IDMWORKS, LLC v. Pophaly
Filing
47
ORDER denying 5 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman on 6/23/2016. (mda)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
CASE NO.: 16‐20627‐GOODMAN
[CONSENT CASE]
IDMWORKS, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
GAURAV POPHALY,
Defendant.
_____________________/
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff IDMWORKS, LLC filed a verified motion for temporary injunctive relief.
[ECF No. 5]. Defendant Gaurav Pophaly opposes the motion. [ECF No. 19]. The Court
held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion. [ECF No. 34]. For the reasons outlined
below, the Undersigned denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief.
I.
Background
a.
As Plaintiff describes itself, it is in the information‐technology business. More
General Factual Background
specifically, Plaintiff constructs and improves corporate identity‐and‐access
management (“IAM”) software solutions ‐‐ i.e., a form of corporate‐network security ‐‐
for commercial enterprises. [ECF Nos. 1, p. 2 (Verified Complaint for Injunctive Relief
and Damages); 38, p. 39 (May 2, 2016 Hearing Transcript]. In layman’s terms, Plaintiff’s
“services are meant to make sure that the right people get the right access to the right
things at the right times.” [ECF No. 38, p. 39].
b.
Plaintiff’s Relationship with Defendant
On July 20, 2012, Plaintiff hired Defendant as an “Identity and Access
Management Engineer.” [ECF No. 38, p. 40‐41; Pl. Ex.1 1 (specifically, Exhibit A to
Employment Agreement)]. At the time of his hiring, Defendant did not have any
specific prior experience with IAM services. [ECF Nos. 38, p. 42; 33‐1 (Stanciu April 28,
2016 Deposition Transcript), p. 29]. Indeed, Defendant’s resume at the time of his hiring
makes no reference to “Identify and Access Management.” [ECF No. 38, p. 99; Pl. Ex. 9
(Defendant’s 2012 Resume)]. Nor did Defendant then possess the skill, knowledge, and
ability required to provide the type of IAM services provided by Plaintiff. [ECF Nos. 38,
p. 42; 33‐1, p. 29].
Defendant entered into a restrictive covenant whereby he promised not to
compete with Plaintiff. More specifically, Defendant executed a Confidentiality, Non‐
Competition, and Non‐Solicitation Agreement (the “Agreement”), which provides, in
pertinent part, that the Defendant “agrees that [he] shall not in any capacity, directly or
indirectly . . . (a) provide services of any kind to any company that [he] has previously
provided consulting services to on behalf of IDMWORKS.” [Pl. Ex. 2, ¶ 4(a)].
The Undersigned shall refer to exhibits submitted by Plaintiff during the
evidentiary hearing as “Pl. Ex.” and refer to exhibits submitted by Defendant as “Def.
Ex.”
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The Parties disagree on the amount and nature of the training which Plaintiff
provided to Defendant, but the Court makes the following findings concerning the
training:
Defendant participated in a two or three week formal training with his direct
supervisor and friend, Alex Stanciu, at the beginning of his employment with Plaintiff.
[ECF No. 38, p. 43]. This informal training took place at Mr. Stanciu’s personal residence
and “often went later than normal business hours.” [ECF No. 33‐1; pp. 10‐11]. The only
formal training Defendant actually received while employed with Plaintiff was a
conference for Quest APS. [ECF No. 38, p. 126]. Although Plaintiff seems to have
covered some of Defendant’s travel expenses, it did not actually pay for Defendant to
attend the Quest APS conference. [ECF No. 38, p. 82]. Moreover, Defendant never used
Quest APS while employed by Plaintiff or in his position at Ernst & Young (“EY”). [ECF
No. 38, pp. 80, 126].
Each of the remaining instances of purported training alleged by Plaintiff was
unsubstantiated, as outlined below.
1.
Plaintiff’s Oracle Subscription: Plaintiff alleged a substantial monetary
investment into Defendant’s training in connection with Plaintiff’s subscription to
Oracle. [ECF No. 20‐1, ¶¶ 12‐15]. However, Plaintiff’s CEO Todd Rossin retreated from
the dollar amounts he described in his declaration. [ECF Nos. 20‐1; 38, pp. 83‐85].
