Khoury v. The Miami-Dade County School Board et al
Filing
188
ORDER granting the Defendants' motions for summary judgment 147 , 148 . Signed by Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. on 3/26/2018. (vgn) NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014-69. Modified on 3/26/2018 (jh).
United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Susan Khoury, Plaintiff
v.
Miami–Dade County School Board
and Gregory Williams, Defendants.
)
)
)
) Civil Action No. 16-20680-Civ-Scola
)
)
Order Granting the Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff Susan Khoury lives in a home near the Glades Middle School
baseball field. For years she has complained about cars she believed were
parking illegally around the field where the Glades Baseball and Softball league
holds practices and games in the evenings. The police have received many
complaints over the years from parents of the ball players that Khoury has
videotaped and photographed their children and that she has had several
aggressive confrontations with the parents. On January 29, 2015, Officer
Gregory Williams, a Miami-Dade School Police Officer, was called to the area of
the ball field by yet another parent who felt threatened by Khoury. After
conducting an investigation, Williams determined that Khoury was a danger to
herself or others and detained her pursuant to Florida’s Baker Act.1 Khoury
sued the Miami-Dade School Board (“School Board”) and Officer Williams
1 The Florida Mental Health Act of 1971, also known as the Baker Act, allows a law
enforcement officer to detain a person for an involuntary mental health examinations if “there
is reason to believe that the person has a mental illness and because of his or her mental
illness:
(a) 1. The person has refused voluntary examination after conscientious explanation
and disclosure of the purpose of the examination; or
2. The person is unable to determine for himself or herself whether examination is
necessary; and
(b) 1. Without care or treatment, the person is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to
care for himself or herself; such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of
substantial harm to his or her well-being; and it is not apparent that such harm may be
avoided through the help of willing family members or friends or the provision of other
services; or
2. There is a substantial likelihood that without care or treatment the person will cause
serious bodily harm to himself or herself or others in the near future, as evidenced by
recent behavior.
Fla. Stat. § 394.463(1)(2006).
(collectively “Defendants”) because she believed that she was wrongfully
detained and the School Board had a policy, custom, or practice of detaining
citizens who did not qualify under the Baker Act. The Defendants now move for
summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Defendants’ motions (ECF
No. 147, 148) are granted.
1. Background
On February 24, 2016, Khoury filed a seven-count complaint, which
included federal claims and a state law claim, against the School Board and
Officer Williams. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) On March 21, 2016, the Defendants
moved to dismiss the federal claims in the complaint. (Mot., ECF No. 8.) The
Court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Count II, which was a
failure-to-train claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the School Board based
on the First Amendment, but denied the motion on all other grounds. (ECF No.
19.) Relevant here, in the Plaintiff’s response to the School Board’s motion for
summary judgment, she withdrew her remaining failure-to-train claim against
the School Board. (ECF No. 158 at 12, n.7.) As a result, the Plaintiff’s
remaining claims against the School Board are: a § 1983 claim against the
School Board for having a policy, custom, or practice of improperly subjecting
citizens to the Baker Act in violation of the Fourth Amendment in an effort to
reduce crime statistics (Compl. at ¶¶ 95–103, ECF No. 1); three § 1983 claims
against Officer Williams, in which the Plaintiff alleges a Fourth Amendment
violation for false arrest and imprisonment (id. at ¶¶ 104–109), a Fourth
Amendment violation for excessive force (id. at ¶¶ 110–116), and a First
Amendment violation for retaliation (id. at ¶¶ 117–125); and, a state law claim
for false arrest and false imprisonment against the School Board and Officer
Williams. (Id. at ¶¶ 126–132.)
A. Events of January 29, 2015
The crux of the Plaintiff’s claims stems from events that occurred not too
far from her home. The Plaintiff lives near Glades Middle School, where the
Glades Baseball and Softball League (GBSL) practices and conducts their
games. (Pl. Dep., ECF No. 151-1 at 78:1–79:8). By way of background, the use
of the field became a nuisance to the Plaintiff and several of her neighbors
because of the noise and lights that emanated from the field on a regular basis.
(Id. at 245:24–247:21). Beginning in 2011, the Plaintiff presented various
complaints to the School Board, including complaints about illegally parked
cars and the field gates being left open. (Id. at 247:11–23; 253:3–24.) When the
issues continued, the Plaintiff decided to start taking photos or filming cars
that were illegally parked near the field. (Id. at 156:5–23.) On
January 14, 2015, she had a discussion with a School Board official about the
fact that the field gates were open despite the fact that they were supposed to
be locked. (Id. at 278:14–24.)
On the night of January 29, 2015, the Plaintiff sought to take a
photograph of an open gate next to two illegally parked cars. (Id. at 278:2–16;
Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 5, ECF No. 160-20.) Doris Zubilliaga, a mother of one of the GBSL
players, was in one of the cars and believed that the Plaintiff was filming her.
(Zubilliaga Aff. at ¶ 7–8, ECF No. 151-5.) Ms. Zubilliaga became upset, which
led to a confrontation between the two women. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Ms. Zubilliaga
proceeded to call the police. (Id. at ¶ 10.)
About 20 minutes later, Officer Williams arrived on the scene. Officer
Williams spoke first with Ms. Zubilliaga, who told him that she was sitting in
her car when the Plaintiff came up to her and started filming her, and that she
asked her multiple times to refrain from doing so to no avail. (Zubilliaga Aff. at
¶ 10, ECF No. 151-5.) Ms. Zubilliaga also told Officer Williams that the Plaintiff
was taking photos of “the kids, her kids and filming her and . . . [that the
Plaintiff] got combative and aggressive with her when she asked her not to do
it.” (Williams Dep., ECF No. 151-6 at 25:2–8.)
