Marantes v. Miami-Dade County et al
Filing
11
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS granting 4 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Count IV of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is REMANDED to the 11th Judicial Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade County, Fl orida. Closing Case. Motions Terminated: 4 MOTION TO DISMISS 1 Notice of Removal (State Court Complaint), FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Ruperto Peart, Jose Gonzalez, Miami-Dade County, Russell Giordano. Signed by Judge Marcia G. Cooke on 7/10/2015. (tm) NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014-69.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 15-cv-21910-MGC
ARIEL MARANTES
Plaintiff,
v.
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, RUPERTO PEART,
RUSSELL GIORDANO, JOSE GONZALEZ,
and JORGE RODRIGUEZ,
Defendants.
___________________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Miami-Dade County (the
“County”), Ruperto Peart (“Officer Peart”), Russell Giordano (“Officer Giordano”),
Jose Gonzalez (“Officer Gonzalez”), and Jorge Rodriguez’s (“Officer Rodriguez”)
(collectively, “Defendants”) Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint for Failure to State a Claim (“Motion to Dismiss”). (ECF No. 4).
Defendants move to dismiss Counts I, II, and III of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
(“Complaint”). (Id.). The Motion to Dismiss is fully briefed and ripe for
adjudication. (ECF Nos. 9, 10). After reviewing the pleadings, the record, and the
relevant legal authorities, I am granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and
remanding the remaining state law battery claim to state court.
I.
BACKGROUND
On August 14, 2012, Officers Peart, Giordano, Gonzalez, and Rodriguez
were at the Latin American Cafeteria at 11436 SW 184 Street, Miami, Florida, when
they saw Plaintiff, Ariel Marantes, engage another individual in a fistfight. (Compl.
¶¶ 7-8, 11-12). The officers approached Plaintiff and the other individual in order to
separate the parties and stop the fight. (Id. ¶ 12). Plaintiff alleges that the officers used
excessive force to arrest him when they “slamm[ed] him twice to the ground,”
applied a “choke with a Carotid Restraint Hold [ACTR],” held him to the hot
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asphalt, and kicked him “about the head and body while he was pleading for help.”
(Id. ¶¶ 12-15). Plaintiff does not allege that the officers used any force on him after he
was subdued. (See generally Compl.). Subsequent to the arrest, Plaintiff was charged
with two counts of felony battery of a police officer and one count of resisting an
officer with violence. (Id. ¶ 25). Plaintiff eventually entered a plea of no contest for
resisting arrest without violence. (Id.; ECF No. 4, Ex. 1).
On March 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Complaint in state court, and the case
was subsequently removed to the Southern District of Florida. (ECF No. 1). In
Counts I and II of the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts civil rights claims against the
individual officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl. ¶¶ 30-48). In Count III,
Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim against Miami-Dade County, Florida for municipal
liability under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
(Compl. ¶¶ 49-58). Count IV is a state law battery claim. (Id. ¶¶ 59-64). Defendants
now move to dismiss Counts I, II, and III of the Complaint. (ECF No. 4).
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A civil complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Additionally, in
order to survive dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
plaintiff’s complaint must include plausible factual content that “allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. For the
purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may accept the facts of
the complaint as true, but need not accept legal conclusions. Id. Further, “courts may
infer from the factual allegations in the complaint ‘obvious alternative
explanation[s],’ which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the
plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283,
1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682)).
If the allegations in a complaint—on their face—demonstrate that an
affirmative defense bars recovery, the complaint may be dismissed for failure to state
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a claim. LeFrere v. Quezada, 582 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009); Cottone v. Jenne,
326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003). For an affirmative defense of qualified
immunity, the defendant is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of
discovery, “unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly
established law.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). To determine whether the
law in question was clearly established at the time of the violation, the Court “looks
only to binding precedent—cases from the United States Supreme Court, the
Eleventh Circuit, and the highest court of the state under which the claim arose.”
Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Amnesty Int'l, USA v.
Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1184 (11th Cir. 2009)).
Unless the plaintiff states a claim of violation of clearly established law, the
district court should grant qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage. See
Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2003). After dismissing a plaintiff’s
federal claims, a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“The district courts may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . (3) the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); see also Rowe v. City of
Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002) (observing that the decision to
continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction “should be and is vested in the sound
discretion of the district court”).
III.
ANALYSIS
A. Qualified Immunity
“The defense of qualified immunity protects officials performing discretionary
functions from liability ‘where their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Moore v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1232-33 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (quoting
Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1997)). First, to determine if an
official is engaged in a discretionary function, the Court considers whether the acts
that the official undertook “are of a type that fell within the employee's job
responsibilities.” Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). Here,
the Defendant Officers were clearly acting within the scope of their discretionary
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authority as police officers at all relevant times. See id. Plaintiff does not dispute this
conclusion. (See Compl. ¶¶ 31-32, 40).
“Once the defendants establish that they were acting within their
discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified
immunity is not appropriate.” Lumley v. City of Dade City, 327 F.3d 1186, 1194 (11th
Cir. 2003). Qualified immunity is not appropriate where (1) the facts as alleged show
that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) such a right was
clearly established. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007).1 To show that a right is
clearly established, a plaintiff cannot rely on “general, conclusory allegations” or
“broad legal truisms.” Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1190 (11th Cir. 1989); see also
Muhammad v. Wainwright, 839 F.2d 1422, 1424 (11th Cir. 1987). “Instead, the burden
is on the plaintiff to show that, when the defendant acted, the law established the
contours of a right so clearly that a reasonable official would have understood his
acts were unlawful.” Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1993)
modified, 14 F.3d 583 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)).