Plaintiff paid a lump sum to Oracle for Plaintiff and all of its employees to have access to
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the Oracle platform and materials. [ECF No. 38, pp. 83‐85]. It was never established that
Defendant actually used study materials beyond those he purchased himself. [ECF No.
38, pp. 83, 127].
2.
Oracle Training in Philadelphia: Plaintiff represented that Defendant
participated in a ten‐day Oracle training session in Philadelphia. [ECF No. 20‐1, ¶
12(d)]. However, Defendant was providing services to Plaintiff’s client in Chicago at the
relevant time. [ECF No. 38, p. 125]. Defendant’s supervisor confirmed that Defendant
did not participate in this training. [ECF No. 33, p. 17].
3.
In‐House Training Program: Plaintiff represented that Defendant
participated in an in‐house training program entitled “Strategic Investment in
Employees.” [ECF No. 20‐1, ¶ 15]. This was not in fact the name of the event, and it was
actually a summit for employees. [Pl. Ex. 4]. The document describing the summit and
Defendant’s testimony suggest that the summit was not a training session, but, rather, a
forum for employees to communicate between themselves about clients and
technologies they are using. [ECF No. 38, p. 128; Pl. Ex. 4]. As Defendant suggested, it
appears to have been a team‐building exercise. [ECF No. 38, p. 128]. Plaintiff’s CEO
contradicted his own testimony regarding the extent to which the summit included
Oracle training. [ECF No. 38, p. 50]. Defendant’s supervisor confirmed that Plaintiff
never provided Defendant with formal in‐house training of the kind described by
Plaintiff’s CEO in his declaration. [ECF No. 33, p. 15].
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4.
Additional One‐on‐One Training: Plaintiff represented that Defendant
received weeks of one‐on‐one training in addition to the initial training with Mr.
Stanciu. [ECF No. 20‐1, ¶ 12(h)]. Plaintiff provided no further information regarding
the training and both Defendant and his direct supervisor deny that Defendant
received additional one‐on‐one training. [ECF Nos. 33, p. 17; 38, pp. 17‐19].
The Undersigned also deems significant the fact that the Oracle “training” was
not actually training provided by Plaintiff. Instead, it was access to Oracle’s training,
and Plaintiff’s CEO did not know for certain whether Defendant actually took
advantage of the access provided. Moreover, the Undersigned also finds it highly
relevant that the access provided by Oracle was made available to all of its partners in
the network ‐‐ which means it was likely made available to more than 50 other partners.
Therefore, this aspect of the so‐called specialized training is actually Oracle training
which Plaintiff gave Defendant access to as part of his employment.
In light of the many inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s position and its failure to offer
testimony from a witness knowledgeable as to Defendant’s training, this Court
concludes that Defendant’s only actually specialized trainings were the initial two‐ or
three‐week informal training with Mr. Stanciu at his residence and the Quest APS
conference. The remainder of Defendant’s training which Plaintiff sufficiently
established was self‐administered or on the job. [ECF Nos. 33 pp. 16, 35‐36; 38, p. 127].
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c.
Plaintiff’s Business Relationship with Ernst & Young
In August 2011, Plaintiff formed a business relationship with EY. [ECF No. 38, p.
62]. Plaintiff provided EY with IAM services such as IAM architecture, IAM
implementation, IAM development, and IAM support services (primarily concerning
Oracle “identity manager” and related products). [Id., p. 62]. To the extent that
Plaintiff’s employees needed to perform IAM services onsite for EY, Plaintiff’s
employees traveled to EY’s offices to do so. [Id., p. 63]. Plaintiff’s employees used
equipment owned by EY. [Id., p. 64]. Plaintiffʹs employees used e‐mail addresses issued
by EY. [Id.]. Plaintiff expected payment from EY. [Id., p. 62]. EY was in fact responsible
for payment to Plaintiff for the provision of those IAM services. [Id., p. 63]. EY was the
beneficiary of the IAM services provided by Plaintiff. [Id., p. 63]. And Plaintiff derived
approximately $750,000 in revenues from EY. [Id., p. 63].
