Saint Fleur v. United States Of America

Filing 6

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE. Closing Case. Signed by Judge Marcia G. Cooke on 9/13/2016. (tm) NOTICE: If there are sealed documents in this case, they may be unsealed after 1 year or as directed by Court Order, unless they have been designated to be permanently sealed. See Local Rule 5.4 and Administrative Order 2014-69.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 16-Civ-22655-COOKE
(09-Cr-21075-COOKE)
MARCKSON SAINT FLEUR,
Movant,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
____________________________________________/
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
This is a federal prisoner’s collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Movant
Marckson Saint Fleur moves to vacate, correct or set aside his sentence. For the reasons that
follow, I deny the motion.
I. Background
On January 10, 2011, Saint Fleur pled guilty to two counts in a Superseding
Indictment: (1) one count of Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and (2) one
count of using, carrying, and discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). On March 30, 2011, the district court sentenced Saint
Fleur to a total term of 150 months: 30 months on the Hobbs Act count and 120 months
consecutive on the § 924(c) count.
On April 13, 2012, Saint Fleur moved to vacate his sentence pursuant to § 2255 on
numerous grounds including ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied that
motion on January 20, 2014.
On May 9, 2016, Saint Fleur moved the Eleventh Circuit pro se for authorization to
file a second § 2255 motion in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United
States, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held that the “residual clause” of the
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is unconstitutionally
vague.1 Saint Fleur argued that under Johnson, he is actually innocent of the § 924(c) count
1

The Supreme Court made Johnson retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review in

because the “residual clause” in § 924(c)(3)(B) – which is worded similarly to the “residual
clause” in § 924(e) – is unconstitutionally vague.
On June 9, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit denied Saint Fleur’s application. In re Saint
Fleur, ___F.3d ___, 2016 WL 3190539 (11th Cir. June 8, 2016).
On June 24, 2016, Saint Fleur, by and through counsel, filed a second application
with the Eleventh Circuit again seeking authorization of a successive § 2255 motion. That
application remains pending.
II. Discussion
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2241
et seq., there are three requirements for second or successive habeas petitions: (1) “any claim
that has already been adjudicated in a previous petition must be dismissed;” (2) “any claim
that has not already been adjudicated must be dismissed unless it relies on either a new and
retroactive rule of constitutional law or new facts showing a high probability of actual
innocence;” and (3) “before the district court may accept a successive petition for filing, the
court of appeals must determine that it presents a claim not previously raised that is
sufficient to meet § 2244(b)(2)’s new-rule or actual-innocence provisions.” Gonzales v. Crosby,
545 U.S. 524, 529-30 (2005).
Saint Fleur has not satisfied the third requirement. The Eleventh Circuit denied his
first application for authorization to file a successive petition under § 2255, and has not yet
ruled on his second application. Unless and until the circuit court authorizes him to file a
successive petition, I am foreclosed from reviewing one on its merits.
This case is therefore DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE
this case. All pending motions, if any, are DENIED as moot.
DONE and ORDERED in chambers, at Miami, Florida, this 13th day of September
2016.

Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016).

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of record