Plaintiff fails to carry this burden, first, because his complaint comprises only
conclusory allegations and, second, because he does not address any Eleventh
Circuit case law regarding the use of force on resisting arrestees. Defendants, on the
other hand, provide several cases from the Eleventh Circuit and the Southern District
of Florida in which courts have allowed officers to use significant force when dealing
with resisting arrestees. (ECF No. 4, pp. 7-11). In fact, courts in some of these cases
1
The Supreme Court has recognized that a district court, in order to avoid
superfluous analysis, can and sometimes should conduct this two-part test in reverse
order. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 229 (2003) (“[T]here will be cases in
which a court will rather quickly and easily decide that there was no violation of
clearly established law before turning to the more difficult question whether the
relevant facts make out a constitutional question at all.”); see also Lewis v. City of W.
Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The Supreme Court
recognized that discussion of a constitutional violation may become unnecessary for
qualified immunity purposes when the right was not clearly established.”). The
reverse analysis is suitable here because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a clearly
established right.
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found qualified immunity for officers who used greater force in less threatening
circumstances on individuals who were not resisting arrest. See, e.g., Post, 7 F.3d at
1559-60 (officer was entitled to qualified immunity after applying a chokehold and
pushing a restaurant owner, who was not resisting arrest, against a wall during an
arrest for a building code violation).
Plaintiff does not address Post or any other relevant case law2 in his Complaint
or Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Response”), and therefore fails to
show that Defendant Officers—“at the pertinent time and given the specific
circumstances of this case—had fair notice that their conduct would violate clear
federal law.” Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576, 584 (11th Cir. 2007). Even so, the
Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that officers may use significant force during the
arrest of a resisting suspect. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Cooks, 672 F.3d 972 (11th Cir. 2012)
(officers were entitled to qualified immunity where they repeatedly used their tasers
on an individual resisting arrest); Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288
(11th Cir. 2009) (officers were entitled to qualified immunity where suspect died after
being hogtied, even though suspect was not a danger and was merely resisting
arrest); Benton v. Hopkins, 190 F. App’x 856 (11th Cir. 2008) (officers did not use
excessive force when they used pepper spray on resisting arrestee and then struck
him multiple times with a metal baton).
Although Plaintiff maintains that he did not resist the arrest with violence (see
Compl. ¶ 24)—an assertion this Court accepts as true at this stage—the Eleventh
2
Plaintiff cites to Slone v. Judd, No. 809-CV-1175-T-27TGW, 2009 WL
5214984 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2009), apparently to provide an example of a case in
which qualified immunity did not attach. (ECF No. 9, ¶ 13). However, Slone is a
decision from the Middle District of Florida and cannot be used to demonstrate
“clearly established” law here. Jenkins by Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d
821, 827 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997) (“In this circuit, the law can be ‘clearly established’ for
qualified immunity purposes only by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state where the case arose.”).
Moreover, Slone involved the use of an electronic shield on a detainee “after he was
handcuffed, shackled, and had stopped resisting,” which the court found raised
material issues of fact regarding excessive force. Slone, 2011 WL 1124618, at *18
(emphasis added). Plaintiff never alleges that Defendants used force on him after he
was subdued. (See generally Compl.).
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Circuit has also allowed the use of significant force on arrestees resisting without
violence. See, e.g., Hoyt, 672 F.3d at 977-78; Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1292; Post, 7 F.3d at
1559-60. Plaintiff does not distinguish the factual circumstances of his arrest from
any of these cases, nor does he develop any legal theory to rebut Defendants’
assertion of qualified immunity.3 Therefore, Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s Complaint
demonstrate, on their face, that an affirmative defense bars recovery. Accordingly,
they must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See LeFrere, 582 F.3d at 1263.
B. Municipal Liability
Plaintiff’s failure to allege a violation of a clearly established right in Counts I
and II of his Complaint forecloses his Monell claim for municipal liability. See City of
Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“If a person has suffered no
constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the
departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive
force is quite beside the point.”); see also Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1328 (11th
Cir. 2009) (noting that the law does not authorize “the award of damages against a
municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the
officer inflicted no constitutional harm.”). As discussed above, Plaintiff fails to allege
a constitutional injury and, on this basis alone, cannot bring a cause of action for
municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4
IV.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Complaint on its face fails to demonstrate a constitutional injury.
Moreover, his Complaint and Response both fail to satisfy the exacting standard
3
Plaintiff’s Response contains only copy-and-pasted sections from the
Complaint, a few inapposite legal citations, and unsubstantiated legal conclusions.
Moreover, it entirely ignores Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
4
To impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, Plaintiff would have to show
that (1) his constitutional rights were violated, (2) the County had a custom or policy
that constituted deliberate indifference to those constitutional rights, and (3) this
policy or custom caused the constitutional violations at issue. McDowell v. Brown, 392
F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). While Plaintiff’s Complaint fails at the first step, it
should also be noted that the Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations
regarding a County policy or custom of indifference to constitutional rights. (See
generally Compl.).
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necessary to overcome an affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Plaintiff’s
failure to demonstrate a constitutional injury is also fatal to his Monell claim for
municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, it is ORDERED and
ADJUDGED that
1.
Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 4) is GRANTED. Counts I, II, and III of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
are DISMISSED.
2.
Count IV (State Law Claim Against the County for Battery) is
REMANDED to the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court in and for Miami-Dade
County, Florida.
3.
The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
4.
All pending motions, if any, are DENIED as moot.
DONE and ORDERED in chambers, at Miami, Florida, this 10TH day of
July 2015.
Copies furnished to:
Edwin G. Torres, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Counsel of record
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