After speaking with Ms. Zubilliaga, who was across the street from the
Plaintiff at the time, Officer Williams opened a locked gate leading to the
baseball field. (Pl.’s Resp. to School Board’s Stmt. of Material Facts at ¶ 10,
ECF No. 159.) Officer Williams then asked the Plaintiff to come speak to him by
his car, which the Plaintiff refused to do because she wanted to avoid a
confrontation with Ms. Zubilliaga. Officer Williams then approached the
Plaintiff to speak to her.2 (Pl.’s Dep., ECF No. 151-1 at 295:23–297:14.) The
Plaintiff tried to explain her side of the story to Officer Williams and also asked
him why he had opened the gate. (Id. at 291:23–292:20.) She claims that he
replied, “[b]ecause I can open any of the gates anytime.” (Pl.’s Aff. at ¶ 21, ECF
No. 160-20.) Officer Williams claims that they also discussed whether the cars
were illegally parked, and that he told the Plaintiff that the cars were not
illegally parked but she did not believe him. (Williams’s Dep., ECF No. 151-6 at
29:1–6.) The Plaintiff disputes that they had this discussion but affirmatively
contends Ms. Zubilliaga’s car was illegally parked. (Pl.’s Resp. to William’s
2 The Defendants claims that Officer Williams asked the Plaintiff to speak to him after he spoke
with Ms. Zubilliaga, and that once the Plaintiff refused to speak with him, he opened the locked
gate. (School Board’s Stmt. of Material Facts at ¶ 10, ECF No. 149; Williams’s Stmt. of Material
Facts at ¶ 29, ECF No. 150.) At the summary judgment stage, we must construe the facts in
favor of the Plaintiff as the non-moving party, Feliciano v. Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1247
(11th Cir. 2013), so the Court presents the Plaintiff’s version of the facts as stated in the text.
Stmt. at ¶ 31.) When Officer Williams proceeded to walk away from the
Plaintiff, she asked him multiple times for his name and Officer Williams did
not respond. (Id. at 297:12–19.)
Officer Williams then went back across the street to speak with
Ms. Zubilliaga and other residents. Ms. Zubilliaga asked him to report the
incident out of fear that the situation could escalate if not properly
documented. (Zubilliaga Aff. at ¶ 12, ECF No. 151-5.) Other residents
complained to Officer Williams about Plaintiff Khoury, and told him that she
would often take photos and videotape their children at the field. (Williams
Dep., ECF No. 151-6 at 79:25–80:10). One resident told Officer Williams that
when the residents would ask her to stop, she would “get in their face” and
several residents said they were “afraid of her.” (Id. at 81:1–4.)
While Officer Williams was across the street, the Plaintiff proceeded to
record a video. (Plaintiff’s Video, ECF No. 142.) She then said: “Hey officer! Can
you tell me your name please?” Officer Williams did not respond. (Id.) She then
approached Officer Williams’s vehicle, beside which Officer Williams was
standing with Ms. Zubilliaga and others. (Id.) Officer Williams, while walking
towards the Plaintiff, asked: “Why are you filming me?” (Id.) The parties dispute
what happened next.
Plaintiff claims that at this point, Officer Williams charged towards her.
(Pl.’s Aff. at ¶ 26, ECF No. 161-20.) Officer Williams then twisted her left arm
behind her back in an attempt to arrest her. (Id. at ¶ 28.) Plaintiff claims that
she “felt excruciating pain and heard a crackling sound.” (Id.) There is no
dispute that Plaintiff resisted Officer Williams’s attempts to arrest her. (Pl.’s
Dep., ECF No. 160-2 at 14:6–16:24.)
Officer Williams claims that after he asked the Plaintiff why she was
filming him, she approached him, and the light from the Plaintiff’s cellphone
caused him to put his “arm up to block the light,” at which point, the Plaintiff
pushed him and he lost his footing and stumbled, causing them both to fall to
the ground. (Williams Dep., ECF No. 151-6 at 34:3–20.) He claims that while he
was trying to help the Plaintiff up, she said that he was attacking her. (Id. at
34:25–35:4). After initially getting her up, Officer Williams claims that she put
her weight on him, which caused them to fall down again. (Id. at 35:6–11.)
Plaintiff Khoury vehemently disputes Officer Williams’s claim that she pushed
him. (Pl.’s Resp. to William’s Stmt. of Material Facts, ECF No. 159 at ¶ 43; Pl.’s
Resp. to School Board’s Stmt. at ¶ 23.)
An off-duty police officer, Officer Victor Agosto of the Homestead Police
Department, was at the location and came over to the scene and attempted to
assist Officer Williams in controlling the Plaintiff. (School Board’s Stmt. at ¶ 29,
ECF No. 151-4.) While Officer Williams and Officer Agosto were trying to
handcuff the Plaintiff, she called out for help multiple times, exclaimed that
she had done nothing wrong, used the phrase “false arrest,” and shouted out
“call Metro-Dade.” (Bystander’s Video, ECF No. 142.) She also claims that she
was shouting that the officers were hurting her. (Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 29, ECF No. 16020.) Upon gaining control over the Plaintiff, and handcuffing her, Officer
Williams detained her pursuant to the Baker Act and took her to Kendall
Regional Center, where she received treatment for a dislocated elbow. (Medical
Records, ECF No. 160-26.) She was then transferred to Miami Behavioral
Health Center for a mental health evaluation. (Id.)
B. Evidence of the School Board’s Policy, Custom, or Practice
The Plaintiff asserts that in 2012, the School Board, under the leadership
of then-Chief of Police Charles Hurley developed an unwritten policy of
improperly detaining citizens under the Baker Act to reduce crime statistics.
