Matthiesen v. Matthiesen
Filing
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ORDER granting 8 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; denying as moot 21 Motion for Discovery; denying as moot 28 Motion to Strike ; denying as moot 29 Motion to Strike. Closing Case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goo dman on 8/2/2016. (tr00) NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014-69.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
CASE NO. 16‐20360‐CIV‐GOODMAN
[CONSENT CASE]
ZAINA MATTHIESEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRIAN MATTHIESEN,
Defendants.
________________________________/
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
In her 1980 country music hit “Starting Over Again,”1 Dolly Parton sang about a
middle‐aged couple separating after 30 years of marriage. The opening lines framed the
musical story: “Momma moved out / Daddy sold the house / They split up their money/
And went on their way.” More than 35 years later, those lyrics help to inform the ruling
on a motion to dismiss a lawsuit filed by a woman against her former, now‐divorced
husband. Although the parties in the lawsuit entered into a financial settlement in the
divorce and “split up their money” like the divorced couple in Dolly Parton’s song, they
did not exactly go “on their way,” as litigation was resumed.
The parting of the ways at issue here involves Plaintiff Zaina Matthiesen and
Defendant Brian Matthiesen, who were divorced in 2012. [ECF No. 1, p. 9]. Plaintiff
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From the album, Dolly, Dolly, Dolly (RCA Nashville).
alleges that, in 2015, she discovered evidence that Defendant concealed assets during
the divorce proceedings, which resulted in her receiving less than she was entitled to in
the marriage settlement. [Id., at pp. 11‐13]. After moving to dissolve the marriage
settlement agreement in state court, Plaintiff invoked diversity jurisdiction and filed this
federal court action. Plaintiff presents six causes of action, which, as the Undersigned
describes below, all arise out of the divorce proceedings.
Defendant moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
claiming that this case falls within the domestic relations exception to subject matter
jurisdiction. [ECF No. 8]. Plaintiff opposed [ECF No. 18] the motion, and Defendant
filed a reply memorandum [ECF No. 31]. The parties consented to full magistrate judge
jurisdiction [ECF No. 17, p. 10] and United States District Judge Jose E. Martinez
referred [ECF No. 19] the matter to the Undersigned for disposition through trial and
including entry of final judgment. For the reasons outlined below, the Undersigned
grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of the domestic relations exception.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff and Defendant, as part of a Dissolution of Marriage Proceeding, entered
into a Mediated Marital Settlement Agreement (“MSA”) on October 18, 2011. [ECF Nos.
1, pp. 6‐7, 9; 8‐1, pp. 8‐29]. On February 21, 2012, the Circuit Court for the Eleventh
Judicial Circuit of Miami‐Dade County, Florida, entered Final Judgment of Dissolution
of Marriage (the “Final Judgment”), approving the MSA. [Id., at pp. 4‐7]. In March 2015,
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Plaintiff filed a motion in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, requesting that the state court
“set aside/vacate” the MSA and the Final Judgment on the grounds that Defendant had
allegedly “filed fraudulent financial affidavits” in connection with the MSA by failing to
disclose certain account statements. [ECF No. 8‐1, pp. 30‐31]. On February 1, 2016,
during a hearing on the matter, Plaintiff’s counsel voluntarily withdrew the state court
motion to set aside the MSA and the Final Judgment. [ECF Nos. 8‐1, p. 32; 31‐1, pp. 34‐
35].
Also on February 1, 2016, Plaintiff brought this action in the Southern District of
Florida. [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff alleges: (1) Fraud by Concealment; (2) Equitable
Accounting; (3) Fraudulent Misrepresentation; (4) Negligent Misrepresentation; (5)
Unjust Enrichment (as to the pre‐marital home); and (6) Unjust Enrichment (as to other
marital assets). [Id., pp. 1‐21]. The fraud and negligence claims relate to the alleged
withholding of certain financial records from the financial affidavit, which purported to
itemize the marital assets in Defendant’s possession, filed in connection with the MSA.
[ECF No. 1, pp. 7, 10‐13, 15‐18].
Plaintiff requests that the Court award her $180,000.00 [id., at pp. 13, 16, 18], an
equitable accounting [id., at p. 14], the deed to the pre‐marital home or the proceeds of
the sale of such home [id., at p. 20], and payment in equity, which amount will be
determined by the Court, to cure the alleged unjust enrichment [id., at p. 21].
