Cameron et al v. Scottsdale Insurance Company

Filing 74

ORDER DENYING 69 MOTION TO REMAND. Signed by Judge Marcia G. Cooke on 2/1/2019. See attached document for full details. (smz)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 16-21704-Civ-COOKE/TORRES
KEN CAMERON and MICHELLE CAMERON,
Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent.
___________________________________________/
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND
THIS MATTER is before me upon Petitioners’ Motion to Remand to State Court (ECF
No. 69). The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. For the reasons set forth herein, the
Motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
On or around March 28, 2016, Petitioners filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief in the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Florida. ECF No. 1-2. Petitioners stated in that initial
pleading that they were seeking “declaratory relief under Florida Statute §86.011 to determine
the extent of Petitioners’ rights and Respondent’s obligations under the . . . property insurance
policy for a loss sustained by Petitioner[s].” Id. at p. 2. Respondent filed its Notice of Removal,
based on diversity jurisdiction, on May 13, 2016. ECF No. 1.
On March 28, 2017, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent.
ECF No. 27. The Court determined that the “Water Exclusion Endorsement” in the insurance
policy applied to the damages claimed by Petitioners, barring recovery for them. Id. at pp. 2–4.
On April 16, 2018, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated this Court’s summary
judgment order. Cameron v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 726 F. App’x 757 (11th Cir. 2018). The Eleventh
Circuit determined that this case was controlled by the Florida state court case of Cheetham v.
Southern Oak Ins. Co., 114 So. 3d 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013), and that under Cheetham the
Water Exclusion Endorsement did not apply to the damages claimed by Petitioners. 726 F.
App’x at 760. The Eleventh Circuit therefore vacated the grant of summary judgment for
Respondent, and remanded to this Court for further proceedings. Id. at 763.
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On June 26, 2018, this Court dismissed this action as moot. ECF No. 55. The Court
noted that Respondent had sent Petitioners a letter declaring that, in light of the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision, Respondent would “issue payment in accordance with the applicable policy
terms and conditions for the damages . . . for which cover[age] was disclaimed.” Id. at p. 1
(quoting ECF No. 53-1, at p. 1). This Court therefore determined that the action was “moot, as
there [was] no longer a dispute over whether Petitioners’ claim [was] covered by the insurance
policy.” ECF No. 55, at p. 1. The Court further noted that, although “there remain[ed] a
dispute regarding the dollar amount to which Petitioners [were] entitled under the policy . . . . ,
the amount of coverage under the policy was never at issue in this matter[.]” Id. at p. 1 n.1. The
Parties’ lingering disagreement about the amount of coverage, therefore, did not save this case
from mootness. Id.
Notwithstanding the dismissal of the case, the Court elected to retain jurisdiction to
resolve Petitioners’ still-pending Motion for Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees and Costs (ECF
No. 53) and Motion for Sanctions for Respondent’s Breach of Mediation Confidentiality (ECF
No. 54). ECF No. 55, at p. 2 (noting that “a federal court may consider collateral issues after
an action is no longer pending” (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395
(1990))).
Following the Court’s dismissal of the action, Respondent filed two motions of its own:
a Motion to Compel Mediation (ECF No. 58) and a Motion to Compel Appraisal (ECF No.
59). Both of Respondent’s motions, as well as the two motions filed by Petitioners over which
this Court retained jurisdiction, remain pending. All four motions have been referred to
Magistrate Judge Edwin G. Torres. ECF Nos. 55, 68.
Finally, Petitioners have now filed one more motion—the instant Motion to Remand to
State Court. ECF No. 69. In it, Petitioners argue that this Court should exercise its discretion
to remand this case, along with the four pending motions listed above, to the Florida state court
where the case originated. Id. at p. 5. Respondent opposes such remand. ECF No. 71.
II. DISCUSSION
Petitioners offer two alternative bases for remanding this case, with its pending motions,
to the Florida state court. ECF No. 69, at p. 1 n.1. First, Petitioners suggest that this Court
“arguably divested itself of subject matter jurisdiction when it dismissed this case as moot.” Id.
at p. 2. Alternatively, Petitioners state that remand “may . . . be appropriate” as a discretionary

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matter and “for the sake of expediency, as the collateral matters that remain pending do not
require federal adjudication[.]” Id. at p. 1 n.1. 1
Turning first to Petitioners’ jurisdictional argument, “[i]t is well established that a
federal court may consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending. For example,
district courts may award costs after an action is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.” Ware v.
Pine State Mortg. Corp., — F. App’x —, 2018 WL 5733210, at *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 31, 2018)
(quoting Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 395). Indeed, this Court explicitly noted as much when it
retained jurisdiction over Petitioners’ motions for attorney’s fees and sanctions despite
dismissing this case as moot. ECF No. 55, at p. 2.
Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the motions subsequently filed by Respondent
is a closer question. Those motions relate to the amount of coverage due under the insurance
policy—a question that the Court has already noted “was never at issue in this matter[.]” ECF
No. 55, at p. 1 n.1. However, to the extent that this Court lacks jurisdiction over those
motions, the same must be true of the state court as well. The sounder decision is not to
remand the motions to the state court, but to allow the motions to be addressed in due course
by the Magistrate Judge to whom they have already been referred.
As to Petitioners’ argument that the Court should exercise its discretion to remand the
case “for the sake of expediency,” ECF No. 69, at p. 1 n.1, Petitioners have cited no authority
establishing that the Court may do so. To be sure, as Petitioners point out, a district court may
“decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if the district court has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Handi-Van Inc. v. Broward Cty., 445 F. App’x
165, 170 (11th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). But what
Petitioners are asking the Court to do is not to remand a claim, since no claim remains in this
case. Instead, Petitioners are asking the Court to remand the pending motions to the state court,
unattached to any claim. See, e.g., Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 396 (“the imposition of costs,
attorney’s fees, and contempt sanctions . . . is not a judgment on the merits of an action,” but
The Court notes as an initial matter that Petitioners’ motion to remand is not time-barred. The
requirement that such motions “be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal”
applies only to motions “on the basis of a[] defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c). Petitioners’ jurisdictional argument is thus excluded from the time limit, as is
Petitioners’ “expediency” argument, which “do[es] not depend on any ‘defect’ in the removal itself.”
Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 1999) (section 1447(c)’s time limit does not apply
to “a determination that a federal court should abstain in a particular case or that it should refuse to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . after dismissal of all federal claims”).
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rather “a collateral issue”). Petitioners have failed to show that this Court may remand
collateral motions to the state court in an action that has already been dismissed as moot.
Finally, even if the Court had discretion to send free-floating motions to the state court,
Petitioners have not shown that the Court should do so. Petitioners’ motions for attorney’s fees
and sanctions relate, at least in large part, to matters that occurred during the proceedings
before this Court. Cf., e.g., Landmark Equity Fund II, LLC v. Residential Fund 76, LLC, 2014 WL
12603175, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 12, 2014) (“Notwithstanding this Court’s finding that it lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, . . . this Court inherently retained
jurisdiction to award fees associated with proceedings already held before it.”). And it has
already been noted that there is no reason to believe the state court enjoys greater jurisdiction
over Respondent’s pending motions than this Court does. Simply put, with the case in its
current posture, the Court does not find that the “concerns of comity, judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and the like” would be best served by remanding the pending motions in
this matter to the Florida state court. Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cty., 402
F.3d 1092, 1123 (11th Cir. 2005).
III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that
Petitioners’ Motion to Remand to State Court (ECF No. 69) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in chambers at Miami, Florida, this 1st day of February 2019.

Copies furnished to:
Edwin G. Torres, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Counsel of record

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