(School Board’s Stmt. at ¶ 69, ECF No. 149.) Reports from various newspapers
at the time discussed the high number of incidents in which the Baker Act was
invoked. (Sample Articles, ECF No. 160-27.) However, these incidents involved
the use of the Baker Act to detain students at the school during school hours –
not an adult neighbor outside a ball field in the evening. Frank Zenere, the
Chairperson of the Crisis Management Program for Miami-Dade County Public
Schools, testified that his previous supervisor, Suzy Berrios,3 on several
occasions promoted reliance on the Baker Act when officers sought to arrest
students instead. (Zenere’s Dep., ECF No. 151-22 at 25:7–30:12.) Detective
Steve Hadley also testified regarding a letter that was sent in 2012 in which he
stated that the Baker Act was being used to manipulate crime statistics under
Chief Hurley. (Hadley’s Dep., ECF No. 160-7 at 45:7–46:25.) Officer Nanette
Badger, who was the administrative officer to Chief Hurley, also testified that
she had received phone calls regarding Ms. Berrios and she had been
concerned about an increase in Baker Act incidents coupled with the reduction
of arrests at the time. (Badger Dep., ECF No. 160-8, 17:11–17, 24:6–14, 31:9–
34:2.) There was also evidence that Officer Badger had contacted Commander
Deanna Fox-Williams with information regarding Chief Hurley’s misuse of the
Baker Act to manipulate crime statistics. (Email, ECF No. 160-25 at 3.)
Upon receipt of complaints made against Chief Hurley, the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement conducted an inquiry, but ultimately decided
that there was insufficient information to justify a criminal investigation.
(FDLE Letter, ECF No. 151-14.) Miami-Dade Schools Police Department
Ms. Berrios is also referred to in the record as “Suzy Milano-Berrios.” (See, e.g., ECF No. 15122 at 22:6–9.)
3
conducted a second review, which was led by then-Chief of Police Gerald
Kitchell. (School Board’s Stmt. at ¶ 82, ECF No. 149.) Chief Kitchell found “no
validity” to the allegation that Chief Hurley “reduced arrests by directing
officers to initiate Baker Acts,” despite not interviewing individuals who had
submitted complaints, or individuals who had seen or been subject to a Baker
Act arrest. (Pl.’s Resp. to School Board’s Stmt. at ¶ 84, ECF No. 159.) A third
review was completed after current-Chief of Police Ian Moffett became Chief of
Police in May of 2013. (School Board’s Stmt. at ¶ 91, ECF No. 149.) That review
revealed that a significant number of Baker Act incidents had occurred before
he became Chief, that they were all in compliance with the statute, and that
since his appointment, the number of Baker Act incidents has dropped every
year since the 2012-2013 academic year, for a total 64% reduction in Baker
Act incidents from the 2012-2013 academic year to the 2015-2016 academic
year. (Moffett Aff. at ¶ 7, 14, ECF No. 151-17.)
The Plaintiff cites to testimony from the School Board’s non-lawenforcement employees regarding seven incidents that occurred in 2013 and
2016 to support her assertion that there is a custom or practice of relying on
the Baker Act when it does not apply. The reported incidents involved: (1) a
student who threw a shoe at security monitor after refusing to take her
diabetes medication (Henley Dep., ECF 160-12 at 6:10–7:3); (2) a student who
attempted to assault a teacher (Tunson Dep., ECF No. 160-13 at 7:22–8:8); (3)
a student who had been in a physical altercation with two students and said he
was going to “kill” them using a gun (Lee Dep., ECF 160-14 at 11:3–13:6);
Smith Dep., ECF No. 160-15 at 9:4–20); (4) a student who was found with a
knife in his pocket (Samuels Dep., ECF No. 160-16 at 6:10–24); (5) a student
who struck a security monitor in the head after the security monitor attempted
to diffuse an argument between the student and his sister (Head Dep., 160-17
at 7:21–10:6); (6) a student who had been in an altercation with another
student and then yelled at the principal and refused to comply with the
principal’s demands (Hepburn Dep., ECF No. 160-18 at 9:1–7); and, (7) a
student who had been caught smoking tobacco in the school bathroom (Belfield
Dep., ECF No. 160-19 at 9:25-10:8).
2. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper if following discovery, the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits and admissions on file show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, the Court must “view the evidence and all factual inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all
reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant.” Feliciano, 707
F.3d at 1247 (quoting Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1143 (11th
Cir. 2007)). So, when a conflict arises between the facts presented by the
parties, the Court must credit the nonmoving party’s version. Id. The moving
party bears the burden of proof to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
3. Analysis
The Defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos.
147, 148.) As a result, the Court will consider each motion in turn.
A. The School Board’s Motion for Summary Judgment
According to the Plaintiff, there was no arguable probable cause to detain
her under the Baker Act. The Plaintiff contends that her constitutional rights
were violated because she did not qualify for detention under the Baker Act
and that the School Board Police has a policy, custom, or practice of detaining
citizens who do not qualify for detention to manipulate crime statistics. The
School Board now moves for summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim
against it, arguing that the Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence of such a
policy, custom, or practice. (Mot., ECF No. 148.)
The School Board argues that summary judgment is warranted because
the record is “devoid of any evidence” of a policy, custom, or practice of the
School Board police that improperly subject citizens to the Baker Act in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to lower crime statistics. The School Board
claims that the Plaintiff has not met her burden of showing a persistent and
widespread practice of the School Board police improperly applying the Baker
Act.
First, the School Board argues that the evidence the Plaintiff offers from
2012 does not present an issue of material fact. In particular, the School Board
argues that the Plaintiff’s reliance on a series of newspaper articles that
discuss the fact that in 2012, the Miami-Dade County schools had over 600
Baker-Act incidents does not support the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim because the
percentage of incidents dropped 64% from the time those articles were
published to the time of the Plaintiff’s incident. (Id. at 11.) It also argues that
the Plaintiff has failed to show that any of the incidents referenced in the
articles resulted in complaints that the Baker Act had been improperly relied
upon. (Id.) The Defendant also claims that there was “no correlation” between
the number of arrests and the number of Baker-Act incidents in 2012, and
even if there was such a correlation in 2012, that was a result of the training
police officers were receiving and the rise of “juveniles experiencing mental
illnesses” in Florida. (Id. at 11–12.)
