in the course of his employment with
Casa Market; and (2) acting within the course of his agency with Casa Grill.
As provided in the jury instructions:
An employee acts within the scope of his employment only if the
following three elements are proven by a preponderance of the
evidence:
1.) At the time of the accident, the employee was performing the
kind of activity he was employed to perform;
2.) The activity was being performed substantially within the time
and space limits of the employee’s employment; and
3.) The performance of the activity was motivated, at least in part,
to further the employer’s interests; and

An agent acts within the scope of his agency for one or more of the
defendant companies only if the following three elements are
proven by a preponderance of the evidence:
1.) At the time of the accident, the agent was performing the kind
of activity he was directed to perform;
2.) The activity was being performed substantially within the time
and space limits of the his agency; and
3.) The performance of the activity was motivated, at least in part,
to further the defendant company’s interests.
(Jury Instr., ECF No. 154, 3–6 (emphasis added).)
Casa Market and Casa Grill complain that Padron failed to set forth any
evidence that Lazaro E. was acting within either the scope of his employment
with Casa Market or within the scope of his agency with Casa Grill. To that
end, Casa Market and Casa Grill insist that, first, just before the accident
Lazaro E. was, if anything, performing work for Casa Bay alone and not either
Casa Market or Casa Grill. And, second, in any event, at the time of the
accident itself, Lazaro E. had deviated from his Casa Bay work and was
actually running a purely personal errand that had nothing to do with any of
the three companies. The Court disagrees, finding evidence from which the jury
could have found that Lazaro E. was both acting within the scope of his
employment with Casa Market and within the scope of his agency with Casa
Grill.
As a starting point, neither Casa Market nor Casa Grill quarrels with the
jury’s finding that, around the time of the accident, Lazaro E. was (1) an
employee of both Casa Market and Grill and (2) an agent of Casa Grill. Thus
the only issues now under consideration are whether the evidence was
sufficient for the jury to find that Lazaro E. was acting within the scope of his
employment and agency with Casa Market and Grill, respectively.
Regarding the events preceding the car accident, the evidence presented
at trial established that Lazaro E. had, at some point, been asked to drive his
grandfather home from one of the Casablanca entities. According to Lazaro Jr.
(Lazaro E.’s father), Maribel Sanchez (Lazaro Jr.’s wife and Lazaro E.’s mother
as well as boss), also told Lazaro E. to buy a new television to replace a broken
one at Casa Bay. After dropping off his grandfather, Lazaro E. then went to a
nearby Best Buy, on Bird Road in Miami, to purchase the television. Since that
store did not have the particular television he wanted in stock, someone from
the store directed Lazaro E. to a Best Buy in Miami Beach. As he was leaving
the Best Buy on Bird Road, however, Maribel called Lazaro E. and told him to
go pick up his cousins from school. According to Lazaro E.’s trial testimony, it

was while he was on his way from the Best Buy to his cousins’ school that he
was involved in the collision with Padron.
Casa Market and Casa Grill insist that the trial witnesses universally
testified that Lazaro E. was running a purely personal errand for himself, and
not for any of the companies, at the time of the accident. The Court disagrees
with this characterization of the evidence.
First of all, it was undisputed that Lazaro E. was on the clock when
Maribel told him to go pick up his cousins: the parties stipulated that Lazaro E.
had clocked in at 8:00 a.m. and had been clocked out at 4:00 p.m. on the day
of the accident. The accident occurred around 2:30 p.m. Furthermore, Yasmin
Fleitas, the human resources manager for all three Casa entities (and one of
Lazaro E.’s aunts), testified that she considered Lazaro E. to have been working
at the time of the accident. That Lazaro E. was working, and not running a
personal errand, at the time of the accident is further buttressed by the fact
that he was ultimately paid for working those hours on the day of the accident.
Indeed, Fleitas testified that despite being well aware of the accident, she
reviewed and approved Lazaro E.’s timecard for that day. She also testified that
she was generally unaware of any time for which Lazaro E. was ever paid but
wasn’t actually working.
Second, it was well established at trial that Maribel, in addition to being
Lazaro E.’s mother, was also one of the people that regulated his work
activities, including errands, for all three Casa companies. While Loretta
Sanchez (Lazaro E.’s aunt and Lazaro Jr.’s sister) testified that she had
intended for Lazaro E. to pick up her children, there is no dispute that she
called Maribel, and not Lazaro E. directly. Loretta also testified that that she
always calls Maribel for everything. Thus despite Loretta’s testimony that she
believed Lazaro E. was picking up his cousins as a personal favor to her, as her
nephew, the jury could have inferred from her testimony that she had asked
Maribel for the help directly rather than as a mere conduit to Lazaro E.
Further, Loretta testified that Maribel told her, in no uncertain terms, that she
would make sure that Lazaro E. picked up the children. That is, Maribel did
not tell Loretta that she would, for example, call Lazaro E. on Loretta’s behalf,
to relay the request to see if he could take the time to pick up his cousins. To
the contrary, not a single witness testified that Lazaro E. was given an option.
Rather, the evidence showed that Maribel called Lazaro E. and told him to pick
up his cousins. Lazaro E. himself even acknowledged that his general duties for
the Casa companies included doing, without exception, whatever his parents
told him to do, even if it was a personal errand for one of them. Lazaro Jr.
testified that Maribel relied on Lazaro E. to run personal errands so that she

