Wayne v. State of Florida, Department of Corrections
Filing
18
ORDER granting 7 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. Closing case. Signed by Judge Darrin P. Gayles on 1/15/2016. (zvr) NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014-69.
—FOR REPORTER PUBLICATION—
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
SCOTTY WAYNE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 15-23165-CIV-GAYLES
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
Scotty Wayne, the Plaintiff, brings this action against his employer, the Defendant State
of Florida, Department of Corrections (“FDC”), pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Specifically, he alleges in his Amended Complaint
that FDC retaliated against him by assigning him an unreasonable workload upon his return from
self-care leave, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).1 He seeks injunctive relief.
Before the Court is FDC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint [ECF
No. 7]. The Court has reviewed the motion, the parties’ submissions, the record, and the applicable
law. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim
for injunctive relief is barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and, therefore,
FDC’s motion to dismiss shall be granted.
I.
BACKGROUND
The parties do not dispute the general factual premise of this matter, as alleged in the
Amended Complaint. Wayne, who was at the time the cause of action arose and is currently an
1
“The FMLA allows eligible employees to take up to twelve weeks of leave in any one-year period to address a
family member’s or the employee’s own serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C), (D). Leave taken
under the FMLA to care for family members is often labeled ‘family-care’ leave; leave taken to address an
employee’s own health condition is frequently referred to as ‘self-care’ leave.” Bryant v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging &
Disability Servs., 781 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2015).
FDC employee, requested and was approved for leave under the FMLA’s “self-care” provision2
from May 7, 2015, through June 6, 2015, due to his own serious medical condition. Am. Compl.
¶¶ 9, 16-17. He alleges that, upon his return, FDC—through his manager, Rosalind Wromas—
assigned him a larger amount of work than he had previously been assigned and gave him a
shorter period of time in which to complete that work. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. He filed suit, alleging that
FDC violated the retaliation provision of the FMLA. Wayne claims that he has been injured as a
result of FDC’s actions and seeks injunctive and prospective relief in the form of a transfer to a
different supervisor and out of Ms. Wromas’s direct and indirect control. See id. ¶ 25(a); Pl.’s
Opp’n at 2.
In its motion to dismiss, FDC contends that, as an agency of the State of Florida, it is
entitled to immunity from the Plaintiff’s claims under the Eleventh Amendment. Def.’s Mot. at
1-2, 4-5. Alternatively, FDC contends that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted because he has not alleged that he has suffered an actionable adverse
employment action. Id. at 2, 5-6. Wayne responds by stating that the authority on which FDC relies
in its sovereign immunity argument applies only to suits under the FMLA self-care provision for
monetary damages, not injunctive relief. Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-2. He also states that the issue of
whether he has alleged an actionable adverse employment action is more appropriately resolved
on summary judgment, not on a motion to dismiss. Id. at 2.
II.
DISCUSSION
The Eleventh Circuit has ruled that the assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity
challenges a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and must be resolved before a court may address
the merits of the underlying claim. See Seaborn v. Florida, 143 F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998)
2
Under the self-care provision of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D), “[A]n eligible employee shall be entitled
to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period . . . [b]ecause of a serious health condition that
makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.”
2
(citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)). As a result, the Court will address the parties’ contentions regarding
sovereign immunity before turning to the contentions regarding the merits of Wayne’s allegations.
The Eleventh Amendment, “as interpreted by the Supreme Court, generally provides that
Article III’s jurisdictional grant did not and does not limit the sovereign immunity that states
enjoyed when they joined the Union.” Walker v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 771 F.3d 748, 751
(11th Cir. 2014) (citing Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011)). It
“largely shields states from suit in federal courts without their consent, leaving parties with claims
against a State to present them, if the State permits, in the State’s own tribunals.” United States
ex rel. Lesinski v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 739 F.3d 598, 601 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hess v.
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The text of the Amendment itself provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
U.S. Const. amend XI. Despite this language, the Eleventh Amendment also bars suit against a
State brought by a citizen of that State, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), as well as suit
brought against an “arm of the State,” Versiglio v. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 686, F.3d 1290, 1291
(11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Wayne does not dispute that FDC is an “arm of the State,” a
designation supported by the rulings of several Florida federal district courts. See, e.g., Clark v.
