Farias et al v. U.S. Bank National Association et al

Filing 29

ORDER granting 12 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 12 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; denying as moot 26 Motion to Stay. Closing Case. Motions Terminated: 26 MOTION to Stay re 21 Consent to Ju risdiction by US Magistrate Judge filed by Javier Carrillo, 12 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Complaint FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 1 Complaint filed by U.S. Bank National Association. Signed by Magistrate Judge John J. O'Sullivan on 8/4/2015. (mkr) NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014-69.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 15-21827-CIV-O’SULLIVAN
[CONSENT]
MAYRA E. FARIAS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________/
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Complaint (DE# 12,
6/12/15) filed by defendant U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee for the Lehman
XS Trust, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates, Series 2006-16N (hereinafter “U.S.
Bank”)1 and the Emergency Motion to Stay Proceedings in 11th Circuit Court (DE# 26,
7/29/15) filed by plaintiff Javier Carrillo. On August 3, 2015, the Court heard oral
argument on both motions.
BACKGROUND
On May 14, 2015, plaintiffs Mayra Farias and Javier Carrillo (collectively
“plaintiffs”) commenced the instant action against defendants U.S. Bank National
Association, as trustee for the Lehman XS Trust, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates,
Series 2006-16N and OneWest Bank, F.S.B. c/o Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
(collectively “defendants”). See Complaint/Petition (DE# 1, 5/14/15) (hereinafter

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On June 29, 2015, the Court granted defendant OneWest Bank, F.S.B. c/o
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC’s motion to adopt/join the motion to dismiss. See Order
(DE# 19, 6/29/15).

“Complaint”).
On June 12, 2015, defendant U.S. Bank moved to dismiss the complaint with
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Motion to Dismiss Complaint (DE#
12, 6/12/15). The plaintiffs filed their response in opposition on June 29, 2015. See
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Complaint (DE# 16, 6/29/15).
U.S. Bank filed its reply on July 8, 2015. See Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Complaint (DE# 20, 7/8/15).
On July 29, 2015, plaintiff Javier Carrillo filed an Emergency Motion to Stay
Proceedings in 11th Circuit Court (DE# 26, 7/29/15). On August 3, 2015, the Court held
oral argument on both motions. This matter is ripe for adjudication.
ANALYSIS
The Complaint seeks to assert numerous claims including claims under the Truth
in Lending Act (“TILA”) arising from state court foreclosure proceedings involving the
plaintiffs’ home (hereinafter “subject property”).2 U.S. Bank seeks to dismiss all counts
of the Complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine. In addition to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, U.S. Bank argues that
the plaintiffs’ TILA monetary damage claim should be dismissed with prejudice because
it was filed outside the limitations period. At the August 3, 2015, U.S. Bank withdrew its
argument that it was not properly served under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A.

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
With certain exceptions, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that the federal
2

On April 29, 2015, the subject property “was offered for public sale.” See
Exhibit 13 to the Complaint (DE# 1).
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district courts have no jurisdiction to review a final judgment rendered by a state court.
Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 466 (11th Cir.1996). The doctrine "applies not only to
claims presented or adjudicated by a state court, but also to claims that are ‘inextricably
intertwined' with a state court's judgment." Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332
(11th Cir. 2001). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when:
(1) the party in federal court is the same as the party in state court; (2) the
prior state court ruling was a final or conclusive judgment on the merits;
(3) the party seeking relief in federal court had a reasonable opportunity to
raise its federal claims in the state court proceeding; and (4) the issue
before the federal court was either adjudicated by the state court or was
inextricably intertwined with the state court's judgment.
Parker v. Potter, 368 F. App’x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Storck v. City of Coral
Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1310 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (quotation marks
& citation omitted)).
In the instant case, the parties were the same in both the state and federal court
proceedings. The state court’s ruling was a final judgment. The plaintiffs had a
reasonable opportunity to raise their federal claims in the state court proceedings as
evidenced by the plaintiffs’ multiple filings in the trial court proceeding and in the
appellate proceeding. Finally, the issues raised in federal court are inextricably
intertwined with the state court's judgment in that the plaintiffs raise virtually the same
arguments they pursued in the state court. The plaintiffs are seeking a judgment which
if granted, would, in essence, reverse the decision of the state trial and appellate
courts.
The plaintiffs argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135
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S.Ct. 790 (2015). The plaintiffs note that the state court did not have the benefit of the
Jesinoski opinion because it was decided by the Supreme Court on January 13, 2015.
However, nothing in the Jesinoski decision abolishes the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Moreover, the plaintiffs brought the Jesinoski decision to the state court’s attention in a
motion for rehearing. See Exhibit 9 to the Complaint (DE# 1). The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine applies in this matter and the Court has no jurisdiction over this action.
B.

Limitations Period of TILA Monetary Claim
The plaintiff’s TILA monetary damages claim is DISMISSED because it was filed

outside the limitations period. “Pursuant to § 1640(e), all TILA claims must be brought
‘within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e).
The violation ‘occurs’ when the transaction is consummated.” Velardo v. Fremont Inv. &
Loan, 298 Fed.Appx. 890, 892 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The parties dispute when
the one-year limitations period began to run. According to the plaintiffs, because the
loan on the subject property was subject to an adjustable interest rate, the lender was
required to provide the plaintiffs with notice every time the interest rate was adjusted.
Even assuming, without deciding, that the plaintiffs are correct in the calculation of the
limitations period, the plaintiffs acknowledged at the August 3, 2015 hearing that the
last time the interest rate on the loan was adjusted was in 2012. The instant action was
filed on May 14, 2015, well after the one-year limitations period. The plaintiffs’ TILA
claim is time-barred and DISMISSED.
Because the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’
claims, the Emergency Motion to Stay Proceedings in 11th Circuit Court (DE# 26,
7/29/15) is DENIED AS MOOT.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Emergency Motion to Stay Proceedings in
11th Circuit Court (DE# 26, 7/29/15) is DENIED as moot. It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion to Dismiss Complaint (DE# 12,
6/12/15) is GRANTED. The Complaint (DE# 1, 5/14/15) is DISMISSED with prejudice.
THE CLERK OF THE COURT SHALL MARK THIS CASE CLOSED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 4th day of August,
2015.

JOHN J. O’SULLIVAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Copies to:
All counsel of record
Copies mailed to:
Mayra Farias
11011 SW 160th Street
Miami, FL 33157
Javier Carrillo
6811 SW 3rd Street
Miami, FL 33144

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