could concentrate on the business of the three Casa entities. The jury could
have reasonably disregarded the self-serving testimony offered by the various
owners and employees of the Casa companies that Lazaro E. was on a purely
personal mission that did not in any way benefit the companies. Instead, there
was evidence presented that Maribel often asked Lazaro E. to run personal
errands for her and that his doing so ultimately benefitted the businesses,
allowing Maribel to focus on more important things in the companies. It would
be reasonable for the jury to infer that Maribel’s directive to Lazaro E.
regarding Loretta’s children was an errand that was in fact personal to Maribel
and not Lazaro E. and, further, that she asked Lazaro E. to run the errand as
his boss rather than as his mother.
Next there was ample evidence that the three Casa entities operated as
one cohesive family business. Loretta, for one, testified that the three
companies are indeed all one unified business. The parties stipulated that
Lazaro E. was paid for his services to all three companies through paychecks
from Casa Market. Maribel testified that all three companies jointly
collaborated in marketing efforts. And, most importantly, Maribel herself, at the
time of the accident, was working for, if not managing, all three Casa entities.
She was also a corporate officer for Casa Grill and Casa Market but not Casa
Bay. Thus, any errand that Maribel directed Lazaro to do, whether it was
personal to her (i.e. picking up the cousins) or whether it was for only Casa Bay
(i.e., buying the television), indirectly benefitted all three companies. For, if
Maribel could delegate a more menial task to Lazaro E. that involved either a
personal matter or another entity, that would free up her time to focus on more
important things involving the entire family business, including both Casa Grill
and Casa Market.
In sum, the Court finds a legally sufficient basis upon which the jury
could have found that at the time of the accident: (1) Lazaro E. was performing
the kind of activity he was employed by Casa Market to perform and the kind of
activity he was directed to perform by Casa Grill; (2) that he was performing
that activity within the time and space limits of his employment with Casa
Market and of his agency with Casa Grill; and (3) that his performance of the
activity was motivated, at least in part, to further both Casa Market and Casa
Grill’s interests. Casa Grill and Casa Market’s focus on their argument that
Lazaro E.’s timesheet alone is insufficient to establish that he was acting within
the scope of his employment or agency is misplaced. Lazaro E.’s timesheet was
but one fact, albeit a significant fact, that supported the jury’s verdict. It was
by no means the only fact. Padron certainly presented enough evidence to