The School Board similarly takes issue with the Plaintiff’s evidence from
after 2012. The School Board argues that the testimony provided regarding
events prior to the Plaintiff’s encounter with Officer Williams do not support her
claim because, in each case, the application of the Baker Act’s protocols was
warranted. (Id. at 12, n.8.) The School Board further argues that any evidence
related to events that took place after the Plaintiff’s incident should not be
considered. (Id. at 12.)
The School Board further claims that the Plaintiff has been unable to
point to any factually similar incidents and that her singular encounter is
insufficient to prove her case. Any efforts by the Plaintiff to point to incidents
on school grounds during school hours, the School Board claims, should be
disregarded by the Court since they are factually distinct and the “vast
majority” of those who were subject to the Baker Act protocols never made
formal complaints to the School Board. (Id. at 13.)
In response, the Plaintiff argues that there are genuine issues of material
fact that preclude summary judgment. (Resp. to School Board’s Mot., ECF No.
158.) The Plaintiff asserts that the parties disagree on “just about every
material fact[ ]” and dispute the inferences that can be drawn from her
particular incident and the testimony of School Board employees regarding the
School Board’s policy of relying on the Baker Act to detain citizens. (Id. at 3.)
The Plaintiff argues that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated because
she was detained by Officer Williams without probable cause, that there is
evidence of prior similar incidents of improper detentions by School Board
officers, and that there is definitive testimony from current-Chief of Police Ian
Moffett to support her contention that she was detained pursuant to the School
Board’s policy or custom. The Plaintiff cites to testimony from Mr. Zenere,
Detective Hadley, and Officer Badger, to support her claim that there was
pressure to employ the Baker Act even in situations where such application
was unwarranted. The Plaintiff also cites to the depositions of non-police
employees regarding particular incidents, which she claims establish a custom
and practice of using the Baker Act protocols on undeserving individuals.
In its reply, the School Board argued that the Plaintiff relies on “seven
incidents” to prove her case and that there is no evidence of a policy, custom,
or practice of improper reliance on the Baker Act by the School Board police.
(Reply, ECF No. 166 at 1.) The School Board argues that none of the witnesses
who testified claimed that the reliance on the Baker Act was unwarranted nor
could they since they are not police officers, and that each event was
distinguishable from the Plaintiff’s incident because they involved students on
school grounds. The School Board also attempts to specifically refute the
Plaintiff’s citation to Detective Hadley and Frank Zenere’s testimony and argues
that they testified that they were unaware of instances when officers were
pressured to rely on the Baker Act. The School Board doubles-down on its
rejection of Plaintiff’s reliance on evidence of improper uses of the Baker Act
from 2012, and cites to testimony in the record that supports its position that
any improper uses were confronted and dealt with, or nonexistent, and that
since 2012, there have been no formal complaints.
In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), the Supreme Court held that municipalities and local government
entities can be subject to liability under § 1983 where “the action that is
alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body’s officers.” Id. at 690. In effect, the government entity’s “policy or custom”
must be the “moving force” behind the constitutional deprivation. Cuesta v.
School Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., 285 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir 2002). A
policy or custom is established by showing a “persistent and wide-spread
practice” and the government’s actual or constructive knowledge of that
practice. Depew v. City of St. Marys, Ga., 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
“Normally random acts or isolated incidents are insufficient to establish a
custom or policy.” Id. Relatedly, “a longstanding and widespread practice is
deemed authorized by the policymaking officials because they must have
known about it but failed to stop it.” Brown v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 923 F.2d
1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991). To impose liability then, a plaintiff must show:
“(1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a
custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional
right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v.
Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).
Even if the Court were to assume that the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights
were violated, the Plaintiff’s claim against the School Board fails because she
has not presented evidence of a “persistent and widespread practice” of the
School Board police violating other citizens’ constitutional rights by improperly
relying on the Baker Act in situations where it did not apply. Although perhaps
there is evidence in the record to demonstrate that there were forces
encouraging the administration of the procedures set out in the Baker Act in
2012, the Plaintiff has not pointed to evidence suggesting this practice
continued beyond that period.
Despite the Plaintiff’s contention that the parties disagree as to “just
about every material fact[ ],” the record demonstrates that there is no dispute
between the parties that since 2012, the number of incidents where officers
have relied on the Baker Act has substantially declined. In fact, the Plaintiff did
not contest the School Board’s assertion that after Chief Hurley’s departure, no
complaints about the Baker Act’s administration have been filed. (ECF No. 149
at ¶ 124.) The Plaintiff also did not contest that since the academic year of
2012-2013, the number of incidents where the Baker Act was invoked has
dropped for each academic year through 2015-2016, and that there has been a
64% drop in the number of instances where the Baker Act was relied upon. (Id.
at ¶¶ 100–102.) Her response was merely that “[t]hese statistics only show that
there was a serious problem.” (Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 159 at ¶ 102 (emphasis
added).)
Significantly, there is no dispute that the other incidents involved Baker
Act detentions of students during school hours, not an adult neighbor during a
night-time game at the ball field.
Notwithstanding this concession, the Plaintiff claims that there is
evidence in the record of a policy, custom, or practice by the School Board’s
Police Department to invoke the Baker Act when individuals do not exhibit the
required criteria. The Court disagrees. Even viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, the record fails to support the conclusion that the
School Board Police Department has a policy, custom, or practice of detaining
people who did not qualify under the Baker Act.