Tucker, No. 13-2642, 2014 WL 68646, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2014); Holt v. Nw. Fla. Reception
Ctr. Annex, No. 12-0214, 2012 WL 4758369, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2012), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Holt v. Doss, 2012 WL 4746162 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2012); Bearelly
v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 00-1355, 2002 WL 400779, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2002). Nor does
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Wayne dispute that the State of Florida, through FDC, has not consented to suit under this
provision of the FMLA. See Stewart, 563 U.S. at 253 (explaining that a “State may waive its
sovereign immunity at its pleasure”).
Because Wayne seeks injunctive relief in this action, the Court notes that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), creates an exception to sovereign
immunity that applies in which the plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief to end continuing
violations of federal law. See, e.g., Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 645-46
(2002). This exception, however, applies only in “suits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against state officers in their official capacities,” Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,
269 (1997), and “has no application in suits against the States and their agencies, which are barred
regardless of the relief sought,” P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.
139, 146 (1993). Because Wayne has named no state official in his or her official capacity as a
defendant in this case (only FDC, a state agency), he is not permitted to invoke Ex parte Young
to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment bar.
Wayne can proceed with his claims only if he can demonstrate that Congress has abrogated
the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. See Stewart, 563 U.S. at 254 (“[A]bsent
waiver or valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain a private person’s suit against a
State.”). Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity to give individual citizens a right of
action against a nonconsenting state in federal court “when it both unequivocally intends to do so
and ‘act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.’” Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)).
The relationship between FMLA self-care–provision retaliation claims like Wayne’s and
the doctrine of state sovereign immunity requires, at the outset, an understanding of four cases.
First, in Garrett v. University of Alabama at Birmingham Board of Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214 (11th
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Cir. 1999), rev’d in part on other grounds, 531 U.S. 356 (2001),3 the Eleventh Circuit denied the
claim of a plaintiff who alleged that the University of Alabama unlawfully retaliated against her
in violation of the FMLA by failing to offer her the same or an equivalent position upon her
return from self-care leave. The court held that Congress did not have the authority to abrogate
state sovereign immunity on claims arising under the self-care provision of the FMLA. See id. at
1219. Second, in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2002), the
Supreme Court held that Congress did validly abrogate state sovereign immunity for claims by
state employees seeking money damages in federal court alleging that the state failed to comply
with the one of the family-care provisions of the FMLA.4
Third, in Batchelor v. South Florida Water Management District, 242 F. App’x 652 (11th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam), a panel of the Eleventh Circuit ruled that “[o]ur holding in Garrett that
Congress is without authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity for claims arising under the
self-care provision of the FMLA remains the law of this Circuit.” Id. at 653 (emphasis added). In
rendering this decision, the panel recognized, first, that the Supreme Court’s decision in Garrett,
which reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding on the ADA issue, see supra note 3, left its holding
on the FMLA issue undisturbed; and, second, that the Supreme Court’s holding in Hibbs applied
only to the family-care provisions of the FMLA. See id. at 652-53; see also Nelson v. Univ. of Tex.,
535 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Because Hibbs concerned only subsection C of § 2612(a)(1),
the Court made no comment on whether Congress validly abrogated sovereign immunity under
subsection D.”).
3
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding—unrelated for the Court’s present purposes—that
Congress validly abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity through the passing of Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363.
4
Specifically, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C), which provides an eligible employee leave for the care of a “spouse . . .
son, daughter or parent” with “a serious health condition.”
5
Fourth and finally, in Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012), the Supreme
Court affirmed the same conclusion the Eleventh Circuit panel previously reached in Batchelor.
There, a plurality of the Court held that “suits against States under [the self-care provision] are
barred by the States’ immunity as sovereigns in our federal system.” Id. at 1332 (plurality op.). The
petitioner in Coleman was an employee of the Court of Appeals of Maryland who requested sick
leave and was informed that he would be terminated if he did not resign. He sued his employer in
federal court, alleging, inter alia, that the employer violated the FMLA by failing to grant him
self-care leave. See id. at 1332-33. The plurality found that Congress “failed” to “identify a pattern
of constitutional violations and tailor a remedy congruent and proportional to the documented
violations . . . when it allowed employees to sue States for violations of the FMLA’s self-care
provision,” and therefore the Eleventh Amendment barred claims brought under this provision.
