Brown v. Miami-Dade County School District et al

Filing 22

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS granting 12 Motion to Dismiss. Closing Case. Motions Terminated: 12 Motion to Dismiss filed by Miami-Dade County School District, Carlos Rios, Ana Barreto. Signed by Judge Marcia G. Cooke on 11/24/2015. (tm) NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014-69.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 15-22077-Civ-COOKE/TORRES
CLARA BROWN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, a Florida subdivision,
CARLOS RIOS, an individual, ANA
RASCO, an individual, MATTHEW
RADDING, an individual, and ANA
BARRETO, an individual,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Clara Brown (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Brown”) brings this action pursuant to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants the School Board of Miami-Dade County1 (the
“School Board”), Carlos Rios (“Mr. Rios”), Ana Barreto (“Ms. Barreto”), Ana Rasco (“Ms.
Rasco”), and Matthew Radding (“Mr. Radding”).2 Plaintiff alleges that she was forced to
resign her position as a tenured teacher at Miami Jackson Senior High in Miami, Florida,
under threat of termination, on the basis of race and age discrimination. As a result, she
alleges the following: Racial Discrimination in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Count I); Age Discrimination in Violation of the ADEA (Count II); Reprisal for
Engaging in Protected Activities (Count III); and Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IV).
Defendants the School Board, Mr. Rios, and Ms. Barreto filed a Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice (ECF No. 12), to which Plaintiff filed her Response to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice and Rule to Show Cause
(ECF No. 19), and Defendants filed their Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice (ECF No. 20). I have reviewed the parties’
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Incorrectly referred to as “Miami-Dade County School District” in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Plaintiff has failed to serve Defendants Matthew Radding and Ana Rasco within the 120 days required by Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(m). Therefore the claims against them are dismissed without prejudice.

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arguments, the record, and the relevant legal authorities. For the reasons provided herein, the
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Clara Brown, a sixty-year-old African-American female, was employed as a
public school teacher with the Miami-Dade County School District from 1979 through
October 2013. Compl. ¶ 3. She was a tenured teacher at Miami Jackson Senior High School
in Miami, Florida when she was allegedly forced to resign. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 10. The majority of
staff and teachers at Miami Jackson Senior High School are Hispanic, and as such, Plaintiff
alleges that she was subjected to “rigorous screening and illegal screening processes and
teaching evaluations that Hispanic teachers were not [subjected to].” Id. at ¶¶ 14, 15. More
specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to two “observation of standards” plans in
October and December of 2012 at the behest of Defendant Mr. Radding, the Science Chair. Id.
at ¶ 21. She complained to Defendant Mr. Rios, the school’s principal, and to her union
representative, Debra Riddick, that she was being discriminated against because of her age and
race after she was placed on a ninety day performance improvement plan, which she alleges is
applicable only to probationary school instructional personnel. Id. at ¶¶ 22, 23. Subsequently,
allegedly as retaliation for her complaints, Plaintiff was subjected to three additional
observation of standards plans, allegedly coerced into signing a probationary employment
contract, and placed under a performance improvement plan. Id. at ¶ 24. She then alleges that
after weeks of harassment as a probationary employee, she felt compelled to resign because her
“working conditions were so intolerable.” Id. at ¶¶ 24, 25. She alleges that Defendants knew
that the ninety-day performance improvement plan for probationary new hires was illegally
applied to her, as a teacher with over twenty-nine years of experience.

Id. at ¶ 25.