From a formalistic perspective, Plaintiff provided certain IAM services through
Clearpath Workforce Management (“Clearpath”). [ECF No. 31, p. 16]. As an employee
of Plaintiff, Defendant was assigned by Clearpath to provide services to EY.
d.
EY’s Hiring of Defendant, and Termination of its Relationship with
Plaintiff
As noted above, Plaintiff did not actually have a contract with EY and did not
receive payment directly from EY. [ECF No. 38, p. 17]. Situated between Plaintiff and
EY during Defendant’s employment with Plaintiff was a company called Clearpath.
[ECF No. 38, p. 75]. Plaintiff attempted to label Clearpath as a mere payroll company in
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several filings with the Court, but Rossin backed down from that assertion, conceding
that Clearpath also provides vendor services. [Compare ECF No. 28‐1 at ¶ 15, with ECF
No. 38, pp. 64; 75]. Specifically, Rossin agreed that EY “engages contract staffing
services through Clearpak [sic].” [ECF No. 38, p. 75].
Plaintiff also conceded that there was no exclusivity as to the provision of
information technology, or even IAM, services. [ECF No. 38, p. 17]. Maryann Falduto,
EY’s director of vendor services, and Defendant both confirmed that EY has many
information technology vendors. [ECF No. 31‐1, pp. 17‐18; ECF No. 68, pp. 131‐33]. The
company hired to replace Plaintiff has provided services to EY for several years and
provides IAM services almost exclusively. [ECF No. 38, p. 131].
Defendant had been working on an IAM project at EY when EY extended a job
offer to him in November 2015. [ECF No. 38, p. 130]. Defendant did not accept the
offer, and he communicated the offer to Plaintiff. [ECF No. 38, p. 130]. EY had a
history of making employment offers to Plaintiff’s employees. [ECF No. 33‐1, p. 13].
Plaintiff confronted EY about its offer to Defendant, and at that point, EY itself made
the decision to not continue using Plaintiff’s employees after the December 31, 2015
expiration of EY’s contract with Clearpath. [ECF No. 38, pp. 130‐32]. EY replaced
Defendant and Plaintiff’s other employees with a consultant by the name of Logu
Christian from a company called Aptec. [Id.]. Defendant and Plaintiff’s other employees
working at EY transferred files prepared for EY to the new Aptec consultant. [Id.].
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Plaintiff’s arrangement with EY expired at the end of December, and at that point
EY made a second employment offer to Defendant. [ECF Nos. 19‐1, ¶ 34; 38, p. 131].
Defendant accepted the offer in early January. [ECF No. 19, ¶ 45].
e. Defendant’s Position at EY
Defendant is now Assistant Director of Identity Management Engineering at EY.
[ECF No. 19‐1, ¶ 47]. In Defendant’s management position, he is responsible for making
decisions as to EY’s IAM programs and designing IAM solutions. [ECF No. 19‐1, ¶¶ 47‐
50].
II.
Governing Legal Standard
Plaintiff’s motion is one seeking “temporary injunctive relief.” There is no such
specific relief listed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Instead, Rule 65(a) provides
for a preliminary injunction and Rule 65(b) provides for a temporary restraining order,
which may not exceed 14 days (but the Court may extend it for another 14 days for
good cause or for a longer time if the adverse party consents). At the hearing, Plaintiff
clarified its position and noted that its motion seeks a preliminary injunction. [ECF No.
38, p. 27].
The parties agree on the legal standard ‐‐ i.e., Plaintiff must show: “(1) there is a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable
injury exists if an injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury to the plaintiff
outweighs any harm that an injunction may cause the defendants; and (4) issuing the
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injunction will not harm the public interest.” Winmark Corp. v. Brenoby Sports, Inc., 32 F.
Supp. 3d 1206, 1218 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be
granted unless the movant clearly establishes the “burden of persuasion” as to the four
factors. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000). Granting a preliminary
injunction “is the exception rather than the rule.” Id. (quoting Texas v. Seatrain Int’l, S.A.,
518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975).