Id. at 1338.
It would seem obvious that Garrett, Hibbs, Batchelor, and, most recently, Coleman
together close the proverbial doors of the federal courts to Wayne’s claim under the self-care
provision of the FMLA. He seeks to open himself a window, however, by contending that
Coleman merely “refines the earlier holdings stating that sovereign immunity applies to suits
under the FMLA self-care provision for monetary damages.” Pl’s Opp’n at 2 (emphasis added).
Because he is only seeking injunctive relief, he argues, sovereign immunity should not apply.
But the plurality in Coleman did not provide for this sort of distinction; in fact, it held
explicitly that sovereign immunity bars “suits against States” under the self-care provision—in
other words, all suits—without singling out only those seeking monetary damages. Coleman, 132
S. Ct. at 1332. Additionally, neither Garrett nor Hibbs nor Batchelor make the distinction Wayne
reads into them. And while the Coleman plurality may not have mentioned suits seeking injunctive
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relief brought against States and their agencies, it certainly did not carve out an exception
permitting them, either.
What’s more, Coleman contains no language that would in any way disturb the Court’s
prior precedent detailing how the Eleventh Amendment affects cases seeking monetary damages
no differently than those seeking injunctive relief. In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984), for instance, the Court explained that a suit against the
State is barred “regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.” Id. at 101-02. And in
Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982), it opined that “[i]t would be a novel proposition indeed that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin the State itself simply because no money
judgment is sought. . . . [T]he Eleventh Amendment by its terms clearly applies to a suit seeking
an injunction, a remedy available only from equity.” Id. at 90-91. Other district courts have
maintained this status quo in the wake of Coleman and have continued to bar suits seeking
injunctive relief under the FMLA’s self-care provision. See, e.g., Ginwright v. Dep’t of Rev., No.
12-0473, 2013 WL 1187943, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 21, 2013) (following Garrett and Batchelor
and dismissing claims against the Alabama Department of Revenue under the self-care provision);
see also Harman v. Univ. of Md., No. 10-2041, 2013 WL 6858854, at *6 (D. Md. Dec. 20, 2013)
(barring claims for injunctive relief under the FMLA brought only against a State university).
In fact, the Fifth Circuit, following Coleman, recently rejected an argument similar to
Wayne’s in Bryant v. Texas Department of Aging & Disability Services, 781 F.3d 764 (5th Cir.
2015). There, the district court denied a motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff had
brought a retaliation claim pursuant to the self-care provision of the FMLA, seeking prospective
equitable relief in the form of reinstatement. On interlocutory appeal by the state agency–
employer, the plaintiff argued that her claim for reinstatement was “an acceptable form of prospective relief against the state that is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. at 769. The
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Fifth Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court, holding that the injunctive relief exception
on which the plaintiff was attempting to rely was, in actuality, the Ex parte Young doctrine, which
“does not apply to suits against state agencies.” Id.
Wayne argues, like the plaintiff did in Bryant, that sovereign immunity does not bar his
self-care claim because he seeks injunctive relief—here, in the form of a transfer to a new
supervisor—rather than monetary damages. But he points to no authority to support this contention
other than an incorrect reading of Coleman. Thus, because he has brought suit against only the
state agency (FDC), and not against a state official in his or her official capacity, he cannot
invoke what is, in essence, Ex parte Young to keep his claim in federal court. See, e.g., Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781-82 (1978) (per curiam). Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff’s
retaliation claim seeking injunctive relief against an agency of the State under the self-care
provision of the FMLA is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.5
Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant’s motion to dismiss [ECF No. 7] is
GRANTED. The Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [ECF No. 6] is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to mark this case CLOSED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 15th day of January, 2016.
_________________________________
DARRIN P. GAYLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5
As the Court has determined that the Eleventh Amendment issue is dispositive of the Plaintiff’s case, it will not
address FDC’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of the allegations contained within the Amended Complaint.
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