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Plaintiff asserts that the case is properly within this federal court’s jurisdiction on
the basis of complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) because Plaintiff is a citizen
of the State of Florida, Defendant is allegedly a citizen of the State of California, and the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs. [Id., at pp. 1‐2].
Defendant’s dismissal motion argued that this case is not properly in federal
court because (1) Defendant is in fact a citizen of Florida, thus defeating complete
diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and (2) the so‐called “domestic relations
exception” to diversity jurisdiction bars this Court from hearing this dispute. [ECF No.
8, p.1]. The Court and the parties agreed during a telephonic scheduling conference
held on April 12, 2016 [ECF No. 30] that the domestic relations exception would be the
initial issue and that the Court would address the diversity issue only if necessary
because the diversity argument might require jurisdictional discovery on the relevant
facts.
Because of the ruling outlined below, the Court need not address the dispute
over diversity jurisdiction because, regardless of whether diversity exists, this case falls
within the domestic relations exception.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The Court has a continuing obligation to ensure
that it maintains the authority to handle the matter before it. Indeed, “[t]he objection
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that a federal court lacks subject‐matter jurisdiction . . . may be raised by a party, or by a
court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of
judgment.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006).
There are two forms of subject matter jurisdiction attacks under 12(b)(1): facial
attacks, requiring the court to simply look at the complaint and see if the plaintiff has
satisfactorily asserted some basis for subject matter jurisdiction, and factual attacks,
allowing the court to consider testimony, affidavits, and other material outside the
pleadings in determining whether subject matter jurisdiction is met in fact. See Lawrence
v. Dunbar, 919. F.2d 1525, 1528‐29 (11th Cir. 1990). In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant
raises both a facial attack (on the domestic relations exception ground) and a factual
attack (alleging that he is in fact a Florida resident, in an attempt to defeat diversity
jurisdiction).
Because the purported basis for subject matter jurisdiction is diversity of
citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and as the parties agreed during the scheduling
conference [ECF No. 30], the initial inquiry pertains to the facial attack. Thus, the
threshold question is whether this case is subject to the domestic relations exception to
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, “a well‐accepted doctrine which allows the federal
courts to abstain from deciding cases presenting intrafamily disputes.” Kirby v.
Mellenger, 830 F.2d 176, 177 (11th Cir. 1987). If the domestic relations exception applies
here, then the Court lacks the subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case under 28
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U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) or otherwise, as no other basis for subject matter jurisdiction has
been asserted.
The domestic relations exception is not “compelled by the text of the
Constitution or federal statute[;]”rather, it is a “judicially created doctrine[] stemming in
large measure from misty understandings of English legal history.” Marshall v. Marshall,
547 U.S. 293, 299 (2006). Despite its origins, the Supreme Court has recognized the
exception, albeit as a limited one, concluding that “the domestic relations exception
encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody
decree[.]” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992)).
The Eleventh Circuit holds that federal courts “will not review or modify a state
court divorce order even when the plaintiff couches the claim in other terms.” McCavey
v. Barnett, 629 F. App’x 865, 867 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); see also McLaughlin v.
Cotner, 193 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a case “involv[ing] issues arising
out of conflict over a divorce decree” even where the plaintiff “attempt[s] to disguise
the true nature of the action by claiming that she is merely making a claim for damages
based on a breach of contract” falls within the domestic relations exception as
explicated by Ankenbrandt) (cited to approvingly by the Eleventh Circuit in McCavey).
Still, the scope of the exception and a federal court’s ability to refuse to hear domestic
relations‐related cases is not unbounded. See Kirby, 830 F.2d at 178.
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Trial courts are afforded great deference in assessing whether the domestic
relations exception applies. Although a general dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is reviewed de novo, abstention under the domestic relations exception is
reviewed for abuse of discretion ‐‐ a far more deferential standard. Id. at 867 n.1 (citing
Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006) and Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d 1438,
1441 (11th Cir. 1998)).
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s Complaint focuses in large part on an alleged withholding by
Defendant of financial records from a financial affidavit filed which purported to
enumerate the marital assets under his possession or control. [ECF No. 1]. The financial
affidavit was supplied as a basis for the MSA and in connection with divorce
proceedings overseen by the state family court in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit.