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to satisfactorily demonstrate the
existence of the first factor: substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Therefore, it
is not necessary to evaluate the other three factors. Plaintiff might prevail on the merits
at trial, but, as outlined below, it is a stretch to now conclude there is a likelihood of
success. Plaintiff cannot obtain a preliminary injunction by merely proving the
possibility of success, which is all it has established.
III.
Analysis
Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits
In order to prevail in the instant action, Plaintiff will have to demonstrate two
points. First, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the restrictive covenants at issue are
reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest. Second, Plaintiff must
demonstrate that Defendant breached an enforceable restrictive covenant. Plaintiff has
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failed to carry its burden with respect to the first and therefore does not have a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
i. The Restrictive Covenants are Unenforceable Under Fla. Stat. § 542.355
“Florida statutory law (as a matter of public policy) does not allow a party to
enforce a restrictive covenant unless it proves that enforcement is necessary to protect
its legitimate business interests.” Evans v. Generic Sol. Engʹg, LLC, 178 So. 3d 114, 116
(Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (emphasis added) (reversing order providing injunctive relief
because plaintiff did not have a substantial enough business relationship with a former
customer that would permit enforcement of a restrictive covenant). A legitimate
business interest must represent an investment by the employer and must enable unfair
competition if misappropriated. John A. Grant, Jr. & Thomas Steele, Restrictive
Covenants: Florida Returns to the Original “Unfair Competition” Approach for the 21st
Century, 70 (Nov.) Fla. B.J. 53, 55 (1996).
In the instant case, the only legitimate business interests alleged by Plaintiff are
(1) its interest in specialized or extraordinary training, and (2) its substantial customer
relationship with EY.2 Further, a restrictive covenant can only be enforced to the extent
that it is necessary to protect a legitimate business interest. Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(c).
Plaintiff does not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits because it has
neither sufficiently proven the existence of a legitimate business interest or that
Plaintiff withdrew all arguments based on confidential information. [ECF Nos.
20, n.1; 38, pp. 35, 133].
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enforcement of the restrictive covenant is reasonably necessary. Fla. Stat. § 542.335(b) ‐
(c). In short, Defendant is not employed by EY as a result of the type of harm the statute
was designed to protect against ‐‐ an unfair competitive advantage.
ii.
Plaintiff Did Not Have a Substantial Customer Relationship With
EY
Florida law protects “[s]ubstantial relationships with specific prospective or
existing customers, patients, or clients.” Fla. Stat. § 542.335 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff here cannot read the word “substantial” out of the statute and gain the
benefit of an injunction based upon a relationship with EY that was non‐exclusive,
vague and apparently terminated by EY itself because it was offended or upset by
Plaintiff’s decision to stridently confront it about Defendant’s job offer. See generally
Evans, 178 So. 3d at 117 (holding that plaintiff’s lack of any exclusive contract with
customer, coupled with its lack of a reasonable expectation that plaintiff would
continue to provide services to the customer after its non‐exclusive contract expired,
constituted basis to overturn the trial court’s finding of a substantial relationship and to
reverse the injunctive relief); Anich Indus., Inc. v. Raney, 751 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 5th DCA
2000) (affirming denial of employer’s request for preliminary injunction against former
employee and her new employer for violating the terms of a non‐compete agreement
because it did not demonstrate the existence of a legitimate business interest).
Plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated a substantial customer relationship
with EY. Although the relevant statute does not define the criteria for substantial
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relationships, an analysis of Florida case law reveals that a substantial relationship is
more likely to exist where there is active, on‐going business being conducted;
exclusivity; a customer who cannot be easily identified by other competitors in the
industry; and an expectation of continued business. See, e.g., Evans, 178 So. 3d at 116‐18;
Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Carter, 9 So. 3d 1258, 1266 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); Shields v. Paving Stone
Co., 796 So. 2d 1267, 1268‐69 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Anich Indus., Inc., 751 So. 2d at 770‐71.
In the instant case, Plaintiff has not adequately established any of the factors that
tend to support the existence of a substantial relationship with EY.
First, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that it is in the midst of an active
relationship with EY. In fact, it did not have an actual contract directly with EY. Instead,
Plaintiff contracted out Defendant to provide services through Clearpath. Clearpath
then subcontracted Defendant to EY. This does not sufficiently establish the existence of
a substantial relationship. See, e.g., Concrete Surface Innovations, Inc. v. McCarty, Case No.
6:10‐cv‐568, 2010 WL 1930971, *8 (M.D. Fla. May 13, 2010) (noting that the existence of
multiple layers of contractors and sub‐contractors between the vendor and the end
customer militates against the existence of substantial relationships).
Second, Plaintiff did not have anything approaching an exclusive relationship
with EY. Plaintiff’s CEO testified that he was “sure” that EY utilized other companies to
provide IAM services. [ECF No. 38, p. 17]. Defendant confirmed this at the hearing and
an EY employee confirmed as much during her deposition. [ECF Nos. 31‐1, p. 17‐18; 38,
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p. 132‐133]. See Evans, 178 So. 3d at 117 (finding no substantial relationship where
company did business with multiple vendors of the same services).
Third, a large company like EY can easily be identified by competing companies
and targeted as a prospective client. See Shields, 796 So. 2d at 1268 (denying injunction
where employer did not have exclusive relationships with any of its customers and
where customers were “readily identifiable” by publicly available means such as trade
journals or the yellow pages).
Fourth, Plaintiff had no expectation of continued, albeit indirect, business from
EY beyond December of 2015. As Plaintiff’s CEO testified, EY terminated its
relationship with Plaintiff by not extending the arrangement beyond the December 31,
2015 expiration date. [ECF No. 38, p. 66]. In November 2015, Plaintiff threatened to pull
its employees off the EY project. In response to this threat, EY began transitioning the
work to another company and terminated the Clearpath/IDMWORKS arrangement at
the end of December 2015.
Therefore, it appears that Plaintiff’s threats to EY was the cause of the end of
whatever relationship that may have existed before Defendant ultimately accepted
direct employment with EY. See, e.g., TrueBlue, Inc. v. Dyn, No. 8:09‐cv‐1894, 2010
WL 3565756, *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2010) (denying motion for summary judgment for
failure to establish legitimate business interest in substantial relationships with
customers given evidence that Plaintiff did not value its client relationships).
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By the time Defendant accepted employment with EY, Plaintiff had no
employees performing services for EY (whether through Clearpath or directly). Even if
EY could be considered Plaintiff’s customer (as opposed to Clearpath’s customer), by the
time Defendant accepted employment with EY, it was by then a former customer. A
company cannot successfully claim a protectable business interest in a relationship with
a former customer.3 See Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Carter, 9 So. 3d at 1265 (“[P]rotection of
former customers generally does not qualify as a legitimate business interest where no
identifiable agreement exists with such customers establishing that they would return
with future work.”).
Plaintiff argued, but failed to prove, that it was Defendant’s behavior that caused
EY to end the relationship. The Court finds Defendant’s version of why EY terminated
the relationship credible. The Court’s position is bolstered by the fact that EY hired a
different IAM firm to replace Defendant and Plaintiff’s other employees. The weight of
the evidence does not support Plaintiff’s assertion that EY ended its relationship with
Plaintiff because it hired Defendant to perform Plaintiff’s job directly. Under these facts,
Plaintiff seems to rely exclusively on the argument that EY was a current
customer in its Reply. [ECF No. 20, pp. 2‐4]. However, it was Plaintiff’s burden to
establish that Defendant somehow competed while Plaintiff’s employees were still
providing services to EY. Instead, the weight of the evidence indicates that EY made
plans to replace Plaintiff and implemented a transition plan earlier in December. For
these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to establish that EY was a current
customer at the time Defendant accepted EY’s second offer of employment and left
Plaintiff’s employ.
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enforcement of the restrictive covenants does not protect a substantial customer
relationship.
iii.