Additionally, she perceived being forced by Defendants to waive the protections afforded to
her under Fla. Stat. § 1012.33 to be “cruel and cynical to the extreme and discriminatory by
law.” Id.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). When evaluating a complaint subject to a motion to dismiss, all factual
allegations must be accepted as true, however, mere conclusory statements “are not entitled to
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the assumption of truth.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664. The factual allegations alone must state a
facially plausible entitlement to relief. Id. The standard of facial plausibility is met “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
A court’s consideration when ruling on a motion to dismiss is limited to the complaint
and any incorporated exhibits. See Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th
Cir. 2000). However, a document attached to a motion to dismiss may be considered without
converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment if that document is central to the
claim and its authenticity is undisputed. Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002)
(citations omitted). “Undisputed” means that the document’s authenticity is not challenged.
Id.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Counts I, II, and III
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue, in part, that Plaintiff’s claims under Title
VII and the ADEA must be dismissed for failure to exhaust the administrative procedures
outlined by the parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”). In response, Plaintiff
argues that she could not avail herself of the appeals process outlined in the parties’ CBA
because only a written disciplinary action triggers the appeals process and she never received a
written formal charge of discipline.
Plaintiff appears to allege that since she was not technically disciplined, the grievance
procedures laid out in the CBA are inapplicable. Plaintiff also alleges that she was forced to
resign due to Defendants’ “harassment and discriminatory practices” and that she was “not
given the benefit of [the CBA’s] appeal protocols because she was not made aware of any
appeal rights.” Resp. to Defs’ Mot. Dismiss ¶¶ 2, 3. It appears as though Plaintiff is trying to
have her cake and eat it too, so to speak. On the one hand, she argues that the CBA is
inapplicable to her situation because she was forced to resign, while on the other hand, she
indicates that she would have availed herself of the appeals protocol in the CBA if she had
known about it. However, it is clear from Plaintiff’s allegations that she was aware of her
rights under the CBA because she immediately reached out to Ms. Riddick, her union
representative, when she felt like she was being discriminated against based on her age and her
race.
After considering the allegations presented by Plaintiff and accepting all factual
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allegations as true, I find that Plaintiff’s forced resignation was tantamount to a dismissal, and
therefore, Plaintiff was subject to the grievance procedure set forth in the CBA. The issues
Plaintiff complains of could and should have been addressed through the procedures laid out in
the CBA. See Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 1985). The
Eleventh Circuit in Mason found that “[e]mployees claiming breach of a collective bargaining
agreement or wrongful termination of employment by their employer are bound by that
agreement’s terms providing a method for resolving disputes between them and their
employer,” and their reasoning is equally applicable in a case involving allegations of
discrimination in violation of Title VII and the ADEA. Plaintiff should have availed herself of
the appeals procedures laid out in the CBA before tendering her resignation, thus affording her
employer an opportunity to address any perceived wrongdoing. Therefore, Counts I, II, and III
of Plaintiff’s Complaint are dismissed for failure to pursue administrative remedies available
through the parties’ CBA.
B. Count IV
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on any person who, under color of state law,
deprives a person “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To sufficiently state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
allege (1) that he or she has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and (2) that the defendant deprived him or her of this right while acting
under color of state law. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978).
“Local government bodies, such as school boards, may be held liable under § 1983 only
for acts ‘of the municipality—that is, acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or
ordered.’” K.M. v. School Bd. of Lee Cty. Fla., 150 Fed. Appx. 953, 957 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986)). “State law determines which bodies or persons
may establish municipal policy. Under Florida law, final policymaking authority for a school
district is vested in the School Board.” Id. (citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 491 U.S. 701
(1989) and Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1001.41). The Defendant School Board therefore establishes
municipal policy.
The plaintiff must identify the municipal policy or custom that caused his injury, Davis
v. DeKalb Cty. School Dist., 233 F.3d 1367, 1375 (11th Cir. 2000), and must allege that the policy
or custom was the moving force of the constitutional violation. Cuesta v. School Bd. of MiamiDade Cty., Fla., 285 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir. 2002). “A policy is a decision that is officially
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adopted by the municipality, or created by an official of such rank that he or she could be said
to be acting on behalf of the [entity] .... A custom is a practice that is so settled and permanent
that it takes on the force of law.” Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997)). “Even in the
absence of an express policy or custom, a local government body can be held liable ‘for a single
act or decision of a municipal official with final policymaking authority in the area of the act or
decision.’” Cuesta, 285 F.3d at 968 (quoting McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11th
Cir. 1996)). “Because Florida law identifies the School Board as the policymaker for the
School District, a single decision by the Board may constitute School Board policy, even if not
phrased as a formal policy statement.” K.M. v. School Board of Lee County Fla., 150 Fed. Appx.
at 957.
Plaintiff fails to identify any custom, pattern, or practice by Defendants to discriminate
against teachers based on race or age through the use of allegedly illegitimate criteria.
Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege any actions or decisions by the School Board itself to
demonstrate that her termination constituted a policy of the municipality. Plaintiff asserts the
following in her Complaint: (1) “Defendant Ana Rasco … was … the Assistant Superintendant
for Human Capital for Defendant School District and a policy level employee of Defendant
School District” (Compl. ¶ 5); (2) “Defendant Carlos Rios … was … the Principal at Miami
Jackson Senior high School … and an administrator of Defendant School District with powers
to issue recommendations…” (Compl. ¶ 6); (3) “Defendant Ana Barreto … was … the
Assistant Principal at Miami Jackson Senior High School … [and] the professional surrogate
for Defendant Rios” (Compl. ¶ 7); and (4) “Defendant Matthew Radding … was … a coemployee of Defendant School District, tasked with making recommendations that … affected
the continued employment and good standing [of] Plaintiff’s teaching certificate.” (Compl. ¶
8). She also alleges that she was forced to resign because she “was placed in an intolerable
working environment by the actions of Defendants Rios, Barreto and Radding, then adopted
and vouchsafed by Defendants Rasco, Carvalho and the School District.”

Compl. ¶ 26.

However, Plaintiff fails to allege that the Defendant School Board itself made the decision to
terminate her. Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that the decisions of Defendants Mr. Rios, Ms.
Barreto, and Mr. Radding were “adopted and vouchsafed” by Defendant School Board is not
enough to properly allege liability under Section 1983.
Under a ratification theory, a “municipality, by actively endorsing or approving of the
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conduct of its employees or officials, may be held responsible for it.” Garvie v. City of Ft. Walton
Beach, Fla., 366 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 2004). “For plaintiffs to state a successful § 1983
claim against a municipality based on a ratification theory, however, ‘they must demonstrate
that local government policymakers had an opportunity to review the subordinate's decision
and agreed with both the decision and the decision's basis.’” Garvie, 366 F.3d at 1189 (quoting
Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1175 n. 12 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated on other grounds by, 536
U.S. 953 (2002), reinstated by 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003)). No such allegation exists in
Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Plaintiff employs a shotgun pleading, incorporating every prior

paragraph by reference into each new allegation, and completely fails to allege that the
Defendant with final policymaking authority, the School Board, participated in any way in
Plaintiff’s termination. Therefore, Count IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with
Prejudice (ECF No. 12) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED
without prejudice. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case. All pending motions, if any, are
DENIED as moot.
DONE and ORDERED in chambers at Miami, Florida, this 24th day of November
2015.

Copies furnished to:
Edwin G. Torres, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Counsel of Record

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