For instance, the testimony of Mr. Zenere, Detective Hadley, and Officer
Badger, reference events from in or around 2012, and relate in large part to
qualms employees had with two individuals, Chief Hurley and Ms. Berrios,
both of whom no longer work for their respective institutions and have not
been employed by the School Board since around 2012 or 2013. Although
these witnesses’ testimony could serve to demonstrate that in 2012 there were
problems with the administration of the Baker Act, this testimony is
insufficient to establish a pattern of constitutional violations related to events
in 2015. See Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1346 (11th Cir. 1994)
(rejecting testimony from incidents that occurred at least one year prior to the
preliminary injunction hearing because such testimony did not support the
substantial likelihood of a pervasive practice); Wakefield v. City of Pembroke
Pines, 269 F. App’x 936, 940 (11th Cir. 2008) (concluding that two events that
were 13 months apart did not establish a custom of use of excessive force).
There is also undisputed evidence in the record that the School Board
Police Department’s administration of the Baker Act was investigated multiple
times after allegations of improper administrations of the Baker Act surfaced in
2012, and that additional training programs were implemented. (Moffett Aff. at
¶ 10–11, ECF No. 151-17.) This evidence suggests that if there were improper
applications of the Baker Act in 2012, the School Board attempted to remedy
the situation, which serves as an additional basis for granting summary
judgment to the School Board. See Brown, 923 F. 2d at 1481; Yates v. Cobb
Cty. School Dist., 687 F. App’x 866, 873 (11th Cir. 2017).
Beyond the evidence from 2012, the Plaintiff relies on testimony from
school officials regarding incidents in 2013 and 2016. This testimony similarly
fails to demonstrate that there was widespread practice of the School Board
police improperly relying on the Baker Act for several reasons. First, assuming
the incidents are factually similar enough to the Plaintiff’s incident in 2015, the
Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that these incidents resulted in
complaints or findings that the Baker Act was improperly relied upon. Without
more, the evidence merely describes other examples of when the School Board
police thought employing the Baker Act was warranted, which is insufficient to
show a constitutional violation. See Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1351
(11th Cir. 1998) (concluding that evidence of over 8,000 disorderly conduct
arrests was insufficient to establish prior constitutional violations or false
arrests because the evidence did not state the reasons for those arrests). The
Plaintiff attempts to rely on school officials’ testimony to support her position
that these incidents are examples of inappropriate uses of the Baker Act.
However, the individuals who were deposed, who ranged in position from
security monitor to principal at various schools in Miami-Dade County, did not
state as much nor did they testify that they were well-versed in the Baker Act,
its requirements, or when it should be relied upon. In several instances, the
witnesses could not even recall the incident that they were being deposed
about. (See, e.g., Lee Dep., ECF 160-14 at 10:3–6; Smith Dep., ECF No. 16015, 8:5–16; Samuels, Dep. ECF No. 160-16 at 6:6–24.)
Overall, the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate there is a genuine issue of
material fact relating to her § 1983 claim against the School Board. Since the
facts in the record demonstrate there was no policy, custom, or practice of
improperly invoking the Baker Act at the time of this incident, the School
Board is entitled to summary judgment.
B. Officer Williams’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Officer Williams moves for summary judgment on all counts against him
and claims he is entitled to qualified immunity. The Plaintiff responds that
there are too many factual disputes to grant Officer Williams summary
judgment and that Officer Williams violated her clearly established
constitutional rights, so he is not entitled to qualified immunity. Since qualified
immunity offers “complete protection for government officials sued in their
individual capacities” when the official’s conduct does not violate clearly
established law, see Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1156 (11th Cir.
2005), the Court turns to whether Officer Williams is entitled to qualified
immunity as to each claim.
To determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified
immunity, the official must first establish that he was acting within his
discretionary authority at the time of the challenged conduct. See id. If the
official can establish that he was acting in his discretionary authority, then the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to show (1) that the official “violated a
constitutional right”; and (2) that the “right was clearly established at the time
of the incident.” Id. Both of these elements must be satisfied, but the two-prong
inquiry can be done in whatever order is deemed appropriate for the case. May
v. City of Nahunta, Ga., 846 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2017). “A right may be
clearly established for qualified immunity purposes in one of three ways: “(1)
case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the constitutional
right; (2) a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or
case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so
egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total
absence of case law.” Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288,
1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly
established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct
was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” May, 846 F.3d at 1331 (quoting
Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002)).
The parties do not dispute that Officer Williams was acting in his
discretionary authority for purposes of determining whether he is entitled to
qualified immunity. The parties do dispute, however, whether he violated the
Plaintiff’s rights and whether those rights were clearly established. At the
motion to dismiss stage, the Court held that Officer Williams was not entitled
to qualified immunity on all counts. At the summary judgment stage, the Court
has been presented with sufficient evidence to warrant concluding that Officer
Williams is entitled to qualified immunity on all of the Plaintiff’s claims.
a. False Arrest and Imprisonment Claim
Plaintiff’s false arrest and imprisonment claim alleges that Officer
Williams violated her Fourth Amendment rights when he detained her
pursuant to the Baker Act because he did not have probable cause to detain
her. (Compl. ¶ 104–109, ECF No. 1.) Officer Williams moves for summary
judgment as to this claim and argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity
because he had arguable probable cause to detain the Plaintiff under the Baker
Act and the Plaintiff cannot point to a materially similar case that would have
put him on notice that he was violating clearly established law or show that
such case law is unnecessary to prove her constitutional rights were violated.
The Court holds that Officer Williams is entitled to qualified immunity and
summary judgment is warranted.
Officer Williams maintains that his decision to invoke the Baker Act was
based on his training and knowledge regarding the statute’s requirements.4 He
contends that the totality of the circumstances led him to believe that Plaintiff
Khoury needed to be detained. (Williams’s Mot., ECF No. 147 at 9–10.) In
particular, he points to the fact that the Plaintiff exhibited “highs and lows”
and “mood swings,” she could not comprehend what he had communicated to
her about the parked car, she reacted negatively to him opening the field gate,
she had pushed him, and that at times she did not recognize that he was a law
enforcement officer, as evidence that she needed to be detained under the
Baker Act. He also claims that she exhibited rapid speech and eye movement,
combative behavior, and that this irrational behavior was noted by other eye
witnesses. Officer Williams additionally argues that the Plaintiff cannot show
that he violated clearly established law.