Plaintiff Did Not Provide Extraordinary or Specialized Training
Plaintiff alleged that it has a legitimate business interest in the training it provided
Defendant. Training constitutes a legitimate business interest protectable by an
injunction only when the training rises to the level of being specialized or
extraordinary. Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(b)(5). This means that training must go beyond
that typically offered in any given industry. Autonation Inc. v. O’Brien, 347 F. Supp. 2d
1299, 1306 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (requiring that training exceed what is common or typical in
the industry before it can become a protectable interest); Dyer v. Pioneer Concepts Inc.,
667 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (quoting Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127,
132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (“Training is classified as extraordinary when it exceeds ‘what is
usual, regular, common, or customary in the industry in which the employee is
employed.’”).
In light of the testimony provided by Plaintiff’s CEO at the injunction hearing (and
as outlined in the factual summary earlier in this Order), this Court finds that Plaintiff’s
interest in Defendant’s training is not subject to injunctive relief because Plaintiff did
not establish that the training was specialized.
First, any actual training Defendant received seems typical of most industries.
Plaintiff adduced no evidence that the actual training provided to Defendant went
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beyond industry norms. Instead, the only testimony about training within the industry
came from the Defendant, who testified that the training he received was not different
from training he would expect to receive at other companies in the industry. [ECF No.
38, pp. 126‐27]. Without Plaintiff providing any evidence or testimony that the training
it provided to Defendant exceeded what is typical in the industry, this Court cannot say
that the training constitutes a protectable interest entitled to injunctive relief. See
Autonation Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
Second, providing Defendant access to a database of Oracle training materials
does not constitute extraordinary or specialized training for several reasons. Evidence
presented at the hearing established that many other companies have access to the same
database of Oracle training materials and provide the same access to their employees.
[ECF No. 38, pp. 90, 127, 137]. Thus, this so‐called training (or access to training) is not a
protectable interest of Plaintiff’s. See Autonation, 347 F. Supp. 3d at 1306 (finding no
extraordinary training where there was no specialized training that went beyond what
is normal or typical in the industry).
Third, the evidence revealed that use of the Oracle training materials was
optional. Optional training does not constitute a legitimate business interest sufficient to
justify injunctive relief. See Austin v. Mid State Fire Equip. of Cent. Florida, Inc., 727 So. 2d
1097, 1098 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (finding that optional training did not rise to the level of
specialized or extraordinary training and did not constitute a legitimate business
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interest protectable by injunction); see also Autonation Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d at 1306
(finding no legitimate business interest in protecting training where employee “was not
required to attend the various training seminars and only ‘popped in and out’ of the
meetings.”).
Therefore, Plaintiff does not have a legitimate business interest in Defendant’s
training sufficient to warrant injunctive relief.
IV.
Conclusion
Plaintiff has not established a likelihood of success on the merits and the
Undersigned is therefore compelled to deny its request for a preliminary injunction. See
Anich, 751 So.2d 767, 770 (because employer failed to demonstrate the existence of a
legitimate business interest, it therefore failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on
the merits of its claim for violation of a non‐compete agreement); Dawson v. Ameritox,
Ltd., 571 F. App’x 875, 879‐80 (11th Cir. 2014) (agreeing with district court’s order
terminating a temporary restraining order and denying the request for a preliminary
injunction because the party failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits and stating that, because the party failed to meet likelihood of success, the
district court did not need to address the other requirements for obtaining injunctive
relief); Oce North America, Inc. v. Caputo, 416 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (“the
Court finds that Defendant has posited valid defenses to the contract which Plaintiff has
not established a substantial likelihood of success in overcoming.”); Pirtek, USA LLC v.
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Whitehead, Case No. 05‐0242‐CG‐C, 2006 WL 2038651, *4 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2006)
(“plaintiff has failed to establish that it has a legitimate business interest in protecting
against competition[;] . . . therefore, the court concludes that plaintiff has not
demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, as defined by [Florida
Statute §] 542.335.”).
To be sure, Plaintiff “may very well prevail in the present action in the end,” but
its failure to establish likelihood of success necessarily means it has failed to carry its
burden of demonstrating that the extreme remedy of a preliminary injunction is
appropriate here. Oce, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 1329.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, June 23, 2016.
Copies furnished to:
All Counsel of Record
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