create a substantial conflict in the evidence on all of the essential elements of
her case. See Pickett, 420 F.3d. at 1278.
3. The Court denies Casa Market and Casa Grill’s motion for a new
trial.
A. Legal Standard
In accordance with Rule 59(a), a court may grant a motion for a new trial
on all or some issues, “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been
granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). The
Eleventh Circuit, however, “permits a district court to order a new trial only
under extremely narrow circumstances.” Gonzalez v. Batmasian, No. 9:16-CV81696, 2017 WL 3055009, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 19, 2017) (Middlebrooks, J.).
That is, “[i]t may do so when ‘the verdict is against the clear weight of the
evidence or will result in a miscarriage of justice.’” Id. (citing Hewitt v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 732 F.2d 1554, 1556 (11th Cir. 1984)). Under Rule 59, the
standard is more flexible than the standard under Rule 50 and the court is free
to independently weigh the evidence itself. Williams v. City of Valdosta, 689
F.2d 964, 973 (11th Cir. 1982). However, in order to find in the movant’s favor,
the Court “must find the verdict contrary to the great, and not merely the
greater, weight of the evidence.” Id. “[W]hen independently weighing the
evidence, the trial court is to view not only that evidence favoring the jury
verdict but evidence in favor of the moving party as well.” Id.
B. Discussion
Upon a review of the evidence, the Court finds no occasion to disturb the
jury’s verdict: the jury’s verdict is not contrary to the great weight of the
evidence. Although, as Casa Grill and Casa Market point out, all five of
Padron’s witnesses “testified that Lazaro E. Sanchez was doing a personal
errand for his aunt at the time of the accident” (Defs.’ Mot. at 9), the Court
does not find such conclusory and self-serving testimony compelling. This is
especially so in light of other testimony offered by some of these witnesses that
contradicted the allegation that the errand was purely personal to Lazaro E.
Similarly, the Court is not persuaded by the testimony from the five witnesses
that picking up his cousins was not the kind of activity that Lazaro E. was
employed or directed to perform. Many of these same five witnesses also
testified that Lazaro Jr. and Maribel often directed Lazaro E. to run personal
errands for them as part of his employment in the family business. The Court
does not find credible the various witnesses’ self-serving testimony that carved
out this particular errand from all of the other errands that Lazaro E. was

asked to run while working for the Casa entities. Lastly, Casa Grill and Casa
Market’s contention that purchasing the television benefitted only Casa Bay is
unavailing. Maribel asked Lazaro E. to purchase the television. Maribel in turn
was a manager of all three businesses. Thus, any errand that she did not have
to run herself, regardless of which company that specific errand was for,
necessarily benefitted the entire family business. In the end, although there
was certainly plenty of evidence in Casa Grill and Casa Market’s favor, the
Court finds that it cannot say that the jury’s verdict is against the clear weight
of the evidence.
Casa Grill and Casa Market further argue that the Court confused the
jury in answering the jury’s questions, submitted to the Court during
deliberations: “What is the legal definition of a company? Is the definition open
to interpretation?” (Jury Note/Question, ECF No. 150, 1.) The Court answered:
“The use of ‘company’ or ‘companies’ in the jury instructions refers to
Casablanca Fish Market and/or Casablanca Seafood Bar & Grill, Inc. and there
is no dispute that each of those entities is a ‘company’ as that term is used.”
(Court’s Resp., ECF No. 150, 2.) Casa Grill and Casa Market submit that this
“confused the jury by improperly blending the Defendants into one entity.”
(Defs.’ Mot. at 10.) To begin with, the Court finds this unlikely as the jury
clearly treated Casa Market and Casa Grill differently: the jury found that
Lazaro E. was acting within the scope of his employment with Casa Market but
only within the scope of his agency as to Casa Grill. This alone shows that
Casa Grill and Casa Market’s concerns are not well founded. Without more,
their conclusory arguments that the Court’s answer was confusing fails to
persuade.
Additionally, after reading its proposed answer to the jury’s question to
the parties, the Court asked all the attorneys if they had any objections. They
universally and unequivocally all said no. Casa Grill and Casa Market therefore
appear to have, in any event, waived their rights to now challenge the Court’s
response. C.f. United States v. Fulford, 267 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001)
(finding, in an appellate context, that a party had waived the right to contest a
jury instruction after finding it acceptable at trial).
4. The Court denies Casa Market and Casa Grill’s motion to dismiss.2
Casa Grill and Casa Market’s argument for dismissal is twofold. First,
they contend that because Wilshire settled its claims with Casa Bay and
Casa Market and Casa Grill also ask the Court to remand the remaining state
claims. This case, however, is an original action and not before the Court on removal.
There is thus nowhere to remand this case to.