Specifically, Plaintiff presents six causes of action ‐‐ all arising from the alleged
misrepresentation in the financial affidavit. The prayers for relief for each cause of
action call on this Court to directly impact the MSA. Three of the causes of action
(Counts I, III and IV) directly seek the $180,000 that Plaintiff alleges Defendant
concealed from the financial affidavit on the basis that she would have been entitled to
the funds if Defendant had disclosed this asset during the divorce proceedings. Count II
seeks an equitable accounting of Defendant’s assets to determine if he concealed any
other marital assets during the divorce proceedings. Count V requests the pre‐marital
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home of Plaintiff and Defendant because Plaintiff claims she would have been entitled
to it in the MSA if Defendant had appropriately disclosed the $180,000. Count VI seeks
50% of the marital assets based upon the inclusion of the $180,000 that Plaintiff claims
Defendant concealed.
While it is true that Plaintiff’s claims do not necessarily sound in divorce or
alimony explicitly by name, the general subject matter of each claim remains the same:
Plaintiff accuses Defendant of improprieties in connection with the settlement reached
as part of divorce proceedings. It is thus clear to the Court that this case involves “the
issuance of a divorce . . . decree.” Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704.
Though the parties are designated Plaintiff and Defendant, their relational
identities as “former wife” and “former husband,” respectively, are neither incidental
nor irrelevant. The grounds for the claims set forth in the Complaint arise solely
because Plaintiff and Defendant are former wife and husband, and the material
components of the allegations exist only because the two went through the state court
process of divorce and division of the marital assets.
The facts here are similar to those in McCavey, where the Eleventh Circuit
determined that the claim was nonjusticiable based upon the domestic relations
exception. In McCavey, a former husband sued his former wife in federal district court
in Georgia, alleging state law claims of breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty. See
629 F. App’x at 866. The defendant was accused of impropriety relating to the title and
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transfer of property held in an inter vivos family trust. Id. The Eleventh Circuit found
that because the plaintiff sought “to have a federal court review the division of marital
property as determined in his [state court] divorce proceedings, such review falls within
the domestic relations exception, and the district court properly determined that it
lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction under that rule.” Id. at 867.
McCavey noted that district courts should abstain from hearing domestic
relations cases where “(1) there is a strong state interest in domestic relations; (2) the
state courts can competently settle the family dispute; (3) the state continues to
supervise the decrees; and (4) federal dockets are congested.” 629 F. App’x at 867 (citing
Stone, 135 F.3d at 1441).
These considerations weigh heavily in favor of dismissing the case under the
domestic relations exception.
The state court is equipped to competently handle this dispute. The Eleventh
Judicial Circuit oversaw the divorce, entering the Final Judgment and approving the
MSA. Plaintiff does not represent that the state court cannot maintain jurisdiction. In
Kirby, where the Eleventh Circuit found that the domestic relations exception did not
bar the federal court from hearing the case, the court noted that the state under whose
law the claim was brought “will not hear this case absent [the defendant’s] consent
because he is not a citizen of that state[.]” 830 F.2d at 178. Plaintiff does not represent
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that she faces such an obstacle in state court here. To the contrary, one basis for
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was that he is a citizen of the State of Florida.
Furthermore, the Eleventh Judicial Circuit continues to oversee the case. The
Final Judgment contained the stipulation that “[t]he [Eleventh Judicial Circuit] Court
reserves jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter to enforce the Final
Judgment and the Mediated Marital Settlement Agreement thereto incorporated
herein.” [ECF No. 8‐1, p. 6].
As described above, Plaintiff seeks several types of relief in her Complaint. At
bottom, however, Plaintiff necessarily seeks to have this Court review, modify and/or
vacate a state court divorce decree. Because of the domestic relations exception to
diversity jurisdiction, this Court cannot conduct such a review or alter this state court
divorce judgment, even if Plaintiff couches her claims and requests for relief in other
terms. See McCavey, 629 F. App’x at 867; see also McClaughlin, 193 F.3d at 413.
Because the Court has determined that the domestic relations exception to
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction applies, the Court has no basis for subject matter
jurisdiction even if complete diversity does exist. Thus, the issue of whether complete
diversity exists is rendered moot.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss
pursuant to the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction, denies as moot all
other pending motions, and closes this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Miami, Florida, August 2, 2016.
Copies furnished to:
All Counsel of Record
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