The Plaintiff claims that the evidence demonstrates that Officer Williams
detained her under the Baker Act without probable cause and that she was
arrested merely for exercising her First Amendment rights. As a result, she
claims she was justified in resisting her unlawful arrest. She also argues that
case law demonstrates that Officer Williams violated her clearly established
First Amendment right to record an officer, or in the alternative, that Officer
Williams’ conduct was so egregious that case law is unnecessary to show her
constitutional rights were violated.
“A warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Constitution
and provides a basis for a section 1983 claim.” Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382
F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, “[w]here a police officer lacks
probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under section 1983
4 Although Officer Williams cites to the School Board’s Standard Operating Procedure on the
Baker Act and the behaviors it directs officers to be aware of, see ECF No. 151-9 at 2–3, the
Court is only concerned with whether Officer Williams violated the Fourth Amendment.
Nevertheless, the fact that Officer Williams claims he observed certain of the behaviors he was
trained to be aware of serves as corroborating evidence that he had probable cause to detain
Plaintiff Khoury.
for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest.” Ortega v.
Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996).
In the context of a mental-health seizure, “the Fourth Amendment
requires the officer to have probable cause to believe that the person is
dangerous either to himself or to others.” May, 846 F.3d at 1327–28; Roberts v.
Spielman, 643 F.3d 899, 905 (11th Cir. 2011). Although the Baker Act sets out
its own requirements for detaining an individual, the Fourth Amendment’s
probable cause inquiry governs. See May, 846 F.3d at 1327–28; Roberts, 643
F.3d at 905; Cochrane v. Harvey, No. 4:04-cv-475-RH/WCS, 2005 WL
2176874, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2005) (discussing the standards of the
Fourth Amendment and the Baker Act).
To be entitled to qualified immunity, however, an officer need not have
actual probable cause. May, 846 F.3d at 1328. Instead, only “arguable
probable cause” is necessary, which requires that the facts and circumstances
to be such that the “officer reasonably could have believed probable cause
existed.” Id. (quoting Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 181, 184 (11th Cir. 1997)).
Arguable probable cause may exist where a public official makes a “good faith,”
“reasonable mistake” in the legitimate performance of his or her duties.
Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1226. But a public official who “recklessly or
deliberately” violates the law is not entitled to immunity under the arguableprobable-cause doctrine. Id. at 1233–34. Accordingly, the Court must decide
whether Officer Williams carried his burden of demonstrating, as a matter of
law, that at least arguable probable cause existed to detain Plaintiff Khoury
under the Baker Act.
In determining whether the Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right was
violated, we consider whether the facts—viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff Khoury—establish that a constitutional right has been violated. See,
e.g., May, 846 F.3d at 1327. To do so, the Court must determine whether
Officer Williams had arguable probable cause by considering the “facts and
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge.” See Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1231
n.11 (recalling that probable cause requires that the “facts and circumstances
within the officer’s knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy
information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances
shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit
an offense.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Stated
differently, the Court can conclude that there was arguable probable cause to
detain the Plaintiff when “reasonable officers in the same circumstances and
possessing the same knowledge as [Officer Willams] could have believed that
probable cause existed to [detain the Plaintiff].” Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d
1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Redd v. City of Enter., 140 F.3d 1378,
1382 (11th Cir. 1998)).
As a result, certain evidence cited by Officer Williams, such as testimony
from witnesses who felt that the Plaintiff was acting combatively or aggressively
on the night of the incident or who felt that the Plaintiff suffered from mental
health issues before the incident, without any indication that Officer Williams
was informed of such details, cannot enter the Court’s calculus. The Court,
however, can consider information that was relayed to Officer Williams, and
other corroborating evidence that Officer Williams may have considered, before
he decided to invoke the Baker Act. See, e.g., May, 846 F.3d at 1329 (relying on
evidence from emergency personnel and officer’s own observations, among
other factors, including fact that the officer had been dispatched following a
911 call, to determine that the officer had arguable probable cause to conduct
a mental health seizure); Roberts, 643 F.4d at 906 (relying on the fact that the
officer had been dispatched in response to a 911 call, statements made to the
officer, and fact that nothing in the record suggested that the officer should
have doubted those statements, to conclude that officer had arguable probable
cause to conduct a mental health seizure).
Officer Williams claims that he decided to detain the Plaintiff under the
Baker Act based on his interactions with her and the surrounding
circumstances. Although the Plaintiff contests that she did not exhibit the
behaviors Officer Williams describes and that she did not push Officer
Williams, and even though the video evidence objectively indicates that she was
aware that Officer Williams was a police officer, the Court concludes that
reasonable officers in Officer Williams’s position could have believed that
probable cause existed to detain the Plaintiff. Based on the information
presented to Officer Williams and supporting corroborating evidence in the
record, the Court concludes that Officer Williams had arguable probable cause
to believe that Plaintiff Khoury was a threat to herself or others.
First, Officer Williams arrived at the scene as a result of a 911 call and
heard from multiple people that Plaintiff Khoury had exhibited concerning
behaviors. Officer Williams initially heard from Ms. Zubilliaga that Plaintiff
Khoury had been filming her and her kids on the field. Thereafter, he heard
from other residents that it was not the first time that Plaintiff Khoury had
been seen taking photos or filming near the field, and that they thought she
was filming their children and had exhibited combative behavior when they
asked her to stop.
Second, Officer Williams’s own interactions with the Plaintiff indicated
she may have needed to be evaluated. For example, Officer Williams claims
that after she approached him, she pushed him. Although the Plaintiff disputes
this, there is evidence in the record from Ms. Zubilliaga, an eyewitness, to
support that Plaintiff Khoury did push him. (Zubilliaga Aff. at ¶ 14, ECF No.
151-5.) Even if the Court were to ignore this event, Officer Williams perceived
Plaintiff Khoury to be exhibiting mood swings and odd behavior when he spoke
to her when he first arrived on the scene and when she claimed he was
attacking her. (See, e.g., Williams Dep., ECF No. 151-6 at 49:19–25.) Although
Plaintiff claims that Officer Williams was attacking her and cites to video
evidence in support (Pl.’s Resp. to Williams’s Stmt., ECF No. 157 at ¶ 82), the
Court’s independent review of the video shows that Officer Williams was not
attacking her. See Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th
Cir. 2010) (“Where the video obviously contradicts Plaintiff’s version of the
facts, we accept the video depiction instead of Plaintiff’s account.”).
Taking all of the information at Officer Williams’s disposal at the time of
the incident, and the Court’s review of the record, the Court holds that Officer
Williams had arguable probable cause to detain the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the
Court grants summary judgment to Officer Williams on Plaintiff’s false arrest
and imprisonment claims.
b. Excessive Force Claim
Plaintiff Khoury’s next claim is that Officer Williams violated her Fourth
Amendment right to be free from excessive force when he dislocated her elbow
while unlawfully detaining her, and that this injury was exacerbated when she
was pushed against Officer Williams’s patrol car and being slammed on the
ground. (Compl. at ¶ 110–116, ECF No. 1.) Officer Williams moves for summary
judgment on this claim and argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
The Court agrees with Officer Williams.
Officer Williams asserts that the evidence establishes that he used an
appropriate level of force to detain Plaintiff Khoury. (Williams’s Mot., ECF No.
147 at 15–18.) He claims that he struggled to control her and she resisted
arrest. Moreover, he asserts that he never pushed or slammed the Plaintiff to
the ground. He also contends that he was unaware for her injuries at the time.
Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, he argues that
his actions were within legally permissible bounds.
Plaintiff Khoury responds that based on the totality of the circumstances,
the force used by Officer Williams was objectively unreasonable because she
had not violated any law, was not a threat to anyone, and did not meet the
criteria to be detained under the Baker Act. (Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 156 at 17.)
She further claims that the facts from the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Davis v.
Williams, 451 F.3d 749 (11th Cir. 2006), where the panel denied qualified
immunity, should be applied here. She also argues that Officer Williams’s
behavior was so egregious that case law is unnecessary to support her claim.
(Id. at 18.)
“The Fourth Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures includes the right to be free from excessive force.” Mercado, 407 F.3d
at 1156. In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme Court held
that courts must determine whether the seizure, or here, the alleged excessive
force, was objectively reasonable. See id. at 396. To do so, courts must balance
the “nature and quality of the intrusion” against the “governmental interest at
stake.” Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1157 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). In
assessing the reasonableness of the particular seizure, courts must look at the
“facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of
the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempt to
evade arrest by flight.” Id. The officer’s subjective intent does not affect the
Court’s determination. Id. at 397.
Because the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard offers no
bright-line rule, courts are directed to judge excessive use of force claims “from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight.” Post v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1559 (11th Cir.
1993), modified, 14 F.3d 583 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). In effect then, “qualified immunity applies unless the
application of the standard would inevitably lead every reasonable officer in
[Officer Williams’s] position to conclude the force was lawful.” Id.
Upon consideration of the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
and the relevant law in the Eleventh Circuit, the Court concludes that Officer
Williams did not use excessive force in detaining Plaintiff Khoury. Plaintiff
Khoury’s injury, although unfortunate, is insufficient to warrant a finding of
excessive force. In fact, it is well-established in the Eleventh Circuit that “a
typical arrest involves some force and injury,” Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d
1341,1351 (11th Cir. 2002), and “the application of de minimis force, without
more, will not support a claim for excessive force.” Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d
1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2000). As noted by the panel in Rodriguez: “[p]ainful
handcuffing, without more, is not excessive force in cases where the resulting
injuries are minimal.” Id. at 1351 (citing cases). Moreover, Plaintiff Khoury was
actively resisting when Officer Williams had arguable probable cause to detain
her under the Baker Act. In an attempt to control the Plaintiff, Officer Williams
used de minimis force to handcuff her. Even if the Plaintiff told Officer Williams
he was hurting her—a fact which the video evidence appears to refute—an
officer’s knowledge of such pain is not dispositive. Rodriguez, 280 F.3d at
1344–45, 1351.
In cases with similar facts to this one, the Eleventh Circuit has
concluded that the officer did not exert excessive force and was entitled to
qualified immunity. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 280 F.3d at 1344–45, 1351
(concluding that handcuffing during mistaken arrest, which resulted in the
plaintiff suffering from the displacement of a key bone fragment, was not
excessive force, despite the fact that the plaintiff screamed that he was in pain
during the arrest and told the officer he was recovering from an injury); Nolin,
207 F.3d at 1255, 1258–59 (concluding that officer was entitled to qualified
immunity when he grabbed the plaintiff “from behind by the shoulder and
wrist, threw him against a van three or four feet away, kneed him in the back
and pushed his head into the side of the van, searched his groin area in an
uncomfortable manner, and handcuffed him”). In fact, the handcuffing
technique used by Officer Williams is a “relatively common and ordinarily
accepted non-excessive way to detain an arrestee.” Rodriguez, 280 F.3d at
1351.
The Plaintiff points to Davis for support, but the Court finds it
distinguishable. Davis involved a homeowner who, upon noticing flashing
police lights outside his house, proceeded outside to see what was going on.
Davis, 451 F.3d at 763. Officers were conducting a traffic stop, and told the
plaintiff to leave. After some discussion and the officers indicating to the
plaintiff that if he continued to speak to them, he would be arrested, the
plaintiff proceeded towards his house. Id. With his back to the officers, the
officers “grabbed [him] from behind, twisted his arms behind his back, and
handcuffed him.” Id. The plaintiff tried to communicate to the officers that he
had a bad shoulder, but one of the officers responded by pushing his arm to
cause the plaintiff greater pain. Id. at 764. The plaintiff was eventually
handcuffed and forced to the ground, with one of the officers pushing on his
bad shoulder. Id. Following this, one of the officers dragged the plaintiff to the
police car, allowed a police dog out of its cage, and put the plaintiff into the
cage, where he stayed while being driven to another location from which he
later got transported to the police station. Id. He suffered from a torn rotator
cuff, for which he underwent surgery, and other injuries. Id. The Court
concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the officer’s actions
constituted excessive force because Mr. Davis “was not suspected of having
committed a serious crime, he did not pose an immediate threat to anyone, and
he did not actively resist arrest.” Id. at 767.
Although some of the facts from Davis may appear similar at first glance,
there are several facts that distinguish Davis from the Plaintiff’s case. Firstly
and most importantly, the plaintiff in Davis was arrested without probable
cause and here, there was arguable probable cause to detain Plaintiff Khoury.
Second, the plaintiff in Davis did not actively resist arrest, whereas the Plaintiff
herself has admitted to actively resisting Officer Williams’s efforts to detain her.
That fact alone weighs in favor of finding that Officer Williams’s actions were
reasonable under the circumstances. See, e.g., Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1292
(concluding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where the plaintiff
was an “agitated and uncooperative man” who actively resisted arrest). Lastly,
the Plaintiff’s incident pales in comparison to Mr. Davis’s in terms of the length
of time she was subjected to force, the degree of force she endured, and the
type of injury she suffered.
The Court concludes that the facts and law do not support the Plaintiff’s
excessive force claim. As a result, the Court grants summary judgment to
Officer Williams as to the Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.
c. First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff Khoury’s last § 1983 claim is a First Amendment retaliation
claim, in which she alleges that Officer Williams violated her First Amendment
right by preventing her from recording him, slamming her to the ground,
dislocating her elbow, and detaining her under the Baker Act. (Compl. at
¶ 117–125, ECF No. 1.) Officer Williams presents several arguments asserting
that Plaintiff Khoury’s claim must fail as a matter of law, since the evidence in
the record demonstrates that Officer Williams did not prevent her from
recording him and he did not retaliate against her for filming him. (Williams’s
Mot., ECF No. 147 at 18–21.) In response, the Plaintiff claims that the record
evidence proves that he was bothered by the fact that she was filming him and
that he detained her in retaliation for doing so. Plaintiff Khoury’s only legal
argument is that any reasonable officer would have recognized that she was
exercising her First Amendment right to record police officers. (Resp. to
Williams’s Mot., ECF No. 156 at 19.) The Court finds that Officer Williams is
entitled to summary judgment.
To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish
“first, that his speech or act was constitutionally protected; second, that the
defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely affected the protected speech; and
third, that there is a causal connection between the retaliatory actions and the
adverse effect on speech.” Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir.
2005). “A plaintiff suffers adverse action if the defendant’s allegedly retaliatory
conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of
First Amendment rights.” Id. at 1254.
Although the Court recognizes that Plaintiff Khoury had a right to
videotape Officer Williams, see Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333
(11th Cir. 2000), and that Officer Williams was aware that she was recording
him, see Plaintiff’s Video, ECF No. 142, the Court concludes that Officer
Williams is entitled to qualified immunity. As already determined, Officer
Williams had arguable cause to detain her under the Baker Act, which serves
as a basis for granting qualified immunity, even if she was exercising her First
Amendment right when that decision was made. See Redd v. City of Enterprise,
140 F.3d 1378, 1383-84 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen an officer has arguable
probable cause to believe that a person is committing a particular public
offense, he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit, even if the offender may
be speaking at the time that he is arrested.”). As a result, because of the
Court’s conclusion that Officer Williams had arguable probable cause to detain
her, Plaintiff Khoury’s First Amendment retaliation claim fails. See Dahl v.
Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Whatever the officers’
motivation . . . the existence of probable cause to arrest Dahl defeats her First
Amendment claim.”). Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to
Officer Williams on the Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.
d. State Law Claim for False Arrest and False Imprisonment
The Plaintiff’s last claim is a state law claim for false arrest and
imprisonment against the School Board and Officer Gregory Williams. Officer
Williams claims he is entitled to immunity pursuant to Florida Statute 768.28.
Although the School Board did not make substantive arguments on this claim,
it did request summary judgment as to this claim. (School Board’s Mot., ECF
No. 148 at 2.) Plaintiff Khoury did not assert any arguments in response to the
Defendants’ motions. Nevertheless, the Court grants the Defendants’ motions
for summary judgment as to this claim.
Under Florida law, a claim for false arrest and false imprisonment are
effectively the same claim. Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1430 n.5 (11th Cir.
1998) (“[U]nder Florida law, ‘false arrest and false imprisonment are different
labels for the same cause of action.’” (quoting Weissman v. K-Mart Corp., 396
So. 2d 1164, 1164 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)). Like under federal law, the
existence of probable cause bars a claim for false arrest and false
imprisonment. See, e.g., id. at 1435 (“[P]robable cause constitutes an absolute
bar to both state and § 1983 claims alleging false arrest.”); Mas v. Metro. Dade
Cty., 775 So.2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (granting summary judgment
because “probable cause is a complete bar to an action for false arrest and
false imprisonment” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Due to
the Court’s ruling that Officer Williams had at least arguable probable cause to
detain the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff’s state law claim against the Defendants fails
and summary judgment is warranted.
4. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment
(ECF No. 147, 148) are granted. The Clerk shall close this case. Any other
pending motions are denied as moot. The calendar call set for
March 27, 2018 and the trial set for the trial period beginning April 2, 2018
are hereby canceled.
Done and ordered, at Miami, Florida, on March 26, 2018.
________________________________
Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge
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