2

Padron, the Court no longer has jurisdiction over Padron’s remaining claims
against Casa Market and Casa Grill. Second, they argue, even if the Court has
supplemental jurisdiction over Padron’s state-law claims, the Court should use
its discretion to decline to exercise such jurisdiction. Both arguments fail.
To begin with, Wilshire initiated this case under 28 U.S.C. § 2201,
seeking declaratory relief. The Court’s jurisdiction was based on diversity, in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as Wilshire, a North Carolina citizen, was
diverse from defendants Padron and Casa Bay, both Florida citizens. According
to Casa Market and Casa Grill, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides that a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction does not have supplemental jurisdiction over
any third-party defendants who are non-diverse from their respective thirdparty claimant. Padron and Casa Market and Casa Grill are all Florida citizens.
So, Casa Market and Casa Grill reason, the Court does not have jurisdiction
over Padron’s third-party claims against third-party defendants Casa Market
and Casa Grill. But Casa Market and Casa Grill either misconstrue or
purposely misstate the relevant supplemental jurisdiction provision. That
provision addresses only claims by plaintiffs, here Wilshire, against, among
others, third-party defendants who are nondiverse to the plaintiff. It says
nothing about requiring diversity between a third-party plaintiff and a thirdparty defendant.
Next, Casa Market and Casa Grill urge the Court to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Padron’s claims because the Court has
dismissed all the claims over which it had original jurisdiction. Ordinarily this
Court often remands or dismisses remaining state-law claims when it has
dismissed all the federal claims in a case over which it had original jurisdiction.
But that is almost universally “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of
the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain.” Parker v.
Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 745 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). Here, the claims
based on diversity did not drop out of the lawsuit in its “early stages.” Instead,
three days before the trial was set to commence, Wilshire, Casa Bay, and
Padron notified the Court that they had settled the claims amongst themselves,
leaving only Padron’s third-party claims against Casa Market and Casa Grill.
(Not. of Partial Settlement, ECF No. 147.) And then it was not until almost a
month after the jury had reached a verdict on the vicarious-liability issue that
Wilshire, Padron, and Casa Bay filed the joint stipulation of dismissal of their
claims. (Jt. Stip., ECF No. 157.) Further, in carefully considering the balance
among such factors as judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, the
Court finds dismissal at this stage of the litigation unwarranted.

5. The Court denies Casa Market and Casa Grill’s motion for leave to
amend.
Casa Market and Casa Grill filed their answer and affirmative defenses to
Padron’s third-party complaint on August 7, 2015. (ECF No. 19.) The Court
thereafter set October 20, 2015 as the deadline for the parties to amend their
pleadings. (ECF No. 23.) Now, close to two years after that deadline has
expired, Casa Market and Casa Grill seek to amend their answer and
affirmative defenses to specify two Fabre defendants.
In support of the amendment, Casa Market and Casa Grill point to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) which provides “[t]he court should
freely give leave” to amend “when justice so requires.” At the same time, they
also acknowledge that, under Rule 16(b), a movant must also show “good
cause” if amendment is sought after the deadline to do so has passed. See Sosa
v. Air Print Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s
consent.”). The standard set forth in Rule 16(b) “precludes modification [of the
scheduling order] unless the schedule cannot ‘be met despite the diligence of
the party seeking the extension.’” See Sosa, 133 F.3d at 1418. Thus, “diligence
is the key to satisfying the good cause requirement.” De Varona v. Discount
Auto Parts, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 671, 672–73 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (Ungaro, J.). Only if
“good cause” for an untimely amendment is shown under Rule 16(b), does Rule
15(a)’s instruction, that leave should be freely given when justice so requires,
come into play. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). While this standard is lenient, still,
“a motion to amend may be denied on numerous grounds such as undue
delay, undue prejudice to the [opposing party], and futility of the amendment.”
See Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted).
Casa Market and Casa Grill have not established the diligence required
to support a finding of good cause. Instead Casa Market and Casa Grill only
provide the Court with conclusory allegations that they “were unable to obtain
the identity of Fabre defendants until after the October 20, 2015 deadline.”
(Defs.’ Mot. for Leave to Amend, ECF No. 169, 5.) They then explain that they
were only able to discover the information needed for the amendment during
the depositions of Padron on April 19, 2016 and of an accident eyewitness on
July 8, 2016. Casa Market and Casa Grill do not explain why this is so nor do
they explain why they waited over a year since purportedly receiving the
information to even seek leave to amend. In short, Casa Market and Casa Grill
have not carried their burden that, despite their diligence, they were unable to
attain the discovered information sooner. See Southern Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v.

3M Co., 575 F.3d 1235, 1241, n. 3 (11th Cir. 2009) (lack of diligence finding
triggered by “a [party’s] failure to seek the information it needs to determine
whether an amendment is in order”).
6. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Casa Market and Casa
Grill’s: motion for a judgment as a matter of law as well as their motion, in the
alternative, for a new trial (ECF No. 156); motion to dismiss and remand (ECF
No. 170); and motion for leave amend (ECF No. 169).
Done and ordered at Miami, Florida on August 14, 2017.
________________________________
Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge